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West African leaders stressed the importance of keeping to term limits at Monday&#8217;s one-day summit in Niamey.

West Africa 2020 elections: How to enforce the tenets of democracy

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As Ghana marks its 63rd year of independence, Raimah Amevor, CEO of Mindfully Africa joins CNBC Africa to discuss the role of women in fostering democracy in Ghana.

ghana

Mindfully Africa CEO Amevor on the role of women in Ghana’s development

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The Kofi Annan Commission has called on governments, businesses and civil societies to protect democracy from digital threats. As voters from over 15 African countries head to the polls this year, Ory Okolloh, Director for Information at Omidyar Network joins CNBC Africa to explore ways Africa can protect the integrity of its democracy and elections from digital threats.

These are measures Africa is taking to protect integrity of elections & democracy from digital threats

By <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/nic-cheeseman-180800">Nic Cheeseman</a>, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-birmingham-1138">University of Birmingham</a>

There is growing concern about the potential for the message and media sharing platform WhatsApp to undermine democracy in a number of countries across the world including <a href="http://theconversation.com/whatsapp-skewed-brazilian-election-proving-social-medias-danger-to-democracy-106476">Brazil</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/13/big-tech-whatsapp-democracy-india">India</a>. 

Because WhatsApp is encrypted – and so offers users far greater protection from prosecution than Twitter or Facebook – it has become particularly notorious for spreading “fake news”. 

This is a major concern in Africa, where WhatsApp is the most <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1206935/whatsapp-is-the-most-popular-messaging-app-in-africa/">popular messaging app in 40 countries</a>. This is due to its low cost and the ability to easily share messages with both individuals and groups. 

But is this really how WhatApp is used? And if it is, to what extent does this compromise the quality of elections? 

A joint team from the Centre for Democracy and Development (Nigeria) and the University of Birmingham (UK) has spent the last few months researching the impact of WhatsApp on the 2019 Nigerian elections held in May. 

Their <a href="https://www.cddwestafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/WHATSAPP-NIGERIA-ELECTION-2019.pdf">report</a> comes to conclusions that are both troubling, as well as encouraging. 

The research reveals that the platform was used to mislead voters in increasingly sophisticated ways. But it also shows that Whatsapp strengthened democracy in other areas.

<h2>Misinformation and disinformation</h2>

The term “<a href="http://blogs.royalsociety.org/publishing/ignorance-can-be-fatal-countering-the-crisis-in-fake-news-and-fake-science/">fake news</a> has become widely used over the past few years. However, it is problematic because it lumps together very different kinds of information and behaviour. For example, we need to separate out deliberate attempts to mislead others by creating false stories (disinformation) from the innocent sharing of made up stories by people who believe it to be true (misinformation).

The 2019 Nigerian elections saw both disinformation and misinformation. We studied this by conducting 46 interviews in the states of Abuja, Oyo and Kano, as well as seven focus groups and a survey of 1,005 people.

During the course of conducting the research candidates consistently told us that they predominantly used WhatsApp to share information about their qualities and campaign pledges. But many WhatsApp users said that at a high proportion of the messages they received were designed to undermine a rival leader’s reputation – to &#8220;decampaign” them.

There were some high profile examples of disinformation. The most notorious story circulated on social media was that the president had died while undergoing medical treatment outside of the country, and had <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-46424562">been replaced by a clone from Sudan</a>. 

Other fabricated communications were less outlandish but no less significant. Many ordinary citizens shared these messages, in some cases because they knew they were false and wanted to amplify their impact, but in many cases because they thought they were true.

The most effective decampaigning strategies were those that shared messages that resonated with individuals because they contained an element of the truth, or played on recent experiences. 

<h2>WhatsApp takes over</h2>

The political influence of WhatsApp has expanded rapidly in line with its growing penetration. As a result, it has become part of the fabric of election campaigns and is now a key mechanism through which political leaders seek to communicate with their campaign teams and supporters. 

Fully 91% of the people we interviewed were active WhatsApp users; as one person put it:

<blockquote>
I use WhatsApp more than I use the toilet.
</blockquote>

In Nigeria, election candidates were already using the platform to <a href="https://www.academia.edu/32414216/The_Impact_of_Social_Media_during_the_2015_Nigerian_General_Elections">push messages in 2015</a>. But the people we interviewed agreed that the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/02/15/its-nigerias-first-whatsapp-election-heres-what-were-learning-about-how-fake-news-spreads/">2019 elections</a> saw a significant step up in terms of how the leading parties organised their social media strategy.

Politically, WhatsApp was used in an increasingly sophisticated way at the presidential level. In 2019, the two main presidential candidates – President Muhammadu Buhari and opposition leader Atiku Abubakar – both had dedicated teams pushing out messages over social media: the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6B-DqX1o370">Buhari New Media Centre</a> and <a href="https://www.atikulatedyouthforce.com/membership">Atikulated Youth Force</a>. By forming hundreds of Whatsapp groups of 256 members, these organisations could send messages to tens of thousands of people at the touch of a button.

Buhari’s effort was better funded and particularly impressive. It established a network of local and regional representatives connected to a “central command” in Abuja. This enabled the campaign to rapidly send messages from the national to the local level, while also responding to hostile messages and rumours shared by its rivals.

While those in power typically had more money to invest in their campaigns, many opposition leaders pointed out that in important ways WhatsApp had created a more level political playing field. Those who had been involved in politics for some time explained that “fake news” was nothing new in Nigeria, but that in the past it was sometimes impossible to counteract these messages because there was no way to get airtime on government aligned radio. 

WhatsApp had changed this situation. Opposition leaders now have a cheap way of fighting back. It has also been used to coordinate anti-corruption campaigns and election observation, strengthening democracy. 

<h2>Evolution or revolution?</h2>

It’s also important not to overstate the significance of WhatsApp. Things look very different below the national level, for example, where campaign structures were less developed and a significant proportion of activity remained informal.

We found that while candidates for Governor and Member of Parliament did set up WhatsApp groups, they were much less organised. In many cases, candidates relied on existing networks and social influencers to get the message out.

Candidates were also keen to stress that while they used WhatsApp during their campaigns, they did not rely on it. Voters expect to see their leaders on the ground, and expected them to provide a range of services for the community. Advertising good deeds over WhatsApp could help a leader get credit, but only if they had fulfilled their responsibilities in the first place.

In other words, WhatsApp can amplify and complement a candidate’s ground campaign. But it cannot replace it.

<h2>Throwing out the water but keeping the baby</h2>

These findings suggest that solutions to the power of social media platforms like WhatsApp isn’t to ban them, or to allow governments to censor them. This would merely exaggerate the vast advantages of incumbency that ruling parties already enjoy. 

A better solution would be to promote <a href="https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2016/11/09/what-is-digital-literacy.html">digital literacy</a>, develop <a href="http://www.comminit.com/democracy-governance/content/guidelines-development-social-media-code-conduct-elections">social media codes of conduct</a> around elections, and empower WhatsApp uses to control which groups they are added to, and what information they receive.

