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By <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/kerstin-carlson-344474">Kerstin Carlson</a>, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-southern-denmark-1097">University of Southern Denmark</a>

In June this year two lawyers filed a complaint at the International Criminal Court (ICC) naming European Union member states’ migration policies in the Mediterranean as crimes against humanity. 

The court’s Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, must decide whether she wants to open a preliminary investigation into the criminality of Europe’s treatment of migrants. 

The challenge against the EU’s Mediterranean migrant policy is set out in a 245-page document prepared by Juan Branco and Omer Shatz, two lawyer-activists working and teaching in Paris. They <a href="https://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/jun/eu-icc-case-EU-Migration-Policies.pdf">argue that EU migration policy</a> is founded in deterrence and that drowned migrants are a deliberate element of this policy. The international law that they allege has been violated – crimes against humanity – applies to state policies practiced even outside of armed conflict. 

Doctrinally and juridically, the ICC can proceed. The question that remains is political: can and should the ICC come after its founders on their own turf?

There are two reasons why the answer is emphatically yes. First, the complaint addresses what has become a rights impasse in the EU. By taking on an area stymying other supranational courts, the ICC can fulfil its role as a judicial institution of last resort. Second, by turning its sights on its founders (and funders), the ICC can redress the charges of neocolonialism in and around Africa that have dogged it for the past decade.

<h2>ICC legitimacy</h2>

The ICC is the world’s first permanent international criminal court. Founded in 2002, it currently has 122 member states. 

So far, it has only prosecuted Africans. This has led to persistent critiques that it is a neocolonial institution that “only chases Africans” and only tries rebels. In turn, this has led to pushback against the court from powerful actors like the African Union, which <a href="http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/african-union-resolution-urges-states-to-leave-icc/">urges its members to leave the court</a>. 

The first departure from the court occurred in 2017, when <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/27/world/africa/burundi-international-criminal-court.html">Burundi left</a>. The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/17/world/asia/philippines-international-criminal-court.html">Philippines</a> followed suit in March of this year. Both countries are currently under investigation by the ICC for state sponsored atrocities. <a href="https://justiceinconflict.org/2018/09/10/a-graceful-exit-for-south-africas-icc-withdrawal-plans/">South Africa threatened withdrawal</a>, but this seems to have blown over.

In this climate, many cheered the news of the ICC Prosecutor’s <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/23/afghanistan-icc-abandons-field">2017 request to investigate</a> crimes committed in Afghanistan. As a member of the ICC, Afghanistan is within the ICC’s jurisdiction. The investigation included atrocities committed by the Taliban and foreign military forces active in Afghanistan, including members of the US armed forces. 

The US, which is not a member of the ICC, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2002/08/03/us-hague-invasion-act-becomes-law">violently opposes</a> any possibility that its military personnel might be caught up in ICC charges. In <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1448">April 2019</a> the ICC announced that a pre-trial chamber had shut down the investigation because US opposition made ICC action impossible. 

Court watchers <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/23/afghanistan-icc-abandons-field">reacted with frustration and disgust</a>.

<h2>EU migration</h2>

An estimated <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/20/the-list-europe-migrant-bodycount">30,000 migrants have drowned</a> in the Mediterranean in the past three decades. International attention was drawn to their plight during the migration surge of 2015, when the image of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/31/alan-kurdi-death-canada-refugee-policy-syria-boy-beach-turkey-photo">3-year-old Alan Kurdi</a> face-down on a Turkish beach circulated the globe. More than one million people entered Europe that year. This led the EU and its member states to close land and sea borders in the east by erecting fences and completing a Euro 3 billion deal with Turkey to keep migrants there. NATO ships were posted in the Aegean to catch and return migrants. 

