By <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/nic-cheeseman-180800">Nic Cheeseman</a>, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-birmingham-1138">University of Birmingham</a>

There is growing concern about the potential for the message and media sharing platform WhatsApp to undermine democracy in a number of countries across the world including <a href="http://theconversation.com/whatsapp-skewed-brazilian-election-proving-social-medias-danger-to-democracy-106476">Brazil</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/13/big-tech-whatsapp-democracy-india">India</a>. 

Because WhatsApp is encrypted – and so offers users far greater protection from prosecution than Twitter or Facebook – it has become particularly notorious for spreading “fake news”. 

This is a major concern in Africa, where WhatsApp is the most <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1206935/whatsapp-is-the-most-popular-messaging-app-in-africa/">popular messaging app in 40 countries</a>. This is due to its low cost and the ability to easily share messages with both individuals and groups. 

But is this really how WhatApp is used? And if it is, to what extent does this compromise the quality of elections? 

A joint team from the Centre for Democracy and Development (Nigeria) and the University of Birmingham (UK) has spent the last few months researching the impact of WhatsApp on the 2019 Nigerian elections held in May. 

Their <a href="https://www.cddwestafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/WHATSAPP-NIGERIA-ELECTION-2019.pdf">report</a> comes to conclusions that are both troubling, as well as encouraging. 

The research reveals that the platform was used to mislead voters in increasingly sophisticated ways. But it also shows that Whatsapp strengthened democracy in other areas.

<h2>Misinformation and disinformation</h2>

The term “<a href="http://blogs.royalsociety.org/publishing/ignorance-can-be-fatal-countering-the-crisis-in-fake-news-and-fake-science/">fake news</a> has become widely used over the past few years. However, it is problematic because it lumps together very different kinds of information and behaviour. For example, we need to separate out deliberate attempts to mislead others by creating false stories (disinformation) from the innocent sharing of made up stories by people who believe it to be true (misinformation).

The 2019 Nigerian elections saw both disinformation and misinformation. We studied this by conducting 46 interviews in the states of Abuja, Oyo and Kano, as well as seven focus groups and a survey of 1,005 people.

During the course of conducting the research candidates consistently told us that they predominantly used WhatsApp to share information about their qualities and campaign pledges. But many WhatsApp users said that at a high proportion of the messages they received were designed to undermine a rival leader’s reputation – to &#8220;decampaign” them.

There were some high profile examples of disinformation. The most notorious story circulated on social media was that the president had died while undergoing medical treatment outside of the country, and had <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-46424562">been replaced by a clone from Sudan</a>. 

Other fabricated communications were less outlandish but no less significant. Many ordinary citizens shared these messages, in some cases because they knew they were false and wanted to amplify their impact, but in many cases because they thought they were true.

The most effective decampaigning strategies were those that shared messages that resonated with individuals because they contained an element of the truth, or played on recent experiences. 

<h2>WhatsApp takes over</h2>

The political influence of WhatsApp has expanded rapidly in line with its growing penetration. As a result, it has become part of the fabric of election campaigns and is now a key mechanism through which political leaders seek to communicate with their campaign teams and supporters. 

Fully 91% of the people we interviewed were active WhatsApp users; as one person put it:

<blockquote>
I use WhatsApp more than I use the toilet.
</blockquote>

In Nigeria, election candidates were already using the platform to <a href="https://www.academia.edu/32414216/The_Impact_of_Social_Media_during_the_2015_Nigerian_General_Elections">push messages in 2015</a>. But the people we interviewed agreed that the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/02/15/its-nigerias-first-whatsapp-election-heres-what-were-learning-about-how-fake-news-spreads/">2019 elections</a> saw a significant step up in terms of how the leading parties organised their social media strategy.

Politically, WhatsApp was used in an increasingly sophisticated way at the presidential level. In 2019, the two main presidential candidates – President Muhammadu Buhari and opposition leader Atiku Abubakar – both had dedicated teams pushing out messages over social media: the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6B-DqX1o370">Buhari New Media Centre</a> and <a href="https://www.atikulatedyouthforce.com/membership">Atikulated Youth Force</a>. By forming hundreds of Whatsapp groups of 256 members, these organisations could send messages to tens of thousands of people at the touch of a button.

Buhari’s effort was better funded and particularly impressive. It established a network of local and regional representatives connected to a “central command” in Abuja. This enabled the campaign to rapidly send messages from the national to the local level, while also responding to hostile messages and rumours shared by its rivals.

While those in power typically had more money to invest in their campaigns, many opposition leaders pointed out that in important ways WhatsApp had created a more level political playing field. Those who had been involved in politics for some time explained that “fake news” was nothing new in Nigeria, but that in the past it was sometimes impossible to counteract these messages because there was no way to get airtime on government aligned radio. 

WhatsApp had changed this situation. Opposition leaders now have a cheap way of fighting back. It has also been used to coordinate anti-corruption campaigns and election observation, strengthening democracy. 

<h2>Evolution or revolution?</h2>

It’s also important not to overstate the significance of WhatsApp. Things look very different below the national level, for example, where campaign structures were less developed and a significant proportion of activity remained informal.

We found that while candidates for Governor and Member of Parliament did set up WhatsApp groups, they were much less organised. In many cases, candidates relied on existing networks and social influencers to get the message out.

Candidates were also keen to stress that while they used WhatsApp during their campaigns, they did not rely on it. Voters expect to see their leaders on the ground, and expected them to provide a range of services for the community. Advertising good deeds over WhatsApp could help a leader get credit, but only if they had fulfilled their responsibilities in the first place.

In other words, WhatsApp can amplify and complement a candidate’s ground campaign. But it cannot replace it.

<h2>Throwing out the water but keeping the baby</h2>

These findings suggest that solutions to the power of social media platforms like WhatsApp isn’t to ban them, or to allow governments to censor them. This would merely exaggerate the vast advantages of incumbency that ruling parties already enjoy. 

A better solution would be to promote <a href="https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2016/11/09/what-is-digital-literacy.html">digital literacy</a>, develop <a href="http://www.comminit.com/democracy-governance/content/guidelines-development-social-media-code-conduct-elections">social media codes of conduct</a> around elections, and empower WhatsApp uses to control which groups they are added to, and what information they receive.

The research was conducted, and publications authored by, Jamie Hitchen, Idayat Hassan, Jonathan Fisher and Nic Cheeseman.<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121064/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" style="border: none !important; box-shadow: none !important; margin: 0 !important; max-height: 1px !important; max-width: 1px !important; min-height: 1px !important; min-width: 1px !important; opacity: 0 !important; outline: none !important; padding: 0 !important; text-shadow: none !important" />

<a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/nic-cheeseman-180800">Nic Cheeseman</a>, Professor of Democracy, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-birmingham-1138">University of Birmingham</a>

This article is republished from <a href="http://theconversation.com">The Conversation</a> under a Creative Commons license. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/whatsapp-played-a-big-role-in-the-nigerian-election-not-all-of-it-was-bad-121064">original article</a>.

With WhatsApp having played a major role in Nigeria’s elections does it undermine democracy ?