The research was conducted, and publications authored by, Jamie Hitchen, Idayat Hassan, Jonathan Fisher and Nic Cheeseman.<img decoding="async" loading="lazy" src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121064/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" style="border: none !important; box-shadow: none !important; margin: 0 !important; max-height: 1px !important; max-width: 1px !important; min-height: 1px !important; min-width: 1px !important; opacity: 0 !important; outline: none !important; padding: 0 !important; text-shadow: none !important" />

<a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/nic-cheeseman-180800">Nic Cheeseman</a>, Professor of Democracy, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-birmingham-1138">University of Birmingham</a>

This article is republished from <a href="http://theconversation.com">The Conversation</a> under a Creative Commons license. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/whatsapp-played-a-big-role-in-the-nigerian-election-not-all-of-it-was-bad-121064">original article</a>.

With WhatsApp having played a major role in Nigeria’s elections does it undermine democracy ?

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The Inter-Party Advisory Council, a body that houses all registered political parties in Nigeria says they plans to constitute a legal body to interact with INEC to address vote buying in elections. According to Chude Achike, Political Affairs Commentator, Nigeria’s democracy has not gotten to a level where some of the primary ideals of democracy are fully implemented. Speaking to CNBC Africa’s Christy Cole, Achike discussed vote buying in Nigerian politics.

Vote-buying a threat to Nigeria’s democracy – Expert

ADDIS ABABA (Reuters) &#8211; Ethiopia must pursue multiparty democracy, the prime minister’s chief of staff said on Sunday in what could be the latest in a series of momentous changes sweeping the country.
The country allows competing parties but all parliamentary seats are held by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, which has maintained tight control in the country of 100 million people since it fought its way to power in 1991.
The ruling coalition has also presided over an economy that has grown faster than any other in sub-Saharan Africa over the past decade.
Abiy Ahmed became prime minister in April and since then the government has instituted reforms including releasing political prisoners, diluting state control of the economy and making peace with northern neighbour Eritrea.
The government this month lifted a ban on opposition groups that were considered terrorist groups. Any further steps to strengthen the country’s democracy would likely make elections due in 2020 more competitive. [L8N1UG1ZZ].
Abiy was meeting national and regional parties on Sunday and his chief of staff, Fitsum Arega, said in a tweet:
“PM Abiy concluded: Given our current politics, there is no option except pursuing a multiparty democracy supported by strong institutions that respect human rights and rule of law.”
He said the parties appreciated Abiy’s political reforms and also wanted changes to electoral laws.
The coalition swept the 2015 vote but the opposition was weakened by restrictive laws and what human rights group described as repression. Security forces killed hundreds of people in three years of unrest since then.
The opposition said it was cheated of victory in an election in 2005, after which 193 protesters and seven policeman were killed in riots.
Writing by Omar Mohammed; Editing by Matthew Mpoke Bigg

Why Ethiopia’s prime minister is suggesting a multiparty democracy

David E Kiwuwa|Princeton University
The recent sitting of the central committee of the Chinese Communist Party(CCP) rolled out a big surprise development: a proposed <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/27/ensuring-happier-lives-chinese-media-defends-move-to-make-xi-jinping-all-powerful?CMP=share_btn_link">removal of presidential term limits</a>. This came among a <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-02/25/c_136999410.htm">raft of other constitutional amendments</a>.
<img decoding="async" loading="lazy" class="alignnone wp-image-43742 size-full" src="http://cnbc.africa/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/china_president_xi.jpg" alt="China's Xi arrives in South Africa for talks with Zuma" width="600" height="400" />
The two-term limit had been instituted in 1982 by Deng Xiaoping after his experience with the chaotic post-Mao succession. Term limits were instituted to facilitate orderly succession and to support China’s reform era.
China’s economic transformation wasn’t to be disrupted or sidetracked by unnecessary political struggles and uncertainty. Consequently, successive communist leaders have abided by this limitation. And it has ushered in relatively smooth and carefully choreographed changes of leadership.
The broader implication of this announcement, critics fear, might be that it signals to African authoritarians to strengthen their grasp on executive office and push back on the need for leadership alternation.
In fact observers are already pointing to the increasing allure of the China model as a basis for African economic and political development.
In Africa, term limits have acted as a democratic safety net for the untamed African presidency, and their removal has often been counterproductive. Their removal in Beijing might have the unintended knock-on effect of weakening faltering democracies on the African continent.
<h2>The era of Xi Jinping</h2>
President Xi Jinping’s tenure has been like no other in China’s recent history. Arguably the most transformative leader since Mao Zedong, he has gone on to cement an indelible mark on the system that paved his way to the top.
As the President of the People’s Republic, chairman of the Central Military Commission, and general secretary of the CCP, he has consolidated his core leadership. He has also had his personal political doctrine; Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era written into the constitution.
While at it, he tore up the rule book by purging the highest party echelons of corrupt officials both big and small. Or in his words “tigers and flies”.
Xi has also pivoted China to the centre of the world stage. He has midwifed an assertive and confident China that is no longer subservient to the West.
Some might even call him a progressive. And this is why the CCP’s 
proposal to remove China’s presidential term limits could be construed as surprising.
To the keen observer, however, this latest development isn’t as surprising as it seems. This is because there was a notable absence of primed successors in China’s new Standing Committee of the Politburo historically an avenue from which incoming leadership is always chosen. The five existing members all 60 years and above are presumed too old to be considered for president at the 20th congress in 2022.
So for the moment, once the constitutional changes are approved, President Xi Jinping will stay put.
But what impact will this have beyond China?
<h2>Relations between Africa and China</h2>
African countries are often castigated for their poor leadership record, long term presidencies and atrocious human rights record. Yet in dealing with African states, China professes a doctrine of non-interference in the internal matters of national governments.
The implication has been that China is willing to do business with African leaders irrespective of their political realities.
As a result China’s relations with countries such as Zimbabwe, Sudan, Ethiopia, Gabon, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Uganda &#8211; to mention a few &#8211; have been buoyed by billions of dollars of investment. In return, China expects Africa’s political support and steady access to the continent’s raw materials. This according to Beijing is a win-win mutual relationship.
With the removal of China’s presidential term limits adds a new dimension to the relationship: African presidents now have a political godfather whose political practice they can claim to emulate. Or at the very least to validate their continued stay in office.
Claims that removing term limits will ensure that Chinese live happier lives, rejuvenate economic and political growth, and fulfil the will of the people mirrors the rhetoric in countries like Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Congo, and Gabon to mention but a few.
China has fast become Africa’s development partner of choice and now the country and the continent are on the same political wavelength.
To be fair, however, while Xi Jinping has superintended over phenomenal social and economic transformation over the past few years (he has been in power since 2012), not much can be said of his African counterparts. While he has aggressively and persistently purged corrupt officials his counterparts continued to indulge in unabated state looting and profligacy.
<h2>Unwelcome gift</h2>
<img decoding="async" loading="lazy" src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92746/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />While ending term limits might be good for China, it is an unwelcome gift for African despots who can now point to China as justification for their authoritarian tendencies. China might profess a non-interference policy, and claim to tailor its engagements on a country by country basis, but it will remain a model for many African governance whether it likes it or not. And therein lies the irony of global leadership for with power comes responsibility.
This article was originally published on The Conversation.

