Sarah Logan | Economist, International Growth Centre
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Critical elections are being held in Rwanda and Kenya. In Rwanda, the incumbent Paul Kagame will face Frank Habineza, of the Democratic Green Party of Rwanda and independent candidate Philippe Mpanyimana.
In Kenya, Raila Odinga, representing an umbrella opposition party, the National Super Alliance, will challenge incumbent Uhuru Kenyatta of the Jubilee Party.
Some controversy already mars both polls. Victoire Ingabire, considered the strongest opposition leader in Rwanda, remains jailed for threatening state security. The Rwandan constitution was also recently amended to allow Kagame to run for a third term and to potentially rule until 2034.
In Kenya, there’s been considerable criticism of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, the body running the election. Issues have included the reliability of the technology being used and the alleged partiality of the commission’s former leadership. And the recent printing of 1.2 million extra ballot papers has raised suspicions of planned vote rigging. The torture and murder of Christopher Msando, the commission’s head of information and technology, has further increased concerns.
<div id="attachment_268267" style="width: 346px" class="wp-caption alignleft"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-268267" class="wp-image-268267 size-full" src="http://cnbc.africa/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Raila_Odinga_Elections_Wikimedia.jpg" alt="" width="336" height="504" />Kenyan opposition leader, Raila Odinga: Wikimedia</div>
With their frequent irregularities, it’s easy to become cynical about elections in Africa. But we must fight our scepticism and indifference because elections continue to be an extremely important component of the continent’s growing democracy.
<h2>Elections and democracy</h2>
While elections alone are insufficient for democracy, they are nevertheless a prerequisite. This is because they promote political participation and competition needed for democracy. It’s the failure or absence of elections that largely defines dictatorships.
Other prerequisites for democracy include:
<ul>
<li>checks on executive power,</li>
<li>civilian control of the military,</li>
<li>civil rights and due process, and</li>
<li>an independent media and active civil society.</li>
</ul>
Since the early 1990s, elections in Africa have, on the whole, become increasingly free and fair. A number of factors have contributed to this. The effectiveness of electoral governance – institutions and regulatory norms – has been the most important. The legitimacy of elections depends on clear procedural rules.
Studies have found that the electoral management boards are the most significant indicators of the quality of electoral governance. In particular, whether a board is autonomous of government is crucial. Very few African countries inherited autonomous electoral management boards at independence. But, in line with global trends, their prevalence has been rising.
By 2002 more than half of African electoral management boards were fully autonomous, 29% were semi-autonomous, and only 20% weren’t autonomous.
International election observation has also contributed to elections becoming more free and fair. Their presence can reduce fraud and increase domestic confidence in the process. Inviting international observers to monitor an election has now become a necessary conditionfor an election to be considered internationally legitimate. Refusal to do so is almost akin to admitting electoral fraud.
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Long-term observers begin work months ahead of an election. This is because free and fair elections depend a great deal on what happens before voting day. In fact, vote buying and political intimidation before polling day are more common than disputes over vote counting or polling procedures.
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<h2>Free media and active citizens</h2>
A free media and active civil society continue to play an indispensable oversight role. This includes keeping institutions honest and keeping people informed.
A study in Sierra Leone showed that election debates between parliamentary candidates were very effective. Recorded debates between local parliamentary candidates were shown in numerous villages.
An evaluation of their impact showed that watching the election debates substantially increased viewers’ political knowledge. It also made it more likely that they would vote along policy (rather than ethnic) lines. Electedpoliticians who had been involved in the debates also tended to invest more in their constituencies, and to visit them more often.
<h2>Civil society</h2>
Civil society has a particular role in promoting a peaceful electoral environment. Its role is particularly crucial where tensions are high. Non-partisan citizen observers and monitoring groups, such as the West Africa Election Observers Network, are increasingly involved in election monitoring. Some of the results have been impressive. For example, a coalition of observers in Ghana trained and deployed about 4000 people to cover the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections.
