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African Union Member States (55) reporting COVID-19 cases (4,812,313), deaths (130,025) and recoveries (4,351,816) by region: Central (172,873 cases; 2,781 deaths; 159,001 recoveries): Burundi (4,650; 6; 4,198), Cameroon (77,982; 1,270; 72,926), CAR (7,085; 97; 6,665), Chad (4,927; 173; 4,742), Congo (11,658; 153; 10,591), DRC (31,386; 782; 27,654), Equatorial Guinea (8,476; 113; 8,146), Gabon (24,365; 150; 21,791), Sao Tome and Principe (2,344; 37; 2,288) Eastern (647,406; 12,678; 536,199): Comoros (3,949; 146; 3,719), Djibouti (11,523; 153; 11,354), Eritrea (4,022; 14; 3,812), Ethiopia (270,944; 4,139; 235,850), Kenya (170,041; 3,124; 116,018), Madagascar (41,184; 828; 40,028), Mauritius (1,356; 17; 1,181), Rwanda (26,878; 352; 25,542), Seychelles (11,145; 40; 9,936), Somalia (14,647; 768; 6,717), South Sudan (10,688; 115; 10,514), Sudan (35,289; 2,600; 27,949), Tanzania** (509; 21; 178), Uganda (45,231; 361; 43,401) Northern (1,453,109; 43,808; 1,276,107): Algeria (128,198; 3,586; 89,292), Egypt (259,540; 14,950; 190,254), Libya (184,815; 3,116; 171,279), Mauritania (19,407; 462; 18,377), Morocco (518,458; 9,135; 506,443), Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (739; 46; 691), Tunisia (341,952; 12,513; 299,771) Southern (2,066,519; 64,531; 1,933,721): Angola (33,607; 745; 27,529), Botswana (56,313; 831; 50,494), Eswatini (18,587; 672; 17,855), Lesotho (10,825; 326; 6,434), Malawi (34,323; 1,154; 32,598), Mozambique (70,697; 835; 69,232), Namibia (54,268; 807; 50,053), South Africa (1,654,551; 56,293; 1,551,520), Zambia (94,430; 1,275; 91,443), Zimbabwe (38,918; 1,593; 36,563) Western (472,406; 6,227; 446,788): Benin (8,058; 101; 7,893), Burkina Faso (13,424; 166; 13,248), Cabo Verde (30,122; 261; 28,163), Côte d&#39;Ivoire (47,195; 301; 46,591), Gambia (5,990; 178; 5,767), Ghana (93,775; 784; 91,853), Guinea (23,110; 161; 20,840), Guinea Bissau (3,760; 68; 3,511), Liberia (2,179; 86; 2,033), Mali (14,262; 516; 9,559), Niger (5,409; 192; 5,080), Nigeria (166,254; 2,071; 156,546), Senegal (41,296; 1,138; 39,932), Sierra Leone (4,140; 79; 3,128), Togo (13,432; 125; 12,644)Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC).
Media files

Coronavirus: African Union Member States reporting COVID-19 cases as of 29 May 2021, 9 am EAT

By Zaynab Mohamed – Political Analyst



After Prime Minister Thomas Thabane deployed the army on the streets of Maseru over the weekend, South African mediators were sent to ease the tensions.



Two-day talks between stakeholders were concluded, with Deputy Prime Minister Monyane Moleleki and South African mediator Jeff Radebe signing an agreement which stated that, among other things, the processes of Parliament must continue to ensure that Mr Thabane will leave office with “dignity, grace and security”.



Mr Radebe told journalists that the “timeline is immediate” for Mr Thabane’s exit.



Mr Thabane, however, does not agree. The 80-year-old prime minister fired back in an interview published in the Lesotho Times on Thursday, April 23, saying, “People that I don’t report to [are] setting the time for my departure, their own convenient time. They have no right to do so … I don’t understand what all this rush is about. I am not going to give in to their demands.”



When the army was deployed, there were rumours that Police Commissioner Holomo Molibeli had been arrested. It later emerged that, although Mr Molibeli was not arrested, Mr Thabane did, in fact, order his arrest and that of two of his subordinates, but Lieutenant General Mojalefa Lesoela, the commander of the Lesotho Defence Force, refused to carry out this order.



Mr Thabane earlier (unsuccessfully) attempted to fire Mr Molibeli after he charged Mr Thabane with playing a part in the murder of his ex-wife Lipolelo Thabane.



The deal to form a new coalition government signed by the All Basotho Congress (ABC) and the Democratic Congress (DC) is now supported by enough MPs to guarantee the 61-seat threshold. Two of Mr Thabane’s current coalition partners, the Basotho National Party (BNP) and the Reformed Congress of Lesotho (RCL), support the ABC-DC coalition and so does a smaller opposition party, the Popular Front for Democracy (PFD).



Now that parliamentary proceedings can go ahead, steps towards the vote of no confidence are being taken.



The Senate will be sitting on Friday, April 24, to approve an amendment bill which advises King Letsie III to dissolve Parliament if Mr Thabane loses a vote of no confidence. Once approved by the Senate, the amendment bill will then have to be signed into law by King Letsie.



Then the lower house will sit for the vote of no confidence, which Mr Thabane looks certain to lose.



By deploying the army to restore order, Mr Thabane showed his willingness to resort to violence, but with General Lesoela refusing to carry out his orders, bloodshed was avoided this time.



With all odds against him – a murder case, a vote of no confidence, and a disobedient army boss – we would assume that Mr Thabane would have cut his losses by now.



However, he still stands firm, making us wonder what he still has planned for the mountain kingdom.

Op-Ed: Thabane puzzled by “all this rush”

JOHANNESBURG, Jan 16 (Reuters) &#8211; The United Nations World Food Programme said on Thursday that a record 45 million people in the 16-nation Southern African Development Community faced growing hunger following repeated drought, widespread flooding and economic disarray.



Southern Africa is in the grips of a severe drought, as climate change wreaks havoc in impoverished countries already struggling to cope with extreme natural disasters, such as Cyclone Idai which devastated Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi in 2019.



Zimbabwe, once the breadbasket of southern Africa, is experiencing its worst economic crisis in a decade, marked by soaring inflation and shortages of food, fuel, medicines and electricity.



&#8220;This hunger crisis is on a scale we&#8217;ve not seen before and the evidence shows it&#8217;s going to get worse,&#8221; the WFP&#8217;s Regional Director for Southern Africa, Lola Castro, said in a statement.



&#8220;The annual cyclone season has begun and we simply cannot afford a repeat of the devastation caused by last year&#8217;s unprecedented storms.&#8221;



The agency plans to provide &#8220;lean season&#8221; assistance to 8.3 million people grappling with &#8220;crisis&#8221; or &#8220;emergency&#8221; levels of hunger in eight of the hardest-hit countries, which include Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique, Madagascar, Namibia, Lesotho, Eswatini and Malawi.



To date, WFP has secured just $205 million of the $489 million required for this assistance and has been forced to resort heavily to internal borrowing to ensure food reaches those in need, it said.