Why China’s removal of term limits is a gift to African despots

Mohamed M Diatta | Sciences Po – USPC
The winds of change may blow in several directions across Africa this year as a host of countries prepare for elections. But a change in power isn’t always synonymous with change in governance. In Africa, very often, a new face in power doesn’t signal change of the system of governance.
<div id="attachment_298824" style="width: 860px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img aria-describedby="caption-attachment-298824" decoding="async" loading="lazy" class="wp-image-298824 size-full" src="http://cnbc.africa/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Kabila_GettyImages-800731456.png" alt="" width="850" height="538" />President of the Democratic Republic of Congo Joseph Kabila smiles as he delivers his remarks during a meeting with South African President Jacob Zuma at Sefako Makgatho Presidential Guest House in Pretoria on June 25, 2017. Image: Getty Images</div>
The continent is set for a busy 2018 electoral year. In the past presidential, legislative, or local elections, or a combination, have had a destabilising if not devastating effect due to pre and post-election transparency issues and accompanying protests, violence and political instability. But when conducted well, elections have also brought hope for a better future. Ghana and Benin are good examples.
The year ahead won’t be any different. On the one hand the expected end of Joseph Kabila’s tenure in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) might bring momentous change to the country. On the other it’s more difficult to foresee better days for South Sudan. Others might also depart before elections.
<h2>Early departures?</h2>
All eyes are on Pretoria where the ruling African National Congress has asked President Jacob Zuma to resign following the election of Cyril Ramaphosa as ANC president and South Africa’s next president. As of February 13 he was showing no signs of doing so.
And seven years after the Jasmine Revolution that ousted the regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Tunisians are back on the streets. The wave that took away Ben Ali now threatens to sweep the government of Beji Caid Essebsi.
<h2>Presidential seats at stake</h2>
The DRC has added more instability to its already complex situation. The country has been embroiled in a political and institutional crisis since Joseph Kabila extended his term in office, after failing to amend the constitution to remove the disposition preventing him from running for a third term. He has twice postponed presidential elections, despite signing the December 2016 agreement whose main clause was to have presidential and legislative elections held by December 2017.
Kabila’s failure to hold elections by the December 2017 deadline has led to mounting national protests, which the regime has crushed. Increasing national and international pressure might see Kabila out in 2018 unless he amends the constitution.
In Cameroon, Paul Biya, 85, in power since 1982, should be up for reelection in October. Although there is no indication that he will relinquish power, he has faced dissensions and separatist claims from so-called anglophone Cameroon and is believed to have ill-health. The current lack of succession plans if Biya does not run, leaves room for speculation and uncertainty.
In Madagascar, concern reigns in the run-up to the presidential election at the end of this year, which should see incumbent Hery Rajaonarimampianina face up his two predecessors Marc Ravalomanana and Andry Rajoelina. The island, with a tumultuous history, has been prey to institutional instability since 2001. There are fears this will happen again.
Three countries, South Sudan, Libya and Mali, plagued by instability for some years, are expected to hold presidential elections this year. Strong uncertainties prevail in South Sudan and Libya where negotiations for peaceful settlements have yielded little tangible results. In Mali the government doesn’t control large parts of its territory and is not immune to terrorist attacks.
No surprise will come from Cairo where, Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, will certainly be reelected president of a country he now controls unchallenged.
<h2>Longevity and power sharing dilemmas</h2>
In West Africa, Togolese Faure Gnassingbé appears as a poor student in the field of democracy. He came to power in 2005 in a quasi-dynastic political ‘transition’, replacing his father, General Gnassingbe Eyadema, who had been in power for 38 years. Reelected in 2015, he has, since August 2017, faced massive and sustained popular protests demanding institutional reforms and the end of his family’s 50-year rule.
The Economic Community of West African States is trying, through negotiations, to restore calm. An uneasy situation is emerging given that Faure is the current chairman of the organization until June 2018. But if he completely loses the support of his peers, he might be on his way out. Legislative elections are scheduled to take place by July.
Like Togo, Gabon experienced a similar ‘transition’ from father Omar Bongo, who died in power in 2009 after 42 years of rule, to his son Ali Bongo, who replaced him that year. Once a haven of peace in an unstable Central African region, Gabon has tumbled into a serious crisis since the highly contested presidential election in 2016 which was marred by widespread fraud and deadly repression. Jean Ping, leader of the opposition and former chairperson of the African Union Commission, continues to claim victory.
The hardening of the Libreville regime has recently resulted in a constitutional amendment that the opposition characterises as a ‘monarchisation’ of power. Legislative elections planned this year will certainly be a turning point for the country.
In Guinea Bissau, the power of José Mario Vaz is in troubled waters, with the appointment of a seventh prime minister since 2014. The opposition has decried the president for overstepping his constitutional prerogatives by monopolising power, in violation of the Conakry agreement signed in 2016, under the aegis of the regional west African body.
Vaz runs the risk of sanctions, in which case he would definitively lose the support of the organisation and the protection of the regional troop deployment. This would precipitate his departure and could plunge the country into chaos, in a state that has mostly known military coups and instability. Legislative elections are expected to take place this year.
In Chad, the crisis that has affected resource-dependent countries has plagued the economy. This is coupled with Idris Deby’s stronghold on power and his repressive methods. Despite facing civil unrest, he is unlikely to be shaken even though the country is expected to hold legislative elections this year.
<h2>Ghana setting the pace</h2>
Over the past 20 years, since the John Kofi Agyekum Kufuor presidency, Ghana has epitomised democracy south of the Sahara (aside from South Africa). Its institutional stability and peaceful transitions of power are commendable.
<img decoding="async" loading="lazy" src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91690/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />What the continent needs most are strong institutions, which will only come about with a regeneration of its leadership as well as its political class. This renewal must be rooted in a paradigm shift as embodied with determination, class and panache by Ghanaian president Nana Akufo Addo.
This article was originally published on The Conversation.