Mohamed M Diatta | Sciences Po – USPC
At a time where Africa has seen a few long-standing leaders exit, the issue of change in power is occupying minds of citizens as well as those in leadership positions.
<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="aligncenter wp-image-290966 size-full" src="http://cnbc.africa/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Angola_Joao-Lourenço_Dos-Santos_GettyImages.png" alt="" width="850" height="566" />
In spite of their varied repertoire of tactics to remain in power, no one is immune to the wave of change in leadership that has led many African presidents to lose their coveted top job.
Whether through elections, succession battles, coups or end of terms in office it has become a question of when and how they will exit. That’s if one is not too concerned with what comes afterwards. Though it is too early to tell whether meaningful changes can be expected, cases such as Zimbabwe suggest that its citizens can envisage more of the same.
Nevertheless, a review of developments in 2017 shows that it was a fruitful year for those advocating change. Examples include the Gambia where Adama Barrow came in as a promising new leader. Angola’s Joao Manuel Lourenço rose to power and immediately replaced some top public servants, raising hopes that he might champion good governance, although there hasn’t been an overhaul of the system.
In any case, the arrival of a ‘new’ leader in power always brings optimism for change and constitutes an opportunity for new beginnings.
<h2>The big changes of 2017</h2>
In the Gambia Yahya Abdul-Aziz Jammeh decided to hang onto power following his electoral defeat to Adama Barrow.
<div id="attachment_299592" style="width: 310px" class="wp-caption alignleft"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-299592" class="wp-image-299592 size-medium" src="http://cnbc.africa/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Gambia-President_Adama-Barrow_GettyImages-300x200.png" alt="" width="300" height="200" />Gambian President, Adama Barrow. Image: Getty Images</div>
After nearly four decades in power Angola’s Jose Eduardo Dos Santos did not seek reelection. But his ruling Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) retained power after winning the August presidential election. Dos Santos was succeeded by Joao Manuel Goncalves Lourenço, his former Minister of Defense.A nuisance to his Senegalese neighbour and an embarrassment to his peers in the subregional body, he was eventually pushed out by the Economic Community of West African States, ending his 22-year rule. He has since been in exile in Equatorial Guinea.
Zimbabwe provided the finale to an eventful year when, in a battle for succession, Robert Mugabe was forced out by a faction of his ZANU-PF with the help the Zimbabwean Defense Forces. Emmerson Mnangagwa, his long-time ally, and vice-president, took over the country. Mnangagwa has announced that elections this year will be ‘free and fair’. He is expected to retain power and his ZANU-PF to keep control of the national assembly.
<h2>Different fortunes</h2>
Rwanda, Kenya and Liberia all presented tales of different presidential fortunes.
After the December 2015 constitutional amendment allowing Paul Kagame to run for a third term and potentially remain in power until 2034, he was, without a surprise, reelected in august 2017 with almost 99 % of the votes. Kagame, touted by many as the providential leader who has stabilised and redressed a country emerging from genocide, is also criticised for muzzling all forms of opposition and restricting civil liberties.
In Kenya, Chris Msando, head of information, communication and technology for the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, was tortured and murdered a week before the presidential election. Following the august 8th polls, the opposition coalition known as NASA and led by Raila Ondinga, contested the reelection of incumbent Uhuru Kenyatta. Despite international observers (including the African Union) finding no major issues with the polls, the Kenyan Supreme Court annulled the results and called for a new election in October.
<div id="attachment_292572" style="width: 310px" class="wp-caption alignright"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-292572" class="wp-image-292572 size-medium" src="http://cnbc.africa/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Uhuru-Kenyatta_New_Flickr-300x200.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="200" />Kenyan President, Uhuru Kenyatta.</div>
Kenya has since sunk into a political and institutional crisis, aggravated by the recent inauguration of Odinga as the ‘peoples president’.Uhuru Kenyatta was eventually reelected president in October, after NASA’s refusal to take part in the election without addressing the key issues raised about the electoral commission.
Africa’s presidential electoral year ended in Liberia, on 28 December, with the passing of the baton between the ruling-party’s candidate Joseph Nyumah Bokai and Georges Oppong Weah. The former soccer star turned politician and senator, won in the second round with more than 60% of the votes taking over from Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s 12 year rule. He will have to redress the resource-rich but yet poor nation, in the wake of a debilitating Ebola outbreak.
<h2>Lessons to take into 2018</h2>
In the three emblematic cases of ‘handover’ – Angola, Zimbabwe and The Gambia – it’s difficult to say whether the democratic deficit is less serious today. But if ZANU-PF and the MPLA don’t renew themselves, systems that don’t have a stellar record in the rule of law and good governance departments could easily be perpetuated.
Gambians, for their part, can hope that the coming to power of a novice in politics will bring them a better life.
Ensuring democratic and good governance, free and fair elections, and peaceful transitions to power are no longer optional.
Stability in several countries will indubitably be jeopardised in 2018 if some governments do not deliver free and fair elections. Similarly, undertaking constitutional changes that contradict the rule of law, the separation of powers and don’t uphold political agreements, will further entrench instability. From this point of view, Africa’s regional organisations will have to manage the post-electoral crises from previous years – including Kenya – and try and prevent those on the horizon this year.
<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91600/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />The African Union must, more than ever, have all its member states sing to the tune of democracy. This can be facilitated by a reform of the organisation. But this, in turn, hinges on the political will of those who will have to endorse the necessary changes. Unfortunately, they remain, for the moment, the guardians of the old order.
This article was originally published on The Conversation.

Africa waves some leaders goodbye: but is the democratic deficit any narrower?

Mohamed M Diatta | Sciences Po – USPC
The winds of change may blow in several directions across Africa this year as a host of countries prepare for elections. But a change in power isn’t always synonymous with change in governance. In Africa, very often, a new face in power doesn’t signal change of the system of governance.
<div id="attachment_298824" style="width: 860px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-298824" class="wp-image-298824 size-full" src="http://cnbc.africa/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Kabila_GettyImages-800731456.png" alt="" width="850" height="538" />President of the Democratic Republic of Congo Joseph Kabila smiles as he delivers his remarks during a meeting with South African President Jacob Zuma at Sefako Makgatho Presidential Guest House in Pretoria on June 25, 2017. Image: Getty Images</div>
The continent is set for a busy 2018 electoral year. In the past presidential, legislative, or local elections, or a combination, have had a destabilising if not devastating effect due to pre and post-election transparency issues and accompanying protests, violence and political instability. But when conducted well, elections have also brought hope for a better future. Ghana and Benin are good examples.
The year ahead won’t be any different. On the one hand the expected end of Joseph Kabila’s tenure in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) might bring momentous change to the country. On the other it’s more difficult to foresee better days for South Sudan. Others might also depart before elections.
<h2>Early departures?</h2>
All eyes are on Pretoria where the ruling African National Congress has asked President Jacob Zuma to resign following the election of Cyril Ramaphosa as ANC president and South Africa’s next president. As of February 13 he was showing no signs of doing so.
And seven years after the Jasmine Revolution that ousted the regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Tunisians are back on the streets. The wave that took away Ben Ali now threatens to sweep the government of Beji Caid Essebsi.
<h2>Presidential seats at stake</h2>
The DRC has added more instability to its already complex situation. The country has been embroiled in a political and institutional crisis since Joseph Kabila extended his term in office, after failing to amend the constitution to remove the disposition preventing him from running for a third term. He has twice postponed presidential elections, despite signing the December 2016 agreement whose main clause was to have presidential and legislative elections held by December 2017.
Kabila’s failure to hold elections by the December 2017 deadline has led to mounting national protests, which the regime has crushed. Increasing national and international pressure might see Kabila out in 2018 unless he amends the constitution.
In Cameroon, Paul Biya, 85, in power since 1982, should be up for reelection in October. Although there is no indication that he will relinquish power, he has faced dissensions and separatist claims from so-called anglophone Cameroon and is believed to have ill-health. The current lack of succession plans if Biya does not run, leaves room for speculation and uncertainty.
In Madagascar, concern reigns in the run-up to the presidential election at the end of this year, which should see incumbent Hery Rajaonarimampianina face up his two predecessors Marc Ravalomanana and Andry Rajoelina. The island, with a tumultuous history, has been prey to institutional instability since 2001. There are fears this will happen again.
Three countries, South Sudan, Libya and Mali, plagued by instability for some years, are expected to hold presidential elections this year. Strong uncertainties prevail in South Sudan and Libya where negotiations for peaceful settlements have yielded little tangible results. In Mali the government doesn’t control large parts of its territory and is not immune to terrorist attacks.
No surprise will come from Cairo where, Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, will certainly be reelected president of a country he now controls unchallenged.
<h2>Longevity and power sharing dilemmas</h2>
In West Africa, Togolese Faure Gnassingbé appears as a poor student in the field of democracy. He came to power in 2005 in a quasi-dynastic political ‘transition’, replacing his father, General Gnassingbe Eyadema, who had been in power for 38 years. Reelected in 2015, he has, since August 2017, faced massive and sustained popular protests demanding institutional reforms and the end of his family’s 50-year rule.
The Economic Community of West African States is trying, through negotiations, to restore calm. An uneasy situation is emerging given that Faure is the current chairman of the organization until June 2018. But if he completely loses the support of his peers, he might be on his way out. Legislative elections are scheduled to take place by July.
Like Togo, Gabon experienced a similar ‘transition’ from father Omar Bongo, who died in power in 2009 after 42 years of rule, to his son Ali Bongo, who replaced him that year. Once a haven of peace in an unstable Central African region, Gabon has tumbled into a serious crisis since the highly contested presidential election in 2016 which was marred by widespread fraud and deadly repression. Jean Ping, leader of the opposition and former chairperson of the African Union Commission, continues to claim victory.
The hardening of the Libreville regime has recently resulted in a constitutional amendment that the opposition characterises as a ‘monarchisation’ of power. Legislative elections planned this year will certainly be a turning point for the country.
In Guinea Bissau, the power of José Mario Vaz is in troubled waters, with the appointment of a seventh prime minister since 2014. The opposition has decried the president for overstepping his constitutional prerogatives by monopolising power, in violation of the Conakry agreement signed in 2016, under the aegis of the regional west African body.
Vaz runs the risk of sanctions, in which case he would definitively lose the support of the organisation and the protection of the regional troop deployment. This would precipitate his departure and could plunge the country into chaos, in a state that has mostly known military coups and instability. Legislative elections are expected to take place this year.
In Chad, the crisis that has affected resource-dependent countries has plagued the economy. This is coupled with Idris Deby’s stronghold on power and his repressive methods. Despite facing civil unrest, he is unlikely to be shaken even though the country is expected to hold legislative elections this year.
<h2>Ghana setting the pace</h2>
Over the past 20 years, since the John Kofi Agyekum Kufuor presidency, Ghana has epitomised democracy south of the Sahara (aside from South Africa). Its institutional stability and peaceful transitions of power are commendable.
<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91690/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />What the continent needs most are strong institutions, which will only come about with a regeneration of its leadership as well as its political class. This renewal must be rooted in a paradigm shift as embodied with determination, class and panache by Ghanaian president Nana Akufo Addo.
This article was originally published on The Conversation.