In December, the United Nations said it was procuring food assistance for 4.1 million Zimbabweans, a quarter of the population of a country where shortages are being exacerbated by runaway inflation and climate-induced drought.



&#8220;Zimbabwe is in the throes of its worst hunger emergency in a decade, with 7.7 million people – half the population – seriously food insecure,&#8221; the agency said.



In Zambia and drought-stricken Lesotho, 20% of the population faces a food crisis, as do 10% of Namibians.



Castro said that if the agency does not receive the necessary funding, it will have no choice but to assist fewer of those most in need and with less.



(Reporting by Nqobile Dludla; Editing by Jon Boyle and Giles Elgood)

UN food agency says record 45 million people across Southern Africa face hunger

By Gary van Staden, Head of Research, NKC African Economics



The third date since July by which Lesotho Prime Minister Tom Thabane was supposed to reopen Parliament came and went this week with no indication that the embattled leader of the All Basotho Convention (ABC) is ready to face down a motion of no confidence, let alone implement the agreement brokered by South African President Cyril Ramaphosa some two months ago.



Mr
Thabane prorogued Parliament sine die (without stipulating when it would
reassemble) in June to avoid a no-confidence vote brought by his own party. The
three dates on which the legislature was meant to reopen – August 5, August 16,
and September 25 – have passed into the clouded history of the country with no
indication of when or even if Parliament will be reopened. 



The
much-heralded July agreement signed by Mr Thabane, opposition parties, and NGOs
and labelled a major breakthrough has apparently joined several other
‘breakthrough’ agreements on the trash heap of Lesotho’s toxic politics. 



The
thrust of the July Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was to give legislative
authority to a so-called National Legislative Reform Authority (NLRA) that
would co-ordinate the national reforms process in the kingdom. The reform
authority will be constituted in terms of an act of Parliament, which will
guide the country in effecting constitutional governance, security, and media
reforms. 



Mr
Ramaphosa welcomed the signing as a “historic milestone that firmly set Lesotho
on the road to reform. The Basotho people can celebrate the convergence of
consensus that has led to this historic agreement and has built a strong
foundation for reforms to go ahead.” 



But
Mr Thabane had other ideas and at first suggested that Parliament be reopened
only to legislate the NLRA and then immediately prorogue again to avoid the
no-confidence vote; a suggestion even elements of his own party rejected. 



He
has since looked for ways to avoid or defeat the no-confidence vote – including
this week’s extraordinary attempt to secure the support of his arch enemy,
Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) leader Mothetjoa Metsing. 



With
the support of Mr Metsing and all 11 LCD Members of Parliament (MP), the prime
minister might just survive by a narrow margin of two votes. That is of course
assuming that all the MPs back Mr Thabane, all his coalition partners vote
against the motion, and all of Mr Metsing’s MPs comply. 



That
seems a tall order, but Mr Thabane is that desperate. 



Some
of Mr Metsing’s demands for his support – that Mr Thabane forms a government of
national unity and that former army commander Tlali Kamoli be released from
prison – are unpalatable to many MPs, so the initiative seems doomed.



Meanwhile,
a growing row between Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) commander Lieutenant General
Mojalefa Letsoela and Defence Minister Tefo Mapesela is straining
civilian-military relations to the increasing concern of civil society. The
army has been at the centre of Lesotho’s instability over the years, with its
critics accusing it of meddling in politics. 



The
LDF commander claimed that unnamed political elements were trying to infiltrate
and destabilise the forces, but local media reported it was common knowledge
that the defence minister was the target. 



Lt
Gen. Letsoela vowed never to allow “outsiders” to interfere with the army,
while Mr Mapesela has accused Lt Gen. Letsoela of “revolting against civilian
authority and taking major decisions without consultation.” Strained relations
between the military and civilian authority is probably the very last thing
Lesotho needs right now.



It
is clear that Mr Thabane regards his treaty and other agreement obligations as
secondary by some measure to his own political survival. While the
‘breakthrough’ agreements that could assist Lesotho find some measure of
stability sit on ice, the prime minister continues to break agreements to
reopen Parliament and spends most of his time looking for unlikely alliances to
save his political skin. 



We
remain convinced that agreements that depend on Mr Thabane’s integrity and
compliance, including the July MoU, are doomed to fail. Unless Mr Ramaphosa, as
the Southern Africa Development Community facilitator in Lesotho, ends the
obsession with keeping Mr Thabane in power, nothing is going to change. 



Agreements
that suit Mr Thabane and South Africa will not help Lesotho.

Op-Ed: Lesotho’s Thabane keeps Parliament suspended to avoid vote

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Martin Makgatlhe, CEO and Founder, Motswedi Securities Lesotho joins CNBC Africa to look at movements shaping the Lesotho market.

Lesotho to have its first listing soon

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Khotso Moji a Money Market, Fixed Income and Structuring Dealer at Standard Bank joins CNBC Africa to look at movements shaping the Lesotho market.