With a busy election schedule, Africa needs a reversal of the old order

Barbara Yoxon | University of York
Kenya’s transition to a multiparty democracy in 1991 was one of the most promising cases of political change in Africa. Before then, the Kenya National Union Party (KANU) had monopolised power since outlawing political opposition in 1982. The transition from a single to a multiparty state was a truly significant event.
<img decoding="async" loading="lazy" class="aligncenter wp-image-292594 size-full" src="http://cnbc.africa/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Kenyatta-Swearing-In_GettyImages.png" alt="" width="850" height="567" />
KANU faced its first real challenge since independence in multiparty presidential elections held in 1992. But the party didn’t lose its grip on power until president Daniel arap Moi lost to opposition leader Mwai Kibaki in the 2002 elections. The next presidential elections of 2007 were marked by political violence in which more than 1,500 people were killed following claims that the two major candidates had manipulated the results.
Despite this history of political instability, the country’s new democratic direction was seemingly confirmed when the Kenyan Supreme Court overturned the results of the August 8, 2017 elections. In a historic ruling for Africa, it called for the presidential election to be repeated.
Initially many praised the court for upholding democracy. But weeks later the same court upheld Kenyatta’s second victory. A spokesman for the opposition coalition speculated that members of the Supreme Court were intimidated.
The turn of events in favour of President Kenyatta is not surprising. It suggests that the process of free elections was never intended to help the country democratise. This mirrors events in other seemingly transitioning countries such as Zimbabwe or Senegal.
What is more, the process of opening up the political system could – in and of itself – never have been expected to deliver democracy. This was the case in Ukraine, where shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union elections were expected to bring about a process of democratisation similar to Poland’s in 1989. But democracy never arrived in the Ukraine. Instead it plunged deeper into authoritarianism.
In Kenya’s case, elections have been used to bolster the legitimacy of an autocratic regime. While Kenya holds free and regular elections, political elites regularly intimidate political opposition as well as journalists and the judiciary. This effectively skews the results of each election in favour of the government.
<h2>Democracy is about more than elections</h2>
Recent research on transitioning countries looks at how they have held regular multiparty elections at the national level, yet violated democratic minimum standards.
The research suggests that since the end of the Cold War countries like Kenya, Turkey, the Ukraine and Zimbabwe have turned into the most common form of nondemocratic rule in the world. As multiparty states they have combined elements of both democracy and autocracy. Their rulers have learnt to use free multiparty elections in their favour.
Kenya’s story is a reminder that authoritarian regimes &#8211; even those that look like democracies &#8211; are unlikely to go away anytime soon.
Definitions of democracy vary. But most scholars agree that to complete their transitions countries, including Kenya, would have to meet a number of criteria. These include free, fair, and competitive elections, full adult suffrage, freedom of the press, speech and association, and an executive free from external influence.
The last point indicates that no military, religious or civilian organisation in the country can override the decisions of a fairly elected executive.
<h2>Kenya’s democracy scorecard</h2>
While Kenya certainly meets many of the criteria it struggles to meet two in particular.
The first is fair elections. The country has held regular free elections since 1991 and it allows a number of political parties to take part. But the elections can’t be described as having been fair.
A recent Amnesty International report has condemned Kenya for routinely targeting political opposition in an effort to dissuade them from challenging the government. This includes arbitrary arrests and even killings by the police in the 2017 elections. This uneven playing field can result in unfair elections.
The second criteria that Kenya fails on is freedom of the press, speech and association. For a country to be democratic it should allow basic political freedoms for its citizens and institutions. This has not been the case in Kenya. For example, the International Federation of Journalists recently reported that journalists were routinely harassed and intimidated by the police and political party supporters in the 2017 elections.
Similarly, the bodyguard of one of the judges was shot a day before the court’s scheduled ruling on a motion to delay the repeat vote.
As a result of these serious shortcomings, Kenya cannot be viewed as a democracy. The playing field remains uneven despite major constitutional changes to guarantee an independent judiciary and to establish a separation of powers in the government.
<h2>The problem with elections</h2>
There have been clear examples – Poland in 1989 and South Africa in 1994 – of where elections helped many countries successfully transition. But elections, even free and competitive, don’t always mean that the country is more democratic. There have been instances when they have been used to help ruling politicians stay in power as happened in Ukraine, Turkey and Singapore.<img decoding="async" loading="lazy" src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88341/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />Kenya’s ruling elite too has learnt to use elections to its advantage. Instead of weakening the elite’s grip on power, the elections might actually make them stronger. Given this situation, and recent events, it’s unclear whether Kenya will ever complete its transition to democracy.
This article was originally published on The Conversation.

Op-Ed: Why elections don’t always equal democracy: the case of Kenya

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Democracy has come a long way in Africa, but the continent is still trying to find the best form that entrenches its realities. Recent developments in Zimbabwe has made many wonder if the country will be better or worse off.

Zimbabwe crisis: The state of democracy in Africa explored

Sekou Toure Otondi | University of Nairobi
In his last address at Uhuru Park on the eve of Kenya’s October 26 election re-run, Raila Odinga announced the creation of what he called a National Resistance Movement. In a later interview with CNN, he clarified that the movement was a new wing of the opposition coalition, the National Super Alliance (NASA) which he led into the presidential elections in early August.
&nbsp;
<div id="attachment_280932" style="width: 1034px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img aria-describedby="caption-attachment-280932" decoding="async" loading="lazy" class="wp-image-280932 size-full" src="http://cnbc.africa/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Raila-Odinga_New_Flickr.jpg" alt="" width="1024" height="562" />NEW DELHI/INDIA, 16NOV10 &#8211; Raila Amolo Odinga, Prime Minister of Kenya, during the New South session at the World Economic Forum&#8217;s India Economic Summit 2010 held in New Delhi, 14-16 November 2010. Copyright (cc-by-sa) © World Economic Forum (www.weforum.org/Photo Matthew Jordaan matthew.jordaan@inl.co.za)</div>
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He said the resistance movement would complement the other arms of the opposition coalition and would pursue a peaceful, non-violent struggle. It’s main objective would be to advance electoral justice in Kenya and across Africa as well.
His latest public address was expected to provide a radical way forward. But it fell short of expectations among his supporters who expected a more radical announcement. In addition to the resistance movement, Odinga also created a “People’s Parliament” to protect election integrity, constitutionalism, democracy and the rule of law.
Odinga’s immediate aim remains to force a credible election in the next 90 days. To achieve this the opposition alliance is seeking a total overhaul of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission.
These moves come at a time when opposition leaders feel that the international community, led by the US and European Union, are either reluctant to push for reforms. Many believe that they are conspiring with the Jubliee regime to protect their own business, security, and diplomatic interests in the region.
The developments spearheaded by Odinga are, in my opinion, good for Kenya’s democracy. By constituting a People’s Assembly, NASA is seeking to put citizens at the centre of the struggle for electoral reforms, constitutionalism, and the expansion of democratisation.
<h2>Undemocratic behaviour</h2>
The Jubilee administration, buoyed by an overwhelming majority in both houses of parliament, appears to be trying to roll back Kenya’s democratic gains. The fact that the party is also in control of the executive makes matters worse.
This is exemplified by its forceful passage of the controversial bill to amend the electoral process in the middle of the election cycle. Parliamentarians pressed ahead with the bill despite being cautioned against doing so by a wide section of Kenyan society and the international community. Some parts of the bill seem well-intentioned. But others, such as the provisions that prioritise manual voting mechanisms over the current electronic system, don’t augur well for the country.
The Jubilee regime has also embarked on a crackdown of civil society organisations deemed to be sympathetic to the opposition coalition. These include the Kenya Human Rights commission and Africog, a governance and public ethics non-governmental organisation.
In addition, members of the party are openly calling for a “benevolent dictatorship” in Kenya. This call was first made by the Jubilee Party vice-chairman David Murathe.
Benevolent dictatorships – which operate on the basis that certain democratic rights need to be ceded for economic gain – are cited as the reason for the economic rise of countries such as China and Singapore. But the same may not necessarily be true for Kenya. Under the one party dictatorships of former presidents Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel Moi Kenya’s economy was stunted. In Africa the countries that have made economic progress such as Botswana, Namibia, and Mauritius are some of the most democratic.
<h2>Odinga’s options</h2>
Odinga has three options to make sure Kenya’s democracy is strengthened, and not weakened.
The first is to file another petition to the Supreme Court. He can bring the case in his own capacity or sponsor like-minded civil society organisations to petition the court. The petition would challenge the credibility of the repeat electoral process and the legitimacy of Kenyatta’s presidency.
The other option is to sustain a civil disobedience campaign. This would involve peaceful protests and other forms of opposition such as an economic boycott of goods and service providers associated with Kenyatta’s regime.
The opposition could also call for street protests. The danger with this is that they could turn violent. Since the August 8th election demonstrators have repeatedly clashed with police. And in certain parts of the country NASA and Jubilee supporters have clashed in confrontations that could escalate into ethnic violence.
A final and extreme option would be for the regions that support the alliance to secede. The secession debate, which was triggered by NASA technical advisor David Ndii, has excited the opposition’s support base. Odinga himself, though cautious, seems to be sympathetic if what he calls “electoral authoritarianism” persists.
In reality NASA should be pushing for Kenya’s devolved system of governance to be strengthened with a view to redrawing boundaries and creating a federal system. This approach is likely to be well received in alliance strongholds, particularly in regions where communities have felt marginalised and disenfranchised by successive Kenyan governments.
Where does this all leave Odinga? Regardless of his future political trajectory, he has left a positive mark on Kenya’s political landscape. He has been at the forefront of the struggle for democracy, good governance, and upholding the rule of law. The Supreme Court has vindicated him. This is in addition to his campaign for Kenyans to boycott the repeat election that resulted in low voter turnout, leaving Kenyatta reeling with legitimacy question.
<img decoding="async" loading="lazy" src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86562/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />Odinga’s struggle for electoral integrity as a key cornerstone for democracy and rule of law should be supported by progressive forces across the continent. Retrogressive regimes have an uncanny way of entrenching themselves. Hence Odinga, and his alliance’s push should be contextualised in the wider struggle towards a functioning democracy for Africa.
Sekou Toure Otondi, PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi
This article was originally published on The Conversation.