Migrant-saving projects, such as the Italian Mare Nostrum programme that <a href="https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/548713624.pdf">collected 150,000 migrants in 2013-2014</a>, were replaced by border guarding projects. Political pressure designed to reduce the number of migrants who made it to European shores led to the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/12/migrant-rescue-ships-mediterranean">revocation and non-renewal of licenses</a> for boats registered to NGOs whose purpose was to rescue migrants at sea. This has led to the current situation, where <a href="https://qz.com/1639293/only-one-refugee-rescue-boat-operated-by-aid-groups-remains-in-the-mediterranean-sea/">there is only one boat patrolling</a> the Mediterranean.

The EU has handed search and rescue duties over to the Libyan coast guard, which has been accused repeatedly of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/jan/21/eu-support-for-libya-contributes-to-extreme-abuse-of-refugees-human-rights-watch-study">atrocities against migrants</a>. European countries now negotiate Mediterranean migrant reception on <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/23/eu-countries-agree-plan-to-handle-migrants-and-refugees">a case-by-case basis</a>.

<h2>A rights impasse</h2>

International and supranational law applies to migrants, but so far it has inadequately protected them. The <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf">law of the sea</a> mandates that ships collect people in need. A series of refusals to allow ships to disembark collected migrants has <a href="https://www.jus.uio.no/nifs/english/research/projects/oslos/events/seminars/2018-11-14-migration.html">imperilled this international doctrine</a>. 

In the EU, the <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/PERI/2017/600414/IPOL_PERI(2017)600414_EN.pdf">Court of Justice</a> oversees migration and refugee policies. Such oversight now includes a two-year-old deal with Libya that some claim is tantamount to “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/feb/05/eu-deal-libya-refugees-libyan-detention-centres">sentencing migrants to death</a>.” 

For its part, the European Court of Human Rights has established itself as “<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-european-court-of-human-rights-is-no-friend-to-migrants-42129">no friend to migrants</a>.” Although the court’s 2012 decision in <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2012/02/italy-historic-european-court-judgment-upholds-migrants-rights/">Hirsi</a> was celebrated for a progressive stance regarding the rights of migrants at sea, it is unclear <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/emil/20/4/article-p396_3.xml?lang=en">how expansively that ruling applies</a>.

European courts <a href="https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press#%7B%22itemid%22:%5B%22003-6443361-8477507%22%5D%7D">are being invoked</a> and making rulings, yet the journey for migrants has only grown more desperate and deadly over the past few years. Existing European mechanisms, policies, and international rights commitments are not producing change. 

In this rights impasse, the introduction of a new legal paradigm is essential. 

<h2>Fulfilling its role</h2>

A foundational element of ICC procedure is complementarity. This holds that the court only intervenes when states cannot or will not act on their own. 

Complementarity has played an unexpectedly central role in the cases before the ICC to date, as African states have self-referred defendants claiming that they do not have the resources to try them themselves. This has greatly contributed to the ICC’s political failure in Africa, as rights-abusing governments have handed over political adversaries to the ICC for prosecution in bad faith, enjoying the benefits of a domestic political sphere relieved of these adversaries while <a href="https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/A/bo47223014.html">simultaneously complaining of ICC meddling in domestic affairs</a>.

This isn’t how complementarity was supposed to work. 

The present rights impasse in the EU regarding migration showcases what complementarity was intended to do – granting sovereign states primacy over law enforcement and stepping in only when states both violate humanitarian law and refuse to act. The past decade of deadly migration coupled with a deliberately wastrel refugee policy in Europe qualifies as just such a situation.

Would-be migrants don’t vote and cannot garner political representation in the EU. This leaves only human rights norms, and the international commitments in which they are enshrined, to protect them. These norms are not being enforced, in part because questions of citizenship and border security have remained largely the domain of sovereign states. Those policies are resulting in an ongoing crime against humanity. 

The ICC may be the only institution capable of breaking the current impasse by threatening to bring Europe’s leaders to criminal account. This is the work of last resort for which international criminal law is designed. The ICC should embrace the progressive ideals that drove its construction, and engage.<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120851/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" style="border: none !important; box-shadow: none !important; margin: 0 !important; max-height: 1px !important; max-width: 1px !important; min-height: 1px !important; min-width: 1px !important; opacity: 0 !important; outline: none !important; padding: 0 !important; text-shadow: none !important" />

<a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/kerstin-carlson-344474">Kerstin Carlson</a>, Associate Professor International Law, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-southern-denmark-1097">University of Southern Denmark</a>

This article is republished from <a href="http://theconversation.com">The Conversation</a> under a Creative Commons license. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/migration-in-the-mediterranean-why-its-time-to-put-european-leaders-on-trial-120851">original article</a>.