Standard Bank sees improved investment opportunities in Lesotho

By AfDB Vice President for Energy , Amadou Hott
With the lowest power consumption per capita in the world, sub-Saharan Africa is arguably the darkest section of the global village with investments, social and economic growth and jobs creation hobbled by frequent outages, load shedding and total black outs. Over 645 million Africans lack access to electricity.
Yet the continent is rich in energy resources, with well over 10 terawatts of solar potential, 350 gigawatts of hydroelectric potential, 110 gigawatts of wind potential, and an additional 15 gigawatts of geothermal potential. All of these is outside Africa’s huge reserves of coal and gas, which can provide some of the continent’s cheapest electricity.
Surrounded by energy wealth, most Africans still wonder why their countries are so power poor. From the comfort of their friend’s home in the Kingdom of Lesotho, Augustine and his wife Anna, usually spend their evenings staring at the vast Katse dam, the highest dam in Africa, located on the Malibamatso River. They marvel at the evidence of what Mankind can achieve. Lesotho sells billions of litres of the “White Gold” from this dam to neighboring South Africa; the dam also pumps 72 Megawatts of electricity into the national grid.
Completed in 2009, the Katse dam’s imposing 132 KV transmission towers and lines that connect to the grid disappear into the horizon, beyond the towering Maluti mountains that have stood firm for at least 200 million years. Augustine is however moody, most of the time. Saddened by the fact that many of his compatriots still do not have access to electricity, several of their vital social and commercial needs remain unmet due to lack of electricity.
This scenario is Africa-wide. The lack of access to electricity cuts off the vital wants of society. Clearly, children underperform for lack of electricity as schools and homes lack electricity and lives are at risk at hospitals across the continent, as lifesaving equipment lie comatose, unable to be deployed for the purposes they were purchased and installed for.
For these reasons and more, Anna and Augustine are hoping that Africa’s business and political leaders will put Africa’s industrialization and energy drive at the top of their agenda during the 53rd annual meetings of the African Development Bank in the coastal city of Busan, South Korea in May 2018. Thankfully, this year’s annual meeting’s theme is “Accelerate Africa’s Industrialisation”.
Korea holds interesting memories for Augustine. The happiest moments of his life were in May 2002. That was the month his home was connected to the distribution network with a pre-payment meter and this happened just before the commencement of the 2002 FIFA World Cup jointly hosted by Japan and South Korea. The electricity meters and lines connected to Augustine’s community were courtesy of a US$36 million Utilities Sector Reform Project, financed by the African Development Bank, the World Bank and the European Union.
Augustine worked with the project team as a driver. He witnessed the evolution of the project between 2000 and 2007, driving engineers and project managers around his mountainous country and parts of South Africa. The smiles of tens of thousands of new electricity customers are permanently etched in his memory:  from deep rural cross-border pilot electrification projects in Dili-Dili (where it was cheaper to be connected from South Africa) to the Letseng diamond mine (renowned for its large stones) and an ultra-modern ski resort in Mokhotlong (frequented by rich tourists); and to Semonkong village (which has the highest waterfall in Africa) and is supplied by a 2MW mini-hydro power plant run by the national utility company.
They recall the problems folks in Lesotho faced in 2008, when Eskom (the South African utility, that has over 40, 000 MWs installed capacity) unexpectedly restricted supplies to the Lesotho Electricity Corporation (LEC, a 100 MW customer). This led to load-shedding and increased costs.  However, LEC was able to buy power, from as far away as Mozambique, thanks to a functioning electricity market under the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP). Mozambique also has the Mozal aluminum smelter plant, which commenced operations in 2000 and produces over 500, 000 tonnes per year for export, and recently for the local downstream industry. Mozal is the largest industrial employer in Mozambique.
Similarly, Zambia, Botswana and the Democratic Republic of Congo also have huge copper reserves that can be refined locally and used for electrical cables and equipment to drive the transition to green power in the SAPP and the rest of Africa.
Augustine recently heard on the news that Eskom currently has excess capacity, which it is planning to export to its neighbours.  Eskom is also the sole off-taker for over $19 billion of investments under a 2013-2018 globally acclaimed Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer (REIPP) auction programme. This is driving industrialization and will accelerate South Africa’s transition to green growth.
The African Development Bank, as one of the lead financiers in South Africa, providing over $2 Billion to the power sector, is working with other development partners to replicate this success across Africa. This is underpinned by the Bank’s performance in 2017 –  when it approved 31 energy projects in 23 countries, totaling $1.4 Billion.
In the same fiscal period, the Bank’s private sector investments rose by 40% to $400 million, with 100% renewable generation projects, including base-load hydro and solar generation projects in Morocco and Côte d’Ivoire, and key cross-border transmission interconnectors in the West and Central African Power Pool networks. These networks will facilitate the establishment of regional power markets, reduce carbon footprint and accelerate industrialization through the conversion of the region’s vast natural resources like the conversion of bauxite to aluminum, iron ore to steel and gas to fertilizers, and processing of rice, cocoa, fruits and vegetables.
Female entrepreneurs like Anna abound across Africa. Anna remembers how access to electricity enabled her to quit working long hours at one of the huge Taiwanese-owned textile factories in Maseru. That was when she took the bold step to become an entrepreneur. Things are looking up for Anna and her household. This winter will be nice and warm. Their home overlooking the dam now has a solar water heater and a Solar Home System. The authorities will soon replace their old pre-paid meters with smart meters and they will certainly not miss watching any of their favorite matches at this year’s FIFA World Cup in Russia.
After the World Cup, Augustine will have to go see his old friends in high places. He has also heard the rumours and needs to go confirm things for himself. He’s heard through the local grapevine that further industrialization of his community and country is in the offing. Investors are looking for local partners to co-invest and work on a plethora of projects: a 50 MW wind, 20 MW solar and a 500 &#8211; 1000 MW hydro power projects, in Mafeteng. The projects have been initiated by the Bank’s Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa grant). He needs to know how communities and SMEs like him can align with the unfolding positive realities of modern industrialization.

Africa is rich in energy resources but power poor, how the AfDB is working to change this

