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For the past few weeks, locusts have been swarming across East Africa with farmers in Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya now counting losses. The devastating insects are moving fast through the region and have reached Tanzania and Uganda. Masokoyi Wasswa, Chief Administrative Officer of Amudat District which is one of the areas affected, joins CNBC Africa for more.

Tracking the impact of locust invasions on Ugandan agriculture

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The last decade was the warmest on record as a result of climate change and the horn of Africa is one the regions that have been hit the most. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, people in Ethiopia, Somalia, and other parts of Eastern Africa are increasingly caught between deadly extremes weather conditions in addition to violence. Julien Lerisson, Head of ICRC Delegation in Ethiopia joins CNBC Africa for more.

How climate change is threating food security & peace in the Horn of Africa

How climate change is threatening food security & peace in the Horn of Africa

By <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/emma-elfversson-800607">Emma Elfversson</a>, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/uppsala-university-1826">Uppsala University</a>; <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/paul-d-williams-439129">Paul D. Williams</a>, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/george-washington-university-1262">George Washington University</a>, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/sara-lindberg-bromley-880383">Sara Lindberg Bromley</a>, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/uppsala-university-1826">Uppsala University</a>

In an ever more urbanising world, peacekeepers will <a href="https://cpr.unu.edu/peacekeeping-in-cities-is-the-un-prepared.html">increasingly operate in cities</a>. In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23802014.2019.1678399">recent article</a>, we analysed how attacks against the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) affected the peacekeepers’ ability to operate in Mogadishu.

Cities host key logistical and political assets and institutions. They are frequently the object of fierce contestation among warring parties. Cities may also <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030280901">remain divided and insecure</a> long after formal peace agreements are signed, posing significant challenges to peaceful transitions.

Securing strategically important cities and protecting key institutions are thus <a href="https://cic.nyu.edu/publications/UN-Peacekeeping-in-Urban-Environments-The-Legacy-of-UNMIL">crucial tasks</a> for peace operations. However, operating in densely populated urban areas brings significant challenges.

For one, the density of cities makes it more difficult for peacekeepers to distinguish armed fighters from the civilian population. Militants with intimate knowledge of the city’s infrastructure may also counteract <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-review-of-the-red-cross/article/future-war-in-cities-urbanizations-challenge-to-strategic-studies-in-the-21st-century/D1999E08103B58ECB46D25B9F42C049A">peacekeepers’ technological advantage</a>. The city’s symbolic and political importance often makes it a prime target for large-scale attacks which can be difficult for peacekeepers to anticipate and prevent.

<h2>Attacks on urban peacekeepers</h2>

Some peace operations deployed in cities have come under attack by forces opposed to their presence. Such attacks, in turn, affect peacekeepers’ ability to operate and sometimes have led to their withdrawal. In Kigali, Rwanda, the killing of ten Belgian peacekeepers posted to the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-01.htm">UN mission there</a> on 7 April 1994 led the country to withdraw its contingent. 

The <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unsom1backgr1.html">United Nations Operation in Somalia</a> was also forced to leave after the United States pulled out its troops. This was after the infamous <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/legacy-black-hawk-down-180971000/">“Black Hawk Down”</a> battle in Mogadishu in October 1993. 

<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13533312.2018.1512858">Recent research</a> has shown such responses may be the exception rather than the rule. But attacks on peacekeepers may have other important effects for operational effectiveness.

In our article, we focus on the African mission in Somalia between 2007 and 2009, the mission’s first three years of operations. The <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/fighting-for-peace-in-somalia-9780198724544?cc=se&amp;lang=en&amp;">mission</a> was deployed where there was little “peace to keep”. It quickly came under attack from al-Shabaab, the main armed group opposing Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

Using data from the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343317735882">Peacemakers at Risk (PAR) dataset</a> we analysed patterns of violence involving the peacekeepers. An estimated 50 peacekeepers were killed in direct acts of violence in Mogadishu between 2007 and 2009. This affected AMISOM’s operations in several ways.

First, the insecure conditions in Mogadishu forced it to concentrate on its core military tasks – protecting the TFG and its own troops. Patrolling and civilian engagement were limited, which also reduced the mission’s access to intelligence.