With a busy election schedule, Africa needs a reversal of the old order

Stephen Chan | SOAS, University of London
Kenya’s recently annulled elections will soon be re-run, but the long-term questions they raised about election management are still unanswered. The spotlight is on the work of international observer teams, but there are also much wider questions of electoral capacity – problems that extend to the top of the African Union, and thence across the whole continent.
African democracies are in the process of co-ordinating a generation jump in applied technology. So far, they have actually done a remarkable job by global standards. After all, something like electronic voting is still not used in the UK, where people in raincoats wait patiently while someone with a pencil draws a line through their name on a paper spreadsheet. The rain-sodden voter drips into the polling booth and makes a choice, casts their vote with a pencil on a sheet of paper, and shuffles outside again while putting up an ineffectual umbrella. Nothing has changed for 100 years.
It’s Africa that has led the way – and the West isn’t the place to look for immediate answers for all the problems of running a 21st-century election. One such problem is the use of multiple forms of electronic voting. Voter identification by electronic means is given priority in Nigeria, but even there, it’s not implemented consistently: there are different systems provided by different companies, all submitting tenders on a competitive basis.
The African Union needs to devise a standard set of requirements and attributes for electronic voting across the continent. It’s no longer enough to have a protocol that says paper votes have to be placed into clear plastic ballot boxes. But the African Union has fallen behind. Its previous head, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, was hardly technologically minded; in fact, her successor has apparently stressed the commission urgently needs an email system fit for purpose.
Dlamini-Zuma has now returned to line up for the presidency of her home country, South Africa, whose cabinet is renowned for its technological illiteracy. There are very few images of its current president, Jacob Zuma, working on a laptop or PC, and possibly none of him actually pressing the keys. (His next door neighbour, Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, has seemingly never been pictured with a laptop at all.)
But if the presidents might have trouble sending simple emails, the thousands of local observers at each election will need special training of the sort never attempted before. They need to know not just how the system works, but how it can be made not to work – or at least, to work in ways that do not reflect the electorate’s will. Only after that does the question of international observer capacity come into play.
<h2>Mastering the system</h2>
It’s fair to say that although EU observers to Kenya were deployed far in advance of the election and had good geographical coverage, the team was not replete with electronic expertise. And it’s not as if there was no advance knowledge that this would be an electronic election.
Well before the elections began and before the EU observer team was deployed, senior members of both the EU team and the Kenyan opposition were given access to a detailed paper I prepared on the problems of electronic observation. And there was ample evidence from the 2015 Nigerian elections that these things could be bumpy rides. To be fair, electoral commissions need to upgrade their capacities as well; whatever happened in Kenya, whether wicked or incompetent, it was clear electoral officials were not on top of their game, unlike their Nigerian counterparts, who managed to resolve their problems in the end.
Electoral commissions need to open up all stages of the electronic process to knowledgeable observers, and especially the verification stage. This is where subtle algorithmic adjustments can be inserted to preserve close parity between voting patterns on the ground and “verified” results that “just” deliver very narrow victories to a ruling party.
At least electronic cheating can only really work persuasively in close elections. The days of 90% victories are almost (if not quite) over, but they will be followed a rash of elections “won” by about 2%. Margins of about 4%, as in the Kenyan elections, will have to be open to expert interrogation. As it turned out, Kenya’s elections were annulled on grounds of non-electronic irregularities, but neither the opposition nor the electoral commission seemed able to make sustained cases for or against electronic abuse.
Still, it is Africa that has come almost of age in electronic and digital voting. The West’s elections look like Sony Walkmans in the age of the smartphone. Even that comparison might be a bit flattering: in the UK, going to vote is like cranking up an LP on a turntable to 78rpm. Let’s hope Africa’s new leaders and technocrats will make the generational jump more smoothly in the future, and keep showing the creaky old West the way.