<figure><img decoding="async" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/219387/original/file-20180517-155564-upsa5z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" alt="File 20180517 155564 upsa5z.jpg?ixlib=rb 1.1" /><figcaption>Burundi’s Pierre Nkurunziza is one of many authoritarian African leaders. 
AMISOM Public Information/Flickr</figcaption></figure>
<a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/cheryl-hendricks-267661">Cheryl Hendricks</a>, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-johannesburg-1275">University of Johannesburg</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/gabriel-ngah-kiven-482032">Gabriel Ngah Kiven</a>, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-johannesburg-1275">University of Johannesburg</a>
There is mounting concern in Africa about a lack of leadership as well as an increasing trend of hard-won democratic rights being reversed. One way this is being done is through presidential term limits being abandoned, or extended. This in turn is leading to a reemergence of authoritarian politics, and political violence.
Extending or abolishing term limits is not unique to the continent. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin won a fourth term <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/18/world/europe/election-russia-putin-president.html">in March 2018</a> after changes to the constitution and some nimble political footwork. And the Chinese parliament <a href="https://www.independent.ie/.../china-abolishes-presidential-term-limits-36692282.html">recently voted</a> to abolish term limits allowing for the possibility of President Xi Jinping becoming president for life. Given that Russia and China play an influential role on the African continent these events don’t bode well for the future of presidents sticking to term limits on the continent.
Burundi is a case in point. A poll <a href="https://theconversation.com/democracy-in-peril-burundis-referendum-will-cement-nkurunzizas-grip-on-power-96544">is being held</a> to amend the constitution to extend presidential term limits from five to seven years. Incumbency would be restricted to two consecutive terms. But the amendment doesn’t apply retroactively which means that President Pierre Nkurunziza could possibly remain in office until 2034. If he lives that long (he’s 55-years-old), and given that he assumed the position in 2005, this would make him president for 29 years.
Burundi is far from alone. Rwanda, Togo, Gabon, Uganda, Chad, Cameroon, Djibouti, Republic of Congo, Sudan, Eritrea, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have all fiddled with term limits. They’ve done this by abolishing, amending or ignoring them, or by simply not holding elections. Other countries such as Ethiopia, Gambia, Lesotho, and Morocco <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/term-limits-for-african-leaders-linked-to-stability/">have never</a> introduced term limits.
Some bids to remove or extend term limits and have failed. These include Frederick Chiluba in 2001 and more recently Edgar Lungu in Zambia, Olusegun Obesanjo of Nigeria (2005), Mamadou Tandja of Niger(2009-2010) and Blaise Compaore of Burkino Faso (2014).
Noteworthy is the fact that many West African countries actually adhere to term limits. This was recognised recently when Ellen Johnson Sirleaf received the Mo Ibrahim <a href="http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/prize/">leadership prize</a> after duly serving her constitutionally mandated term.
The upward trend of amending or abolishing constitutional term limits is likely to increase if organisations like the African Union (AU) don’t deal with the problem. In many countries citizens showing their disapproval, have been met with repression and violence. Large-scale political violence is likely to be the consequence if the trend persists.
<h2>A rolling back of rights</h2>
Africa went through a wave of democratisation from the 1990s. Citizens took to the streets demanding democratic rights. In many countries, the uprisings ended decades of one-partyism and personal rule. The key demands were for multi-party democracy, constitutionalism and that democratic norms and standards be institutionalised.
It’s in this milieu that countries adopted a bill of rights, the rule of law, checks and balances and term limits. Presidential term limits were deemed necessary for a number of reasons. The view was that <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2015/10/05/how-and-why-term-limits-matter">they would enable</a> better governance, equal opportunity to serve in government, curb patronage politics as well as end authoritarianism. These norms and standards were also seen as a way to stabilise countries <a href="http://www.monitor.co.ug/SpecialReports/688342-688342-ptx9ooz/index.html">politically</a>.
It certainly seems that these constitutional gains are being eroded by heads of state seeking to prolong their stay in power. There also appears to be little concerted attempt by bodies such as the AU to stop the erosion of hard-fought for democratic rights.
The AU’s silence may be because of ambiguity in norms and policy, and because of its leadership. The AU’s Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, which was ratified in 2012, rejects unconstitutional changes of government. But it doesn’t say anything specifically about abolishing term limits. <a href="http://archive.ipu.org/idd-E/afr_charter.pdf">Article 23 (5)</a> notes that countries will have appropriate sanction imposed on them if there are:
<blockquote>Any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments, which is an infringement on the principals of democratic change of government</blockquote>
But it doesn’t spell out what type of amendments are being referred to.
The second factor has to do with the fact that many holding leadership positions at the AU are the same men who have amended or abandoned term limits – or come from the countries that have done so. This suggests the organisation won’t be tackling the “third termism” trend any time soon.
<h2>Spurious reasons for extending stays</h2>
A number of arguments have been put forward by leaders seeking to extend, or simply abandoning, term limits.
One is that term limits prevent <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Mugabe-slams-two-term-limit-on-African-leaders-20150614">people’s choice</a> of president. Another is that African leaders have much more to do to bring about development and therefore need more time. A third is that they have the sovereign right to govern and change constitutions as they see fit. And finally, the strongman argument around a president’s ability to keep the country united and to create peace and stability.
Rwanda is a case in point. President Paul Kagame <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/08/05/rwandas-paul-kagame-landslide-poll-win-around-98-votes/">received 99%</a> of the vote in August 2017. There’s no gainsaying that there have been remarkable achievements in rebuilding a post-genocide Rwanda. But if there isn’t anybody (and this is doubtful) capable of challenging Kagame after 18 years of rule, then he hasn’t created an environment for democratic leadership to emerge.
We should also be wary of election results that yield 99% support as this smacks of the heyday of one-man and one-party rule.
<h2>The curse of third terminism</h2>
As Africans prepare to celebrate Africa Day on the 25th of May, we need to keep in mind the ideas that inspired <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/organisation-african-unity-oau">formation</a> of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963 and the <a href="https://au.int/en/history/oau-and-au">African Union</a> in 2001. These were the Pan-African ideals of political and economic integration, solidarity, unity, dignity, justice and equality for all.
The growing trend of “third termism” is likely to prevent African countries from reaching these goals yet again as the interests of individuals are placed above those of citizens and countries.
Africa needs visionary and courageous leadership, not benevolent or autocratic rulers. It needs leaders that can create the enabling environment for democracy, peace, and development to thrive and endure, and for citizens to live to their fullest potential.
Africa also needs citizens who will hold leaders to account and who will contribute to the realisation of the vision of a democratic pan-African future.
As Africans we don’t have to make a choice between democracy and development. We deserve both.
<a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/cheryl-hendricks-267661">Cheryl Hendricks</a>, Professor of Political Science, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-johannesburg-1275">University of Johannesburg</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/gabriel-ngah-kiven-482032">Gabriel Ngah Kiven</a>, PhD candidate in Political Studies at the Department of Politics and International Relations , <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-johannesburg-1275">University of Johannesburg</a>
This article was originally published on <a href="http://theconversation.com">The Conversation</a>. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/presidential-term-limits-slippery-slope-back-to-authoritarianism-in-africa-96796">original article</a>.

Op-Ed: Is Africa on a slippery slope back to authoritarianism?

Nic Cheeseman | University of Birmingham
There is much to celebrate as the world marks International Day of Democracy. The last year has seen important democratic breakthroughs in Africa. In Gambia an entrenched autocrat was forced from power. In Ghana, a sitting president lost an election for the first time.
In just the last few weeks, Kenya has also joined the club of precedent- setting nations, after the Supreme Court ruled that the election of President Uhuru Kenyatta was illegal and must be held again. Not only was this a first in Kenya, it was also the first time that the election of a sitting president had been overturned by the judiciary in Africa.
These changes reflect a broader trend in sub-Saharan Africa and much of the world. An increasing number of countries are holding multiparty elections. And an increasing proportion of these states have witnessed a transfer of power from one party or leader to another.
It’s true that more elections are now being held than at any time in human history. But recent highlights in Gambia, Ghana and Kenya mask a problematic reality, namely that the expansion of multi-party politics has often gone hand-in-hand with political and economic exclusion. Over the past five years, the level of political repression and economic inequality has increased in Africa. In turn, this has called into question the extent of the continent’s democratic gains.
<h2>Rising repression</h2>
In recent times high levels of repression have been witnessed across much of the continent. These include the arrest of opposition leader, Kizza Besigye, as he campaigned against his defeat in the 2016 presidential election in Uganda. Also, in Kenya there were a high number of human rights violations when security forces cracked down on opposition protests during the election.
According to Freedom House, an American think tank that rates the level of freedom in every country in the world, the quality of civil liberties in Africa has fallen every year for a decade. Seven out of the 15 countries that showed the biggest deterioration in the quality of their political environment over the last 12 months were African. They are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Niger, South Sudan, and Zambia. Next year, Tanzania may well join that list.
Other forms of political exclusion are also prevalent. Rwanda leads the world on female legislative representation while Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda also perform well on this metric. But very few women are ever elected in the continent’s largest states such as Angola, Nigeria and the DRC.
Minority groups often suffer a similar fate. In Botswana, a state often lauded as one of those leading on democratic rights in Africa, the indigenous San community have been largely excluded from the political process. Similarly, lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and queer citizens typically find that their human rights are undermined. Fortunately, this is not true of countries with more progressive constitutions such as South Africa.
<h2>Rising inequality</h2>
In many states, political exclusion has gone hand in hand with rising economic inequality. As a result the relative poverty – the gap between the rich and the poor – is growing. This is despite the fact that the level of absolute poverty has fallen in a number of countries.
In other words, serious developmental gains are occurring at the same time that other forms of economic exclusion are intensifying.
One of the most stunning facts about the continent is that the <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi">Human Development Index</a> – a composite statistic of life expectancy, education, and per capita income indicators – shows that
<blockquote><a href="http://africasacountry.com/2017/01/african-inequality-rising/">every country in Africa is today less equal than it was in 2010</a>.</blockquote>
More worryingly, there is no evidence that democracies are performing better than authoritarian systems on this issue. If anything, the reverse is true. Indeed, one of the most intriguing paradoxes of African democracy is that it is those countries that are most democratic that are most unequal. Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa, three of the continent’s most secure democracies, feature the highest levels of inequality in the world.
The combination of political and economic exclusion in Africa is important for intrinsic and instrumental reasons. Intrinsically, democracy is failing to deliver if it is not helping the worst as much as the best off. Instrumentally, the combination of economic and political exclusion increases the risk that political grievances will develop into instability.
<h2>Building a more inclusive world</h2>
One reason that democratisation has not always reduced the degree of exclusion is that political systems in Africa, much like the rest of the world, tend not to feature inclusive political arrangements.
The continent only features a handful of states that are federal or feature high levels of political devolution. These include Kenya, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa and Sudan. Moreover, even within this small sample the ability of opposition parties to get elected at the sub-national level has often been limited, especially in Ethiopia and Sudan. As a result, individuals and groups that lose out in the race for national office rarely enjoy the kind of local self-government that might make them feel that they have a stake in the political system.
Institutional mechanisms to ensure a form of power sharing are also rare. By and large African states are presidential and highly majoritarian. They also do not feature constitutional provisions that guarantee minorities and losing parties a seat at the table.
Indeed, Burundi is currently the only country that comes close to the consociational “ideal type” of inclusive politics outlined by the famous political scientist Arendt Lijphart. But even there the authoritarian bent of President Pierre Nkurunziza has undermined both the letter and the spirit of the country’s carefully designed constitution.
Absent political representation, and with so few checks and balances on the exercise of power, it is unsurprising that minorities and opposition groups get such a raw deal. Of course, this is not to say that political inclusion is a cure-all: there are many established democracies with less exclusive political arrangements that have failed to reduce economic inequality. But until African political systems become less majoritarian and do a better job of protecting the rights and interests of minorities, the true benefits of democratic government are unlikely to be realised.
This article was first published in The Conversation.