Why Odinga’s resistance movement could be important for democracy in Kenya

André Guichaoua | Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
The multi-party systems established in Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia in the early 1990s have endured despite electoral violence. But democratic hopes have been dashed or perverted throughout the rest of the region. The governments built on the ruins of the civil wars in Angola, Burundi, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Uganda and Rwanda have all relied on armed political groups to stay in power.
From June 2015 to August 2017 an uninterrupted series of general elections took place in Central and East Africa. Those in Burundi (2015)and the DRC (initially set for 2016) were expected to be the most problematic. In both the incumbent presidents were seeking to extend their mandates beyond a second term. In the Congo, Uganda and Kenya, the risk of violent clashes was palpable.
The ruling regimes were not only dated, but worse for wear. At the time of the elections, the presidents of Angola (José Eduardo Dos Santos), the Congo (Denis Sassou N&#8217;Guesso) and Uganda (Yoweri Museveni), all members of the revolutionary or progressive New Generation of African leaders, were all in their seventies and had been in power for 30 or more years. The Presidents of Rwanda (Paul Kagamé), the DRC (Joseph Kabila) and Burundi (Pierre Nkurunziza), having served terms of 21, 14 and 10 years respectively, took steps to change their countries’ constitution to seek a third term.
Despite the bleak regional outlook and contagious scepticism among voters, these pious “democratic” rituals have become critical events over the past 20 years. This is true even in the most authoritarian countries where so much is predetermined. From the parties in the running to the authorised candidates and even the results.
As artificial as they may be, these rites still represent a risk for those in power. Rulers need expert skill to ensure both maximum control over their institutions and demonstrations of love from their people. Consequently, the outcome of the race – between increasingly artful electoral manipulation and limitless possible manifestations of democratic expression – is never entirely certain.
From Kinshasa to Kampala, from Brazzaville to Luanda and Bujumbura, courageous dissenters have organised numerous protests, usually with the approval – and sometimes active support – of the general population. These protests express the frustrations and expectations of a generation fed up with regimes clinging to power and responding to growing disillusion with increasing authoritarianism.
The ruling parties have, on the whole, proved themselves highly resourceful and resilient against the desire for change. Their victory has been comprehensive. Only Kenya is the exception: a second vote is set for October 26 following the Supreme Court’s surprise decision to invalidate the election results. In the DRC, Joseph Kabila’s delaying tacticshave so far allowed him to remain in power. And while Dos Santos eventually withdrew his candidature due to illness, the election of his chosen successor has ensured power in Angola remains in his faction’s hands.
<h2>In power until 2034</h2>
The string of Central and East African elections got off to a bad start. In April 2015, the president of Burundi controversially sought a third term in office. Although devastated by 10 years of internal strife, Burundi had become a symbol of peaceful transition in the region. Three months of tactical manoeuvring and brutal repression were required to bring victory to the incumbent president. This pushed the country back to the brink of civil war and further plunged it down the ranks of the world’s poorest countries.
The resulting crisis and the violent response by this relatively inexperienced president threw discredit on other outgoing presidents in the region, all flagrant repeat offenders. They were forced to up their game.
In February 2016, Museveni took office for the fifth time in Uganda amid relative calm. In March, in a tenser national atmosphere, Congolese president Denis Sassou-Nguesso started on the first of the three extra terms allowed by the recent constitutional reform. He could still be in power in 2031, at nearly 90 years of age.
Not to be outdone, Rwandan President Paul Kagame presided over a constitutional referendum in 2015 enabling him to remain in power until 2034. The reform was approved by 98% of voters, with a voter turnout of more than 98%.
Overall, pending the outcomes in Kenya and DRC, each of the self-proclaimed candidates who won the recent bout of electoral contests can boast enviable popular mandates, and even landslide victories.
<h2>Every leader for themselves</h2>
In the eyes of these leaders their longevity, and that of their counterparts in the region, constitutes in and of itself a justification for remaining power.
Their relations, alliances and conflicts were carved out in a shared past, marked by civil wars and fiercely violent regional clashes. Widespread structural insecurity plagues the entire region as a result. The insecurity is fuelled by governments’ failure to lay down formal, mutually beneficial, political frameworks for cooperation and regional integration. Yet such frameworks would allow them to develop the human resources and agricultural and mining potential of the region in an equitable manner.
In 2013, as part of the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, African Intervention Brigades were authorised to take offensive measures to neutralise the main militia groups in the country’s Eastern region. The Brigades’ main target was the M23, a movement supported by Rwanda and Uganda, according to intelligence later submitted to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The return to low-scale warfare is a sign of a regulated joint governance of the instability.
Despite the presence of peacekeeping forces, numerous political and criminal armed groups still control vast, lawless zones. In their own ways, these groups secure the exploitation of natural resources. They supply a lucrative cross-border trade run at the highest levels of government. These activities bring in significant profits for the ruling classes. They also allow countries in the sub-region to export goods they do not produce themselves. And they ensure the continued viability of the various regional and international trade routes towards the Indian Ocean.
At every stage of wealth creation, profits are essentially redistributed according to private interests. It is therefore easy to understand why each head of state believes themselves best placed to serve both national and personal interests, and the interests of the political-ethnic groups they represent.
<h2>The price of longevity</h2>
When they came to power, the new generation of leaders from the Great Horn of Africa embodied the new ideal of “good governance”. They were “strong men” at the head of “strong and sustainable democracies”, ensuring the order and security necessary for development.
During the course of these elections, none of these so-called democrats, so regularly and resoundingly “elected” by their citizens, had any thoughts of retirement. Setting aside Kabila, whose fate is still undecided, at least two of them, in Burundi and Uganda, had no qualms about changing their country’s constitution to ensure their own reelection.
But in a region of considerable wealth, it’s by no means certain that government can indefinitely be determined by the life expectancy of leaders who are still incapable of developing the regional cooperative frameworks that would ensure peace, security and prosperity for their citizens.