Africa leads the way in election technology, but there’s a long way to go

Jeremiah Ogonda Asaka | Middle Tennessee State University
Kenya’s 2017 general election has been one of the most litigated general elections since the country’s first multiparty poll in 1992.
Just weeks before Election Day the country’s Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) was still embroiled in court battles. In fact, days before the vote, it appeared in court at least twice.
In the first instance Kenya’s main opposition coalition – the National Super Alliance – alongside the Thirdway Alliance Party of Kenya challenged IEBC’s award of a ballot printing tender to Al Ghurair – a Dubai based firm.
The High Court of Kenya ruled for the plaintiffs effectively barring Al-Ghurair from printing the presidential ballot papers.
In its second appearance IEBC appealed the High Court ruling. This time the decision went its way. The Court of Appeal reversed the the lower court’s decision arguing that the election commission didn’t have time to find a new printer. The appeal’s court also ruled that the lower court should have barred Al-Ghurair from printing ballot papers for all elective seats and not just the presidential one.
After the second ruling, IEBC had the green light to print the ballot papers and conduct the general elections. Infamously, the presidential result was then invalidated by the Supreme Court triggering a fresh election slated for October 17, 2017.
The Supreme Court ruling was not just a victory for Kenyan democracy but for democracy everywhere. It underscored the independence of the judiciary, strength of public institutions, and Kenya’s deepening commitment to the rule of law. These lessons go well beyond Africa.
But despite the court’s decision, there are those who still maintain that President Uhuru Kenyatta won the election. The president himself was confident that he had garnered the most votes and he blasted the courtfor usurping the will of the Kenyan people, swearing to fix the problemin the Judiciary if he won the fresh election. His words were broadly interpreted as a direct attack on the judiciary.
Role of election observers questioned
Kenyatta’s remarks are at worst a direct attack on the judiciary and at best an indication that the Executive will interfere with judicial independence. That is a threat that Kenyan will have to contend with at home.
On the international stage, election observers are also facing a threat to their continued existence. The role and effectiveness of international election observation has been called into question after more than 400 observers gave the Kenyan election a clean bill of health. The Supreme Court decision has put them in a tight spot.
The Carter Center which sponsored the John Kerry-led observation team has praised the court decision as “both important and encouraging, because it highlights the independence of the Kenyan judiciary”, while trying to distance itself from any wrongdoing.
Media pundits across the continent and beyond have weighed in on the future of international election observation, some of them calling observer missions out for their formulaic rubber stamping of results. Whichever way one looks at it, the Supreme Court judgment is a stinging indictment on the international election observation enterprise.
Moving forward, election observer missions should address themselves to two key issues if they are to regain credibility. First, they must approach elections as a process rather than an event. In this way observer missions will be able to stagger their reporting to reflect the various phases of the electoral process.
In the Kenyan case for instance, observer mission would be expected to report separately on their findings. They would start by observing voter registration, voting, vote counting and tallying, before reporting on results transmission and verification process, and the announcement of results. A comprehensive report of findings would be made available once the election was over.
Second, observers must contend with the new African election reality that includes a strong information, communication and technology component. It is foolish to observe an electronic electoral process using the same approaches that were used to observe manual election.
Further compounding this issue for the observation industry is the fact that a number of African elections are now hybrids that integrate electronic and manual aspects. This is something that election observer missions must quickly come to terms with in order to update their mode of operation.
Next steps for Kenya
Kenya’s 2017 general election court rulings are significant in two ways. First, they highlight the functioning nature of Kenya’s democracy, which includes checks and balances. In this respect, the Judiciary has emerged as a strong, independent democratic institution. Second, the Supreme Court has to a large extent restored Kenyans’ confidence in their country’s judicial system.
Interesting times lie ahead for Kenya as it prepares for a fresh presidential poll now slated for October 17, 2017. The opposition alliance led by Raila Odinga has already demanded for the reconstitution of IEBCbefore the October poll.
On their part, Kenyatta, his deputy William Ruto and their Jubilee Party have vowed to ensure that the IEBC conducts the fresh poll as presently constituted. As things stand, Kenya still has a long road to travel before the current election dispute is resolved.
That notwithstanding, Kenyans have a date with destiny. The Supreme Court ruling has granted Kenyans another opportunity to decide the path their country will take. It is now anyone’s guess what the result of a fresh election will be. One thing is certain, though, the October 17 presidential election will have long lasting ramifications for Kenya’s maturing democracy.
&nbsp;
This article was first published in The Conversation.

Op-Ed: How will the Supreme Court’s historic ruling impact the country’s democracy

Faith Kiboro | SMC University
After Kenya’s contested election result, opposition leader Raila Odinga announced he wouldn’t be seeking legal redress for what he termed “a sham of an election”. Three days later he’d changed his mind and said he would be contesting the election in the country’s Supreme Court.
This means that Uhuru Kenyatta’s victory is on hold pending a decision by Kenya’s highest court. Its decision is expected in early September. The Supreme Court bench will be constituted by seven justices. These are the Chief Justice David Maraga, his Deputy Lady Justice Philomena Mwilu, Lady Justice Njoki Ndung&#8217;u, and justices Smokin Wanjala, Mohamed Khadhar Ibrahim, Jackton Boma Ojwang and Isaac Lenaola.
The petition is effectively an audit of the electoral process. This is a good thing. To build resilience against election-related disputes, Kenyans must stay open to legal arbitration as a way of vetting the democratic process, and standing up for stronger democratic values.
<h2>Odinga’s case</h2>
The main grounds of Odinga’s petition are that some of the presidential results were derived from nonexistent polling stations by ungazetted presiding and returning officers.
Odinga is also claiming that the results that declared Kenyatta the winner were not submitted procedurally. This claim has been a source of controversy and is likely to form a large part of the petition.
Odinga is also likely to argue that the election commission chairperson acted contrary to the law because he didn’t have all the requisite tallying documents when he declared the result.
He will have to prove that:
<ul>
<li>Some of the requisite tallying documents were not presented and verified at the national tallying centre before the results were declared. He would then have to prove that the failure to present and verify the documents significantly altered the outcome.</li>
<li>The tallying documents did not present a truthful account of the vote – in other words that some were fabricated or falsified. If he can prove this then the integrity of the election will be called into question.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Possible outcomes</h2>
If the court finds that the presidential election was invalid a fresh electionwill have to be called. This would involve the presidential candidates who participated on August 8. If any abandon the electoral contest or die before the scheduled date a fresh nomination exercise would have to be held.
After Odinga’s 2013 presidential petition, the Supreme Court ordered a partial recount of votes before upholding Kenyatta’s win.
But this time around the court is likely to ask for closer scrutiny of the entire poll process.
Odinga has filed a 25,000-page petition, compared to the 800-page document he filed in 2013. This places a huge responsibility on the court to sift through all the allegations.
A number of potential factors could affect its decision.
Firstly , the Supreme Court is likely to be swayed by the opinions of 400 election observers who deemed the election credible.
Secondly, the current chief justice is known to be a moderate. His conservatism may mean that he will uphold the electoral commission’s position and maintain that the election was carried out in a free, fair and transparent manner.
Invalidating the general election would be unprecedented in Kenya. But it could happen because the chief justice is keen to demonstrate judicial independence. The judiciary has recently come under attack from political leaders for deciding in favour of the opposition in its determination of a series of high profile pre-election cases.
<h2>Letter versus spirit of the law</h2>
Ultimately, the judges could go one of two ways.
They could make a decision based purely on the letter of the law. Or they could opt for a judgement that adheres to the spirit of the law – in other words the intention of the law as opposed to its literal meaning.
A judgement based on the spirit of the law is likely to serve the greater good – that is a return to normalcy as quickly as possible.
In the 2013 presidential election, the Supreme Court set a standard of proof which it phrased in a question.
<blockquote>Did the petitioner clearly and decisively show the conduct of the election to have been so devoid of merits, and so distorted, as not to reflect the expression of the people’s electoral intent?</blockquote>
There’s no doubt it will ask the same question this time round.
&nbsp;
This article was first published in The Conversation.

