BLSA statement 
BLSA believes that President Zuma is directly responsible for South Africa’s catastrophic rating downgrade by Standard &amp; Poor&#8217;s today.
Prior to the Presidents ill-considered decisions on the restructuring of the Cabinet, South Africans working together had made sufficient progress on economic growth, structural reforms and fiscal consolidation to maintain our investment grade rating and engender confidence that was reflected in the gradual strengthening of the Rand.
The cost of the downgrade to all South Africans, the poor in particular, will be felt in higher interest rates, higher inflation, higher food prices and lower economic growth which will reduce investment and employment. In addition, capital from international investors will be less available and more expensive for the funding of government, SOEs, projects and companies.
President Zuma has done South Africa great harm, and should be held to account by all South Africans.
CEO Initiative statement 
South Africa’s growth outlook has been dealt a severe blow following the downgrade of the country’s long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating to sub-investment grade. As a result of this downgrade all South Africans will be poorer and in particular it will put increased pressure on the most vulnerable sectors of our society.
Standard &amp; Poor’s (S&amp;P) decision was based on their opinion that the executive changes initiated by President Zuma “have put at risk fiscal and growth outcomes and that contingent liabilities to the state are rising”. This is a disappointing outcome as a number of green shoots were appearing in the economy following the tireless efforts over the past year of collaboration between government, labour and business.
This downgrade could and should have been avoided had the structural reforms necessary to underpin sustained and inclusive economic growth been implemented in the interests of all South Africans.
The most immediate effect of the downgrade is that the country will have to pay more interest on the money it borrows to deliver essential services such as housing and social welfare. It goes without saying that in a low-growth environment this leaves even less money for pressing national priorities such as education and healthcare.
Ratings decisions affect everyone in the country. When investors lose faith and trust in our economy, all citizens pay the price for this in the form of higher inflation, higher borrowing costs and decreased buying power as well as large reductions in the values of their savings, pensions and investments.
Progress towards higher levels of inclusive growth suffers as confidence levels fall and it becomes more expensive to fund investments. Lower growth means businesses will be less likely to expand and take more people into employment.
The CEO Initiative has always maintained that true, sustainable economic empowerment and transformation will only be achieved through inclusive growth. Populist policies that focus on short-term solutions with no regard for the liabilities that we bestow on future generations will only result in the economy slipping further away from providing opportunities that benefit all that live in the country.
South Africa can ill afford to have its limited resources – that should be spent on uplifting the poorest and most vulnerable in society – be stripped through self-seeking behaviour in the public and private sectors.
No good comes from a downgrade. Now that this has happened, what is important is how we react. South Africa needs leadership that is dedicated to the singular task of creating a conducive environment for pursuing policies that support higher levels of inclusive economic growth. Withovut this our country will not fulfil its democratic potential and all our people will be worse off.

Business Leadership blames downgrade of S.A to junk on President Zuma, CEO Initiative issues statement

Moody&#8217;s Investors Service has today placed the Baa2 long-term issuer and senior unsecured bond ratings of the government of South Africa on review for downgrade.
The decision to initiate a review for downgrade was prompted by the abrupt change in leadership of key government institutions. That action has raised questions regarding:
&#8211; progress on reforms previously identified as essential to sustain South Africa&#8217;s fiscal and economic strength, and the effectiveness of South Africa&#8217;s policymaking institutions; and
&#8211; the more immediate implications for growth and public debt given the potentially negative impact on fragile domestic and external investor confidence.
The review will allow Moody&#8217;s to assess these risks and if the changes in leadership signal a weakening in the country&#8217;s institutional, economic and fiscal strength.
South Africa&#8217;s (P)Baa2 Senior Unsecured Shelf and MTN program ratings were also placed under review for downgrade, as was the (P)P-2 Senior Unsecured Short-Term rating.
In a related rating action, Moody&#8217;s has also placed on review for downgrade the Baa2 senior unsecured rating of the ZAR Sovereign Capital Fund Propriety Limited, which is fully and unconditionally guaranteed by the Republic of South Africa.
South Africa&#8217;s long-term local-currency bond and bank deposit country ceiling remain unchanged at A1. The long-term foreign-currency bond and bank deposits country ceilings remain unchanged at A2 and Baa2, respectively.
Its short-term foreign-currency bonds and bank deposits country ceilings also remain unchanged at Prime-1 (P-1) and Prime-2 (P-2), respectively.
RATINGS RATIONALE 
On 30 March, the President of South Africa announced wide-ranging changes to the country&#8217;s government, changing top leadership in 10 ministries, including in key portfolios such as finance and energy.
Changes within a government do not generally signal material changes in a country&#8217;s credit profile. Here, however, the timing and scope of the reshuffle raises questions over the signal they send regarding the prospects for ongoing reforms, the underlying strength of South Africa&#8217;s institutional framework, and the fragile recovery in the country&#8217;s economic and fiscal position.
POLICYMAKING, ECONOMIC AND FISCAL REFORM
The review will assess the likelihood of changes in key areas of financial and macro-economic policymaking as well as in strategic structural areas such as energy policy. In recent years, a number of important areas for reform have been identified by the government, aimed at boosting potential growth and consolidating public finances, including those of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), in order to enhance the sustainability of government finances, and contain exposure to contingent liabilities.
Some key reforms have indeed been implemented, with commensurate improvements in areas such as energy provision and industrial relations. 
However, several aspects of the government&#8217;s reform programme remain outstanding, particularly in completing the legislative and administrative framework governing the mining sector, product market competition, in the labour market, in relation to the development of the private sector, and in encouraging a more even distribution of wealth.
During the review, Moody&#8217;s will assess any announced or likely changes in the government&#8217;s plans and the implications for potential growth and hence for the reversal of the rising debt burden. Moody&#8217;s will also assess any implications for progress on currently stalled structural reforms in strategic areas such as regulation of the mining sector or regulations that would increase transparency in the financial transactions of large businesses; and the prospects for continued progress on reforms to enhance transparency, accountability and good governance in the SOE sector, and to remove structures that encourage rent-seeking over achievement of public policy goals.
The review will also explore the implications of the underlying political dynamics which led to the changes in ministerial appointments for the predictability of South Africa&#8217;s institutional framework, including for the government&#8217;s capacity to conduct sound economic policies which foster economic and fiscal strength. The strength of South Africa&#8217;s institutions has been historically an important source of support to the creditworthiness of the country, nurturing a policy framework that has generally been effective in containing fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances. Moody&#8217;s intends to use the review to determine whether the ongoing tensions within the ANC weaken the credibility and effectiveness of South Africa&#8217;s policymaking, the effectiveness and independence of the public service and ultimately the strength of the country&#8217;s institutions.
IMPLICATIONS FOR GROWTH AND DEBT SUSTAINABILITY
South Africa&#8217;s economy appears to be turning a corner. After years of Moody&#8217;s, in common with other commentators, adjusting growth forecasts downwards, a combination of factors resulted in a growth outturn for 2016 which, while very low (+0.3%), was consistent with prior forecasts.
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<h3 class="news-title">READ: <a href="http://cnbc.africa/news/southern-africa/2017/04/03/south-africa-long-term-foreign-currency-rating-cut-bb-political-institutional-uncertainty-outlook-negative/">S&amp;P downgrades SA to junk</a></h3>
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<h3 class="h5"><a href="http://cnbc.africa/trending/cabinet-reshuffle-17/2017/04/03/impact-cabinetreshuffle-s-sovereign-ratings/">This is the impact of the #CabinetReshuffle on S.A’s sovereign ratings</a></h3>
<h3 class="h5"><a href="http://cnbc.africa/news/southern-africa/2017/04/03/rating-downgrade-risks-triggering-series-economic-setbacks-south-africa-irr/">Rating downgrade risks triggering a series of economic setbacks for South Africa – IRR</a></h3>
Moody&#8217;s expectations were a recovery in growth to just over 1% in 2017 and close to 2% in 2018. Fiscal consolidation, including stabilizing the debt-to-GDP ratio, was similarly on track.
That recovery reflects a number of factors. Some include the reforms mentioned earlier, which have restored stability into electricity supply and reduced industrial disputes. Others include the gradual recovery in world growth and trade, the stabilization of commodities prices and the easing of drought conditions.
But the recovery is fragile, and higher growth in future will be highly dependent on domestic and external investment, and therefore on investor confidence. Although South Africa has low foreign currency-denominated debt, about one third of government&#8217;s rand-denominated bonds is held by non-residents, implying higher yields and rollover risk exposure should investor confidence be undermined. Moreover, rising business confidence is a precondition for the revival of private investment, which declined last year and Moody&#8217;s projects it to stagnate in 2017.
Moody&#8217;s review will seek to clarify to what extent these indicators and broader sentiment within the business community may be impacted by the reshuffle. The review period will allow Moody&#8217;s to gain a better picture of any potential changes to medium term fiscal plans, the impact on market prices, inflationary pressures and renewed liquidity challenges of SOEs. 
 
WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING &#8211; DOWN
Moody&#8217;s could downgrade South Africa&#8217;s issuer rating if the rating agency were to conclude that recent events signaled a deterioration in the effectiveness of government or in the credibility of its policy-making; and relatedly in the country&#8217;s economic or fiscal strength. Such a conclusion would be supported by, for example, i) a shift towards policies that Moody&#8217;s concluded were likely to undermine economic and/or fiscal strength; for example a likely deviation from measures outlined in the 2017 budget and the related medium term framework or the lack of progress on SOE reform; or ii) further domestic or external shocks to growth.
WHAT COULD LEAD TO CONFIRMATION OF THE RATING AT THE CURRENT LEVEL
Moody&#8217;s would confirm the rating at Baa2 if the review were to conclude that the impact of recent events on government fiscal and economic policies and on the economy&#8217;s forecast and potential growth was likely to be minimal.