Second, attacks on AMISOM significantly hampered its ability to deploy throughout the city. After securing a few key locations, the mission had to focus on protecting these sites. It was not able to spread out across the city for several years. The concentration to a few key locations was partly the result of delays in the deployment of troops and mission support. However, the fact that many states were <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2018.1418159">unwilling to contribute</a> was partly due to the violence targeting the mission.

Third, attacks on peacekeepers at times led to heavy-handed responses. This prolonged fighting where civilians were caught in the crossfire. In turn, such cases increased popular criticism of the mission and led to pressure on the mission to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2017.1291564">reduce the levels of civilian harm</a>. 

Such instances also exemplify the challenges of peacekeeping in cities, as al-Shabaab often attacked from positions in civilian neighbourhoods.

<h2>Lessons from AMISOM’s experiences</h2>

These experiences illustrate the particular challenges that can result when peacekeepers face armed groups that know the urban terrain and rely on asymmetric tactics. These challenges appear to have hampered the implementation of some mandated tasks. These tasks included the wider stabilisation of the city of Mogadishu, promotion of dialogue, and the facilitation of humanitarian assistance. 

Instead, the mission had to act defensively, focusing on protecting the contested transitional government and the mission’s supply lines.

These problems were amplified by another factor. For the first three years of its operation, the African mission was under-resourced. Later, it gained more troops and additional external support. It was eventually able to drive al-Shabaab’s main forces <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14430283">out of Mogadishu</a> in 2011.

In summary, our analysis indicates that al-Shabaab was able to exploit its knowledge of Mogadishu and the city’s density to attack mission positions. This restricted the mission’s ability to operate effectively. However, despite these challenges, troop contributing countries did not withdraw. Instead, these countries <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/fighting-for-peace-in-somalia-9780198724544?cc=se&amp;lang=en&amp;am">added more troops</a> to the mission. This enabled AMISOM to prevent the overthrow of the Somali TFG, its core mission.

AMISOM’s experiences suggest that urban peace operations must be given sufficient resources from the outset – that is, personnel, equipment and relevant training. They must also invest in gaining detailed knowledge of the urban environment by engaging local populations. And they must prepare for spoilers to hide among the city’s civilians.

Many of the peacekeeping objectives associated with effective operations – such as extensive patrolling and <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022343316682063">civilian engagement</a> – seem difficult to accomplish in urban contexts where peacekeepers themselves become the target of attacks. As peacekeeping continues to become more urban, these issues warrant further attention.<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/126524/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" style="border: none !important; box-shadow: none !important; margin: 0 !important; max-height: 1px !important; max-width: 1px !important; min-height: 1px !important; min-width: 1px !important; opacity: 0 !important; outline: none !important; padding: 0 !important; text-shadow: none !important" />

<a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/emma-elfversson-800607">Emma Elfversson</a>, Post-doctoral Researcher, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/uppsala-university-1826">Uppsala University</a>; <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/paul-d-williams-439129">Paul D. Williams</a>, Professor of International Affairs, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/george-washington-university-1262">George Washington University</a>, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/sara-lindberg-bromley-880383">Sara Lindberg Bromley</a>, Post-doctoral researcher, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/uppsala-university-1826">Uppsala University</a>

This article is republished from <a href="http://theconversation.com">The Conversation</a> under a Creative Commons license. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/urban-peacekeeping-what-weve-learnt-from-aus-mission-in-somalia-126524">original article</a>.

What have we learnt from AU’s mission in Somalia on urban peacekeeping?

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Somalia announced at Africa Oil Week that the country is open for business and that it will launch its first oil and gas licensing round in late December. CNBC Africa’s Fifi Peters spoke to Somalia’s Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Abdirashid Mohamed Ahmed.

Africa Oil Week: Somalia to launch first oil and gas licensing round

NAIROBI (Reuters) &#8211; Somalia’s economy is expected to grow by 2.9% this year, from 2.8% last year, before growth quickens to 3.2-3.5% in the medium term, the World Bank said on Monday.