Migration in the Mediterranean: It’s time for the ICC to put European leaders on trial, here’s why

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JOHANNESBURG &#8211; Among the metal shacks and narrow side streets of South Africa’s townships, one of the country’s biggest lenders sees a sizeable market it wants to be first to crack: multi-million-rand businesses operating largely in cash. 



FirstRand, South Africa’s biggest lender by market share, sees enterprises such as Ram Thapa’s, a beauty shop and fast-food outlet with combined annual turnover of 19 million rand ($1.36 million) but no business account, as ripe targets for a host of financial products.



Businesses in townships &#8211; areas designated for non-whites under apartheid &#8211; have largely been ignored by big banks in Johannesburg’s financial district Sandton, even though some have tens of millions of revenue a year, said Mike Vacy-Lyle, CEO of business banking at FirstRand’s retail unit First National Bank (FNB).



“Four kilometres to the right of Sandton is a township called Alex [Alexandra],” he said. “Inside Alex there are massive businesses and business networks that no bank has bothered to open their eyes to.”



FNB has set its sights on the townships as it prepares to defend its No. 1 position from rival Capitec and new digital lenders such as TymeBank and Bank Zero which have shaken up the retail market with cheaper products and are poised to enter business banking.



There are estimated to be up to 5.78 million micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises in South Africa according to a 2018 report by the World Bank, and while there is no recent data on the proportion of those firms which have a bank account, a 2010 survey cited in the report estimated it was less than half.



FNB plans to attract unbanked businesses onto its books by first getting them to use fintech firm Selpal. The bank acquired an undisclosed stake in the company late last year.



Selpal connects local stores with suppliers via software and tablets. Once a customer is using Selpal, FNB will use the data it collects to offer them an account with, for example, an overdraft attached. The bank is launching a business account in October with zero monthly fees though customers will pay as they use a range of transactions.



In order to succeed, FNB will have to overcome a strong attachment to cash-only transactions, general mistrust of banks, paperwork problems and low margins.



Reflecting that challenge, Vacy-Lyle said it could take up to a decade to sign up at least 600,000 companies. By comparison, it took Capitec five years to add more than 600,000 retail clients.



Rivals including Capitec, as well as Absa, Standard Bank and Nedbank &#8211; which together with FirstRand make up South Africa’s big four &#8211; told Reuters they don’t have plans to target unbanked township businesses specifically.



In a statement, Gerrie Fourie, chief executive of Capitec, said its plan was to focus on the SME market as a whole. Michael Jordaan, co-founder of Bank Zero, said it would target all businesses.



Luisa Mazinter, chief marketing officer of TymeBank, said its business offering would initially be targeted at sole proprietors and micro businesses, allowing current account-holders to open a separate account for their business with no extra documents required.



In the longer-term, TymeBank will adapt the offering to appeal to both formal and informal enterprises and aim to introduce its own point-of-sale devices, Mazinter said.



Bongiwe Gangeni, deputy CEO of Absa’s retail and business bank, said a number of attempts over the past decade to target unbanked companies, including with loans and point of sale devices, had not generated enough revenue to justify the costs.



She said the issue wasn’t always about access. “I think some of them choose not to be banked.”



FNB declined to quantify the income it is hoping to generate from township companies.



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">CASH STILL KING</h3>



On the face of it, lenders in South Africa are relatively well represented among the general population with more than 80% of adults having access to a current account, according to a 2018 report by FinMark Trust, a Johannesburg-based financial inclusion organisation.



But in many communities, cash is still king. A bank account is often a condition of employment or receipt of social payments, and many people withdraw money as soon as they receive it and just use notes and coins.