Op-Ed: Kenya’s election: Supreme Court judges hold the key to the outcome

Sarah Logan | Economist, International Growth Centre
&nbsp;
Critical elections are being held in Rwanda and Kenya. In Rwanda, the incumbent Paul Kagame will face Frank Habineza, of the Democratic Green Party of Rwanda and independent candidate Philippe Mpanyimana.
In Kenya, Raila Odinga, representing an umbrella opposition party, the National Super Alliance, will challenge incumbent Uhuru Kenyatta of the Jubilee Party.
Some controversy already mars both polls. Victoire Ingabire, considered the strongest opposition leader in Rwanda, remains jailed for threatening state security. The Rwandan constitution was also recently amended to allow Kagame to run for a third term and to potentially rule until 2034.
In Kenya, there’s been considerable criticism of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, the body running the election. Issues have included the reliability of the technology being used and the alleged partiality of the commission’s former leadership. And the recent printing of 1.2 million extra ballot papers has raised suspicions of planned vote rigging. The torture and murder of Christopher Msando, the commission’s head of information and technology, has further increased concerns.
<div id="attachment_268267" style="width: 346px" class="wp-caption alignleft"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-268267" class="wp-image-268267 size-full" src="http://cnbc.africa/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Raila_Odinga_Elections_Wikimedia.jpg" alt="" width="336" height="504" />Kenyan opposition leader, Raila Odinga: Wikimedia</div>
With their frequent irregularities, it’s easy to become cynical about elections in Africa. But we must fight our scepticism and indifference because elections continue to be an extremely important component of the continent’s growing democracy.
<h2>Elections and democracy</h2>
While elections alone are insufficient for democracy, they are nevertheless a prerequisite. This is because they promote political participation and competition needed for democracy. It’s the failure or absence of elections that largely defines dictatorships.
Other prerequisites for democracy include:
<ul>
<li>checks on executive power,</li>
<li>civilian control of the military,</li>
<li>civil rights and due process, and</li>
<li>an independent media and active civil society.</li>
</ul>
Since the early 1990s, elections in Africa have, on the whole, become increasingly free and fair. A number of factors have contributed to this. The effectiveness of electoral governance – institutions and regulatory norms – has been the most important. The legitimacy of elections depends on clear procedural rules.
Studies have found that the electoral management boards are the most significant indicators of the quality of electoral governance. In particular, whether a board is autonomous of government is crucial. Very few African countries inherited autonomous electoral management boards at independence. But, in line with global trends, their prevalence has been rising.
By 2002 more than half of African electoral management boards were fully autonomous, 29% were semi-autonomous, and only 20% weren’t autonomous.
International election observation has also contributed to elections becoming more free and fair. Their presence can reduce fraud and increase domestic confidence in the process. Inviting international observers to monitor an election has now become a necessary conditionfor an election to be considered internationally legitimate. Refusal to do so is almost akin to admitting electoral fraud.
&nbsp;
Long-term observers begin work months ahead of an election. This is because free and fair elections depend a great deal on what happens before voting day. In fact, vote buying and political intimidation before polling day are more common than disputes over vote counting or polling procedures.
&nbsp;
<h2>Free media and active citizens</h2>
A free media and active civil society continue to play an indispensable oversight role. This includes keeping institutions honest and keeping people informed.
A study in Sierra Leone showed that election debates between parliamentary candidates were very effective. Recorded debates between local parliamentary candidates were shown in numerous villages.
An evaluation of their impact showed that watching the election debates substantially increased viewers’ political knowledge. It also made it more likely that they would vote along policy (rather than ethnic) lines. Electedpoliticians who had been involved in the debates also tended to invest more in their constituencies, and to visit them more often.
<h2>Civil society</h2>
Civil society has a particular role in promoting a peaceful electoral environment. Its role is particularly crucial where tensions are high. Non-partisan citizen observers and monitoring groups, such as the West Africa Election Observers Network, are increasingly involved in election monitoring. Some of the results have been impressive. For example, a coalition of observers in Ghana trained and deployed about 4000 people to cover the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections.
Regional blocs have also been important in strengthening democracy by enforcing electoral outcomes. A good example was when the Economic Community of West African States stepped in after the Gambian president Yahya Jammeh refused to leave office after losing the 2016 election. The regional body’s commitment to remove him by force if necessary was highly commendable.
Its influence can also be seen in the fact that 14 out of its 15 member states have presidents who have been in office for less than two terms. The Economic Community of West African States should serve as a model to other regional blocs.
<h2>Making Africans polls free and fair</h2>
A great deal of progress has been made on improving political participation across the continent. But genuine political competition in elections remains a challenge. More work is still needed to remove biases in favour of incumbents. Another area that needs work is lifting restrictions on access to state-controlled media by opposition parties.
And for democracy to be strengthened further a number of players have to take an active role. This includes governments, opposition parties, the media, citizens, civil society and the international community.

Why elections matter for democracy in Africa. The cases of Kenya and Rwanda

The questions that I get asked most often by students, policy makers and political leaders are: “can democracy work in Africa?” and “is Africa becoming more democratic?”.
As we celebrate <a href="http://www.enca.com/africa/10-things-you-need-know-about-africa-day">Africa Day</a> and reflect on how far the continent has come since the Organisation of African Unity was founded in 1963, it seems like a good time to share my response.
Some people who ask these questions assume that the answer will be “no”, because they are thinking of the rise of authoritarian abuses in places like <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-need-to-talk-about-zambia-as-it-falls-from-grace-under-president-lungu-77520">Burundi and Zambia</a>. Others assume that the answer is “yes” because they remember recent transfers of power in <a href="http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/ghana-ebbing-power-incumbency">Gambia, Ghana and Nigeria</a>.
Overall trends on the continent can be read in a way that supports both conclusions. On the one hand, the average <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017">quality of civil liberties</a> has declined every year for the last decade. On the other, the number of African states in which the government has been defeated at the ballot box has increased from a handful in the mid 1990s to 19.
To explain this discrepancy, I suggest that we need to approach the issue a little differently. Instead of focusing on the last two or three elections, or Africa-wide averages, we need to look at whether democratic institutions such as term-limits and elections are starting to work as intended. This tells us much more about whether democratic procedures are starting to become entrenched, and hence how contemporary struggles for power are likely to play out.
When we approach the issue in this way it becomes clear that democracy can work in Africa – but that this does not mean that it always will.
<h2>The rules of the game</h2>
Democracies are governed by many different sets of regulations, but two of the most important are presidential term-limits and the need to hold free and fair elections. Because these rules have the capacity to remove presidents and governments from power, they represent a litmus test of the strength of democratic institutions and the commitment of political leaders to democratic principles.
So how are these institutions faring? Let us start with elections. Back in the late 1980s only Botswana, Gambia and Mauritius held relatively open multiparty elections. Today, almost every state bar Eritrea holds elections of some form. However, while this represents a remarkable turn of events, the average quality of these elections is low. According to the <a href="http://www.nelda.co/">National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy dataset</a>, on a 1-10 scale in which 10 is the best score possible, African elections average just over 5.
As a result, opposition parties have to compete for power with one hand tied behind their backs. This helps to explain why African presidents <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/why-definition-free-fair-politics-africa-sometimes-hazy/440808-3799782-o22lkm/">win 88% of the elections that they contest</a>. On this basis, it doesn’t look like democracy is working very well at all.
If we move away from averages, though, it becomes clear that this finding masks two very different trends. In some countries, such as Rwanda and Sudan, elections are being held to legitimise the government but offer <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/200408200964.html">little real choice to voters</a>.
Things look very different if we instead look at Benin and Ghana, which have experienced a number of <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e7aa79ac-5e2f-11e5-a28b-50226830d644">transfers of power</a>. In countries like these, governments allow voters to have their say and – by and large – respect their decision.
This suggests that when it comes to elections there are at least two Africas: one that has not become much more democratic since the early 1990s, and another in which elections have become entrenched and the quality of the process has improved – though not always consistently – over time.
<h2>Constraints on presidential power</h2>
When it comes to upholding the <a href="http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/institutionalization-political-power-africa">presidential term-limits</a> that most African states feature in their constitutions, the picture is also mixed. In many countries, leaders who were never committed to respecting a two- (or in some cases three-term) limit have been able to change or reinterpret the law in a way that allows them to remain in office indefinitely. As a result, term limits have been overturned in Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea, Namibia, Rwanda, Sudan, Togo and Uganda.
But, as we saw with elections, the picture is not as bleak as it may at first appear. To date, African presidents have come up against term-limits 38 times. In only 18 cases have presidents sought to ignore and amend the constitution, and in only 12 cases were they successful. Put another way, of the 42 countries that feature term-limits, so far they have only been overturned in 13.
This is remarkable. On a continent known for “<a href="http://africasacountry.com/2016/03/the-big-man-syndrome-in-africa/">Big Man</a>” rule and which has often been described as being institutionless, one of the most important democratic institutions of them all is starting to take root in a surprising number of states. So far presidents have accepted – or been forced to accept – the ultimate check on their authority in Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sao Tome &amp; Principe, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Zambia.
Thus, while it is important not to overlook the ability of leaders to <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/235518">subvert the rules of the game</a> in the continent’s more authoritarian states, it is also important to recognise that the constraints on presidential power are greater than at any time in the last 50 years. In contemporary Africa, term limits are more likely to be respected than broken.
<h2>Can democracy work in Africa?</h2>
This evidence demonstrates that democracy can work in Africa. In those countries in which high quality elections go hand in hand with entrenched term-limits, we are witnessing processes of democratic consolidation. Some of these processes are just starting, and all are vulnerable to reversal, but there is no longer any reason to doubt that democracy can function in a number of African countries.
So what separates the success stories from the rest? What we know is that there are a number of factors that serve to insulate governments from domestic and international pressure to reform, and so undermine the prospects for democratisation.
One is the presence of strong security forces that can be used to put down opposition and civil society protests. Another is the presence of <a href="https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Working_Paper_184_-_Does_Oil_Wealth_Affect_Democracy_in_Africa.pdf">significant oil reserves</a>. With the exception of Ghana and possibly Nigeria, Africa’s petro-states are all authoritarian.
A third is support from foreign governments, which is often given to regimes that are geo-strategically important and willing to support the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/ugandan-relations-with-western-donors-in-the-1990s-what-impact-on-democratisation/7A43FD132DB52811004160F92A3F1172">foreign policy goals</a> of other states, whether they are democratic or not.
These factors do indeed make it harder to break free of old authoritarian logics. But it’s also important to keep in mind that they don’t make it impossible. Nigeria, for example, ticks most of these boxes and yet witnessed a peaceful transfer of power in 2015.
Given this, and the many other positive stories that have come out of the continent, it is seems apt to end by repeating the final line of my <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/democracy-in-africa/3FFB8B40059192D449B77A402ADC82A1">2015 book</a>. Despite all of the negative stories that dominate the headlines
<blockquote>It is far too early to give up on democracy in Africa.</blockquote>
This is of great importance because there is already evidence that on average more democratic states spend more on <a href="http://www.politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/5395/Stasavage_Harding.pdf">education</a> and achieve higher levels of <a href="http://blogs.die-gdi.de/2017/02/14/africas-democracy-is-good-for-growth/">economic growth</a>.
We therefore have good reasons to believe that in the long-run living under a democracy will improve the lives of African citizens.