Elections in Africa: democratic rituals matter even though the outlook is bleak

Stephen Chan | SOAS, University of London
Kenya’s recently annulled elections will soon be re-run, but the long-term questions they raised about election management are still unanswered. The spotlight is on the work of international observer teams, but there are also much wider questions of electoral capacity – problems that extend to the top of the African Union, and thence across the whole continent.
African democracies are in the process of co-ordinating a generation jump in applied technology. So far, they have actually done a remarkable job by global standards. After all, something like electronic voting is still not used in the UK, where people in raincoats wait patiently while someone with a pencil draws a line through their name on a paper spreadsheet. The rain-sodden voter drips into the polling booth and makes a choice, casts their vote with a pencil on a sheet of paper, and shuffles outside again while putting up an ineffectual umbrella. Nothing has changed for 100 years.
It’s Africa that has led the way – and the West isn’t the place to look for immediate answers for all the problems of running a 21st-century election. One such problem is the use of multiple forms of electronic voting. Voter identification by electronic means is given priority in Nigeria, but even there, it’s not implemented consistently: there are different systems provided by different companies, all submitting tenders on a competitive basis.
The African Union needs to devise a standard set of requirements and attributes for electronic voting across the continent. It’s no longer enough to have a protocol that says paper votes have to be placed into clear plastic ballot boxes. But the African Union has fallen behind. Its previous head, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, was hardly technologically minded; in fact, her successor has apparently stressed the commission urgently needs an email system fit for purpose.
Dlamini-Zuma has now returned to line up for the presidency of her home country, South Africa, whose cabinet is renowned for its technological illiteracy. There are very few images of its current president, Jacob Zuma, working on a laptop or PC, and possibly none of him actually pressing the keys. (His next door neighbour, Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, has seemingly never been pictured with a laptop at all.)
But if the presidents might have trouble sending simple emails, the thousands of local observers at each election will need special training of the sort never attempted before. They need to know not just how the system works, but how it can be made not to work – or at least, to work in ways that do not reflect the electorate’s will. Only after that does the question of international observer capacity come into play.
<h2>Mastering the system</h2>
It’s fair to say that although EU observers to Kenya were deployed far in advance of the election and had good geographical coverage, the team was not replete with electronic expertise. And it’s not as if there was no advance knowledge that this would be an electronic election.
Well before the elections began and before the EU observer team was deployed, senior members of both the EU team and the Kenyan opposition were given access to a detailed paper I prepared on the problems of electronic observation. And there was ample evidence from the 2015 Nigerian elections that these things could be bumpy rides. To be fair, electoral commissions need to upgrade their capacities as well; whatever happened in Kenya, whether wicked or incompetent, it was clear electoral officials were not on top of their game, unlike their Nigerian counterparts, who managed to resolve their problems in the end.
Electoral commissions need to open up all stages of the electronic process to knowledgeable observers, and especially the verification stage. This is where subtle algorithmic adjustments can be inserted to preserve close parity between voting patterns on the ground and “verified” results that “just” deliver very narrow victories to a ruling party.
At least electronic cheating can only really work persuasively in close elections. The days of 90% victories are almost (if not quite) over, but they will be followed a rash of elections “won” by about 2%. Margins of about 4%, as in the Kenyan elections, will have to be open to expert interrogation. As it turned out, Kenya’s elections were annulled on grounds of non-electronic irregularities, but neither the opposition nor the electoral commission seemed able to make sustained cases for or against electronic abuse.
Still, it is Africa that has come almost of age in electronic and digital voting. The West’s elections look like Sony Walkmans in the age of the smartphone. Even that comparison might be a bit flattering: in the UK, going to vote is like cranking up an LP on a turntable to 78rpm. Let’s hope Africa’s new leaders and technocrats will make the generational jump more smoothly in the future, and keep showing the creaky old West the way.

Africa leads the way in election technology, but there’s a long way to go

Nic Cheeseman | University of Birmingham
There is much to celebrate as the world marks International Day of Democracy. The last year has seen important democratic breakthroughs in Africa. In Gambia an entrenched autocrat was forced from power. In Ghana, a sitting president lost an election for the first time.
In just the last few weeks, Kenya has also joined the club of precedent- setting nations, after the Supreme Court ruled that the election of President Uhuru Kenyatta was illegal and must be held again. Not only was this a first in Kenya, it was also the first time that the election of a sitting president had been overturned by the judiciary in Africa.
These changes reflect a broader trend in sub-Saharan Africa and much of the world. An increasing number of countries are holding multiparty elections. And an increasing proportion of these states have witnessed a transfer of power from one party or leader to another.
It’s true that more elections are now being held than at any time in human history. But recent highlights in Gambia, Ghana and Kenya mask a problematic reality, namely that the expansion of multi-party politics has often gone hand-in-hand with political and economic exclusion. Over the past five years, the level of political repression and economic inequality has increased in Africa. In turn, this has called into question the extent of the continent’s democratic gains.
<h2>Rising repression</h2>
In recent times high levels of repression have been witnessed across much of the continent. These include the arrest of opposition leader, Kizza Besigye, as he campaigned against his defeat in the 2016 presidential election in Uganda. Also, in Kenya there were a high number of human rights violations when security forces cracked down on opposition protests during the election.
According to Freedom House, an American think tank that rates the level of freedom in every country in the world, the quality of civil liberties in Africa has fallen every year for a decade. Seven out of the 15 countries that showed the biggest deterioration in the quality of their political environment over the last 12 months were African. They are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Niger, South Sudan, and Zambia. Next year, Tanzania may well join that list.
Other forms of political exclusion are also prevalent. Rwanda leads the world on female legislative representation while Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda also perform well on this metric. But very few women are ever elected in the continent’s largest states such as Angola, Nigeria and the DRC.
Minority groups often suffer a similar fate. In Botswana, a state often lauded as one of those leading on democratic rights in Africa, the indigenous San community have been largely excluded from the political process. Similarly, lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and queer citizens typically find that their human rights are undermined. Fortunately, this is not true of countries with more progressive constitutions such as South Africa.
<h2>Rising inequality</h2>
In many states, political exclusion has gone hand in hand with rising economic inequality. As a result the relative poverty – the gap between the rich and the poor – is growing. This is despite the fact that the level of absolute poverty has fallen in a number of countries.
In other words, serious developmental gains are occurring at the same time that other forms of economic exclusion are intensifying.
One of the most stunning facts about the continent is that the <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi">Human Development Index</a> – a composite statistic of life expectancy, education, and per capita income indicators – shows that
<blockquote><a href="http://africasacountry.com/2017/01/african-inequality-rising/">every country in Africa is today less equal than it was in 2010</a>.</blockquote>
More worryingly, there is no evidence that democracies are performing better than authoritarian systems on this issue. If anything, the reverse is true. Indeed, one of the most intriguing paradoxes of African democracy is that it is those countries that are most democratic that are most unequal. Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa, three of the continent’s most secure democracies, feature the highest levels of inequality in the world.
The combination of political and economic exclusion in Africa is important for intrinsic and instrumental reasons. Intrinsically, democracy is failing to deliver if it is not helping the worst as much as the best off. Instrumentally, the combination of economic and political exclusion increases the risk that political grievances will develop into instability.
<h2>Building a more inclusive world</h2>
One reason that democratisation has not always reduced the degree of exclusion is that political systems in Africa, much like the rest of the world, tend not to feature inclusive political arrangements.
The continent only features a handful of states that are federal or feature high levels of political devolution. These include Kenya, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa and Sudan. Moreover, even within this small sample the ability of opposition parties to get elected at the sub-national level has often been limited, especially in Ethiopia and Sudan. As a result, individuals and groups that lose out in the race for national office rarely enjoy the kind of local self-government that might make them feel that they have a stake in the political system.
Institutional mechanisms to ensure a form of power sharing are also rare. By and large African states are presidential and highly majoritarian. They also do not feature constitutional provisions that guarantee minorities and losing parties a seat at the table.
Indeed, Burundi is currently the only country that comes close to the consociational “ideal type” of inclusive politics outlined by the famous political scientist Arendt Lijphart. But even there the authoritarian bent of President Pierre Nkurunziza has undermined both the letter and the spirit of the country’s carefully designed constitution.
Absent political representation, and with so few checks and balances on the exercise of power, it is unsurprising that minorities and opposition groups get such a raw deal. Of course, this is not to say that political inclusion is a cure-all: there are many established democracies with less exclusive political arrangements that have failed to reduce economic inequality. But until African political systems become less majoritarian and do a better job of protecting the rights and interests of minorities, the true benefits of democratic government are unlikely to be realised.
This article was first published in The Conversation.