Only 24% of South Africans make more than three monthly transactions of any kind through their account, according to a report by Boston Consulting Group in 2017.



Some people are wary of formalising their financial arrangements in case it puts them on the taxman’s radar. Many are also mistrustful of digital methods of payment, as well as the financial sector in general after mis-selling and corruption scandals, and prefer to pool savings in community-based schemes.



In his shop, choc-a-bloc with hair and beauty products and mannequin heads wearing wigs, Thapa said he’d prefer to have a business bank account. Right now, he doesn’t have access to credit and is relying on a point of sale device linked to his brother’s business so he can serve card paying customers.



Cash also attracts trouble, he told Reuters.



“You know, this area is very dangerous,” he said, counting the number of times he had been robbed &#8211; three &#8211; on his fingers.



Bureaucracy is a big hurdle for small enterprises looking to tap traditional finance.



A handful of unbanked businesses Reuters found across two townships were, in almost every case, owned by immigrants or asylum seekers and cited a lack of the right documents &#8211; a factor outside of banks’ control &#8211; as the main reason their business didn’t have an account.



“When you want to do things, they want a business account,” said Vusi Coka, a South African running a tavern in Alexandra. He is struggling to get a mortgage because he can’t show banks how his business is performing.



He can’t open an account for the tavern because it belonged to his late father, and the title hasn’t been transferred into his name.



High fees are another barrier. Digital players have been able to make inroads in the retail market with cheaper products because, unlike traditional banks, they are not lumbered with expensive branch networks that push up costs.



FNB is hoping its zero-fee offering will attract price-conscious entrepreneurs in townships, giving it access to data for cross-selling and growing the market for financial products.



With Selpal serving as a “trojan horse”, Vacy-Lyle said the lender is looking to bank 2,500 township wholesalers by 2022, and after that will look to bring in grocery stores, known as spazas, and taverns, as well as firms like hairdressers and auto repair shops.



While making it easier for such businesses to access financial services, especially credit, was a positive, Brendan Pearce, chief executive of FinMark Trust, said there was a question mark over whether they could make informed decisions.



“There’s a financial literacy issue,” he said, adding fintech firms or others with a more specific focus could usually offer better products at better prices.



“I’m not convinced commercial banks have the solution to financial inclusion.”



($1 = 13.9359 rand)



Additional reporting by Onke Ngcuka, Naledi Mashishi and Mundia Sibongo; Editing by Rachel Armstrong and Carmel Crimmins

How do ‘unseen’ businesses in South Africa’s townships catch a big bank’s eye ?

By <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/nic-cheeseman-180800">Nic Cheeseman</a>, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-birmingham-1138">University of Birmingham</a>

There is growing concern about the potential for the message and media sharing platform WhatsApp to undermine democracy in a number of countries across the world including <a href="http://theconversation.com/whatsapp-skewed-brazilian-election-proving-social-medias-danger-to-democracy-106476">Brazil</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/13/big-tech-whatsapp-democracy-india">India</a>. 

Because WhatsApp is encrypted – and so offers users far greater protection from prosecution than Twitter or Facebook – it has become particularly notorious for spreading “fake news”. 

This is a major concern in Africa, where WhatsApp is the most <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1206935/whatsapp-is-the-most-popular-messaging-app-in-africa/">popular messaging app in 40 countries</a>. This is due to its low cost and the ability to easily share messages with both individuals and groups. 

But is this really how WhatApp is used? And if it is, to what extent does this compromise the quality of elections? 

A joint team from the Centre for Democracy and Development (Nigeria) and the University of Birmingham (UK) has spent the last few months researching the impact of WhatsApp on the 2019 Nigerian elections held in May. 

Their <a href="https://www.cddwestafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/WHATSAPP-NIGERIA-ELECTION-2019.pdf">report</a> comes to conclusions that are both troubling, as well as encouraging. 

The research reveals that the platform was used to mislead voters in increasingly sophisticated ways. But it also shows that Whatsapp strengthened democracy in other areas.