Moody’s places S.A’s rating on review for downgrade

On 30 March, the government of Kenya (B1 stable) revealed its budget for fiscal 2017/18, starting July 2017. The government forecasts a 2.6 percentage point reduction in the fiscal deficit to 6.3% of GDP from around 8.9% in the current fiscal year. The decline in government capex to 7.7% of GDP from 9.8% in the current fiscal year mainly drives the fiscal adjustment. The budget’s reduction in recurrent spending (excluding interest) of about 0.5 percentage points to 11.9% of GDP and a 12.5% increase in government revenue, although only slightly exceeding the nominal growth rate (11.4%), also support fiscal consolidation. Potential expenditure overruns ahead of the general election in August, however, could limit the government’s fiscal consolidation efforts.
The planned reduction in the fiscal deficit is meaningful and by and large achievable because it relies primarily on cuts to capex, over which the government has greater discretionary control. However, at 6.3% of GDP, the fiscal deficit will remain high in fiscal 2017/18. We forecast government debt rising through fiscal 2017/18 to 57.1% of GDP by the end of June 2018, up from an estimated 56.5% in June 2017 and 54.2% in June 2016, as the government increasingly resorts to debt financing.
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Admittedly, capex drives Kenya’s large fiscal deficit, as shown in Exhibit 1, which, at Kenya’s rating level, is not unusual given large infrastructure investment needs. However, with an average interest rate on debt of 6.7% and interest payments taking up to 15% of revenue, Kenya’s government debt is not cheap. Kenya’s debt-service indicators have deteriorated in recent years, reflecting an increasing shift towards non-concessional financing as well as recent spikes in domestic government bond yields. This makes it difficult to reach a balance between cost and benefits related to debt-financed government capex and is greatly dependent on the government’s capex efficiency.
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The budget calls for further fiscal consolidation, of about one percentage point of GDP per annum, beyond fiscal 2017/18, signalling that the government recognizes its fiscal vulnerabilities and the risk of building an unsustainable debt trend. However, as currently laid out, the fiscal adjustment will be challenging to implement after fiscal 2017/18 because the government primarily relies on the rationalization of its recurrent spending and on dynamic revenues. As the IMF pointed out in its First Review of the Stand-By Arrangement in February, a fiscal consolidation targeting a deficit of 3.7% of GDP by fiscal 2018/19 (versus 5.2% under the budget) is “critical to maintain a low risk of debt distress while preserving fiscal space for development priorities.”
Kenya’s Minister of Finance, Henry Rotich, presented the budget more than two months earlier than usual to the parliament as the country prepares for general elections on 8 August. Traditionally, Kenya’s budget is read during the second week of June but as political parties are required to finish the primaries 60 days prior to the election day, the budget was tabled earlier to grant members of parliament time to weigh in.
The budget faces implementation risk in the lead up to the election. Potential election-related expenditure overruns could hinder the government’s intended 0.5 percentage points of GDP reduction in operational expenditures excluding interest. However, the government generally underperforms projected capital investment expenditure, which will likely compensate for any election-related slippage.

Ratings agency Moody’s comments on Kenya’s budget

ABUJA, March 29 (Reuters) &#8211; A consortium led by General Electric submitted the only bid for a Nigerian railway concession project worth around $2 billion for two lines connecting northern cities to others in the south, a procurement process adviser said on Wednesday.
Bids had to be submitted by Wednesday.
Nigeria has been looking for partners to overhaul its ageing railway system, built mainly by British colonial rulers before independence in 1960.
Economic growth in Africa&#8217;s most populous nation has been hampered for decades by the dilapidated road and rail network.
http://cnbc.africa/news/western-africa/2016/10/26/nigerian-lawmakers-to-probe-possible-railway-concession-for-ge/
The concession will cover about 3,500 km (2,200 miles) of existing narrow-gauge lines from the southwestern commercial capital, Lagos, to Kano in the north, and southeastern oil hub Port Harcourt to Maiduguri in the northeast.
&#8220;We received one bid today,&#8221; said Fola Fagbule, vice president and co-head of advisory at Africa Finance Corporation (AFC) which ran a procurement process after being appointed lead adviser by the government.
The only bid, led by GE, was in partnership with Transnet of South Africa, Dutch-based APM Terminals and China&#8217;s Sinohydro Consortium.
Nigeria&#8217;s upper chamber of parliament, the Senate, said in November it would investigate the railway concession over possible violations by Nigerian officials. (Editing by James Dalgleish)
© Thomson Reuters 2017 All rights reserved

GE sole bidder for $2 bln Nigeria rail concession

Old Mutual  has appointed Peter Moyo as Chief Executive Officer of Old Mutual Emerging Markets (OMEM). Moyo will take up his new position on 1 June 2017. He replaces Ralph Mupita who joined MTN as its Group Chief Financial Officer and Executive Director from 3 April 2017.
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http://cnbc.africa/news/2016/10/31/old-mutual-em-ceo-quits/
Moyo was previously CEO of Alexander Forbes from 2005 to 2008 and prior to that Deputy Managing Director of Old Mutual South Africa from 2000 to 2005, having joined as divisional manager in 1997. He is currently the non-executive Chairman of Vodacom Group, a leading African communications company, on the Board of Liberty Holdings and CEO of NMT Capital. He joined EY in 1991 and was appointed partner in 1994.
Trevor Manuel, Chairman of OMEM, said: “I am delighted that Peter has agreed to join OMEM as CEO and I am looking forward to us building a close partnership. Peter is a vastly experienced executive, with deep listed company experience and excellent insights into OMEM. Importantly, he is not afraid of asking tough questions and challenging the status quo, which will be hugely valuable during this critical period for the business as we prepare for a listing.”
Bruce Hemphill, Chief Executive of Old Mutual plc, said: “Peter, with his strong operational experience and extensive knowledge of the business, will be a great complement to Trevor’s broad strategic and governance expertise. While Peter has great knowledge of Old Mutual, he will also bring a fresh perspective gained from his broader corporate experience. I am confident that in Trevor and Peter we have the right team to lead OMEM to its listing and beyond. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank Iain Williamson for doing an excellent job as interim CEO.”
Peter Moyo said: “I am looking forward to leading OMEM during this exciting and important time. I am returning to a business which I admire and I am very excited about working closely with Trevor Manuel and the rest of the leadership team to shape the future of OMEM.”
http://cnbc.africa/news/2017/03/09/old-mutual-break-track-2018-despite-uk-tech-issues-ceo/
http://cnbc.africa/news/2017/03/09/old-mutual-break-track-2018-despite-uk-tech-issues-ceo/

Old Mutual Emerging Markets has a new CEO

Currently, S&amp;P Global Ratings and Fitch Ratings both <a href="http://www.tradingeconomics.com/country-list/rating">rate South Africa “BBB-” with a negative outlook</a>. That is the lowest possible investment-grade rating, with the next likely adjustment being downward to so-called ‘junk status’. <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSFit981462">Fitch Ratings said in November last year</a> that it could downgrade South Africa’s rating if continued political instability adversely affects standards of governance, the economy or public finances. On Friday it released the following statement:
South African president Jacob Zuma&#8217;s cabinet reshuffle signals a change in policy direction and will raise political tensions within the ANC and its traditional allies, potentially weakening public finances and standards of governance, Fitch Ratings says.
 The president announced that the new cabinet, in which he has replaced finance minister Pravin Gordhan with Malusi Gigaba, will work towards &#8220;radical socio-economic transformation.&#8221; In his February State of the Nation speech, he said this would involve changes &#8220;in the structure, systems, institutions and patterns of ownership, management and control of the economy in favour of all South Africans, especially the poor.&#8221;
 We believe fiscal consolidation is likely to become less of a priority and the move to improve transparency and governance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) will be halted. SOEs&#8217; liabilities, and therefore contingent liabilities to the government, will probably grow more rapidly, particularly if a plan to postpone the commissioning of new nuclear power stations to 2037 is reversed.
 The cabinet reshuffle will heighten tensions within the ANC and increase political instability as the party focuses on its policy conference in June and leadership contest in December. The ANC faction weakened by the reshuffle is likely to fight back and challenges to the president could become more open. The political backdrop increases the risk that the government will resort to costly expenditure measures or legislation that will weaken economic growth to stabilise its support.
 Continued political instability that adversely affects standards of governance, the economy or public finances, was one of the ratings sensitivities we highlighted in November when we revised the Outlook on South Africa&#8217;s &#8216;BBB-&#8216; rating to Negative from Stable. Two other risk factors we highlighted in November that could be heightened by the cabinet reshuffle are: a failure to stabilise the government debt/GDP ratio or an increase in contingent liabilities; and a failure of GDP to recover sustainably.
 These developments, together with relevant policy announcements from the new cabinet, could result in Fitch reviewing its ratings on the South Africa sovereign.
More recently, in presentations delivered in mid-March 2017, <a href="http://now.eloqua.com/es.asp?s=302554905&amp;e=361643&amp;elq=7a3c5b71fa6c4cd18fd50609ca6e1c98">S&amp;P Global Ratings reiterated</a> that it could downgrade South Africa if political interference weakens key institutions.
At around midnight on 30 March 2017, President Jacob Zuma <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/president-zuma-appoints-new-ministers-and-deputy-ministers">announced a reshuffle of his Cabinet</a> “in order to improve efficiency and effectiveness.” Newly appointed ministers and deputy ministers were directed to work with their colleagues “to bring about radical socio-economic transformation” in South Africa. Across the country, South Africans united behind the idea that there was little merit in these changes. Even African National Congress (ANC) Secretary General <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/03/31/ramaphosa-opposes-gordhan-s-removal">Gwede Mantashe expressed discomfort</a> with the fact that well performing ministers were removed from Cabinet while underperforming ministers were left in the executive.
Specifically, there was widespread outrage about the dismissal of Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan and his deputy, Mcebisi Jonas, with ANC Deputy President Cyril <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017/03/31/Ramaphosa-speaks-out-on-cabinetreshuffle-Firing-of-Gordhan-unacceptable1">Ramaphosa saying that this was “unacceptable”</a>. The pair had earlier in the week been recalled from an investor roadshow in London. According to media reports, President Zuma based his recall of Messrs Gordhan and Jonas on an intelligence report claiming that the former ministers were meeting in secret with entities planning to overthrow the Zuma administration. Both <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ramaphosa-mantashe-rejected-zumas-reasons-for-axing-gordhan-20170331">Ramaphosa and Mantashe are said to have rejected this report</a>.
On the day after the midnight reshuffle, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/fitch-south-africa-cabinet-reshuffle-sig-idUSFit994700">Fitch Ratings commented</a> that the changes – including the dismissal of Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan and his deputy – signal “a change in policy direction” that could “potentially weaken public finances and standards of governance”. The ratings agency believes that “fiscal consolidation is likely to become less of a priority” and that recent momentum in improving transparency and governance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) “will be halted” As a result, SOEs&#8217; liabilities and therefore contingent liabilities to the government “will probably grow more rapidly”. Furthermore, Fitch Ratings believes the reshuffle “will heighten tensions within the ANC and increase political instability.
http://cnbc.africa/zdnl-mc/2017/03/29/s-business-leaders-written-ancs-top-six/
After warnings from S&amp;P and Fitch about the adverse effect that political instability could have on South Africa’s sovereign ratings, the country now looks to June 2017 when both agencies are scheduled to publish official reviews of their ratings. <a href="https://www.sablog.kpmg.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/South-Africa-Outlook-January-2017.pdf">KPMG warned earlier this year</a> that a Cabinet reshuffle could materialise in 2017 Q1 and that a sovereign ratings downgrade is possible before the middle of 2017. The link between the two events was basically the idea that a change in the Cabinet (now with its fourth finance minister in 16 months) could signal a greater risk that the state would make changes to medium-term fiscal planning, resulting in deteriorated financial metrics for the state.
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Based on internal methodologies, S&amp;P will by the end of 2017 have to make a call on either downgrading South Africa to sub-investment grade or to return the outlook on its “BBB-” rating to ‘stable’. During March, the agency indicated that it could downgrade South Africa if, individually or collectively, any of the following happens:
<ul>
<li>Economic growth or fiscal consolidation do not improve in line with S&amp;P’s projections</li>
<li>Political interference weakens key institutions</li>
<li>Government debt and contingent liabilities exceed the agency’s current expectations</li>
</ul>
There is heightened concern that the Cabinet reshuffle will adversely affect all three of these factors. Further weakness in business and consumer confidence, as well as changes to government spending ideology, will see slow economic growth linger for longer and further constrain the fiscus. The National Treasury – a key institution that ratings agencies watch closely &#8211; now has a new political leadership that wanes in comparison to the experience accumulated by Messrs Gordhan and Jonas. The drive for radical socio-economic transformation through fiscal spending could result in government debt and the guarantees provided to SOEs increase further.
South Africa is perilously close to a sovereign ratings downgrade. This will result in an outflow of investment funds from bonds and equities as many local and international investment funds are mandated to place their money in investment-grade jurisdictions only. This, in turn, will adversely affect the value of the rand, increase the cost of imports, and keep inflation elevated for longer. The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) would have to adjust its monetary policy stance accordingly. Meanwhile, uncertainty over the short-term trajectory of local politics will weigh on local and foreign investor sentiment – and hamper the investment needed to address South Africa’s challenges of unemployment, poverty and inequality.
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This is the impact of the #CabinetReshuffle on S.A’s sovereign ratings