Op-Ed: Democratic breakthroughs in Africa – time to celebrate but worries still linger

Nuraan Davids and Yusef Waghid | Stellenbosch University
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More and more, educational leaders and managers in schools and universities are being confronted with various expressions of hate speech.
In Cape Town, South Africa, a group of high school boys compiled a songwhich included the lyrics: “I feel pain unearthly because of my hatred of kaffirs”. The word “kaffir” is an apartheid-era racial slur and possibly the most offensive word in the South African lexicon. At the University of Witwatersrand, also in South Africa, the phrase “Kill a Jew” was spray-painted on one of its main buildings.
Similarly, in the US, racist flyers were found posted on the campus of Weber State University in Utah. The flyers were recruiting students to the white supremacist Alt-Right movement and declared that “diversity is a code word for White genocide”.
In May this year Stellenbosch University in South Africa became another example. Three students put up Nazi-inspired posters on campus advertising an “Anglo-Afrikaner student” event under the motto “Fight for Stellenbosch”.
The incident caused a massive outcry and the university acted immediately and decisively to condemn the inflammatory hate speech. The students were found guilty of contravening the Student Disciplinary Code, which states that
<blockquote>A student shall not act in a manner that is racist, unfairly discriminatory, violent, grossly insulting, abusive or intimidating against any other person.
Incidents like these bring to the fore the question of how institutions of learning can and should be responding to such controversies, which lay bare our simmering intolerance of difference and “otherness”.
In our latest book, Tolerance and Dissent within Education: On cultivating Debate and Understanding, we look at how the concept of tolerance might be understood, cultivated and enacted in and through education.
One of the arguments we make is that schools and universities should deliberately widen the exposure of students and learners to a diversity of people and views. This will develop their capacities as democratic citizens and enhance the human quest for flourishing in everyday social life.
<h2>What is tolerance?</h2>
Andrew Murphy, a scholar from Rutgers University, describes tolerance as
<blockquote>the self-restraint of not restricting or reducing the rights or autonomy of others, or other ways of being and acting.</blockquote>
But in a global context of heightened bigotry, some people see an appeal to tolerance as a defence of hate speech or racism. This is not what tolerance is. All views and actions should only be tolerated to the extent that they don’t harm others – physically, psychologically or emotionally.
According to the classical Greek philosopher Socrates, tolerance is about the pursuit of truth. It is about being prepared to see the value of another person’s perspective or truth. This necessarily means humbling oneself and acknowledging one’s own limitations and fallibility. Tolerance, then, is fundamentally about equality; about recognising the capacity for both moral truth and error in ourselves and others.
Amy Gutmann from the University of Pennsylvania describes toleranceas
<blockquote>agreeing to disagree about beliefs and practices that are a matter of basic liberty.</blockquote>
This, she argues, is a way to ensure larger civic participation of people, who are recognised as equals by their fellow citizens.
Simply put, tolerance is the choice to “agree to disagree” because we respect each other as moral and civic equals.
<h2>Difference, democracy and human flourishing</h2>
Whenever diverse communities of people come together there is the potential for peaceful coexistence as well as for conflict. If we were to all agree on what to think or how to act the need for tolerance would disappear. But we don’t. So exercising tolerance is an acknowledgement of difference and disagreement – and, at the same time, a decision to co-exist despite these differences, rather than destroy them or each other.
This is fundamental to democracy, which is about equality and the right of people to believe what they believe. Agreement or consensus may be a desired end –- if only to resolve conflict – but it is not a democratic imperative. Tolerance is the tool that helps us democratically manage the dynamics of any plural community or society.
But the value of tolerance goes beyond that. In protecting and cultivating diversity, tolerance also creates the conditions for human flourishing. Disagreement and dissent can be seen as processes of “mutual incitement”. When people disagree, they are in fact inciting each other to think anew and differently about established ideas or beliefs. It is through disagreement that we dislodge ourselves from rigid ways of thinking and being – and refine our ideas and positions.
<h2>The responsibilities of schools and universities</h2>
Schools and universities must make sure that students and learners are exposed to multiple perspectives and ways of doing things. They have to encounter different viewpoints and arguments, and especially those that disrupt their own ways of thinking and their ideas of the world.
It is important that the teacher’s worldview isn’t the only one propagated in the classroom. This means teaching in a way such that pupils or students are invited to bring their own identities and equal intelligence into the conversation. They must be encouraged to engage in deliberation and debate, with mutual respect.
Critical to any educative endeavour is an understanding that there is always the possibility of another perspective and, hence, disagreement. If educational institutions can protect learners from hate speech, whilst also successfully teaching them this this, they will prepare them to become both better democratic citizens and richer people.</blockquote>
This article was first published in The Conversation.