The Horn of Africa country has been in turmoil since 1991, when clan warlords overthrew President Siad Barre and then turned on each other. Over the past decade it has been hit by famine and sporadic terror attacks by al Qaeda-linked militant group al Shabaab.



The higher growth forecast for the next three-to-five years would depend on the country being able to sustain its current economic reform momentum, the World Bank said in a statement.



Tax collection by the government increased by 29% last year, as the economy recovered from a drought the previous year and the government changes its tax policies, the World Bank said.



“While this progress is&nbsp;encouraging, the available fiscal space remains insufficient to meet expenditure needs&nbsp;(for) education and health&nbsp;sectors,” the bank said.



It asked the government to form a fund dedicated to education to allow authorities in Mogadishu to mobilise more cash from regional states and other partners to support learning.



In May, the International Monetary Fund said Somalia’s economy was on the right track but warned that it was still vulnerable to fragile security, climate change and poverty.



Reporting by Duncan Miriri; Editing by Toby Chopra

Somalia’s economy expected to grow by 2.9%, what you need to know

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As the Somalian Government continues to rebuild the country and its economy from scratch, what is the country doing to attract investments? CNBC Africa’s Godfrey Mutizwa, spoke to Abdirahman Beileh, Minister of Finance, Republic of Somalia to discuss this and more.

Abdirahman Beileh on what Somalia is doing to attract investors

NAIROBI (Reuters) &#8211; Somalia’s economy continues to recover, with growth expected to strengthen to 3% in 2019 from 2.8% last year, while inflation could ease to 3% from 3.2% over the same period, the International Monetary Fund said on Tuesday.



Somalia has been in turmoil since 1991, when clan-based warlords overthrew Siad Barre and then turned on each other. Over the past decade it has been hit by famine and sporadic terror attacks by al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab.



“Somalia’s economy continues to recover, supported by vigorous activity in the construction, telecommunications, and financial services sector in 2018,” said Allison Holland, who lead an IMF team discussing Somalia’s Article IV programme, in a statement.



“But the outlook remains vulnerable to the still fragile security situation, climate shocks and the still developing institutional capacity, and more is needed to improve economic resilience, increase employment and reduce poverty.”



An Article IV consultation is part of the IMF’s mandate to scrutinise the economic, financial and exchange rate policies of its members.



The Somali government has broadened the tax base and strengthened tax administration, boosting domestic revenue almost 30% to $184 million in 2018 from a year earlier, and to $54 million for the first quarter of 2019, Holland said.



Writing by Hereward Holland; Editing by Richard Borsuk

IMF says the economic growth in this East African country could rise to 3% in 2019

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Up to 2.2 million people in Somalia are in urgent need of food following a long-lasting drought that led to crop failure and a decline in livestock productivity. Humanitarian organisations are calling for urgent funding to avoid a full-scale humanitarian disaster. CNBC Africa is joined by Victor Moses, Country Director for Norwegian Refugee Council Somalia.

NGO calls for urgent funding for Somalia’s drought

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Despite efforts to curb Female Genital Mutilation; in 2018 the United Nations Population Fund warned that each year the number of women predicted to undergo the practice could rise to 4.6 million by 2030, an increase driven by population growth in communities that carry out the practice; for more CNBC Africa spoke with Dr. Amina Jama, Founder, Women in Global Health Somalia.

Effort to end female genital mutilation in Somalia

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A new food crisis on the rise in Somalia might hurt a whopping 1.5 million people. Geno Teofilo, Regional Head, Communications &#038; Advocacy East Africa at Norwegian Refugee Council joins CNBC Africa to speak about this.

Food crisis in Somalia threatens 1.5 million people

MOGADISHU (Reuters) &#8211; The top official of Somali’s parliament administration said on Sunday he had filed a motion with the speaker of parliament to impeach the country’s president, Mohamed Abdullahi.



“We have filed an impeachment against the president of the federal republic of Somalia,”&nbsp;Abdikarim H. Abdi Buh said in a statement.



Constitutionally, 92 lawmakers have to sign such a motion for it to be submitted to the speaker. Parliament may debate the motion a week later.



Somalia’s parliament has 275 lawmakers in total. A successful impeachment vote requires the backing of two thirds of all MPs.