There is a lot of brave talk about standing up to President Jacob Zuma after the <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/03/31/gordhan-rubbishes-zuma-s-reasons-for-firing-him">dismissal</a> of Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan amid a wider cabinet reshuffle which has been widely condemned as disastrous for South Africa. <img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://counter.theconversation.edu.au/content/75587/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Predictions that the country has reached “<a href="https://theconversation.com/stakes-for-south-africas-democracy-are-high-as-zuma-plunges-the-knife-75550">a turning point</a>”, is facing a <a href="https://theconversation.com/firing-of-south-africas-finance-minister-puts-the-public-purse-in-zumas-hands-75525">ratings downgrade</a> and plummeting investment, rising debt and negative growth vie with warnings that South Africa is headed towards becoming a “failed state”.
Meanwhile, calls are being made to all South Africans to <a href="https://www.biznews.com/leadership/2017/03/31/comment-zumas-night-of-long-knives-gordhan-out-gupta-associates-in/">voice their displeasure</a>, threats to <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/we-will-occupy-treasury-vow-save-sa-supporters-20170331">occupy the National Treasury</a>, and the certainty of numerous <a href="http://www.you.co.za/news/in-pictures-protests-in-pretoria-cape-town-after-zumas-shock-cabinet-reshuffle/">protest marches</a> around the country.
Yet the real action will take place in parliament. And South Africans can take it for granted that Zuma reckons that he can ride out the storm, survive the rest of his term, and secure the election of a like-minded crony to replace him.
So what danger is Zuma facing in parliament?
There are two options for challenging Zuma in parliament. The first, proposed by the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), is a <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/03/31/malema-eff-to-support-da-s-motion-of-no-confidence-in-zuma">vote of no confidence in Zuma</a>; the second, favoured by the smaller Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), is <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/03/30/malema-to-aproach-concourt-in-bid-to-impeach-zuma">impeachment</a>.
To consider the prospects for these, it is necessary to turn to the <a href="http://www.gov.za/DOCUMENTS/CONSTITUTION/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996-1">constitution</a>.
<h2>The odds in parliament</h2>
The opposition’s best option is to seek a motion of no confidence in the President (rather than in the cabinet, the other option provided for by the constitution). The relevant paragraph in the constitution reads as follows:
<blockquote>If the National Assembly, by a vote supported by the majority of its members, passes a motion of no-confidence in the President, the President and the other members of the Cabinet and any Deputy Ministers must resign. <a href="http://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996-chapter-5-president-and-national-executive">(Chaper 5, Paragraph 102 (2))</a>.</blockquote>
Were this motion to pass (and a strict reading of that paragraph implies a majority of all MPs, not simply of those voting), South Africa would be in uncharted territory. There might be various outcomes. One might be that the ANC, as the majority party, would present another candidate to Parliament for election as President for the rest of the electoral term ending in 2019.
Or would it lead to an early general election? Or third, would passage of such a motion impose an absolute bar on Zuma returning to the presidency were he to hang on to the leadership of the ANC, twist arms, and return in triumph to Parliament to win reelection?
Frankly, nobody knows, and South Africans would have to sit through a roller coaster while these alternatives worked their way out.
What are the chances that the country is going to find out? This depends, obviously, on whether the DA can muster enough support to secure a majority. The ANC has 249 seats to the opposition parties’ 151. So, at the minimum, the DA has to pick up 50 seats from the ANC to secure a majority. But given that Zuma is likely to be able to pick up a handful of supportive votes from the smaller parties favouring an Africanist agenda, it is more likely that the DA would require at least 55 (even 60) ANC MPs to vote for its motion (abstention would not be enough).
The requirements for the EFF to win an impeachment motion are even more daunting. For a start, they would require a two-thirds rather than a bare majority. They would require 264 votes, which in practice would mean, let’s say, at least 70 ANC MPs to vote against Zuma.
To make the impeachment case, they would further need to justify the grounds for removing Zuma from office by convincing the National Assembly that Zuma has committed “a serious violation of the law” or is “guilty of misconduct”. (I discount the third ground for removal of a President from office, “inability to perform the functions of office”).
It might seem obvious to those who want to see the back of Zuma that he is guilty of both violating the constitution and of misconduct. But given the compromised standing of virtually all sitting ANC MPs in allowing Zuma to get away with <a href="http://city-press.news24.com/News/constitutional-courts-damning-judgment-zuma-violated-his-oath-of-office-20160331">blatant abuse of the constitution</a>, this would require that any dissident 70 or more of them would have to eat a good dose of humble pie. And in public, too.
So realistically it would seem that a simple vote of no confidence in the president is the easiest to pursue and the most likely to succeed. But what are the chances of success, given that Zuma <a>has survived</a> a number of such motions before?
It is likely that the DA would be able to secure virtually all the votes of the combined opposition, save perhaps up to five MPs from smaller parties who might succumb to Zuma’s blandishments. The commitment and energy of the EFF would be invaluable. Fortunately, they have said they will <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/03/31/malema-eff-to-support-da-s-motion-of-no-confidence-in-zuma">back the DA motion</a>.
But what about potentially dissident ANC MPs? ANC party “elders” often repeat the mantra that the ANC under Zuma has been led astray from the <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017/03/28/We-cant-keep-quiet-ANC-stalwarts">true path of virtue</a>, and that there is need for a return to the old ways which underpinned the party during the struggle for liberation. Does this imply that the “real ANC” is now ready to stand up?
Alas, don’t hold your breath.
<h2>Alternative leadership isn’t in sight</h2>
Mmusi Maimane, leader of the DA, <a href="http://www.702.co.za/articles/250556/maimane-if-no-confidence-vote-succeeds-zuma-s-new-cabinet-nullified">says</a> he’s already been contacted by dissident ANC MPs with promises to support the DA motion. That is good and well – and promising. Yet there is a long way to go, and the stakes for the ANC and individual MPs themselves are extraordinarily high. If the 55 or 60 ANC MPs needed for a majority were to support the DA motion, it would be the signal for total war within the party. Accordingly, it would have to be assumed that they have the appetite for it.
Are there enough of them to take that risk, or will they play for safety by either simply abstaining, or arguing that it is better to keep the fight within the party, and postpone the real battle to the ANC’s <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/anc-tightens-leadership-nomination-process-ahead-of-elective-conference-20170130">congress in December</a>?Given the likelihood that Zuma controls the party machinery more than they do, they would run a severe risk of losing their places on the party’s list at the next election. This in turn would force them to consider whether to align themselves more openly with the DA or the EFF, albeit perhaps, in some new political combination.
These dissenters will need the assurance of good leadership. Perhaps we will see this emerging over the next few days. Yet the signs to date are not good. Yes, Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa has publicly stated his <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ramaphosa-upset-but-wont-resign-20170331">disagreement with Gordhan’s dismissal</a>, yet he did so in tones highly respectful of the president’s constitutional authority.
http://cnbc.africa/news/southern-africa/2017/03/30/south-africas-zuma-meets-top-anc-officials-amid-speculation-gordhan-sacked/
Meanwhile, those ministers disagreeing with Zuma have discounted the option of resigning in mass. This is justified by the need to prevent Zuma stuffing his cabinet with even more of his cronies. However, if they are to justify their decision, we should expect that they should be vocal rather than keeping their heads down. Will they take that further step of moving into outright rebellion? Will the Deputy President be bold enough to lead the charge?
I fear much talk but no action.
Unless, perhaps, Gordhan, the popular hero of the hour, provides one further great service to the nation.
<a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/roger-southall-296862">Roger Southall</a>, Professor of Sociology, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-the-witwatersrand-894">University of the Witwatersrand</a>
This article was originally published on <a href="http://theconversation.com">The Conversation</a>. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/zumas-critics-within-the-anc-are-vocal-but-will-they-act-75587">original article</a>.