Democracy is taking root in Africa. But that doesn’t mean it works all the time

<a href="http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/69574d004112cc428595f510d2cccae0/ServiceundefineddeliveryundefinedprotestsundefinedspreadundefinedacrossundefinedJoburg-20170905">Recent violent protests in South Africa</a> have refocused attention on the growing number of demonstrations over government failure to provide basic services, such as water and electricity. The country is known as the <a href="http://www.sabc.co.za/news/f1/b9ad4d8042b5df199f1a9f3d86b55090/South-Africa:-">“protest capital of the world”</a>.
Research by the Centre for Social Change, University of Johannesburg seems to bear this out. Based on estimates from <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304076282_Counting_Police-Recorded_Protests_Based_on_South_African_Police_Service_Data?_iepl%5BviewId%5D=5KxFFchge3DcotG82x6t7YVe&amp;_iepl%5BprofilePublicationItemVariant%5D=default&amp;_iepl%5Bcontexts%5D%5B0%5D=prfpi&amp;_iepl%5BtargetEntityId%5D=PB%3A304076282&amp;_iepl%5BinteractionType%5D=publicationTitle">South African Police Service data</a>, we found that between 1997 and 2013 there were an average of 900 community protests a year. In recent years the number has climbed to as high as 2,000 protests a year.
The situation in South Africa is not unique. <a href="http://www.cadtm.org/IMG/pdf/World_Protests_2006-2013-Final-2.pdf">Protests have been increasing</a> globally, particularly since the <a href="https://www.globalpolicy.org/social-and-economic-policy/the-world-economic-crisis.html">2008 global economic crisis</a>.
In a <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Southern-Resistance-in-Critical-Perspective-The-Politics-of-Protest-in/Paret-Runciman-Sinwell/p/book/9781472473462">new book</a>, my colleagues from the Centre for Social Change and I attempt to understand South Africa as part of the global protest wave.
On the face of it, protests in South Africa look quite different. They tend to be fragmented and happen mostly in black townships and informal settlements. The occupation of central public spaces in towns and cities, as we are seeing in <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/venezuelan-opposition-renews-protests-maduro-170420173517381.html">Venezuela</a>, happens seldom.
While there are important differences there are also commonalities. Whether protests focus around the “1%” as they did during the <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1369118X.2015.1043318">Occupy movement</a> or around the lack of service provision in townships, protesters around the world are critiquing the failure of a representative democracy to provide socio-economic equality.
<h2>Broken promises</h2>
South Africa’s governing ANC came into power in 1994 on the promise of a <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/better-life-all">“better life for all”</a>. There have been important gains, such as increasing access to electricity from 51% of the population in 1994 to <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-04-25-africa-check-does-the-anc-have-a-good-story-to-tell/#.WRwOQJKGOpp">85% in 2012</a>, but inequality remains endemic. Recent data from the World Bank confirms that South Africa remains one of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/datablog/2017/apr/26/inequality-index-where-are-the-worlds-most-unequal-countries">the most unequal countries in the world</a>.
As part of research by the Centre for Social Change we spoke to protesters all over the country. A new book from the centre highlights the extent to which protesters are raising not just concerns about the quality of service delivery but also about the quality of post-apartheid democracy. As Shirley Zwane, from <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/place/khayelitsha-township">Khayelitsha</a>, near Cape Town, explains:
<blockquote>We don’t have democracy!… We [are] still struggling… you see if we are in democracy there’s no more shacks here… No more bucket system… we supposed to have roads, everything! A better education… There is a democracy?…. No, this is not a democracy! They have, these people in Constantia, Tableview, Parklands, they have a democracy, not for us!</blockquote>
For Shirley the quality of post-apartheid democracy is linked to the provision of basic services. She is not alone in this view.
<a href="http://afrobarometer.org/publications/wp8-views-democracy-south-africa-and-region-trends-and-comparisons">Research by Afrobarometer</a> has found that compared to other countries in the region South Africans are much more likely to emphasise the realisation of socio-economic outcomes as crucial to democracy. That South Africans should view housing and services as central to post-apartheid democracy is unsurprising given that apartheid systemically denied the majority of people these rights.
<h2>Crisis of affordability</h2>
Community protests are fundamentally about the exclusion from democracy experienced by many black working class citizens since the <a href="http://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu/unit.php?id=65-24E-6">end of apartheid in 1994</a>.
Although the provision of services to the previously marginalised black majority has increased substantially, black working class households face an increasing crisis of affordability.
In sectors covered by a minimum wage, the real median wage <a href="https://www.academia.edu/31349234/Is_South_Africa_at_a_Turning_Point">increased by 7.5%</a> between 2011 and 2015. But last year inflation on an <a href="http://www.pacsa.org.za/images/food_barometer/2016/2016_PACSA_Food_Price_Barometer_REDUCED.pdf">average working class food basket was 15%</a> and certain staple foods, such as maize meal, increased by as much as 32%. This has put a real squeeze on working class households especially when, due to high levels unemployment, each black South African wage earner <a href="http://www.pacsa.org.za/images/food_barometer/2016/2016_PACSA_Food_Price_Barometer_REDUCED.pdf">supports four people</a>.
<h2>Structural challenges</h2>
The crisis of affordability facing black working class households also compounds the structural crisis within local government.
In South Africa local governments are responsible for delivering services. Over the past 15 years local municipalities have increasingly had to find ways to fund these services through their own tax base. Many have resorted to cost recovery measures, for example by introducing prepaid meters. Their introduction <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/pimville-residents-protest-against-eskoms-prepaid-meters-20170327">has been behind many protests.</a>
The financial difficulties for local and provincial governments looks set to get worse. In the country’s <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2016/speech/speech.pdf">latest budget</a> the National Treasury cut their funding as part of R25 billion budget cuts. In the case of Gauteng, the scene of the most recent protests, this amounted to a R2.9 billion rand cut <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/tight-budget-for-gauteng-1995372">over three years</a>.
To fill the gap, municipalities and provinces are going to have to look increasingly to their own tax base to fund service provision. A difficult prospect when slightly more than half the population survives on <a href="http://beta2.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-03-10-11/Report-03-10-11.pdf">R779 or less a person a month</a>.
<h2>A global crisis</h2>
As Professor Michael Burawoy argues in our new book, the nature of the crisis varies from country to country. In South Africa the crisis represents the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=gCmEDgAAQBAJ&amp;pg=PT48&amp;lpg=PT48&amp;dq=Michael+Burawoy+forcible+exclusion&amp;source=bl&amp;ots=YPlKuMoX0L&amp;sig=Aagamv6XQL7XWlwXy52qBjgaBmM&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=0ahUKEwiD0u_61PbTAhUkDsAKHXPhA7AQ6AEIKDAB#v=onepage&amp;q=Michael%20Burawoy%20forcible%20exclusion&amp;f=false">forcible exclusion</a> of many black working class households from democratic institutions, largely because of their inability to afford socio-economic goods. For instance, while access to electricity has increased, access is increasingly mediated by prepaid meters, therefore the ability to access service is inextricably linked to the ability to afford them.
It’s this exclusion that leads many to say that <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=gCmEDgAAQBAJ&amp;pg=PT48&amp;lpg=PT48&amp;dq=Michael+Burawoy+forcible+exclusion&amp;source=bl&amp;ots=YPlKuMoX0L&amp;sig=Aagamv6XQL7XWlwXy52qBjgaBmM&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=0ahUKEwiD0u_61PbTAhUkDsAKHXPhA7AQ6AEIKDAB#v=onepage&amp;q=democracy%20only%20for%20the%20rich&amp;f=false">democracy is only for the rich</a>. Globally, people are beginning to search for new solutions to these problems with many being drawn to left-wing movements and political parties, such as <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/cristina-flesher-fominaya/%E2%80%9Cspain-is-different%E2%80%9D-podemos-and-15m">Podemos</a> in Spain. Whether such a comparable movement can emerge in South Africa remains to be seen.