A copy of the motion, seen by Reuters, lists as grounds for the impeachment an allegation that the president secretly signed agreements with other countries including Ethiopia and Eritrea.



The agreements touched on the use of Somali ports and economic and security cooperation, it said.



He was also accused of illegally extraditing alleged criminals to other countries and violating Somalia’s federalism law and the rules and regulations of parliament.



Officials at the president’s office could not be reached for comment.



Reporting by Abdi Sheikh; Writing by Elias Biryabarema; Editing by Andrew Roche

Motion filed to impeach the president of this East African country, what you need to know…

NAIROBI (Reuters) &#8211; Somalia’s economic growth is expected to pick up in 2018 as it recovers from drought that had reduced farming output, the International Monetary Fund said on Tuesday.



It said it projected gross domestic product at 3.1 percent this year from 2.3 percent in 2017. Somalia exports bananas and also produces sorghum.



“Economic activity in 2018 is recovering from the 2016–17 drought. A favourable rainy season is supporting the economic recovery, particularly in the agricultural and livestock sectors; this is leading to a decline in food prices,” the fund said in a statement.



The IMF expects inflation to reach 3.5 percent this year, down from 5.5 percent in 2016.



Somalia has been in turmoil since 1991, when clan-based warlords overthrew dictator Siad Barre and then turned on each other. Over the past decade it has also been hit by an insurgency waged by al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab, as well as famine and maritime piracy.



Reporting by Aaron Maasho; Editing by Matthew Mpoke Bigg

Here’s how much the IMF expects Somalia’s GDP to grow by in 2018

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The government of Somalia attended this year’s Africa Oil Week in Cape Town to announce a first round of bidding on offshore acreages in 206 blocks, mainly in southern Somalia. Engineer Karar Shukri Doomey, Director General in the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources of the Federal Republic of Somalia also addressed concerns about investment security in the country.

Somalia offers 206 oil blocks in first round of open acreage auction

ADDIS ABABA (Reuters) &#8211; Ethiopian Airlines will start flying to the Somali capital Mogadishu on Nov. 2 for the first time in four decades, the state-affiliated Fana Broadcasting reported on Tuesday.
“Our flights will quickly grow to multiple daily flights given the huge volume of traffic between the two sisterly countries and the significant traffic between Somalia and the rest of the world,” the airline’s CEO, Tewolde Gebremariam, was quoted as saying by Fana.
Writing by George Obulutsa; Editing by Matthew Mpoke Bigg

Ethiopian Airlines will resume flights to Mogadishu for the first time in four decades