Zuma’s critics within the ANC are vocal. But will they act?

This is a power show by Zuma who clearly believes he has enough power in the NEC and low enough risk of a parliament split to be removed, to basically do what we wants here.
As expected PGxit occurred and the Deputy removed as well in an open attack on National Treasury. The reshuffle is designed to lubricate the way to the elective conference through NT and a variety of major other ministries.
		
				
		
The market will struggle to digest Gigaba. Someone who has been effective at home affairs but is clearly being put in a role to do a particular job by Zuma and viewed as loyal to Zuma. Similarly with Buthalezi. As we laid out in the piece on Wednesday we view this as an open attack on Treasury to replace people who are conservative and anti-corruption with people loyal to Zuma to help the Zuma faction win in December. This is an attack on the institution of National Treasury and as such will trigger multiple downgrades. As we&#8217;ve highlighted before whilst there are some fiscal risks we are more worried about NT&#8217;s role in procurement, preventing corruption and oversight of SOEs including nuclear and banking. We think this is bad for the market and for SA. Equally there are questions hanging over Buthalezi around his role at PRASA and the links of both to various others such as the Guptas. This will concern the market and I think the market will be deeply worried by these appointment.
Looking at this list is really is a list of largely unknows&#8230;. Importantly Zwane mining minister remains which was a top 6 ask that he be removed and given his closeness to Zuma. Other ministers also not removed who were seen as under-performing Zuma loyalists like Social Development Minister and Comms Minister moved portfolio but staying in cabinet.
Zuma is taking a risk here and the next step is to watch what happens with resignations. A key risk of resignations now from SACP members and it was a surprise that more of them haven&#8217;t been removed. Maybe he wants to goad them to go to allow for a bigger reshuffle next. It is odd that for instance NDZ hasn&#8217;t entered at this stage&#8230;. maybe he is waiting for Ramaphosa to resign and then put her there? This is the next step we watch for. This is not over yet.
We must also consider the growth shock here like after Nene-gate is going to make things harder on the fiscal side with difficult choices on revenues and probably a decision to debt finance instead. This will reinforce the need for ratings downgrades. But as we said before, fiscal will not be the main focus but procurement etc.
The market has been far too complacent that Zuma cannot remove PG but he has now gone and done it and yet the market is still hanging onto the hope of a credible candidate which has not come with a complete clear out at NT. This is a full whack Zuma led reshuffle which will lead to multiple imminent downgrades where Zuma is confident he has the upper hand over weak internal ANC opposition. The market will be watching blowback risk now as the next reason to be too positive on this. The opposition to Zuma is too split with too weak a leadership in the NEC to be effective here. Zuma believes he is, and we think he is, much stronger than the market thinks he is. The market has a lot of cathhing up to do still I think to the reality on the ground.

Nomura: S.A’s Cabinet reshuffle is an “open attack on Treasury”