Op-Ed: Democratic breakthroughs in Africa – time to celebrate but worries still linger

In an interview following his recent return as Prime Minister of Lesotho, Tom Thabane has blamed the army for the country’s chronic political instability. Stating that his previous administration (after an election in 2012) was “scuttled” by the army, he went on to say that he now intended to neutralise the Lesotho Defence Force, even if it means <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-06-15-who-is-thomas-thabane-and-why-is-lesothos-army-so-scared-of-him">getting rid of it entirely</a>.
That certainly sounds a good idea. After all, what real use is a pondokkie(ramshackle) army? Okay, it gave a <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/1998-09-25-sandfs-chaotic-invasion">good account of itself</a> when the South African National Defence Force entered the country to restore order when opposition parties disputed the result of the general election in 1998. But then that was one of the most ham-fisted operations in the annals of military history.
Anyway, despite its incompetence on that occasion, the South African army did impose control. Given that Lesotho is surrounded by South Africa, who is the 3000-strong military intended to defend the country from?
But whether Thabane’s latest government has the political capital to tame the army, let alone get rid of it, is questionable.
From the outside, politics in Lesotho looks inordinately complicated, with a mish-mash of competing <a href="https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-lesotho-goes-to-the-polls/">political parties</a>, fractious governing coalitions, and repeated interventions by the military. It’s a mess, but basically, it’s not that hard to unravel.
<h2>History of political instability</h2>
After a South African backed <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/lesoverview6.htm">coup in 1986</a>, Lesotho was returned to civilian rule in 1993, when an election returned the Basutoland Congress Party to power with a <a href="http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2181_93.htm">landslide victory </a> and no opposition party representation in parliament.
This was a fault of the British style <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/first-past-post-voting-system/">first-past-the-post</a> electoral system, which produced hugely disproportionate results. A similar outcome was recorded in another election in 1998, although this time, the victor was the <a href="http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2181_98.htm">Lesotho Congress for Democracy</a>.
This was the creation of the sitting Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili, who had walked out of his own ruling party in 1997 after he had lost control of its party machinery. All this was too much for the opposition to stomach, and they poured their protesters on to the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/demonstrators-close-down-businesses-and-government-offices-lesotho">streets of Maseru</a>, the capital. Mosisili called for help, and in shambled the South African National Defence Force.
The South Africans, acting for the Southern African Development Community oversaw inter-party negotiations which resulted in a new and fairer electoral system which combined the first past the post system with <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/proportional-representation">proportional representation</a>.
It worked well at first, ensuring proportionate representation of opposition parties in parliament. It should have led to greater accountability, but it didn’t because Lesotho didn’t have the political culture of give and take to go with it.
In a country with little prospect of employment unless one can access government largesse, politics is about <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2009/mar/14/politics">who can eat </a>. In the political sphere, this means that politicians scramble desperately for position. If they lose out, they undermine those who win.
Since 2002 there has been a steady fragmentation of the once dominant Congress tradition, as party malcontents have hived off to form new parties, and to search out new alliances. Indeed, such was the threat to his position that Mosisili pulled his previous trick once again in 2012, walking out of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy to form the Democratic Congress.
But this proved his undoing, as in an election that year he <a href="http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/048f63004b70ed2c915199a9f8f2aadf/Lesotho-election-leads-to-coalition-battle-20120531">lost out to a multi-party coalition</a> formed by the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/lesothos-interparty-talks-more-turbulence-ahead">All Basotho Convention</a> led by Thabane, a former Lesotho Congress for Democracy minister. But Thabane’s coalition didn’t last long either, its disarray forcing the country into another crisis, and under SADC prompting, another election in <a href="http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Lesotho-elections-free-and-fair-20150302">2015</a>.
<h2>Politics and the military</h2>
Mosisili had sought to shore up his increasingly fragile political position through the support of the army. Thabane had sought to counter this by replacing Mosisili’s appointment of Lieutenant-General Tlali Kamoli as Commander by Brigadier-General Maaparankoe Mahao. This was when the serious trouble started.
Elements loyal to Kamoli staged an attempted coup in 2014 which led to Thabane and his fellow coalition leaders <a href="http://www.enca.com/lesothos-prime-minister-thomas-thabane-south-africa">fleeing to South Africa</a>. Although the coup was thwarted by the Southern African Development Community, which told the army to return to barracks, South Africa insisted that the latest crisis be resolved by the holding of yet another election.
This time round it was Mosisili who scraped home, displacing Thabane as prime minister by forming an unwieldy coalition of seven parties. It was unlikely that this would last for long, so Mosisili turned to the army. A temporary commander had been appointed to head the Lesotho Defence Force during the election campaign, when SADC sent both Kamoli and Mahao into exile .
When they returned after the election, Kamoli clearly expected to be reappointed to his position – and was. Meanwhile, prosecutions of soldiers involved in the attempted coup were winding their way <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/03/lesotho-quash-mutiny-charges-against-freed-soldiers/">through the courts</a>, making Kamoli nervous. Amid this drama, soldiers were sent to detain Mahao, <a href="http://amabhungane.co.za/article/2015-09-23-army-and-state-threaten-lesotho-inquiry">who was shot dead in cold blood</a> (supposedly for “resisting arrest”).
Yet more crisis. Mosisili’s coalition began to unravel. He lost a <a href="http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/a0dd578040400fd09d64ddb29663e5e6/Lesothos-Prime-Minister-loses-confidence-vote-20170103">vote of no-confidence</a> in parliament. With SADC ensuring that he could not use the army to prop himself up in power, he had to face (yes, you’ve got it) <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/06/07/ramaphosa-welcomes-african-union-s-declaring-that-lesotho-polls-were-free-and-fair">another election</a>, just a few weeks ago.
By this time, Mosisili’s political credit was running on empty. But although Thabane’s ABC <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/06/07/ramaphosa-welcomes-african-union-s-declaring-that-lesotho-polls-were-free-and-fair">won 48 out of the 60 constituency seats</a>, it was not enough to form another government, so along came another coalition. How long this one will last, remains to be seen.
What is certain is that the dominant faction in the army remains hostile to Thabane (even if it is loyal to Kamoli rather than Mosisili). Thabane’s estranged wife was <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/06/15/tom-thabane-s-wife-killed-in-random-shooting-ahead-of-inauguration-in-lesotho">assassinated</a> even before he had been sworn in as prime minister, some saying that this was the army warning him to watch his step. This may give him sound domestic reason for wanting to do to the army what should have been done a long time ago: reining them in. But does he have the power to do it?
<h2>Demilitarising Lesotho’s politics</h2>
The best hope lies with decisive action by Southern African Development Community, for whom the troubled situation in Lesotho is a running sore. (South Africa’s deputy president Cyril Ramaphosa, the regional body’s points man for Lesotho, must have a room permanently booked for him at the Maseru Sun).
But does the Southern African Development Community have the guts and the unity to do anything about it? Will they be prepared to impugn Lesotho’s “sovereignty”?
Anyway, quite how would they do it?
Demilitarising Lesotho’s politics won’t be easy. But if it doesn’t happen, there will be a constant replay of military intervention and changing political coalitions. There would be no shortage of donor assistance, perhaps to retrain foot soldiers as police. But the officer corps needs to be pensioned off. In toto. Full stop.