<h2>Misinformation and disinformation</h2>

The term “<a href="http://blogs.royalsociety.org/publishing/ignorance-can-be-fatal-countering-the-crisis-in-fake-news-and-fake-science/">fake news</a> has become widely used over the past few years. However, it is problematic because it lumps together very different kinds of information and behaviour. For example, we need to separate out deliberate attempts to mislead others by creating false stories (disinformation) from the innocent sharing of made up stories by people who believe it to be true (misinformation).

The 2019 Nigerian elections saw both disinformation and misinformation. We studied this by conducting 46 interviews in the states of Abuja, Oyo and Kano, as well as seven focus groups and a survey of 1,005 people.

During the course of conducting the research candidates consistently told us that they predominantly used WhatsApp to share information about their qualities and campaign pledges. But many WhatsApp users said that at a high proportion of the messages they received were designed to undermine a rival leader’s reputation – to &#8220;decampaign” them.

There were some high profile examples of disinformation. The most notorious story circulated on social media was that the president had died while undergoing medical treatment outside of the country, and had <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-46424562">been replaced by a clone from Sudan</a>. 

Other fabricated communications were less outlandish but no less significant. Many ordinary citizens shared these messages, in some cases because they knew they were false and wanted to amplify their impact, but in many cases because they thought they were true.

The most effective decampaigning strategies were those that shared messages that resonated with individuals because they contained an element of the truth, or played on recent experiences. 

<h2>WhatsApp takes over</h2>

The political influence of WhatsApp has expanded rapidly in line with its growing penetration. As a result, it has become part of the fabric of election campaigns and is now a key mechanism through which political leaders seek to communicate with their campaign teams and supporters. 

Fully 91% of the people we interviewed were active WhatsApp users; as one person put it:

<blockquote>
I use WhatsApp more than I use the toilet.
</blockquote>

In Nigeria, election candidates were already using the platform to <a href="https://www.academia.edu/32414216/The_Impact_of_Social_Media_during_the_2015_Nigerian_General_Elections">push messages in 2015</a>. But the people we interviewed agreed that the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/02/15/its-nigerias-first-whatsapp-election-heres-what-were-learning-about-how-fake-news-spreads/">2019 elections</a> saw a significant step up in terms of how the leading parties organised their social media strategy.

Politically, WhatsApp was used in an increasingly sophisticated way at the presidential level. In 2019, the two main presidential candidates – President Muhammadu Buhari and opposition leader Atiku Abubakar – both had dedicated teams pushing out messages over social media: the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6B-DqX1o370">Buhari New Media Centre</a> and <a href="https://www.atikulatedyouthforce.com/membership">Atikulated Youth Force</a>. By forming hundreds of Whatsapp groups of 256 members, these organisations could send messages to tens of thousands of people at the touch of a button.

Buhari’s effort was better funded and particularly impressive. It established a network of local and regional representatives connected to a “central command” in Abuja. This enabled the campaign to rapidly send messages from the national to the local level, while also responding to hostile messages and rumours shared by its rivals.

While those in power typically had more money to invest in their campaigns, many opposition leaders pointed out that in important ways WhatsApp had created a more level political playing field. Those who had been involved in politics for some time explained that “fake news” was nothing new in Nigeria, but that in the past it was sometimes impossible to counteract these messages because there was no way to get airtime on government aligned radio. 

WhatsApp had changed this situation. Opposition leaders now have a cheap way of fighting back. It has also been used to coordinate anti-corruption campaigns and election observation, strengthening democracy. 

<h2>Evolution or revolution?</h2>

It’s also important not to overstate the significance of WhatsApp. Things look very different below the national level, for example, where campaign structures were less developed and a significant proportion of activity remained informal.

We found that while candidates for Governor and Member of Parliament did set up WhatsApp groups, they were much less organised. In many cases, candidates relied on existing networks and social influencers to get the message out.