Regional blocs have also been important in strengthening democracy by enforcing electoral outcomes. A good example was when the Economic Community of West African States stepped in after the Gambian president Yahya Jammeh refused to leave office after losing the 2016 election. The regional body’s commitment to remove him by force if necessary was highly commendable.
Its influence can also be seen in the fact that 14 out of its 15 member states have presidents who have been in office for less than two terms. The Economic Community of West African States should serve as a model to other regional blocs.
<h2>Making Africans polls free and fair</h2>
A great deal of progress has been made on improving political participation across the continent. But genuine political competition in elections remains a challenge. More work is still needed to remove biases in favour of incumbents. Another area that needs work is lifting restrictions on access to state-controlled media by opposition parties.
And for democracy to be strengthened further a number of players have to take an active role. This includes governments, opposition parties, the media, citizens, civil society and the international community.

Why elections matter for democracy in Africa. The cases of Kenya and Rwanda

By Martin van Staden
The African National Congress’ suggestion that the number of provinces should be reduced from nine to six comes as a shock. Fortunately, our Constitution and the Rule of Law do not make abusing the levers of power that easy.
It would be unfair to the ANC to imply that this is simply corruption and cheap gerrymandering to avoid losing Gauteng in 2019, as this policy was adopted back in 2007 before the Western Cape fell into the Democratic Alliance’s hands. But the ANC, the oldest and perhaps most experienced democratic political parties on the African continent, must surely be aware that wanting to reduce the number of provinces – and thereby rob the Official Opposition of its democratic mandate in the Western Cape – would be perceived as an outright attack on our constitutional democracy.
A postulate of the constitutional principle of the Rule of Law is that the law and policy must be certain and predictable insofar as it is practically possible. With the electoral – indeed, political – uncertainty currently facing South Africa, it would be reckless to fiddle with the configuration of provinces or municipalities at this stage in our history. This conduct invites uncertainty and unpredictability and is thus arguably a violation of the Rule of Law and thus the Constitution.
<h4>Legal games played by Apartheid government</h4>
South Africans would do well to remember the legal games the Apartheid government engaged in to ensure it got its way, before endorsing the ANC’s plans. Indeed, up to 1956, coloured South Africans enjoyed limited franchise in the Cape Province, but then the National Party passed legislation increasing the size of each province’s Senate representation and thereby giving the government the requisite amount of votes in Parliament to amend the South Africa Act and remove the coloured franchise.
Thankfully, however, for the government to actually decrease the number of provinces, it would need to go about a process to amend the Constitution. Section 74(3)(ii) provides that two-thirds of the National Assembly and six provinces in the National Council of Provinces must approve alterations to “provincial boundaries, powers, functions or institutions”; and section 74(8) provides that the provincial legislatures in question will need to approve such alterations.
When the government is closer to the people and people have more opportunities to participate in the daily governing of their lives, a country is more democratic. This inevitably means devolution of power to lower levels of government, like provinces and municipalities. Where there is a centralisation of power, either by taking powers from lower levels or by reducing the number of lower levels of government, democracy is being eroded.
<h4>Appropriate action to send resources in the right direction</h4>
If the ANC is truly concerned about a “concentration of resources” at the provincial level while service delivery ordinarily happens at local government level, more appropriate action might be to ensure the resources go where they are meant to go. But the real burdensome ‘middleman’ in this relationship is not the provinces, but the national government, which is the furthest away from the people.
Centralisation of power in fewer locales and, at worst, at the national level, does nothing but chip away at real democracy. It assumes all South Africans are alike, live under the same circumstances, and thus have to be governed in the exact same way. While the Rule of Law does demand equal application of the law, this does not mean all law needs to be the same everywhere.
Which laws work best under which circumstances can only be determined if South Africa embraces the cooperative federal model as envisioned by the Constitution. This would be radical transformation indeed.