How tolerance enhances democracy and the quest for human flourishing

George Gathigi | University of Nairobi
The media has been a critical part of the Kenyan election process. But did they do a good job?
I spoke to a variety of sources including journalists, commentators and experts and a number of issues came out. Overall, the insights they gave me suggest that the mainstream media’s coverage of the 2017 general election can best be described as a mixed bag. While it played a very important role, it still has a way to go in terms of the factual, unbiased and objective coverage of elections.
During the election process the media remained at the forefront of presenting different opinions – leading newspapers, television and radio stations all presented different views, and carried opinions from political figures across the spectrum.
But one criticism that came through was that sections of radio, especially local language stations, were very often parochial. Some played extremely partisan politics that was more aligned to local audiences than to national interests.
Another criticism expressed by many of the people I spoke to was that they felt the mainstream media had been lazy in its coverage of competing candidates. The largest media outlets constantly amplified the political binary represented by the two main coalitions, the National Super Alliance (NASA) and the Jubilee Party (JP). There was limited coverage outside the two coalitions with other parties and candidates receiving little airtime.
<h2>Preaching the peace</h2>
The Kenyan media has struggled with the burden of being accused of fuelling post-election violence in 2007 and 2008. For example it was accused of failing to moderate hate messages and of passing on messages that incited violence. TV stations were accused of showing violent messages that led to retaliation between members of different communities.
Given these experiences, this time round the media was at pains to emphasise messages of peace throughout the electioneering period. It also showed restraint and self-censorship in terms of the information and images it presented.
This was evident if you compared coverage provided by the international media with the Kenyan media. While international media has alluded to imminent violence and showed images of isolated instances – before and after the polls closed – the Kenyan media has been more careful.
<h2>Assessing coverage</h2>
Journalists played a critical role in negotiating political and electoral discourse. But the people I spoke to called into question the professionalism of some of the members of the press.
Some people felt that adherence to the principles of truth and accuracy, independence, fairness and impartiality was wanting. There are examples of journalists perceived to be partisan for example Kameme FM broadcasters, some KTN and Citizen anchors and reporters. And that some journalists, including well known television anchors, revealed their political biases by seeming to favour specific candidates and parties.
Another issue that was raised was that some journalists blurred the lines between the personal and the professional. This was especially problematic on social media platforms. The impartiality expected of journalists was viewed as compromised when they openly expressed their political preferences.
The elections also come with a range of issues which demanded various levels of inquiry and analysis. The knowledge of many journalists didn’t always match these demands. At times coverage was shallow and not critically engaging.
In addition, while media houses called on dozens of “experts” and “analysts”, many couldn’t make contributions that justified their titles. Television stations paraded what they called “eminent” and “super” panels to little effect. Beyond being large in size, the panels were often thin when it came to substance.
One big gap was that mainstream media didn’t feature many women. ‘Manels’ (men-only panels) dominated television broadcasts and fewer women were used as news sources and on-air analysts. Women politicians also received significantly less coverage – and far more critical coverage – than their male counterparts.
<h2>The highs and lows</h2>
Compared with previous elections there was been an improvement in live coverage, immediacy, and updates on the campaigns, as well as the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission’s preparations. Media houses also followed the various legal challenges relating to the 2017 elections very closely.
There were also genuine attempts to encourage issue-based debating platforms and to give different contestants opportunities to argue their positions and engage with the electorate.
Media houses also deployed more resources than ever before to cover campaigns in various parts of the country. The rise of fact-checking was also a notable development.
Some of the low moments included the presidential debates that didn’t go as planned. This denied voters the opportunity to fully engage with the candidates. Nevertheless, the media must be commended for organising them.
There were also times when the mainstream media was seen to compete with bloggers to break news. The rush to publish meant that allegations and challenges weren’t verified and that assertions by politicians weren’t checked first.
There were also examples of journalists being sluggish in setting the agenda. For example, there was a general lack of inquiry into campaign financing, the use of state resources for campaigns and the conduct of party primaries.
<h2>Evolving role of social media</h2>
The role of traditional media in election coverage has come under pressure for two reasons.
The first is the emergence of digital platforms that allow political and election discourse, combined with the rise of citizen journalism. This means that the mainstream media is now just one of many news sources.
The second is that traditional media houses are under increasing financial pressure. Many have cut costs by letting experienced journalists go, in turn affecting the quality of media coverage.
But when all is said and done, the mainstream media continues to play a critical role in educating and informing the populace. The increased number of media outlets, especially local language radio and television stations, has ensured broader access to election information.
The mainstream media continues to provide a platform where the people can exchange ideas and engage with their leaders. The integration of multiple platforms including print, broadcast and digital has allowed broader interaction with audiences such that the media both speaks and listens.

Op-Ed: How the media covered Kenya’s general election

Sarah Logan | Economist, International Growth Centre
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Critical elections are being held in Rwanda and Kenya. In Rwanda, the incumbent Paul Kagame will face Frank Habineza, of the Democratic Green Party of Rwanda and independent candidate Philippe Mpanyimana.
In Kenya, Raila Odinga, representing an umbrella opposition party, the National Super Alliance, will challenge incumbent Uhuru Kenyatta of the Jubilee Party.
Some controversy already mars both polls. Victoire Ingabire, considered the strongest opposition leader in Rwanda, remains jailed for threatening state security. The Rwandan constitution was also recently amended to allow Kagame to run for a third term and to potentially rule until 2034.
In Kenya, there’s been considerable criticism of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, the body running the election. Issues have included the reliability of the technology being used and the alleged partiality of the commission’s former leadership. And the recent printing of 1.2 million extra ballot papers has raised suspicions of planned vote rigging. The torture and murder of Christopher Msando, the commission’s head of information and technology, has further increased concerns.
<div id="attachment_268267" style="width: 346px" class="wp-caption alignleft"><img aria-describedby="caption-attachment-268267" decoding="async" loading="lazy" class="wp-image-268267 size-full" src="http://cnbc.africa/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Raila_Odinga_Elections_Wikimedia.jpg" alt="" width="336" height="504" />Kenyan opposition leader, Raila Odinga: Wikimedia</div>
With their frequent irregularities, it’s easy to become cynical about elections in Africa. But we must fight our scepticism and indifference because elections continue to be an extremely important component of the continent’s growing democracy.
<h2>Elections and democracy</h2>
While elections alone are insufficient for democracy, they are nevertheless a prerequisite. This is because they promote political participation and competition needed for democracy. It’s the failure or absence of elections that largely defines dictatorships.
Other prerequisites for democracy include:
<ul>
<li>checks on executive power,</li>
<li>civilian control of the military,</li>
<li>civil rights and due process, and</li>
<li>an independent media and active civil society.</li>
</ul>
Since the early 1990s, elections in Africa have, on the whole, become increasingly free and fair. A number of factors have contributed to this. The effectiveness of electoral governance – institutions and regulatory norms – has been the most important. The legitimacy of elections depends on clear procedural rules.
Studies have found that the electoral management boards are the most significant indicators of the quality of electoral governance. In particular, whether a board is autonomous of government is crucial. Very few African countries inherited autonomous electoral management boards at independence. But, in line with global trends, their prevalence has been rising.
By 2002 more than half of African electoral management boards were fully autonomous, 29% were semi-autonomous, and only 20% weren’t autonomous.
International election observation has also contributed to elections becoming more free and fair. Their presence can reduce fraud and increase domestic confidence in the process. Inviting international observers to monitor an election has now become a necessary conditionfor an election to be considered internationally legitimate. Refusal to do so is almost akin to admitting electoral fraud.
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Long-term observers begin work months ahead of an election. This is because free and fair elections depend a great deal on what happens before voting day. In fact, vote buying and political intimidation before polling day are more common than disputes over vote counting or polling procedures.
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<h2>Free media and active citizens</h2>
A free media and active civil society continue to play an indispensable oversight role. This includes keeping institutions honest and keeping people informed.
A study in Sierra Leone showed that election debates between parliamentary candidates were very effective. Recorded debates between local parliamentary candidates were shown in numerous villages.
An evaluation of their impact showed that watching the election debates substantially increased viewers’ political knowledge. It also made it more likely that they would vote along policy (rather than ethnic) lines. Electedpoliticians who had been involved in the debates also tended to invest more in their constituencies, and to visit them more often.
<h2>Civil society</h2>
Civil society has a particular role in promoting a peaceful electoral environment. Its role is particularly crucial where tensions are high. Non-partisan citizen observers and monitoring groups, such as the West Africa Election Observers Network, are increasingly involved in election monitoring. Some of the results have been impressive. For example, a coalition of observers in Ghana trained and deployed about 4000 people to cover the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections.
Regional blocs have also been important in strengthening democracy by enforcing electoral outcomes. A good example was when the Economic Community of West African States stepped in after the Gambian president Yahya Jammeh refused to leave office after losing the 2016 election. The regional body’s commitment to remove him by force if necessary was highly commendable.
Its influence can also be seen in the fact that 14 out of its 15 member states have presidents who have been in office for less than two terms. The Economic Community of West African States should serve as a model to other regional blocs.
<h2>Making Africans polls free and fair</h2>
A great deal of progress has been made on improving political participation across the continent. But genuine political competition in elections remains a challenge. More work is still needed to remove biases in favour of incumbents. Another area that needs work is lifting restrictions on access to state-controlled media by opposition parties.
And for democracy to be strengthened further a number of players have to take an active role. This includes governments, opposition parties, the media, citizens, civil society and the international community.

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