Since the previous meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) the inflation 
outlook has improved. This was mainly due to the further appreciation of the rand 
exchange rate following the benign market reaction to the US Fed monetary policy 
tightening, as well as the significant narrowing of the domestic current account 
deficit. A more positive growth outlook in the advanced economies has also 
contributed to a more favourable environment for emerging markets generally. 
However, the recent heightened domestic political uncertainty has reversed some of 
these exchange rate gains, and the risk of further rand weakening overshadows the 
inflation outlook.
Domestic growth prospects remain constrained, although the low point of the cycle is probably behind us. Demand pressures are expected to remain weak amid low business and consumer confidence.
The year-on-year inflation rate as measured by the consumer price index (CPI) for all 
urban areas moderated to 6.3% in February, from 6.6% in January, in line with the 
market consensus expectation. Food price inflation, which measured 10.0%, 
moderated for the second consecutive month following its recent peak of 12.0% in 
December. The contribution of the category of food and non-alcoholic beverages to 
the overall inflation outcome declined from 1.9 percentage points in January to 1.7 
percentage points in February. The Bank’s measure of core inflation, which excludes 
food, fuel and electricity, measured 5.2%, down from 5.5%. This follows a recent 
peak of 5.9% in December 2016.
Producer price inflation for final manufactured goods measured 5.6% in February 
compared with 5.9% in January. The category of food products, beverages and 
tobacco products decelerated for the sixth consecutive month to 8.4%, following its 
recent peak of 13.4% in August last year.
The inflation forecast of the Bank has improved, reversing most of the deterioration 
seen at the previous meeting of the MPC. Headline inflation is now expected to 
return to within the target range during the second quarter of 2017 compared with 
the fourth quarter previously, and to remain within the range for the rest of the 
forecast period. CPI inflation is expected to average 5.9% for the year, compared 
with 6.2% in the previous forecast, while the forecast for 2018 has moderated from 
an average of 5.5% to 5.4%. The forecast period has been extended to 2019, with 
an expected average of 5.5% for the year.
This improvement is mainly due to a more appreciated exchange rate assumption. 
Despite the recent depreciation, the current level of the rand is still consistent with 
the exchange rate assumption in the forecast. Although the international oil price 
assumption remains unchanged, the exchange rate is expected to lead to lower 
petrol price inflation, and is reflected in a downward revision to the assumption for 
administered prices. This favourable trend is partially offset by a slower pace of 
disinflation in food and non-alcoholic beverages, driven by an expected acceleration 
in poultry prices in particular. Food price inflation is now expected to average 7.4% 
and 5.2% in 2017 and 2018, compared with 7.0% and 5.0% previously.
The forecast for core inflation is marginally lower than before at an average of 5.4% 
in 2017, and unchanged at 5.2% in 2018. An average core inflation of 5.3% is 
expected in 2019.
Inflation expectations as measured by the Bureau for Economic Research show a 
deterioration over the near-term in particular. The average expectation for 2017 has 
increased from 5.8% to 6.2%, with the largest upward revisions coming from 
businesses and labour respondents. The average expectation for 2018 increased 
marginally from 5.8% to 5.9%, while the expected inflation for 2019 is 6.0%. By 
contrast, average inflation expectations over five years declined by 0.1 percentage 
point to 5.7%.
Median inflation expectations of economic analysts as reflected in the Reuters 
Econometer survey conducted in March, are more or less unchanged since January. 
Inflation is expected to average 5.8% in 2017, and 5.5% and 5.4% in the coming two 
years, roughly in line with the Bank’s forecast. Inflation expectations implicit in the 
break-even inflation rates (the yield differential between conventional bonds and 
inflation linked bonds) had declined since the previous meeting, but have since 
spiked following the recent depreciation of the rand, and remain above the 6.0% 
level for longer-dated maturities.
The global economy shows continued signs of a broad-based improvement. The 
growth outlook in the US remains favourable with business confidence indices at 
high levels. However, there is growing uncertainty about the timing and size of the 
expected fiscal stimulus. Tax reform may take longer than anticipated following the 
recent failure to repeal the Affordable Care Act.
Growth prospects in Japan and Europe are also more promising, with the PMI 
reaching a six-year high in the euro area, led by the services sectors in France and 
Germany. The extent to which the sustainability of this improvement is dependent on 
the highly accommodative monetary policy stance is still unclear.
The outlook for emerging markets is also more positive, in part driven by the 
recovery in the advanced economies, and stronger demand in China. Firmer 
commodity prices have also helped, but an oversupply of some commodities could 
limit these gains.
Global inflation provides a mixed picture with the recent decline in international oil 
prices threatening to reverse the broad-based increases in headline inflation in the 
advanced economies. Some inflation normalisation is evident in the US and the euro 
area, but Japan is showing less momentum in price and wage growth. Inflation in the 
UK is expected to overshoot the target for some time, as the economy adjusts to a 
weaker currency. Similarly, inflation experiences in a number of emerging economies 
have reflected divergent currency movements.
The US Fed raised its policy rate in March in response to the stronger inflation trend 
and improved growth outlook. While this action was widely expected, the gradual 
nature of the expected interest rate cycle implicit in the forward guidance surprised 
the markets. Policy rates are expected to remain at low levels for some time in most of the advanced economies until more favourable inflation and growth dynamics are more firmly entrenched.
For the past few months the rand exchange rate had been relatively resilient, along 
with a number of other emerging market currencies. While most measures of 
emerging market risk have narrowed over recent months, those for South Africa 
have widened again over the past few days. The rand has depreciated significantly 
in response to increased domestic political uncertainty and the exchange rate has reemerged 
as an upside risk to the inflation outlook. Since the previous meeting of the 
MPC, the rand has appreciated by 3.9% against the US dollar, by 4.0% against the 
euro and by 3.4% on a trade-weighted basis.
The prospect of US monetary policy tightening had been seen as a risk to the 
exchange rate. However, the rand and other peer currencies strengthened in 
response to the Fed actions in March, indicative of revised market expectations of a 
more moderate tightening cycle than that priced in.
The rand has also been underpinned by favourable terms of trade trends. 
Furthermore, the improving trend of the deficit on the current account of the balance 
of payments has reduced the perceived vulnerability of the rand to possible capital 
flow reversals. However, while significant adjustment of the current account has 
occurred, the deficit is not expected to remain at the level seen in the fourth quarter 
of last year.
The domestic growth outlook remains weak following the negative growth recorded 
in the fourth quarter of 2016. The 2016 annual GDP growth of 0.3% is likely to have 
been the low point of the growth cycle, and a mild recovery is expected over the 
forecast period. The Bank’s forecast for GDP growth has been revised up by 0.1 
percentage points in both 2017 and 2018, to 1.2% and 1.7%, with growth of 2.0% 
forecast for 2019. While growth is still expected to be below estimated potential 
output growth of around 1.4% in the near term, the output gap is expected to narrow 
to some extent in the later part of the forecast period. The more favourable growth 
outlook is consistent with the Bank’s leading indicator of economic activity which has increased for six consecutive months.
The main drivers of growth are expected to be net exports and positive, albeit weak, 
household consumption expenditure growth. Some impetus is expected to come 
from fixed capital formation in the outer period of the forecast. At a sectoral level, the 
agricultural sector is expected to return to positive growth following good rains in a 
number of regions and improved maize crop estimates. A modest recovery in the 
manufacturing sector is expected following two consecutive months of the Absa PMI 
being above the neutral 50 point level, while the mining sector is forecast to respond 
to more favourable commodity prices.
Low growth in gross fixed capital formation remains a downside risk to growth in the 
short term. In 2016 gross fixed capital formation contracted for the first time since 
2010, with the ratio of fixed capital formation to GDP declining from 20.4% in 2015 to 
19.6% in 2016. Private sector investment remains particularly weak, having 
contracted for five successive quarters. This is reflected in the RMB/BER Business 
Confidence Index which increased marginally in the first quarter of 2017, but at 40 
index points remains well below the neutral level of 50. The BER Manufacturing 
survey shows a sharp decline in expected capital investment over the next 12 
months, with the political climate cited as the main reason.
The constrained growth outlook does not bode well for employment creation in the 
economy. According to the Quarterly Labour Force Survey, in the fourth quarter of 
2016 compared to the fourth quarter of 2015, employment increased by 0.3% while 
the number of unemployed grew by 11.3%. This resulted in an increase in the 
unemployment rate by 2.0 percentage points to 26.5%.
Consumption expenditure by households, which grew by 0.8% in 2016 remains 
subdued amid low consumer confidence. While growth of 2.2% was recorded in both 
of the final two quarters of the 2016, negative retail and wholesale trade sales growth 
in December and January underscore the likely persistence of this weakness. New 
vehicle sales continued to decline in February, although exports increased 
significantly.
These trends are expected to persist as the impact of a higher tax burden, low 
employment growth and weak wealth effects take their toll on consumption 
expenditure. In addition, credit extension by banks to the private sector continues to 
grow at low rates, particularly to households amid a further decline in the household 
debt to disposable income ratio. Expenditure will be supported to some extent by 
positive but moderate real income growth.
Fiscal policy as outlined in the recent budget remains committed to a steady pace of 
deficit reduction over the next three years. Lower tax revenues relative to budget – 
partly a consequence of slower economic growth – have resulted in a shortfall to be 
filled by a combination of lower expenditure growth, increased fuel levies and other 
excise duties, and a number of tax changes. These include limited compensation for 
fiscal drag and a higher marginal tax bracket for high-income earners. The tax 
increases are expected to act as a drag on household consumption expenditure, 
particularly for middle and upper income earners.
International oil prices have declined following increased oil inventories and weak 
compliance with the OPEC-brokered deal to restrict output, and an increase in shale 
gas production in the US. Although Brent crude oil prices increased by about 10% in 
the wake of this agreement, these gains have been largely reversed, with oil prices 
back in the region of US$50 per barrel for the past three weeks. The impact on the 
domestic petrol price will be evident in April when a reduction is expected, despite 
the 39 cent increase in the Road Accident Fund and fuel levies provided for in the 
February budget.
Since the previous MPC meeting the inflation outlook has improved. However, the 
risk to the inflation forecast has been affected by the reaction of the of the exchange 
rate to the current elevated levels of political uncertainty. At current levels of around 
R13.00 against the US dollar, the exchange rate is still moderately stronger than the 
level implied in the exchange rate assumption in the forecast. However, the rand is 
likely to react further to unfolding developments until a greater degree of certainty 
and confidence is restored. The possibility of significant overshooting of the 
exchange rate in the short run also cannot be ruled out. As always, the MPC will 
attempt to “look through” short term fluctuations and focus on longer term trends in 
its policy settings.
The MPC remains concerned about the elevated level of inflation expectations. 
While the near-term reversal was not unexpected, given the deterioration of the 
short-term inflation outlook in January, the longer term expectations remain 
anchored uncomfortably at the upper end of the target range.
Not all the inflation risk factors are on the upside. The deterioration in the forecast at 
the previous meeting was due in part to a higher international oil price assumption. 
This assumption has not been adjusted to reflect the recent market developments. 
There is a downside risk to this assumption, given the possibility of these more 
moderate trends persisting.
A further downside risk comes from electricity price increases, which could turn out 
to be lower than the 8.0% currently in the forecast from mid-2017. The final price 
determination by the energy regulator is yet to be announced.
Overall, the MPC assesses the risk to the inflation outlook to be moderately on the 
upside, mainly due to the high degree of exchange rate uncertainty.
The MPC sees no evidence of significant demand pressures impacting on inflation. 
The growth outlook remains disappointing, and the MPC is concerned that increased 
political uncertainty could impact negatively on private sector investment and 
household consumption expenditure, and further undermine employment growth. 
The risks to the growth outlook are therefore assessed to be on the downside. 
In light of these developments the MPC has decided to keep the repurchase rate 
unchanged at 7.0% per annum. Five members preferred an unchanged stance and 
one member preferred a 25 basis point reduction.
The MPC is of the view that we may have reached the end of the tightening cycle. 
However the Committee would like to see a more sustained improvement in the 
inflation outlook before reducing rates. This assessment may however change if the 
inflation outlook and the risks to the outlook deteriorate.

S.A’s central bank keeps rates on hold, warns of widening risks in last few days

Mauritians are the wealthiest individuals in Africa with an average wealth of US$25,700 per person, whilst people living in Zimbabwe are the poorest with US$200 per person. Interestingly, North African countries such as Algeria, Egypt and Morocco all rank high on the list despite recent instability, see table. This was revealed in AfrAsia Bank and New World Wealth ‘<a href="http://www.afrasiabank.com/en/afrasia-bank-africa-wealth-report">AfrAsia Bank Africa Wealth Report 2017</a>&#8216;.
Note: “wealth per capita” refers to the average wealth of a person living in each country. It excludes government held wealth.
It should be noted that all these figures are below the global average of US$27,000. Top ranked worldwide countries such as Switzerland and Australia have wealth per capita’s of over US$200,000.
<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone size-full wp-image-115807" src="http://cnbc.africa/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Wealth-list-.jpg" alt="" width="891" height="739" />
Other key findings from the report at the end of 2016 include:
<ul>
<li>The average African individual had net assets of approximately US$2,000 (wealth per capita).</li>
<li>Total individual wealth held on the continent amounted to US$2.2 trillion.</li>
<li>There were approximately 145,000 HNWIs living in Africa, with combined wealth holdings of approximately US$800 billion.</li>
<li>There were 7,010 multi-millionaires living in Africa.</li>
</ul>
Growth rate trends:
<ul>
<li>African HNWI numbers have increased by 19% during the review period (2006-2016).</li>
<li>2016 was a bad year for African HNWIs. Their numbers decreased by 2% during the year.</li>
<li>HNWI numbers in Africa are expected to rise by 36% over next 10 years, reaching approximately 198,000 by 2026.</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;

These African countries have the wealthiest and poorest individuals

The South African Communist Party (SACP) was informed of President Jacob Zuma&#8217;s plans to reshuffle cabinet, including the finance minister&#8217;s post it revealed at a press conference. It also confirmed that one of the reasons Zuma recalled Gordhan, his Deputy Mcebisi Jonas and Director-General Lungisa Fuzile from their non-deal international investor roadshow in London was due to &#8216;intelligence&#8217; report alleging a plan by the three to start &#8220;Operation Check Mate&#8221;, see more in the tweet below:
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" data-lang="en">
Here is the fake, Gupta manufactured &#8216;intelligence&#8217; report that made Zuma recall Minister &amp; DM and threaten to fire them: <a href="https://t.co/rmBhpyyl2O">pic.twitter.com/rmBhpyyl2O</a>
— Floyd Shivambu (@FloydShivambu) <a href="https://twitter.com/FloydShivambu/status/847167194769379330">March 29, 2017</a></blockquote>
<script async src="//platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script>
In response to these issues the SACP will hold a politburo meeting tomorrow.
Other issues discussed at the SACP press conference included:
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" data-lang="en">
. <a href="https://twitter.com/SACP1921">@SACP1921</a> concerned by rogue intelligent unit that is feeding fake news to the public
— CNBC Africa (@cnbcafrica) <a href="https://twitter.com/cnbcafrica/status/847365581569314817">March 30, 2017</a></blockquote>
<script async src="//platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script>
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" data-lang="en">
Breaking: <a href="https://twitter.com/SACP1921">@SACP1921</a> confirms intelligence report was part of the reason SA&#8217;s Gordhan and Jonas were asked to come back from overseas trip
— CNBC Africa (@cnbcafrica) <a href="https://twitter.com/cnbcafrica/status/847368413160681472">March 30, 2017</a></blockquote>
<script async src="//platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script>
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" data-lang="en">
We knew Brian Molefe was going to go to <a href="https://twitter.com/ParliamentofRSA">@ParliamentofRSA</a> via the North West, we objected to his appointment &#8211; <a href="https://twitter.com/SACP1921">@SACP1921</a>
— CNBC Africa (@cnbcafrica) <a href="https://twitter.com/cnbcafrica/status/847369955406356480">March 30, 2017</a></blockquote>
<script async src="//platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script>
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" data-lang="en">
SACP was opposed to Brian Molefe being brought into any executive position
— CNBC Africa (@cnbcafrica) <a href="https://twitter.com/cnbcafrica/status/847370350643904513">March 30, 2017</a></blockquote>
<script async src="//platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script>
READ:
<h3 class="news-title"><a href="http://cnbc.africa/zdnl-mc/2017/03/29/s-business-leaders-written-ancs-top-six/">S.A’s Business leaders have written to the ANC’s top six</a></h3>