Candidates were also keen to stress that while they used WhatsApp during their campaigns, they did not rely on it. Voters expect to see their leaders on the ground, and expected them to provide a range of services for the community. Advertising good deeds over WhatsApp could help a leader get credit, but only if they had fulfilled their responsibilities in the first place.

In other words, WhatsApp can amplify and complement a candidate’s ground campaign. But it cannot replace it.

<h2>Throwing out the water but keeping the baby</h2>

These findings suggest that solutions to the power of social media platforms like WhatsApp isn’t to ban them, or to allow governments to censor them. This would merely exaggerate the vast advantages of incumbency that ruling parties already enjoy. 

A better solution would be to promote <a href="https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2016/11/09/what-is-digital-literacy.html">digital literacy</a>, develop <a href="http://www.comminit.com/democracy-governance/content/guidelines-development-social-media-code-conduct-elections">social media codes of conduct</a> around elections, and empower WhatsApp uses to control which groups they are added to, and what information they receive.

The research was conducted, and publications authored by, Jamie Hitchen, Idayat Hassan, Jonathan Fisher and Nic Cheeseman.<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121064/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" style="border: none !important; box-shadow: none !important; margin: 0 !important; max-height: 1px !important; max-width: 1px !important; min-height: 1px !important; min-width: 1px !important; opacity: 0 !important; outline: none !important; padding: 0 !important; text-shadow: none !important" />

<a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/nic-cheeseman-180800">Nic Cheeseman</a>, Professor of Democracy, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-birmingham-1138">University of Birmingham</a>

This article is republished from <a href="http://theconversation.com">The Conversation</a> under a Creative Commons license. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/whatsapp-played-a-big-role-in-the-nigerian-election-not-all-of-it-was-bad-121064">original article</a>.

With WhatsApp having played a major role in Nigeria’s elections does it undermine democracy ?

Togo EU Summit Debate: Achieving inclusive and sustainable economic growth in Togo

<figure>
 <img decoding="async" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/284468/original/file-20190717-147312-1hupjju.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip">
 <figcaption>
 Parliament House of Ghana.
 Shutterstock
 </figcaption>
 </figure>

By <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/adu-owusu-sarkodie-774216">Adu Owusu Sarkodie</a>, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-ghana-1965">University of Ghana</a>

Ghana has been <a href="http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/news/5798-ghana-chosen-to-host-african-continental-free-trade-area-secretariat">chosen</a> by the African Union (AU) to host the secretariat of the African Continental Free Trade Area. It beat other competing countries including Egypt, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar and Senegal to win the bid. 

As a free trade area, member countries have come together and agreed not to impose tariffs, quotas and other trade barriers on goods and services. The agreement is expected to enlarge markets and diversify exports, particularly manufactured goods. According to US-based think tank the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2019/05/30/figures-of-the-week-with-afcfta-officially-in-force-africa-is-now-the-largest-free-trade-area/">Brookings Institute</a>, intra-African trade stands at about 14%, while the share of manufactured goods to the rest of the world stands at 18%. Trade among Asian countries is much higher – at 59% – and even higher among European countries at 69%. The hope is that the African free trade area will boost trade across the continent by 52% <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/36085-doc-qa_cfta_en_rev15march.pdf">by 2022 </a>.

The core mandate of the secretariat will be to implement the free trade agreement, which has been <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/36085-doc-qa_cfta_en_rev15march.pdf">ratified</a> by 25 out of 54 countries. Once all have ratified the deal, it will create the world’s largest free trade area since the formation of the World Trade Organisation in 1995.

Africa’s free trade area will cover a market of 1.2 billion people with a combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/36085-doc-qa_cfta_en_rev15march.pdf">US$2.5 trillion</a>.

The secretariat’s job will be to recruit personnel, train them, and develop organisational capability. The secretariat will also have to implement policies handed down by the governing body, keep the media informed, organise conferences and identify potential funding sources. It will also monitor and evaluate the progress of policies and programmes.