South African protesters echo a global cry: democracy isn’t making people’s lives better

Following the resolution of the political impasse in The Gambia, a great deal of attention has focused on the role played by the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas). The regional body brought a swift end to the potentially explosive crisis sparked by the refusal of former President Yahya Jammeh to hand over to the newly elected Adama Barrow. 
Jammeh’s flight to exile was preceded by weeks of diplomacy to persuade him to hand over power peacefully. When this failed regional troops and military assets were mobilised to install Barrow forcibly. The rest is history. Barrow is now officially in the presidential seat. 
This resounding success, unrivalled by any African regional organisation, has taken decades to craft. It is remarkable to think that at its inception in 1975, joint military action was not even on the cards. 
The fractious 1960s 
By the close of the early 1960s most countries in the West African sub-region had gained political freedom from colonial powers. They adopted a variety of political systems including multiparty democracy, one-party civilian administrations and military autocracies. The region developed quite a reputation for military coups. There were more in the region than anywhere else on the continent. 
Initial attempts to form Ecowas floundered in the early 1960s. This was due largely to the differences between Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, and Nigeria’s first prime minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, on the kind of integration necessary for the states in the region. 
The fall of these two personalities from power in 1966 did not end the political rivalries in the region. Attempts at integration were further delayed by the civil war in Nigeria between 1967 and 1970. Its aftermath further affected any chances at integration due to the struggle over the supremacy of the West African region between Nigeria and Côte d&#8217;Ivoire along Anglo-Francophone lines. 
Eventually two influential military leaders – Generals Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria and Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo – formed the nucleus of Ecowas in the 1970s. They succeeded in bringing on board the other military leaders of Dahomey (now Benin), Ghana and Niger among others. This explains the dominant role of the military in the life of the organisation. 
Ecowas was eventually formed on May 28 1975, in Nigeria as a regional economic grouping of 15 states. Membership went up to 16 when Cape Verde joined in 1976. But it declined again to 15 when Mauritania withdrew in December 2000. 
The Ecowas Treaty of 1975 envisaged the group as an economic community with the aim of promoting 
cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity. 
The grouping saw its role as raising the living standards of people in the region, increasing and maintaining economic stability, fostering closer relations among its members and contributing to the progress and development of the continent. 
It is significant that no reference was made to defence or security in any of the treaty’s 65 articles. 
How did the economic bloc blossom into a dominant sub-regional peace and security organisation in Africa? 
The need for a security organisation 
When Ecowas was formed in 1975 only Nigeria had experienced a civil war. But there was an increase in the number of violent conflicts after the late 1980s. 
Several factors contributed to the intractability and complexity of violent conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Côte d&#8217;Ivoire. These included the effects of the Cold War, economic malaise, human rights abuses and political rivalries and interests of states in the region. The conflicts had deleterious implications for peace and security of the region. 
The effect of the civil wars was that some states became places for recruiting disenchanted unemployed youth into various armed banditry groups. They pillaged the region for natural resources and committed heinous war related crimes. 
Ecowas was formed at a time when power vacillated between civilian and military rulers in the region. The period was characterised by governments accusing one another of supporting dissidents. There were also accusations of domestic problems being instigated externally. 
Against this backdrop, the treaty was revised in 1993. The “Revised Treaty” allowed the promulgation of protocols to regulate the peace and security architecture of member states. 
The peace and security architecture of Ecowas 
The first protocol promulgated was a nonaggression pact signed on April 28 1978 in Lagos, Nigeria. The region’s leaders present noted that the community 
cannot attain its objective save in an atmosphere of peace and harmonious understanding among Community members. 
This marked the beginning of future steps by member states to address security matters in the region. But the protocol proved inadequate against either external attacks or intrastate conflicts which were becoming more frequent. This led to the mutual assistance in defence protocol being passed. 
This was signed in May 1981 despite fervent opposition from Mali, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. It did not create a standing army but provisions were made for joint action in the event of any security threat to a member state through a voluntary contribution of troops. These were referred to as the Allied Armed Forces of the Community. 
But the reliance on troop contributions from member states was a major challenge. This was because by the time troops were assembled the violence would have escalated. 
These and many other bottlenecks, in particular, the harrowing experiences of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (Ecomog) in Liberia and Sierra Leone, led to the next big step. Which is why in 1999 a mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security was agreed. 
Current peace and security framework 
The 1999 protocol put in place comprehensive structures and processes that have to be followed in the event of conflict breaking out. 
The mechanism makes provision for diplomatic and military interventions. It empowers regional leaders to decide on the deployment of political and military missions. 
Ecowas has a standby force in member countries which can be deployed rapidly to prevent conflicts from escalating. The rapid deployment of troops from Nigeria and The Gambia’s neighbour Senegal in the recent deadlock is a case in point. 
Other protocols relating to the prevention, management and resolution of conflict make up a significant part of the regional peace and security architecture. These include a supplementary protocol on democracy and good governance adopted in 2001. 
There are a number of other security related structures. These include an early warning system and a mediation and security council which advises the authority of heads of state and government. In addition, there are offices of the special representatives, a council of elders and special mediators. 
But the challenge of preventing conflicts from escalating remained. To meet this challenge, a conflict prevention framework was agreed in 2008. This enabled the regional powers to harness human and financial resources from other important players such as private and civil society organisations. 
A major challenge that now remains is the financial burden associated with political and military missions. But with its long history of meeting its challenges full square, there is every chance Ecowas will make a success of that, too.