SACP was told of planned Cabinet reshuffle, that included S.A’s FinMin Gordhan

Business Leadership South Africa (BLSA) has sent a letter to the ANC’s top six asking for an honest and transparent meeting as well as to the presidency, Deputy Chairperson of Business Leadership South Africa, Bonang Mohale told CNBC Africa on Wednesday. Mohale was speaking to Bruce Whitfield on the MoneyMakers show.
The letter comes a day after rumours surfaced on the Guptas’ ANN7 website that President Jacob Zuma has informed the ANC&#8217;s top six of plans to remove the country’s Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan from his post. It also follows <a href="http://cnbc.africa/uncategorized/2017/03/27/rand-weakens-cabinet-reshuffle-reports-finmin-recalled-overseas-trip/">a directive from the Presidency on Monday to Gordhan to return to South Africa </a>whilst on an international investor engagement roadshow.
READ: 
<a class="l _HId" href="http://cnbc.africa/news/2017/02/27/replacing-gordhan-jonas/">This would be the cost of replacing SA&#8217;s finance minister, or his deputy 
</a><a id="MAA4AEgBUABgAWoFZW5femE" class="usg-AFQjCNHkuwce0RqSPtII2veSDHYiSj_M6w sig2-lBbp8d3LKiJMCDG6Y9l55Q did-d8acd041fdb95203 article" href="http://cnbc.africa/news/southern-africa/2017/03/28/south-africas-anc-leaders-approve-gordhans-removal-ann7/" target="_blank">“I&#8217;m here, I&#8217;m still finance minister” – SA FinMin Gordhan 
</a><a href="http://cnbc.africa/news/2017/03/29/expectations-gordhan-will-go-leave-south-african-markets-edge/">Expectations Gordhan will go leave South African markets on edge 
</a> 
Mohale also told CNBC Africa that BLSA has issued a statement saying it is not too late to save the country. The “formidable partnership between government, business, labour and civil society needs to be used as a force for good irrespective of agendas, irrespective of December 2017 and the 2019 elections. Our actions in the next few days will determine whether we become a winning nation or we become yet another failed African state. We are at the crucible, the turning point &#8211; in fact this is more than the tipping point, this is a question of life and death for the majority of South Africans&#8221;, he added.
Below Treasury sheds more light on what the roadshow was about: 
Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan, senior officials from the National Treasury and senior leaders of South African business held a series of scheduled meetings with rating agencies and investors in London on 27 March as part of official trips planned for the week. The trips are scheduled National Treasury’s annual domestic and international investor engagement roadshows broadly timed to follow immediately after the tabling of the Budget in February and the publication of the Medium Term Budget Policy Statement in October respectively.
The roadshow was scheduled to take place in two phases. The first phase was set to take place in London on 27 and 28 March. Minister Pravin Gordhan was leading the delegation, which also comprised of Mr Jabu Mabuza (of Business Leadership South Africa and Business Unity South Africa), Ms Nicky Newton-King (of the JSE). Mr George Sebulela from the Black Business Council could not make it due to logistical challenges.
As in the past international roadshow held late last year, leaders of the three labour union federations – COSATU, NACTU and FEDUSA &#8211; were also invited to attend. Due to logistical reasons, they did not make the first day of the meetings, but were told not to travel because the trip was subsequently cancelled. The Reserve Bank delegation which also traditionally joins the roadshows could not be part of it because of the planned Monetary Policy Committee meeting.
The second leg of the roadshow was intended to be in the United States, to be led by the Deputy Minister Mcebisi Jonas. However, this trip was subsequently cancelled before he travelled last night.
In London, Minister Gordhan and his delegation had five face-to-face meetings with sixty representatives from the following fund managers: BlackRock, T.Rowe, Aberdeen, Eaton Vance, Vanguard, Investec, Metlife and Apollona, and 28 investors in a combined lunch. They also met two rating agencies (Fitch and Moody’s), as well as a teleconference with Standard &amp; Poor.
The meetings are part of the normal course of business of the Treasury’s effort to keep both rating agencies and investors informed about fiscal and monetary policy developments, more specifically and about topical contemporary policy issues in SA.
The questions from both investors and rating agencies revolved around: 
1. Economic growth: Investors enquiring about the achievability or otherwise of growth forecasts and Government, business and other partners’ efforts towards achieving faster and more inclusive growth.
2. Fiscal Policy: While broadly commending the budget, investors wanted to know whether there was still scope to adjust both revenue and expenditure sides of the budget in the event that the fiscal targets are likely to be missed materially.
3. Politics: Investors expressed concerns about the political environment and the risk that it could divert attention from setting policies aimed at accelerating growth and creating more work opportunities. They were also curious about the processes leading to the policy conference of the governing party and the electoral conference in December.
This information is crucial for investors to commit the funds under their management by buying South African government bonds (by lending to the South African government) and form their opinions about SA’s credit worthiness and thus to pronounce on the country’s rating. The ratings in turn determine the cost at which SA will borrow the R730 billion it will need to meet its borrowing requirement for the next three years.
Government on a weekly basis needs to borrow more than R13 billion in the domestic market. Of government’s total borrowing requirement, USD6 billion needs to be raised in the international market over the next 3 years to partly meet government’s foreign commitments. This is money that will contribute towards the building of public infrastructure – roads, schools, health facilities, etc &#8211; to deliver better public services to the 55 million South Africans.
One of the clear benefits of the roadshows is that, SA is one of very few countries that do not have to meet investors before issuing an international bond. In other words, the South African government is able to raise amounts as high as USD3 billion within a matter of 3-5 hours. This has been the case for the last 5 year now. 
The meetings commenced at 10am and ended at 18h00 before the team headed for the airport to catch their flight back home.

S.A’s Business leaders have written to the ANC’s top six

The world has become a hostile place for refugees. The narrative often used to justify such actions is national security. <img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://counter.theconversation.edu.au/content/73925/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
The cornerstone of international refugee law is the principle of <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/excom/scip/3ae68ccd10/note-non-refoulement-submitted-high-commissioner.html">non-refoulement</a>. This obliges states not to turn away individuals who have a well-founded fear of persecution, or substantial grounds to believe that if returned to a particular country they would be in danger of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment.
What then happens where an individual is considered a security threat to a state they wish to gain access to? Is that state still obliged to accept the individual, or to continue hosting them? This is a dilemma for countries that host refugees.
Kenya is no stranger to this struggle. Situated in a conflict-prone zone it’s <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/ke/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/03/Infographics-Refugees-in-Kenya_February-2017.pdf">hosted</a> hundreds of thousands of refugees from a range of countries including Somalia, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Ethiopia.
This benevolence has become a particular challenge with the rise of terrorist attacks. The most shocking were the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/westgate-mall-attacks-kenya">Westgate Mall attack</a> in 2013 and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/02/masked-gunmen-attack-university-in-eastern-kenya">Garissa university attack </a>in 2015. They were carried out by Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group based in Somalia.
The government used the attacks to justify the closure of the Dadaab refugee camp and to revoke the <a href="http://reliefweb.int/report/world/guidelines-international-protection-no-11-prima-facie-recognition-refugee-status">prima facie status</a> of Somali refugees.
Kenya’s High Court delivered a <a href="http://kituochasheria.or.ke/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Dadaab-Closure-Judgment-1.pdf">judgment</a> that effectively puts a stop to the government’s plans. I believe that the judgment was correct and balanced. And that the government has other options it should explore to protect its citizens while protecting vulnerable refugees and asylum seekers.
<h2>The case of Dadaab</h2>
Kenya’s National Commission of Human Rights and Kituo cha Sheria (Legal Advice Centre), with the support of Amnesty International, filed a <a href="http://www.enca.com/africa/kenya-high-court-to-hear-petition-against-closure-of-refugee-camp">petition</a> in the High Court challenging the legality of Dadaab’s closure.
The petition’s main argument was that the revocation of refugee status of Somali refugees was discriminatory, unlawful and unreasonable. It argued that the directive, which subjected asylum seekers and refugees to forceful repatriation through the closure of camps, was punitive and a breach of the state’s obligation under the principle of non-refoulement.
The state justified its actions saying the circumstances which gave rise to refugee status no longer existed in Somalia. It also argued that justifiable challenges had emerged making Kenya unable to continue hosting refugees. These challenges included
<blockquote>overcrowding in the camps, terrorist attacks, huge economic costs, human trafficking, proliferation of arms, strained government resources and insecurity.</blockquote>
But the court declared that the decision to target Somali refugees specifically was illegal, discriminatory, unconstitutional and an act of group persecution. It also declared the decision to collectively repatriate refugees in the Dadaab complex a violation of the principle of non-refoulement.
<h2>Balancing national security and protection</h2>
Government concerns on security are legitimate. Nonetheless, the fight against terrorism must take place within the framework of <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/publications/legal/3d4aba564/refugee-protection-guide-international-refugee-law-handbook-parliamentarians.html">international law</a>. This requires states to ensure national security while complying with their international obligations to the protection of refugees.
The <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10">1951 Refugee Convention</a> recognises exceptions to the non-refoulement principle, including a state’s right to protect its citizens.
But the Kenyan court observed that given the seriousness of expulsion
<blockquote>such a decision should involve a careful examination of the question of proportionality between the danger to the security of the community or the gravity of the crime and the persecution feared.</blockquote>
The court took exception to the government’s blanket condemnation of all refugees in the Dadaab complex. It determined that the application of the exception to non-refoulement required individualised determination, and only as a last resort.
The court recognised, however, that the government had an obligation to protect Kenya’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
<h2>Way forward for Kenya?</h2>
The court’s decision effectively brings the government’s plans to repatriate Somali refugees to an end. The government says it will <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1a7c8494-eec9-11e6-930f-061b01e23655">appeal</a>.
Kenya could still explore its options to repatriate but within its obligation under international law. This means that refugees can only be returned to their country of origin if the circumstances that contributed to their plight have ceased. It’s doubtful that Somalia is now a completely safe country for the refugees to return to.
So, what are the government’s options?
The government has the machinery to ensure the safety of its citizens and foreigners within its borders. This means it has the capacity to investigate and to prosecute anyone assisting terrorist organisations such as Al-Shabaab.
It can also improve its screening function to ensure that those granted refugee status are not terrorists.
The government could still explore the possibility of repatriating the refugees on a <a href="http://www.refworld.org/docid/3d62695d4.html">voluntary basis</a> while re-engaging the parties to the <a href="http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5285e0294.pdf">tripartite agreement</a> to develop a comprehensive plan that will take into account the prevailing circumstances in Somalia.
It can also engage with the international community for more <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201605231214.html">financial and humanitarian support</a> to lessen the economic burden of hosting refugees.
The decision by the High Court has restored the dignity of the refugees hosted in Kenya. Their vulnerability shouldn’t be used to exploit them but should instead be a reason to give them the protection they deserve.
<a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/juliet-okoth-343259">Juliet Okoth</a>, Lecturer, International Law, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-nairobi-1958">University of Nairobi</a>
This article was originally published on <a href="http://theconversation.com">The Conversation</a>. Read the <a href="http://theconversation.com/can-kenya-ensure-national-security-while-still-admitting-refugees-73925">original article</a>.