Op-Ed: Why Lesotho’s in such a mess and what can be done about it

The wife of Lesotho Prime Minister Tom Thabane was shot dead late on Wednesday, just hours after her husband&#8217;s inauguration, raising fears of another wave of political violence in the southern African mountain kingdom.
Police spokesperson Clifford Molefe said Lipolelo Thabane, 58, was traveling home with a friend when both women where shot by an unknown assailant in the town of Masana, just outside the capital, Maseru.
Molefe said Lipolelo died on the scene while her friend was taken to a nearby hospital. Molefe said the motive of the shooting was unknown and that investigations were ongoing.
Lesotho, which has been on a political knife-edge since an attempted coup in 2014, held elections last week, the third in five years, after then-prime minister Pakalitha Mosisili lost a no-confidence vote in March.
Thabane&#8217;s All Basotho Convention won 48 parliamentary seats, compared with 30 won by Mosisili&#8217;s Democratic Congress.
Thabane and Lipolelo had been living separately since 2012 after Thabane filed for a divorce which had yet to be granted by the courts.
Thabane&#8217;s office was unreachable for comment.
(Reporting by Marafaele Mohloboli; Writing by Mfuneko Toyana; Editing by Ed Cropley)

New Lesotho Prime Minister’s wife shot dead: police

Lesotho&#8217;s prime minister Pakalitha Mosisili has conceded defeat in a parliamentary election to his opponent Thomas Thabane, the government said, easing concerns of political instability in the mountain kingdom.
&#8220;His Majesty King Letsie III has accepted the resignation of The Right Honourable the Prime Minister, Dr. Pakalitha Mosisili,&#8221; a government statement received on Friday said.
Mosisili will remain in his position until Thabane is sworn in, the statement said.
Thabane&#8217;s All Basotho Convention won 48 parliamentary seats, compared with 30 won by Mosisili&#8217;s Democratic Congress, results released on Tuesday showed.
(Reporting by Marafaele Mohloboli; Writing by Joe Brock; Editing by Olivia Kumwenda-Mtambo)

Lesotho’s prime minister concedes election defeat: government statement

Marafaele Mohloboli
The party of Lesotho&#8217;s former prime minister, Thomas Thabane, won a national election at the weekend but failed to gain an outright majority in parliament and will now form a coalition government, the party said on Tuesday.
Thabane&#8217;s All Basotho Convention (ABC) won 48 parliamentary seats, compared with 30 won by incumbent Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili&#8217;s Democratic Congress (DC), according to results released on Tuesday by the Independent Electoral Commission.
The ABC will form a coalition government with the Alliance of Democrats, the Basotho National Party and the Reformed Congress of Lesotho to reach the 61-seat majority required to form a government, the parties said in a joint statement.
&#8220;The people have spoken in a loud voice and as the four parties we have accepted their mandate and promise to serve them,&#8221; the four parties said. &#8220;We&#8217;d like to announce to Basotho and the international community that together we have enough votes to form a coalition government.&#8221;
The election outcome reverses the result of an election two years ago, when Mosisili&#8217;s DC ousted Thabane and the ABC by uniting with smaller parties.
But Mosisili lost a confidence vote in parliament in March after several defections by ruling coalition lawmakers to the opposition eroded his support.
Lesotho, a nation of 2 million people, has been hit by several coups since gaining independence from Britain in 1966 and its last two elections failed to produce a winner with a clear majority. Thabane, who governed from 2012 until 2015, and other opposition leaders fled the country to South Africa in 2015 after an assassination attempt on his life.
(Reporting by Marafaele Mohloboli; Writing by Nqobile Dludla; Editing by Larry King)