How West Africa built the muscle to rout dictators and keep the peace

Conventional wisdom tells us that good political societies are built on the principles of constitutionalism. This entails upholding the <a href="http://www.blackwellreference.com/public/tocnode?id=g9781405136532_chunk_g978140513653223">rule of law</a> and <a href="http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/vile-constitutionalism-and-the-separation-of-powers">separation of powers</a>. This is to ensure an <a href="http://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-94-007-0753-5_3064">even distribution of power</a> where a society is “<a href="https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/administrative-law/constitutionalism-good-governance-a-dangerous-law-essays.php">built on principles of law, not men</a>”.
In the 1990s many African states <a href="http://www.researchgate.net/publication/265493847_Constitutional_Reforms_and_Constitutionalism_in_Africa_Reflections_on_Some_Current_Challenges_and_Future_Prospects">reinvented their constitutions</a> to build good political societies. They moved away from one-party authoritarian states to embrace a constitutional political order and representative democracy. They also enacted two-term presidential limits. This was, as Charles Fombad <a href="http://www.buffalolawreview.org/past_issues/59_4/Fombad.pdf">tells us</a>
a clear recognition of the need for radical changes … In some cases, it meant a total break with a dreadful past … but in most cases it meant recognising that a constitutional framework built around the one party system that had bred authoritarian and dictatorial rule was a recipe for political instability and economic decline.
But the limitations on presidential terms have not entirely quashed a culture of entitlement to rule. Glimpses of this culture persist.
This is evident in what is now referred to as the “<a href="http://presidential-power.com/?p=4874">third term tragedy</a>” or the “<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/09/16/heres-how-african-leaders-stage-constitutional-coups-they-tweak-the-constitution-to-stay-in-power/">constitutional coup</a>”. This is when African presidents extend their tenure in office, effectively becoming “president for life”, changing constitutions to do so. Increasingly, this is met with civic resistance.
Burundi, Rwanda, the Congo and Burkina Faso are examples of where this has happened.
Roots of constitutionalism
Constitutionalism found its roots in <a href="http://www.sophia-project.org/uploads/1/3/9/5/13955288/elahi_socialcontract.pdf">social contract theory</a>, which was penned by <a href="http://fee.org/articles/john-locke-natural-rights-to-life-liberty-and-property/">John Locke</a> among others.
The basic argument is that humans have inalienable and natural rights to life, freedom and estate. And for us to exercise these rights, we create a political society of consent where constitutional principles reign supreme. Thus, as <a href="http://www.sophia-project.org/uploads/1/3/9/5/13955288/elahi_socialcontract.pdf">Manzoor Elahi</a> reminds us:
According to Locke, the purpose of the government and law is to uphold and protect the natural rights of men. So long as the government fulfils this purpose, the laws given by it are valid and binding, but when it ceases to fulfil it, then the laws would not have validity and the government can be thrown out of power.
This interpretation of the purpose of government also informs the <a href="http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf">principles of good governance</a>. These are transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation, responsiveness, and respecting the rule of law. The social contract between those who govern and those who are governed is founded on this <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/GoodGovernance/Pages/GoodGovernanceIndex.aspx">rights-based approach</a> to governance. This means that leaders govern at the pleasure of the people, and do not rule with sovereign license at the cost of constitutional rules. The well-being and rights of the people must be the central concern of those who govern.
Good governance entails playing by the rules. It requires accepting <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/gambia-jammeh-rejects-result-presidential-election-161210034606068">electoral defeat</a> if the people willed it so.
Cases of constitutional coups
There have been some classic examples of “constitutional coups” in recent years. These include:
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.africanleadershipcentre.org/index.php/2014-10-22-15-44-06/alc-newsletters/sept2015-issue/385-the-new-assault-on-presidential-term-limits-in-africa-focus-on-burundi">Burundi</a>, where President Pierre Nkurunziza’s machinations for a third term in 2015 led to political instability and a <a href="http://europe.newsweek.com/burundi-army-chief-says-coup-attempt-failed-327288">failed military coup</a>. He subsequently emerged victorious in an election marred by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/24/burundi-pierre-nkurunziza-wins-third-term-disputed-election">violence and intimidation</a> in 2015.</li>
<li>Congo: In 2015, President Denis Sassou Nguesso claimed that the people <a href="http://www.voanews.com/a/congo-brazzaville-opposition-to-protest-president-third-term-bid/2976658.html">wanted him</a> to extend his 32-year stay in power and announced a referendum to change the constitution to allow him to contest the election. This was met with mass protest, with people proclaiming that the “<a href="http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKCN0RS0LK20150928">Congo does not belong to Nguesso</a>”. In 2016 he won <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/congo-president-denis-sassou-nguesso-wins-election-160324040212900.html">at the polls</a> amid tight security measures and a communications black out.</li>
<li><a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2014-11-03-an-undignified-exit-the-fall-of-burkina-fasos-compaore">Burkina Faso’s Blaise Compaoré</a> was forced to flee following widespread protests against his bid to extend his 27-year rule in 2014.</li>
<li>Rwanda’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/01/rwanda-paul-kagame-third-term-office-constitutional-changes">President Paul Kagame</a> will run for a third term this year. This after the constitutional was amended to allow him another term, following a referendum to that effect. He may be in power until <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/20/rwanda-vote-gives-president-paul-kagame-extended-powers">2034</a>.</li>
</ul>
In 2015 West African states took a progressive step with a proposal to ban “constitutional coups” by limiting presidents to only two terms. But the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32808685">idea was abandoned</a> as some states in the region did not support it. This happened despite the fact that research shows Africa’s citizens largely <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno30.pdf">support limiting presidential terms</a>.
The African Union (AU) committed to a <a href="http://theconversation.com/why-zumas-african-way-is-at-odds-with-the-african-unions-vision-57589">democratic social contract</a> with <a href="http://archive.au.int/assets/images/agenda2063.pdf">Agenda 2063</a>. There is a formal promise to abide by the will of the people and to respect the rule of law. The problem rather, as <a href="http://www.buffalolawreview.org/past_issues/59_4/Fombad.pdf">Charles Fombad concludes</a>, is that
In many countries, the problems were not caused by the absence of constitutions. Rather it was the ease with which African leaders had rendered constitutions dysfunctional by regularly ignoring their provisions or amending them when it suited their convenience.
Some highlight the lack of effective opposition in Africa. But the problem also relates to views about governance and the rules. It seems the rules are made to the broken.
The AU has to be commended for taking a firm stance against regime change through <a href="https://www.files/ethz.ch/isn/105906/P197.pdf">military coup</a>. It has suspended countries for “<a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/african-union-suspends-burkina-faso-military-coup-150919073352770.html">unconstitutional regime change</a>”. But it has not been as effective in its opposition to dealing with the problem of extended presidential terms. This could be due to the <a href="http://www.saiia.org.za/policy-briefings/presidential-term-limits-a-new-african-foreign-policy-challenge">sovereignty principle</a>, which makes African states reluctant to interfere in others’ affairs.
But the problem of leaders clinging to power is only one manifestation of a lack of respect for constitutional rules in Africa. Others include the fact that opposition political parties are often <a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/02/10/rwanda-end-attacks-opposition-parties">harassed</a> and their leaders <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-uganda-opposition-leader-under-house-arrest-amid-tensions-2016-2">locked up</a>. They are also painted as illegitimate proxies for harmful <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-10-06-icg-confrontation-in-zimbabwe-turns-increasingly-violent/#.WIia6rF7GqA">foreign “third forces”</a> seeking regime change.
Gambia shows democracy advancing, but…
Many have applauded the Economic Community of West Africa <a href="http://www.ecowas.int/">(Ecowas)</a> for the role it played ensuring a peaceful transition after the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38271480">Gambian election</a>.
After President Yahya Jammeh rejected his loss, citing “<a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/gambia-jammeh-rejects-result-presidential-election-161210034606068">foreign interference</a>”, it looked like a replay of a now all-too-familiar script, wherein a leader clings on to power against the popular will.
But regional leaders had other ideas. With a <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/gambia-yahya-jammeh-final-deadline-step-170120044922953.html">not-so gentle push</a> from them, Jammeh eventually <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/jammeh-arrives-banjul-airport-stepping-170121210246506.html">accepted the electoral outcome</a> and vacated the plush presidential chair.
Yes, we may see the Gambian story as an <a href="http://europe.newsweek.com/gambia-election-result-sign-democracy-advancing-africa-528532?rm=eu">advancement for democracy</a> in Africa. And yes, there are many lessons the Southern African Development Community (SADC) can learn from Ecowas in <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-southern-africa-can-learn-from-west-africa-about-dealing-with-despots-71722">dealing decisively with despots</a>.
But the temporary Gambian crisis also points to a deeper governance problem in Africa: leadership attitudes towards “governance”. Many African leaders have yet to appreciate that constitutional rules matter. And while military coups are increasingly “<a href="http://newafricanmagazine.com/why-are-military-coups-going-out-of-fashion-in-africa">out of fashion</a>”, people on the continent need to pay attention to the “softer” methods used to entrench the “president-for-life syndrome” which threaten the continent’s democratic gains.
More importantly, given a commitment to good governance through <a href="http://au.int/en2/agenda2063">Agenda 2063</a>, African leaders must do more than show respect for the rules. They must also realise that they need to govern – not rule – at the pleasure of the people.
This would speak to building a culture of accountability and good governance through a change in mindset – instead of seeing their job as ruling the people leaders would see their role as governing the people. It would also entail vacating political office when your time is up.

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With WhatsApp having played a major role in Nigeria’s elections does it undermine democracy ?

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