Kenya’s conundrum: Can it ensure national security while still admitting refugees?

South Africa&#8217;s struggle stalwart Ahmed Kathrada died this morning, age 87 at the Donald Gordon Hospital in Johannesburg.. This is how the world remembers him:
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" data-lang="en">
A generation of true leaders of heart and spirit who served our people with humility no selflessness. I salute <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/AhmedKathrada?src=hash">#AhmedKathrada</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/hamba?src=hash">#hamba</a> kahle <a href="https://t.co/fTr2CqrgPi">pic.twitter.com/fTr2CqrgPi</a>
— Jay Naidoo (@Jay_Naidoo) <a href="https://twitter.com/Jay_Naidoo/status/846591348010553344">March 28, 2017</a></blockquote>
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Leah &amp; I extend our deepest condolences to all who loved &amp; were loved by <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/AhmedKathrada?src=hash">#AhmedKathrada</a>. God bless you all.
— DesmondTutu Official (@TheDesmondTutu) <a href="https://twitter.com/TheDesmondTutu/status/846595955889754112">March 28, 2017</a></blockquote>
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&#8220;To hate is to be enslaved by evil&#8221;&#8230; RIP <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/AhmedKathrada?src=hash">#AhmedKathrada</a> <a href="https://t.co/7Qx4Pjrq5O">pic.twitter.com/7Qx4Pjrq5O</a>
— Sideshen Pather (@Sideshen) <a href="https://twitter.com/Sideshen/status/846595947752775685">March 28, 2017</a></blockquote>
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Rest in peace <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/AhmedKathrada?src=hash">#AhmedKathrada</a> <a href="https://t.co/SB8aWNZcKb">pic.twitter.com/SB8aWNZcKb</a>
— Phindy (@IamPhindy) <a href="https://twitter.com/IamPhindy/status/846598518072639488">March 28, 2017</a></blockquote>
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<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" data-lang="en">
&#8220;It is a very sad moment for us as the Mandela family to have lost such a giant and icon,&#8221; Mandla Mandela on the passing of <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/AhmedKathrada?src=hash">#AhmedKathrada</a>. <a href="https://t.co/BhJvaGG2qi">pic.twitter.com/BhJvaGG2qi</a>
— eNCA (@eNCA) <a href="https://twitter.com/eNCA/status/846594630036537345">March 28, 2017</a></blockquote>
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<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" data-lang="en">
&#39;Freedom did not fall from the sky, bt was fought for with blood , sweat &amp; tears&#39;- Ahmed Kathrada. Rest in peace uncle Kathy <a href="https://t.co/ziXyKr8Eh3">pic.twitter.com/ziXyKr8Eh3</a>
&mdash; TREASURY.GOV.ZA (@TreasuryRSA) <a href="https://twitter.com/TreasuryRSA/status/846601881883459584">March 28, 2017</a></blockquote>
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READ: 
<a href="http://cnbc.africa/news/special-report/2017/03/28/ahmed-kathrada-gentle-soul-died/">S.A’s struggle stalwart Ahmed Kathrada: The gentle soul has died 
</a><a href="http://cnbc.africa/news/southern-africa/2016/04/21/apartheid-struggle-stalwarts-receive-joburgs-highest-honour/">Apartheid struggle stalwarts receive Joburg’s highest honour 
</a><a href="http://cnbc.africa/news/southern-africa/2013/12/15/kathradas-tribute-to-nelson-mandela/">Kathrada’s tribute to Nelson Mandela 
</a><a href="http://cnbc.africa/news/2013/12/13/the-rivonia-trial-for-the-heroic-and-unflinching-in-the-face-of-death/">The Rivonia trial: For the heroic and unflinching in the face of death 
</a><a href="http://cnbc.africa/news/2013/12/06/nelson-mandela-my-friend-and-cellmate/">Nelson Mandela, my friend and cellmate</a>
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The world remembers Ahmed Kathrada

One of the last survivors of the rebels who faced death with Nelson Mandela was a genial, gentle, soul with resolve of iron.
Ahmed Kathrada (87) who died on Tuesday was one of the great worker bees of South Africa’s struggle against apartheid in the 1950s and early 1960s; at Liliesleaf farm, in the middle class Johannesburg suburb of Rivonia that was used as a hideout for the underground movement, Kathrada, wrote, worked and photocopied pamphlets tirelessly. When the struggle called on him to pose as a white man – he dyed his hair, put on make-up and pretended to be a Portuguese man called Pedro. It was a disguise that fooled people; despite this, he never felt comfortable going in to restaurants and the like where a non-white like himself was not allowed to go under apartheid.
This is the kind of gentle soul Kathrada was. Iron resolve, always, when it came to principle, but never arrogant or full of bravado. He admitted to me once, in an interview for CNBC Africa, that he feared he could have broken if he had been tortured by the special branch after his arrest. His heart was always tender and 26 years in prison left few callouses. Once, on national radio, I heard Kathrada break down when a caller reminded him of a comrade who had been tortured to death more than half a century before.
READ: <a href="http://cnbc.africa/news/southern-africa/2016/04/21/apartheid-struggle-stalwarts-receive-joburgs-highest-honour/"> 
Apartheid struggle stalwarts receive Joburg’s highest honour 
</a><a href="http://cnbc.africa/news/southern-africa/2013/12/15/kathradas-tribute-to-nelson-mandela/">Kathrada’s tribute to Nelson Mandela 
</a><a href="http://cnbc.africa/news/2013/12/13/the-rivonia-trial-for-the-heroic-and-unflinching-in-the-face-of-death/">The Rivonia trial: For the heroic and unflinching in the face of death 
</a><a href="http://cnbc.africa/news/2013/12/06/nelson-mandela-my-friend-and-cellmate/">Nelson Mandela, my friend and cellmate</a>
If the scars were deep, Kathrada’s spirit maintained a salving sense of humour that often saw the absurdities of the struggle and the brutal system they were fighting. With a laugh he told me how Govan Mbeki – the father of South Africa’s former president &#8211; used to sell the eggs he coaxed from the Liliesleaf chickens to his fellow activists despite their protestations. He also told me how the underground activists of Liliesleaf used to sell the vegetables they used to grow.
“Our best customer was the Rivonia Police!” he chuckled as it was the police of Rivonia who raided Liliesleaf with dogs, in July 1964 and sent Kathrada, in chains, to prison for life on Robben Island.
“We subsequently found out that life was to mean life,” he said with irony and his trademark smile.
When Kathrada emerged from a lifetime in prison in 1989, apartheid had taken a lot more from him than his youth; it had also taken his birthplace. The place where he grew up in Schweizer-Reneke, in South Africa’s North West province, had been bulldozed by the authorities in the cause of keeping the races apart.
Incarceration had taken much more. Computers, hotel room cards instead of keys, and the clutter modern world were a mystery to him. He tried driving on the motorways that he had never seen, once, but found it too stressful and confusing. Even a harmless ATM was a mission as Kathrada found out when he went to get some money with fellow Robben Island prisoner Laloo Chiba one Sunday morning.
“He put in his card and it was swallowed, then I put my card in and pressed a few buttons and it was also swallowed. We had to phone the bank and they came to open up the ATM and get our cards out. Now Barbara gets my money for me,” he told me.
Politician Barbara Hogan was Kathrada’s loving partner in later life and they appeared kindred spirits. It was compensation for a prison sentence that robbed Kathrada of being able to raise a family. The prison guards used of Robben Island used to cruelly keep children out of sight for all prisoners; Kathrada told me of the pain of two decades of never hearing that most natural sound, the carefree laughter of a child. Hogan was the nearest to family Kathrada ever knew upon his release.
“When I phone home from overseas my first question is: ‘What happened in Isidingo ( A TV soap opera) my second question is about whether the country has been overthrown!” Kathrada said in his own dry way.
One or two people in the African National Congress would whisper to you that Kathrada was a bit star struck when it came to big names and would drop everything to be with them. It was Kathrada who accompanied the then rising United States senator Barack Obama to Robben Island on his visit to South Africa.
When it came to integrity, there was never a waver or whiff of scandal around Kathrada. I shall remember him for six words he shot back to me in the studio all those years ago. I ventured that there was a rising generation of young people who didn’t know, nor care, about the causes and sacrifices of the struggle generation. 
“That is what we fought for.”
The principled and upstanding way of Ahmed Kathrada; sadly many of those principles he fought from were ignored by a generation old enough to know better.