Lesotho’s Mosisili loses election to former Prime Minister Thabane

Politics are in shambles across the world. Populism and political gambles are making headlines from London to Washington. Southern Africa is no exception. If it’s any comfort, this suggests that there’s nothing genuinely typical about African versions of <a href="https://www.dandc.eu/en/article/populism-common-southern-africa-where-former-liberation-movements-have-become-dominant">political populism</a>. Nor are the flaws in democracy typically African.
This might put some events into wider perspective. But it’s nonetheless worrying to follow the current political turmoil in some southern Africa countries.
The regional hegemon, South Africa, is embroiled in domestic policy tensions of unprecedented proportions since it became a democracy. And the situation in the sub-region is not much better.
The state of opposition politics and democracy is in a shambles too. The fragile political climate and the mentality of most opposition politicians hardly offer meaningful alternatives. This is possibly an explanation – but no excuse – for the undemocratic practices permeating almost every one of the region’s democracies.
Beyond multi-party systems with regular elections, they resemble very little of true democracies.
<h2>South African hiccups</h2>
At the end of May the dimensions of “state capture” in South Africa were set out in a report published by an <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017/05/26/FULL-REPORT-%E2%80%98How-South-Africa-is-Being-Stolen%E2%80%99-a-report-on-state-capture">academic team</a>.
It shows how deeply the personalised systematic plundering of state assets is <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-05-26-betrayal-of-the-promise-the-anatomy-of-state-capture/">entrenched</a>. Additional explosive evidence was presented only days later through thousands of leaked e-mails. Dubbed the “Gupta Leaks”, they document a mafia-like network among Zuma-loyalists and the Indian Gupta family.
The evidence points to massive influence, if not control, over political appointments, the hijacking of higher public administration and embezzlement of <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/stnews/2017/05/28/Here-they-are-The-emails-that-prove-the-Guptas-run-South-Africa">enormous proportions</a>.
Some 65% of South Africans want Zuma to <a href="http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/65-of-south-africans-want-zuma-to-resign--ipsos">resign</a>. An all-time low approval rating of 20% makes him less popular among the electorate than even <a href="http://time.com/4785127/michael-temer-nicolas-maduro-donald-trump/">US President Donald Trump</a>. Despite this – combined with growing demands from within the party that he steps down – the ANC still backs its president.
But divisions within the party are deepening, with some in its leadership demanding an <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/88337066-4797-11e7-8519-9f94ee97d996">investigation</a> into the Gupta patronage network.
For his part, Zuma is focused on pulling strings to secure Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/dispatches/2017/03/10/zuma-succession-the-businessman-vs-the-ex-wife-or-is-it-all-smoke-and-mirrors/">his successor</a> as president of the party. The other front-runner candidate is Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa.
Zuma’s assumption appears to be that, once in office, his former wife would not endorse any legal prosecution of the father of her children.
But the country’s official opposition party, Democratic Alliance (DA), isn’t reaping the benefits of the ANC’s blunders. It has its own problems, which are constraining the gains it might otherwise be making from the ANC’s mess.
The party is divided over what to do about its former leader and Premier of the Western Cape province, Helen Zille following a tweet in which she defended the legacy of colonialism. The comment whipped up a storm of protest and for weeks the party had been at pains on how to deal with the scandal.
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DA leader Mmusi Maimane finally announced that Zille had been suspended from the party and that a disciplinary hearing would decide what further <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-40143710?ocid=socialflow_twitter">political consequences</a> she might face. But a resilient Zille immediately challenged <a href="http://m.news24.com/news24/SouthAfrica/News/das-u-turn-on-zille-suspension-20170603">the decision</a>.
Whatever the outcome, the DA’s image is damaged. Its aspirations to be the country’s new majority party has been dealt a major blow.
<h2>Regional woes</h2>
In Angola, 74-year-old Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who has been in office since 1979, has decided to select a <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3995176/Angolas-President-Dos-Santos-stand-2017-state-radio.html">successor</a>. The scenario will secure that the family “oiligarchy” will remain in control of politics and the country’s economy, while the governing People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) uses the state apparatus to ruthlessly suppress any meaningful <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/the-mercury/20170221/281706909446949">social protests</a>.
In contrast Robert Mugabe – reigning in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980 &#8211; shows no intention of retiring. He was nominated again as the Zimbabwe African Nation Union/Patriotic Front’s (ZANU/PF) candidate for the 2018 <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-30365706/mugabe-confirmed-as-zanu-pf-candidate-for-2018-election">presidential elections</a>. But everyone is anxiously following the party’s internal power struggles over the ailing autocrat’s <a href="http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2017/04/zimbabwes-make-break-moment/">replacement</a>. Fears are that the vacuum created by his departure might create a worse situation.
While the regime’s constant violation of human rights is – as in Angola – geared towards preventing any form of meaningful opposition, there are concerns that the unresolved succession might add another violent dimension to local politics.
Zambia’s democracy also looks sad. The country’s main opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema of the United Party for National Development (UPND) is on trial for high treason. Hichilema has been embroiled in a personal feud with President Edgar Lungu of the governing Patriotic Front (PF) for years. He was arrested in early April after obstructing the president’s motor cavalcade. The charge of high treason is based on the accusation that he <a href="https://zambiareports.com/2017/04/09/hichilema-willfully-put-pres-lungus-life-danger-state-house/">wilfully put President Lungu’s life in danger</a>.
The trial is feeding growing concerns over an increasingly autocratic regime. The once praised democracy, which allowed for several <a href="https://www.themastonline.com/2017/05/15/its-time-to-start-talking-about-zambia-says-cheeseman/">relatively peaceful transfers</a> of political power since the turn of the century, is <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/05/16/birmingham-university-professor-cheesemans-ignorance-democracy-shocking-regrettable/">now in decline</a>.
Lesotho is also in a mess. It provides a timely reminder that competing parties seeking to obtain political control over governments are by no means a guarantee for better governance. Aptly described as a <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-06-02-00-lesothos-groundhog-day-election">“Groundhog Day election”</a>, citizens in the crisis-ridden country went to the polls for the third time since 2012 with no new <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2017/06/02/lesothos-night-before-the-elections-photo-of-the-weekexplainer/">alternatives or options</a>.
Their limited choice is between two former prime ministers aged 77 (Tom Thabane) and 72 (Pakalitha Mosisili). The likely election result is another fragile coalition government – provided the military accepts the result.
Meanwhile, the biggest challenge for relative political stability in the region might still be in the making: President Joseph Kabila, whose second term in office in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) ended in December 2016, is still hanging on with the promise that he’ll vacate the post by end of this year.
Despite a constitutional two-term limit, his plans remain a matter of speculation. In a recent interview, he was characteristically <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/die-lage-am-samstag-aggressiver-nationalismus-plus-atomraketen-a-1150544.html">evasive</a>. He refused to give a straight answer on whether he’s still considering <a href="http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/kabila-says-he-never-promised-to-hold-elections-in-drc-20170603">another term</a> and flatly denied that he had promised anything, including elections.
Kabila’s <a href="http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/12/21/Up-to-20-dead-as-Congo-police-protesters-clash-over-president/6411482288306/">extended stay in office</a> threatens to exacerbate an already explosive and violent situation, with potentially devastating consequences.
His continued reign would not only provoke further bloodshed at home. Any spill-over will challenge the Southern African Development Community’s willingness and ability to find solutions to regional conflicts in the interests of <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-southern-africa-can-learn-from-west-africa-about-dealing-with-despots-71722">relative stability</a>. A stability which is at best fragile and indicative of the crisis of policy in most of the regional body’s member states.