Martin van Staden is Legal Researcher at the Free Market Foundation and Academic Programs Director of Students For Liberty in Southern Africa. Find out more at <a href="http://dmanalytics2.com/click?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.martinvanstaden.com%2F&amp;i=1&amp;d=3Uqobov8RHK8ecY3_gBODg&amp;e=Jill.DeVilliers%40abn360.com&amp;a=8anQTERaQWOIdsMxWJ5hsQ" data-dm-link-id="1">www.martinvanstaden.com</a>.

Op-Ed: Reducing the number of S.A’s provinces is an affront to the Rule of Law and democracy

By Rejoice Ngwenya
Thanks to much-celebrated African nationalists, I am politically independent but in desperate need of freedom. Some would argue that, despite glaring income and standard of living disparities, those living in South Africa, with its world class infrastructure and liberal constitution, are better off than other Africans.
If freedom was that simple, I would be one hell of a happy Zimbabwean. As it stands, I am at a loss as to what extent South Africans are ‘free to choose’, given the vice-grip that the ANC ruling party has on the country’s political system and stuck with a populist president burdened with all manner of accusations. But I have my own country to worry about.
Robert Mugabe and his coterie of grateful cronies have good reason to deliberately confuse independence with freedom. To them, it is a pastime fraught with gainful patronage. They may fool themselves, but they cannot fool me, or even other progressive Africans.
Ironically, we often concur that independence has strong strains of self-determination, devolution, self-rule, and self-governance. The point of departure depends on where we position ourselves on the ideological spectrum because, with even a limited knowledge of liberalism, anyone will know that communism, socialism, authoritarian dictatorship, popular leftist zealotry and ‘executive’ monarchy would not offer, by any stretch of the imagination, a morsel of true freedom.
<h4>Post-colonial nationalist dictatorship</h4>
Zimbabwe labours under the yoke of post-colonial nationalist dictatorship which pretends to allow citizens to play, worship, learn and move at will. Yet looks can be deceiving. True freedom has nothing to do with anarchy or constitutionalised multi-party democracy. Freedom is when the state keeps clear of my life; allowing constitutional institutions meant to safeguard my personal liberties to do their work, unimpeded.
Mugabe, like his counterparts in Zambia, Mozambique, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Lesotho, Swaziland, and, to a lesser extent, South Africa, epitomises this poisonous conflation of independence and freedom. It is impossible to be an executive president for 37 uninterrupted years in a free country.
When institutions and processes that govern electoral independence have been perverted with patronage and cronyism, citizens like me cannot approach the polling station with an open mind. When state media, the police, the army and traditional leaders are contaminated with patronage, designed and paid only to sing praises to an incumbent president and the ruling party, that is not freedom.
<h4>Depriving citizens of true freedom</h4>
When those like me with opposing political views cannot access public media institutions; cannot gather in public spaces to preach the alternative view without attracting the wrath of the police, that is not freedom. Even in the case of South Africa, State Capture deprives citizens of true freedom.
Is it freedom when close to three million Zimbabweans have been hounded out of a country that cannot sustain their professional and economic interests? Is it freedom when 80% of employable adults are etching subsistence livelihoods from vending stalls and underdeveloped crop fields? What about thousands of teachers who struggle on pittance salaries; thousands of civil servants who cannot afford decent shelter and food; or thousands of sick people marooned in public hospitals with no drugs – would that be our version of African freedom?
I could tell you about Mugabe’s cronies who siphon millions of dollars from diamond mines; continue to haemorrhage state companies and benefit from state tenders to line their own pockets. Would I assign that to my freedom?
<h4>How free am I?</h4>
Tell me about a justice system that confines innocent political activists to uninhabitable prisons; allows ruling party politicians to buy votes as thousands of their supporters access food relief – is that freedom? How free am I when I drive on roads that are filled with pot holes and inundated with police check points, while Mugabe squanders millions of dollars on numerous international flights? What about a defunct railway system and electricity supplies that are routinely interrupted – is that freedom?