S.A’s struggle stalwart Ahmed Kathrada: The gentle soul has died

Following a directive from the President Jacob Zuma, Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan and National Treasury Director General Lungisa Fuzile are preparing to return tonight from the UK and are expected to arrive in South Africa tomorrow morning, a Treasury statement revealed. The rand which was at a 2015 high this morning tumbled more than 2 per cent against the dollar to 12.75 following the news of the president&#8217;s directive.
<div id="attachment_113778" style="width: 310px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-113778" class="size-medium wp-image-113778" src="http://cnbc.africa/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/RANDn-300x182.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="182" />Graph: Reuters</div>
R<a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-03-27-news-alert-presidency-halts-gordhan-jonas-international-roadshow-both-instructed-to-return-to-sa-urgently/#.WNjXXG-GPIU">eports</a> suggest that President Jacob Zuma may reshuffle his cabinet including Gordhan. Zuma recalled Gordhan, his Deputy Mcebisi Jonas and Director-General Lungisa Fuzile from their overseas trip this morning. The three together with key National Treasury officials, business and labour were on a non-deal international investor roadshow. The delegation was due to spend two days in London (27 &#8211; 28 March), one day in Boston (29 March) and two days in New York (30-31 March). This follows extensive engagements by senior National Treasury officials with domestic investors following the tabling of the 2017 Budget.
According to Treasury, Mcebisi Jonas who was scheduled to undertake the United States leg of the trip will no longer be leaving tonight as planned in line with the President’s directive.
Business Leadership South Africa in a statement said the President’s announcement directive is &#8220;ill advised&#8221;.
Adding that &#8220;The Finance Ministry, alongside business and labour who are accompanying the National Treasury on this roadshow, have worked hard to maintain South Africa’s investment grade credit rating. The damage to investor sentiment to South Africa as a result of the President’s decision should not be underestimated. Coming in the middle of meetings where business and the National Treasury have been making the case for South Africa, this action has pulled the rug from under our feet, as demonstrated by the rand sharply reversing its strongest growth trend in two years. At a time when investors need stability, certainty, and evidence of progress, this action sends exactly the opposite message.
&#8220;Business calls for cool heads and sound leadership to prevail in the context of certain damage to the economy should decisions be made which cause institutional instability, and associated negative impact on asset prices as seen in the collapse of confidence, currency and equity prices following Nenegate in December 2015. The sovereign credit rating agencies have continuously communicated that institutional stability is one of the central pillars on which their investment grade rating for South Africa rests, and any undermining of such strength puts this rating and the cost of capital at risk.
&#8220;The consequences of uncertainty and a downgrade include diminishing the ability of our country to remain economically stable, finance its debt, and support the government spending on which so many South Africans depend&#8221;.
The body said it was calling on South Africa’s &#8220;political leadership to exercise the greatest due diligence and put the economic welfare of the country first&#8221;.
Zuma&#8217;s directive comes a day before the North Gauteng High Court is due to hear reasons for why a declaratory order should be issued as to whether Gordhan can order the country&#8217;s big-four banks to keep doing business with the politically-connected Gupta family, whose accounts were closed following alleged  suspicious transactions.
<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone size-medium wp-image-113617" src="http://cnbc.africa/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/RAND-300x212.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="212" />
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" data-lang="en">
So <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/PravinGordhan?src=hash">#PravinGordhan</a> was recalled from the UK roadshow. He was supposed to fly to USA tonight. Instead, <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/Zuma?src=hash">#Zuma</a> said his trip is unauthorised.
— Pauli Van Wyk (@PaulivW) <a href="https://twitter.com/PaulivW/status/846294806414462978">March 27, 2017</a></blockquote>
<script async src="//platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script>
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" data-lang="en">
However, <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/Treasury?src=hash">#Treasury</a> says they have written confirmation of roadshow being authorised by <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/Presidency?src=hash">#Presidency</a>. 
We&#8217;re in for a hectic ride. Buckle up.
— Pauli Van Wyk (@PaulivW) <a href="https://twitter.com/PaulivW/status/846295207666749440">March 27, 2017</a></blockquote>
http://cnbc.africa/news/southern-africa/2017/01/30/south-africas-gordhan-alleges-campaign-by-guptas-against-treasury/

Rand weakens on cabinet reshuffle reports, as S.A’s FinMin agrees to return from investor roadshow

As part of Old Mutual&#8217;s plans to unlock value for shareholders, the Anglo-South African financial services firm, has agreed to sell a 24.95% shareholding in OM Asset Management (OMAM) to HNA Capital US in a two-step transaction for approximately $446 million.
Following the transaction, Old Mutual’s shareholding will reduce from 50.8% to 25.9%. The transaction comprises a sale of a 9.95% tranche of OMAM shares held by Old Mutual at a price of $15.30 per share and a sale of a further 15% held by Old Mutual at a price of $15.75 per share.
READ: <a class="l _HId" href="http://cnbc.africa/news/2016/03/11/old-mutual-to-split-assets-sell-nedbank-stake/">Old Mutual to split assets, reduce stake in Nedbank</a>
The completion of the first tranche is subject to antitrust clearance under the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Act in the US and is expected to take place in approximately 30 days. Completion of the second tranche is subject to receipt of certain additional regulatory approvals in various other jurisdictions and is expected to take place in the second half of 2017.
Old Mutual is not subject to any lock-up arrangements in respect of its remaining shareholding, other than its commitment to retain sufficient shares to perform its obligations with respect to this transaction. Consistent with its previous statements, Old Mutual intends to continue the reduction of its holding in OMAM in an orderly manner.
James Ritchie, Chairman of OMAM’s Board of Directors, said: “We are pleased to welcome HNA Capital US as a new, supportive investor in OMAM. We remain focused on executing our growth strategy, which includes working collaboratively with our high quality Affiliates to diversify their businesses and expand their global distribution opportunities, as well as acquiring new Affiliates, to generate strong, long-term value for all of our shareholders. We look forward to working with HNA Capital US to accelerate our growth strategy for the benefit of our clients, Affiliates and shareholders.”
Bruce Hemphill, Group Chief Executive of Old Mutual, said: “We are very pleased to announce this transaction which brings forward further realisation of value for Old Mutual. It represents another step in delivering our managed separation strategy and secures a strategic long-term investor for OMAM”.
Guang Yang, Chief Executive of HNA Capital US, said: “OMAM is a diversified, at-scale multi- boutique asset management franchise with an attractive portfolio of high quality investment managers. We are pleased with our investment in OMAM and look forward to supporting OMAM’s continued growth.”
It is expected that a HNA Capital US-nominated director will join the OMAM board on the completion of the first tranche and a second on the completion of the second tranche. In both cases, these directors will replace existing nominees of Old Mutual.
http://cnbc.africa/news/2017/03/09/old-mutual-break-track-2018-despite-uk-tech-issues-ceo/
OMAM is a global, multi-boutique asset management company with approximately $240 billion of assets under management as at 31 December 2016.
http://cnbc.africa/news/2016/10/31/old-mutual-em-ceo-quits/
Old Mutual will use the proceeds from the transaction for general corporate purposes. Bank of America Merrill Lynch and Evercore acted as joint financial advisors and Skadden Arps and Linklaters as legal advisors to Old Mutual in connection with the transaction.

Monique Vanek

Business Leadership blames downgrade of S.A to junk on President Zuma, CEO Initiative issues statement

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This is the impact of the #CabinetReshuffle on S.A’s sovereign ratings

Zuma’s critics within the ANC are vocal. But will they act?

Nomura: S.A’s Cabinet reshuffle is an “open attack on Treasury”

S.A’s central bank keeps rates on hold, warns of widening risks in last few days

These African countries have the wealthiest and poorest individuals

SACP was told of planned Cabinet reshuffle, that included S.A’s FinMin Gordhan

S.A’s Business leaders have written to the ANC’s top six

Kenya’s conundrum: Can it ensure national security while still admitting refugees?

The world remembers Ahmed Kathrada

S.A’s struggle stalwart Ahmed Kathrada: The gentle soul has died

Rand weakens on cabinet reshuffle reports, as S.A’s FinMin agrees to return from investor roadshow

Old Mutual to sell minority stake in OM Asset Management

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Monique Vanek

Business Leadership blames downgrade of S.A to junk on President Zuma, CEO Initiative issues statement

Moody’s places S.A’s rating on review for downgrade

Ratings agency Moody’s comments on Kenya’s budget

GE sole bidder for $2 bln Nigeria rail concession

Old Mutual Emerging Markets has a new CEO

This is the impact of the #CabinetReshuffle on S.A’s sovereign ratings

Zuma’s critics within the ANC are vocal. But will they act?

Nomura: S.A’s Cabinet reshuffle is an “open attack on Treasury”

S.A’s central bank keeps rates on hold, warns of widening risks in last few days

These African countries have the wealthiest and poorest individuals

SACP was told of planned Cabinet reshuffle, that included S.A’s FinMin Gordhan

S.A’s Business leaders have written to the ANC’s top six

Kenya’s conundrum: Can it ensure national security while still admitting refugees?

The world remembers Ahmed Kathrada

S.A’s struggle stalwart Ahmed Kathrada: The gentle soul has died

Rand weakens on cabinet reshuffle reports, as S.A’s FinMin agrees to return from investor roadshow

Old Mutual to sell minority stake in OM Asset Management

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