This is a first for Ghana which has not hosted a continental secretariat. The hope is that it can emulate the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/why-the-african-union-needs-a-stable-ethiopia">success</a> of other African capitals that have befitted from hosting the AU and the United Nations. Addis Ababa is home to the AU headquarters while Nairobi hosts two of the UN’s biggest bodies. For its part, South Africa hosts the Pan-African Parliament. 

The presence of the AU in Addis Ababa has been <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/why-the-african-union-needs-a-stable-ethiopia">credited</a> with an increase in property valuations as well as job creation.

In making its bid, Ghana took advantage of its strategic geographical location in West Africa. It has put a great deal of effort into making the country a gateway and a trade hub in West Africa. 

Hosting the free trade area secretariat will come with costs and benefits &#8211; direct and indirect. 

<h2>Why Ghana</h2>

In establishing its credentials to host the secretariat, the Ghanaian government would have set out the country’s most notable achievements.

These would have included the fact that it’s been an exemplary member of the AU. For example, in 2007 it was among the first countries to be reviewed by the <a href="https://au.int/en/organs/aprm">African Peer Review Mechanism</a> – the self-assessment mechanism used to measure <a href="https://www.die-gdi.de/en/studies/article/the-african-peer-review-mechanism-aprm-as-a-tool-to-improve-governance-experience-in-ghana/">good governance</a>.

The fact that it put its hand up sent a signal to other countries that the peer review process was credible.

Other factors that would have played in Ghana’s favour are that the country’s economy has been showing strong growth.

It is one of the fastest growing economies in the world with an <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-17/ghana-economic-growth-slows-in-2018-as-oil-expansion-cools">average</a> GDP growth of about 6%. In addition, it comes second to Cape Verde in West Africa in terms of the United Nations Human Development <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/GHA">index</a>. 

In one of the most unstable sub regions in the world, Ghana also has a tradition of relative peace and security, a key parameter for hosting a secretariat. 

In addition, Ghana has had the advantage of learning about trade collaboration through its membership of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas).

<h2>Costs and benefits</h2>

Ghana has been part of the <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/member-states/">15-member</a> Ecowas since its formation in 1990. The regional body introduced a common external tariff in <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-cet-will-be-implemented-as-of-january-2015/">2015</a> . 

While Ghana has enjoyed <a href="https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditctab2018d1_en.pdf">benefits</a> from the arrangement, like many other West African States, it has not been able to harness its full potential. For example, border controls remain cumbersome, delaying transits due to the numerous check points, huge unofficial payments at the <a href="https://www.uneca.org/publications/assessing-regional-integration-africa-aria-ix">borders</a>. 

The most direct cost to the country will be the $10 million <a href="http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/news/5798-ghana-chosen-to-host-african-continental-free-trade-area-secretariat">pledged</a> by President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo to support setting up the secretariat. The AU is also expected to contribute funds and appeals have been made to international funding agencies.

Ghana’s hope is that hosting the secretariat will boost the hospitality sector – and more broadly the services sector – and generate increased international exposure. 

There should also be a boost for job creation as the secretariat hires staff; ranging from economists to translators, administrators and technicians.

There is no clear deadline on when the secretariat is expected to be up and running. The AU itself still has to clear a number of <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/36085-doc-qa_cfta_en_rev15march.pdf">hurdles,</a>, including adopting a structure, staff rules and regulations, and the secretariat’s budget.<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120386/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" style="border: none !important; box-shadow: none !important; margin: 0 !important; max-height: 1px !important; max-width: 1px !important; min-height: 1px !important; min-width: 1px !important; opacity: 0 !important; outline: none !important; padding: 0 !important; text-shadow: none !important">

<a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/adu-owusu-sarkodie-774216">Adu Owusu Sarkodie</a>, Doctor of Economics, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-ghana-1965">University of Ghana</a>

This article is republished from <a href="http://theconversation.com">The Conversation</a> under a Creative Commons license. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ghana-hopes-to-benefit-from-hosting-africas-free-trade-area-secretariat-120386">original article</a>.

Here’s what Ghana hopes to benefit from hosting Africa’s free trade area secretariat

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