By <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/victor-odundo-owuor-460341">Victor Odundo Owuor</a>, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-colorado-733">University of Colorado</a>
A recent <a href="http://www.somaliampf.net/files/Mobile_Money_in_Somalia.pdf">World Bank report</a> showed that Somalia has one of the most active mobile money markets in the world, outpacing most other countries in Africa. It’s even superseded the use of cash in the country of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/country/somalia">14 million</a> people. Victor Owuor asked Tim Kelly, an information and communications technology policy specialist at the World Bank and the report’s author, to explain the findings and what they mean for the country.
Why is mobile money so successful in Somalia?
Mobile money initially started as a simple exchange of airtime credit between users. <a href="https://www.ictworks.org/the-rise-of-mobile-money-services-in-somaliland/#.W7txcNWFPs0">Over</a> ten years ago, mobile network operators formalised this by offering mobile money services. It was quickly perceived as a convenient and safe way of making transactions and storing money.
Unlike Kenya’s famous <a href="https://www.safaricom.co.ke/personal/m-pesa/do-more-with-m-pesa">Mpesa mobile money</a> transfer services, Somalia’s transfers are mainly available in US dollars. Though the companies offering mobile money services are mobile network operators, as in Kenya, they are increasingly forming part of large conglomerates that also offer banking and money transfer services.
In Somalia mobile money transactions are worth <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/997391521473972031/pdf/124406-REVISED-MPFProgressReportFINAL.pdf">about</a> $2.7 billion a month.
Several factors have encouraged the impressive uptake of mobile money:
Many Somalis own mobile phones – <a href="https://wb-mme-dev.masae-analytics.com/Penetration">about</a> nine out of ten Somalis, above the age of 16 own one.
Nearly 60% of Somalia’s population <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28470">is nomadic, or semi-nomadic, and move around a great deal</a>, to find adequate grazing and water for their livestock. So mobile money suits their lifestyle and is also used to facilitate trade.
Concerns over the high prevalence of fake money, absence of monetary regulation, capacity, and limited access to traditional banking services also make mobile money an effective substitute for cash.
Today, mobile money also facilitates vast remittance flows which are critical to most Somali households due to a <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/28470/Output-P160456-v7.pdf?sequence=5&amp;isAllowed=y">lack of</a> opportunities in the Somali labour market. Taking advantage of this trend, remittance companies are increasingly partnering with mobile operators to transfer funds directly to recipients’ mobile money accounts.
How many people are using it and what is it mostly used for?
Our household <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/975231536256355812/Rapid-Growth-in-Mobile-Money-Stability-or-Vulnerability">survey data</a> suggests that about 73% of Somalis above the age of 16 use mobile money services at least once a month – though most use it a few times a month, and high income earners use it a lot more. About 155 million mobile money transactions take place every month.
It’s used for a wide range of things.
One of the most common is to pay bills – for purchases between $2 and $300. Mobile money is thus far more widely used than cash. Two thirds of those surveyed use it to pay for items like water, electricity and charcoal. A third claim to use it to buy groceries, durable goods and livestock.
Close to 40% use mobile money to pay their children’s school fees. It’s also frequently used to send money to friends and family.
We also found that it’s being used to save.
Currently, transactions made are mainly person-to-person payments, but there is growing uptake among businesses. We have seen that receiving salaries through mobile money has, for example, been an important factor encouraging further uptake.
What have the benefits and the risks of this growth been?
Somalia lacks a strong formal banking system. Only <a href="https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/12258.pdf">about</a> 15% of the population has a bank account. Mobile money has helped to expand financial inclusion.
For vulnerable groups, it’s a convenient and fast way to access money quickly. And because it’s viewed as faster and safer than cash handouts, many aid agencies use it to reach remote villages.
As most shops accept mobile money, it also offers beneficiaries more flexibility, and avoids a requirement to travel, which can in turn minimise risk of security incidents.
Nevertheless, there are some considerable risks in the mobile money system. The biggest is a lack of regulation which makes the system fragile and fragmented.
It is also vulnerable to money laundering and terrorism financing. This is because there is a weak “know your customer” compliance, in line with global banking standards, meaning few SIM cards and mobile money accounts are registered using a valid form of identification. Ultimately, this results in limited accountability and tractability.
Another risk is the fact that there’s no assurance that the funds will always be available, as they would be in a normal bank account. That’s because there’s no guaranteed parity between the mobile money balances held by mobile operators and those held in individual and business accounts.
Transfers in Somalia are predominantly available in US dollars, which isn’t healthy for the country’s economy. This is changing – for example, Somaliland obliges that sums under $100 be made in Somali shillings.
The industry also remains largely untaxed, meaning it fails to help raise critical government revenue.
How is mobile money in Somalia different from other African countries?
A few things are different.
Banking, telecommunications and money transfers are so closely intertwined that its resulted in the <a href="https://www.altaiconsulting.com/insights/mobile-money-ecosystem-somalia/">emergence of two</a> large conglomerates, with partnerships between a mobile network operator, bank and money transfer organisation. This is not really the case elsewhere in Africa.
Also, operators have adopted a different business model, based on indirect revenue generated from other services – like the sale of airtime. They are therefore able to offer mobile money between users as a “free” service (without transactions charges or taxes). This is not the case in many other countries in the region.
Another factor that’s different is the virtual absence of regulatory supervision despite the fact that mobile network operators control vast sums in circulation.
Operators also rely on their own distribution network, not external agents (as they do in Kenya). This means that coverage is more limited.
An earlier version of this article carried an incorrect number for total mobile money transactions in Kenya. It has been removed.<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" style="border: none !important; box-shadow: none !important; margin: 0 !important; max-height: 1px !important; max-width: 1px !important; min-height: 1px !important; min-width: 1px !important; opacity: 0 !important; outline: none !important; padding: 0 !important; text-shadow: none !important;" src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/104162/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/victor-odundo-owuor-460341">Victor Odundo Owuor</a>, Senior Research Associate-One Earth Future Foundation, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-colorado-733">University of Colorado</a>
This article is republished from <a href="http://theconversation.com">The Conversation</a> under a Creative Commons license. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/mobile-money-transfers-have-taken-off-in-somalia-but-there-are-risks-104162">original article</a>.