Besides, these so-called nationalist governments have perpetrated the most heinous crimes on their fellowmen, in the name of sovereignty. Imagine if Ian Douglas Smith had murdered 20,000 white Rhodesians, would he not have been classified as a modern-day Adolph Hitler?
In the fight for independence, Mugabe’s ZANLA forces inflicted the most callous acts on thousands of villagers they labelled sell outs. These acts of unwarranted violence were never documented. The momentum of murderous retribution on political opponents was carried over to Entumbane, Gukurahundi, commercial farm invasions, Murambatsvina and the 2008 elections in the so-called ‘era of freedom’.
<h4>Human rights activists continue to be harassed</h4>
Even as you read this, hundreds of human rights activists continue to be harassed while private citizens are denied independent radio and television broadcast licences.
There is no true freedom that impoverishes its citizens, decimates industry and sends millions of young citizens into exile. There is no true freedom that rigs elections and compels villagers to vote for a party they do not support. There is no freedom that allows party deployees to monopolise state institutions to frustrate local governance.
There is no freedom that deprives a country of its own local currency and allows millions of citizens to spend cold nights outside banks queuing for $50 in coin withdrawals.
That is why I insist: thank you Mugabe and your fellow nationalists for independence but, for crying out loud, show me my freedom.
Author: Rejoice Ngwenya is a writer and head of COMALISO (Coalition for Market and Liberal Solutions) in Zimbabwe.

Op-Ed: Mugabe, thanks for independence #ShowMeMyFreedom

Institutions and the rule of law are the essential elements that protect individual South Africans from the excesses and abuses of state power. The recent fiasco where the Public Protector recommended changes to the Constitution is an example of institutions gone awry.
Constitutionalism as a branch of jurisprudence did not develop to foster effective government, but explicitly to restrain government interference in the personal and economic lives of ordinary people. The Public Protector’s recommendation does the opposite: it proposed to alter its establishing statute – the Constitution – to change the very nature of our central bank for seemingly political reasons. The markets reacted predictably and, today, South Africans are a little poorer than they were yesterday.
The business of our institutions should not be to make life harder for anyone – except government, that is.
<h3>Institutions are meant to be immune from political interference</h3>
Institutions are divorced from the politics of the day because they are meant to be consistent and as immune as possible from political interference. In a country with rich constitutionalism and strong institutions like the United States of America, the character of the country does not change when political leadership does. Donald Trump’s influence on America’s status as a bastion of freedom and democracy will be negligible. He might fiddle with the composition and policy of Cabinet, but the Supreme Court and the sturdy devolution of power to states ensure that the reach of the President does not extend too far.
In other countries, such as ours, the political leadership of the day has far greater influence and institutions are secondary considerations. We already refer to the terms of our post-Apartheid presidents as “eras” – the Mandela-era, the Mbeki-era, and the Zuma-era – each with their own style that had a profound impact on South Africa’s world image. Before 1994, no matter who was president, we simply had “the Apartheid-era”, because the institution of Apartheid was so strong (in a bad way!).
<h3>South Africa&#8217;s economy brought to its knees</h3>
Our political leadership does not have to reach far to impact the lives of ordinary South Africans negatively. That a political appointment practically brought South Africa’s economy to its knees is indicative enough that this situation is not right.
South Africa’s institutions may appear strong on paper, yet it is evident that the executive branch of government can act with a free hand. For instance, the Department of Mineral Resources’ recently-published Mining Charter wiped more than R50 billion off the mining industry’s share value. Our institutions seem powerless to stop government from enacting such destructive policy even when the Charter’s history is questionable when it comes to public participation and impact assessments.
<h3>What is the solution?</h3>
Institutions must be concerned, first and foremost, with the government. There is no doubt that private firms and individuals, too, can be corrupt, but the consequence of private sector corruption, by its nature, is limited. Government corruption and overreach, however, can potentially destroy economic growth and the livelihoods of millions. Private corruption is dealt with by market forces, and, failing that, the courts and the criminal justice system. Government corruption is dealt with politically.