Op-Ed: Democracy is looking sickly across southern Africa

People in Lesotho voted in a national election on Saturday just two years after the previous one as the Southern African kingdom struggles with political instability.
The nation of 2 million people has been hit by several coups since independence from Britain in 1966 and army troops were on duty until the polls closed at 1500 GMT on Saturday.
Election officials expect results to start trickling in early on Sunday.
King Letsie III has been head of state of the landlocked country, which is surrounded by South Africa, since independence from Britain in 1996.
But political leadership has been volatile in recent years with the last two elections failing to produce a winner with a clear majority.
Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili, who had been in power since 2015, lost a confidence vote in parliament in March after several defections by ruling coalition lawmakers to the opposition eroded his support.
Democratic Congress party leader Mosisili&#8217;s main rival is All Basotho Convention head Thomas Thabane, who governed from 2012 until 2015. Thabane cast his ballot mid-morning at the Makhoakhoeng polling station in the capital Maseru.
<blockquote>&#8220;I would like to see a changed Lesotho,&#8221; said Fanie Manyathela, speaking at the Makhoakhoeng polling station. &#8220;For way too long we have seen a lot of instability and insecurity causing other people to flee the country.&#8221;</blockquote>
Lesotho, with very little in terms of industry or commercial agriculture, relies heavily on remittances from relatives working on the farms and in the mines of neighboring South Africa.
&#8220;We are growing and we need people that will listen to us when we speak to them,&#8221; Peter Jonas told Reuters at the polling station.
Lesotho, source of some of South Africa&#8217;s largest rivers and home to a multi-phase dam project to with a long-term water supply, is of strategic importance to its much larger and more powerful neighbor.
(Reporting by Marafaele Mohloboli and Dinky Mkhize, Writing by TJ Strydom, editing by Angus MacSwan)

Lesotho votes just two years after previous election amid instability

Lesotho goes to the polls for the third time in five years today, Saturday June 3, in a fresh attempt to bring some political stability to the troubled mountain kingdom, but an outright winner among the 25 contesting parties remains unlikely – suggesting another cobbled-together coalition government and potentially more instability down the line.
The major players come Saturday remain the current heavyweights and includes the Democratic Congress (DC) of outgoing Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili whose seven-party coalition lost a March vote of no confidence sponsored by four opposition parties that resulted in Mr Mosisili deciding to ask King Letsie III to dissolve Parliament and force fresh elections rather than hand power to the opposition grouping that included a breakaway faction of his own party.
Other major parties include the would-be-kings Tom Thabane of the All Basotho Convention (ABC) and the newly-established Alliance of Democrats (AD) headed by Monyane Moleleki – once Mr Mosisili’s deputy in the DC.
The ABC and AD are expected to be joined by two other smaller parties in a potential coalition government, while the DC has an agreement with outgoing Deputy Prime Minister Mothetjoa Metsing’s Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) and the Popular Front for Democracy (PFD).
The latter grouping has agreed a one-candidate strategy in the 80 directly-elected constituencies, with the DC fielding 54 candidates, the LCD 25 and one to the PFD – that of party leader Lekhetho Rakuoane.
This election sees the emergence of several new parties with unproven track records but with some apparent appeal.
These include the AD party formed in January and two other newcomers – the Truth Reconciliation Unity (TRU) party and the Movement for Economic Change (MEC) – all three of which split from the major groupings.
Mr Moleleki broke away from the DC to form the AD, while the former All Basotho Convention (ABC) deputy leader, Tlali Khasu, left to form the TRU and former secretary general of the LCD, Selibe Mochoboroane, quit to establish the MEC.
The performance of these untested parties and their eventual role in any coalition suggest an even more unpredictable outcome this time around.
Then there are the as yet unaligned former coalition partners of the DC that have no deal in place – such as the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP), the Basotho Congress Party (BCP), the National Independent Party (NIP), and the Lesotho People’s Congress (LPC).
There are around a dozen or more even smaller parties that could make the formation of a ruling coalition an even muddier affair – raising the possibility that up to 10 parties could be melded into a single entity.
None of this suggests a stable, enduring coalition government is likely to emerge from Saturday’s poll and most of the political leaders involved have already demonstrated an inability to work together and an unhealthy appetite for power.
The one exception is the newly-formed MEC set up after some leaders split from the LCD. Its leader, Mr Mochoboroane (39), is the youngest by far among the main party leaders. Local media describe him as a “man of action” based on his previous roles as minister of energy and then as minister of small business.
The possibility of a single party gaining an outright victory in the elections – that would need 61 out of the 80 directly-elected constituencies and the additional 40 seats distributed by proportional representation – is remote.
But, given this is Lesotho, it is not impossible.
Mr Thabane is among those confident of an outright victory, but he too has hedged his bets with the mechanisms of a coalition in place with him as prime minister once again, but there is no agreement on that small matter with his major potential partner, the AD and Mr Moleleki.
Mr Thabane told South African media this week that he expected to win at least 60 of the 80 constituencies and emerge on top.
Despite the high stakes and a recent record of violence, we expect Saturday’s poll and the immediate aftermath to be largely peaceful despite security concerns heightened by some opposition party claims the military was preparing a coup in the event Mr Mosisili loses.
That remains unlikely in the short to medium term but will return as a possibility in the event of another protracted bout of instability and infighting among political parties.
The Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) this week dismissed allegations it was planning to stage a coup in the event that the current government loses the elections.
While sporadic violence is possible during this weekend’s vote and the subsequent counting period with the all-but-guaranteed allegations of rigging by losing parties, we do not expect any major confrontation and anticipate that the elections will go off largely peacefully if less than perfectly.
The problems will begin with losing parties rejecting the results, but again we expect the overall outcome to be credible and reflect the general will of the Lesotho people.
Since an outright electoral victory remains unlikely, we will once again enter coalition country and since we are dealing largely with the same crop of leaders who have failed on two previous occasions in the past few years to hold a government together, the prospects this time are unfortunately no brighter.
Leadership and position squabbles are not far down the line and the larger the coalition, the more likely it will be weak and unstable.
Despite some voices to the contrary, we do not expect the LDF to do anything but exercise its constitutional mandate. However, another bout of political instability and volatile coalitions. and all bets may be off.
Finally, whatever the outcome, we need to trust that the Southern African Development Community (SADC) will spare the people of Lesotho another ill-judged intervention.

Lesotho – Weekend elections heading for another indecisive outcome

HARARE (Reuters) &#8211; Econet Wireless, Zimbabwe&#8217;s biggest mobile telecoms company, reported a 10 percent fall in after-tax profit to $36.2 million on Wednesday, blaming a decline in consumer spending.
Revenue for the year to February 2017 fell to $622 million from $641 million last year, the company said in statement.
The southern African nation&#8217;s economy flatlined last year, while shortages of foreign currency and cash have hit consumer spending, with businesses struggling to pay for imports and repay foreign loans.
In January Econet went to the market to raise $130 million from shareholders to avoid defaulting on its foreign loans, which it was struggling to settle due to the dollar shortage.
(Reporting by MacDonald Dzirutwe; Editing by Greg Mahlich)

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