The risks in Somalia’s growing mobile money market

MOGADISHU, June 16 (Reuters) &#8211; Somalia and Ethiopia announced they were jointly investing in four seaports to attract foreign investment to their two countries, the latest move in a tussle for access to ports along one of the world’s most strategic waterways.
After Somalia’s president Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo hosted Ethiopia’s prime minister Abiy Ahmed for a meeting at the presidential palace in Mogadishu, the two leaders issued a joint statement of pledges to cooperate on everything from the development of infrastructure including roads linking the two countries to expanding visa services to promote cultural exchanges.
The statement did not elaborate on which ports the two countries would develop.
The Horn of Africa’s Red Sea coastline extending north of Somalia through Djibouti and Eritrea toward the critical Suez Canal is already dotted with ports owned or run by countries locked in a regional struggle: the United Arab Emirates and its ally Saudi Arabia on one side, and Turkey which backs Qatar on the other.
Landlocked Ethiopia, which has a population of 100 million, has been led since April by 41-year-old former intelligence officer Abiy, who has moved swiftly to assert his nation’s interests on the international stage.
“The leaders further agreed to invest in logistics and service provision specially to leading ports in the continent that can serve both the Indian ocean and the Red Sea,” the statement read.
The day before Abiy’s visit to Somalia, the United Arab Emirates pledged to give $3 billion to Ethiopia in aid and investments, in a major show of support for the new leadership in Ethiopia.
The strengthened partnership between Ethiopia and the oil-rich Gulf monarchy is significant in the context of Addis Ababa’s ties with Mogadishu.
Somalia and the UAE have been at odds for months over the broader dispute in the Gulf region.
That Middle Eastern feud is driving the desire to control the Horn of Africa and its waters, diplomats, businessmen, scholars and Somali officials have told Reuters.
In May, Ethiopian state media reported that Ethiopia had taken an unspecified stake in the port of Djibouti, its main gateway for trade.
Reporting by Abdi Sheikh Writing by Maggie Fick Editing by Stephen Powell

Why Ethiopia and Somalia are jointly investing in four seaports on the Red Sea

Brendon J. Cannon and Ash Rossiter| Khalifa University
When Eritrea gained its independence from Ethiopia in 1993, Ethiopia became landlocked and therefore dependent on its neighbours – especially Djibouti – for access to international markets. This dependency has hampered Ethiopia’s aspiration to emerge as the uncontested regional power in the Horn of Africa.
<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="aligncenter wp-image-302131 size-full" src="http://cnbc.africa/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Djibouti-Port_GettyImages.png" alt="" width="850" height="558" />
Recently, however, the ground has been shifting. As we point out in a recent article, Ethiopia has attempted to take advantage of the recent involvement of various Arab Gulf States in the Horn of Africa’s coastal zone to reduce its dependency on Djibouti’s port. The port currently accounts for 95% of Ethiopia’s imports and exports. It has done so by actively trying to interest partners in the refurbishment and development of other ports in the region: Port Sudan in Sudan, Berbera in the Somaliland region of Somalia, and Mombasa in Kenya.
But it is Berbera, in particular, that will prove the most radical in terms of challenging regional power dynamics as well as international law. This is because a port deal involving Somaliland will challenge Djibouti’s virtual monopoly over maritime trade. In addition, it may entrench the de-facto Balkanization of Somalia and increase the prospects of Ethiopia becoming the regional hegemon.
<h2>Ethiopia’s regional policy</h2>
Ethiopia’s interest in Berbera certainly makes sense from a strategic perspective. It is closest to Ethiopia and will connect the eastern, primarily Somali region of Ethiopia to Addis Ababa. It will also provide a much needed outlet for trade, particularly the export of livestock and agriculture.
The development and expansion of the port at Berbera supports two primary pillars of Ethiopia’s regional policy. The first is maintaining Eritrea’s isolation. The aim would be to weaken it to the point that it implodes and is formally reunited to Ethiopia. Or it becomes a pliant, client state.
The second pillar rests on maintaining the status quo in post-civil war Somalia. Simply put, a weak and fractured Somalia enables Ethiopia to focus on quelling persistent internal security difficulties. It also keeps up pressure on Eritrea.
<figure class="align-center "><figcaption>
<div id="attachment_302130" style="width: 340px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-302130" class="wp-image-302130 size-full" src="http://cnbc.africa/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Ethiopia_map_Wikimedia_01.png" alt="" width="330" height="353" />The Horn of Africa. Image: Wikimedia</div>
</figcaption><figcaption>The Horn of Africa. 
supplied</figcaption></figure>
Ethiopia’s ambitions for Berbera have been hampered by two problems. Firstly the Republic of Somaliland – a de-facto independent state since 1991 – still isn’t recognised internationally. This makes engagement a political and legal headache. Secondly, Ethiopia, doesn’t have the critical resources needed to invest and build a port.
Ethiopia had been trying to get Abu Dhabi and Dubai interested in the Berbera Port for years. It’s latest push was assisted by a number of factors. These included a shift in the UAE’s military focus in Yemen and Ethiopian assurances of more trade and some financing to upgrade the port.
Ethiopia’s diplomatic push – which coincided with developments across the Gulf of Aden – finally got it the result it craved. In May 2016, DP World, a global mega-ports operator, signed an agreement to develop and manage Berbera Port for 30 years.
<h2>The Berbera Port deal</h2>
It is unlikely that DP World would have signed the deal if it didn’t see some long-term commercial benefit. The deal also includes economic, military and political dimensions.
Economically, for example, there will be investments in Somaliland’s fisheries, transportation and hospitality industry. The UAE will also establish a military installation in Berbera. The base is intended to help the UAE tighten its blockade against Yemen and stop weapons being smuggled from Iran.
Politically, the Berbera Port deal has provoked mixed reactions in Somaliland. There has been some popular anger aimed at Somaliland’s former president, Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud aka “Silanyo”, and his family who reportedly benefited personally from it. Anger also stems from inter-clan and sub-clan rivalry over land, particularly in the Berbera area.
But the anger in Somaliland pales in comparison to the reaction in Mogadishu. This is because the Somaliland government has remained largely isolated internationally – until the port deal.
Somalia Federal Government ministers have publicly challenged the right of Somaliland to enter into official agreements with any country. The Ethiopian-driven deal means that Mogadishu’s claims over the breakaway territory have weakened substantially. The deal means that Somaliland has partially broken the glass ceiling of international recognition by entering into substantive deals with viable business partners and states operating on the global stage. Mogadishu can no longer pretend it controls the government in Somaliland’s capital Hargeisa.
<h2>Ethiopia’s wins</h2>
The bottom line is that Ethiopia has engineered access to another port and enhanced its security and strategic economic interests. With the growth in annual volumes of transit cargo, Ethiopia has, for a long time, needed alternative routes from Djibouti.
In addition, Ethiopia has ensured its presence in the running of the port by acquiring a 19% share in the deal.
And by wangling a legally binding agreement between Somaliland and another state, Ethiopia has potentially paved the way for eventual international recognition of Hargeisa.
Ethiopia has also further cemented its hold over Somaliland through a combination of pressure and material incentives. By bringing significant outside investment and recognition, Ethiopia can also increasingly meddle in its internal affairs. This is a conundrum for Hargeisa. It finds itself increasingly emboldened to act independently. Yet it remains constrained by the need to get Addis Ababa’s approval.
As Ethiopia begins to move increasing amounts of goods and services on Somaliland’s new highway to the refurbished port of Berbera, Hargeisa may begin to question key aspects of the port deal.
<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93308/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />But one aspect will not be in question: Ethiopia’s rising power and influence over the entire region.
This article was originally published on The Conversation.

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