Our institutions need to make sure government does only that which it is designed to do, and does it well. Most of all, our institutions must never enable the growth of government for political reasons – something our superior courts have been guilty of on occasion in recent years.
When institutions lose their character as a restraining force and become an enabling force, they cease to be the custodians of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. Instead, they become part of a very corruptible political process. When this happens, tyranny is inevitable.
Martin van Staden is Legal Researcher at the Free Market Foundation and Academic Programs Director of Students For Liberty in Southern Africa. Find out more at <a href="http://dmanalytics2.com/click?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.martinvanstaden.com%2F&amp;i=1&amp;d=htkauALeQYSCx850UiJv_w&amp;e=Jill.DeVilliers%40abn360.com&amp;a=SqFOozLaTpqmevQjn3SPLw" data-dm-link-id="1">www.martinvanstaden.com</a>

Op-Ed: Institutions must remain mindful of their core mandate

What kind of financial system is sure to collapse if the central bank cares about people’s well-being?
The <a href="http://www.pprotect.org/library/investigation_report/2016-17/Report%208%20of%202017&amp;2018%20Public%20Protector%20South%20Africa.pdf">recommendation</a> by South Africa’s Public Protector that the Reserve Bank’s mandate change, says much about Busisiwe Mkhwebane, none of it flattering. It says just as much about mainstream economic debate &#8211; and none of that is flattering either.
Mkhwebane recommended that the central bank’s constitutional mandate, which makes protecting the currency its primary goal, be changed to one which requires it to “promote balanced and sustainable economic growth while ensuring that the socio-economic well-being of the citizens are protected”. She also said the constitution should require the bank “to achieve meaningful socio-economic transformation”.
This triggered a wave of protests, as well as an announcement from the <a href="https://www.resbank.co.za/Lists/News%20and%20Publications/Attachments/7852/PRESS%20RELEASE%20FOR%20SARB%20.pdf">South African Reserve Bank</a> that it would take the matter to court. The <a href="https://probonomatters.co.za/south-african-reserve-bank-says-public-protector-is-overreaching/">Reserve Bank</a> had no option. The constitutional court has ruled that the Public Protector’s findings are binding unless they are challenged in court. Her recommendation wildly exceeded what she is allowed to do by the constitution – or democratic good sense &#8211; and the Reserve Bank could not allow it to stand.
Democratic constitutions are changed by large majorities of the people or their elected representatives – not by individuals. By making a binding recommendation that the constitution be changed, Mkhwebane signalled that she either doesn’t understand – or does not care – for democracy.
Her report is also very useful to a faction of the governing party which wants to <a href="https://theconversation.com/pursuing-a-30-year-old-bailout-is-sending-south-africa-on-a-wild-goose-chase-79792">deflect charges of state capture</a> by claiming that white monopoly capital already controls the state. There are real questions about the fitness for office of a Public Protector whose report seems more interested in protecting connected politicians and business people than with taking the people’s will seriously.
But the reaction did not stop at insisting that Mkhwebane has no business telling the people what the constitution should say. Much of it objected not only to her saying what the Reserve Bank’s mandate should be, but to anyone at all doing that.
<h2>An important debate</h2>
The prize for the wildest reaction went to the commentator who declared that Mkhwebane’s ideas on the Bank’s mandate were <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-06-21-the-holocaust-denier-the-public-protector-and-the-reserve-bank">inspired</a> by someone who denied that the Nazi genocide happened. Others stopped short of tarring constitutional change with the same brush as mass murder but were united in claiming that to suggest that the Reserve Bank’s mandate be broadened is “<a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/ideas/2017-06-21-public-protectors-bizarre-instruction-harms-our-wellbeing/">economically illiterate</a>” and deeply damaging.
Absa, who was the subject of a separate finding by the public protector on the issue of a <a href="https://probonomatters.co.za/the-public-protector-in-her-own-words-on-the-bankorpabsa-matter/">controversial bailout</a>, asked a court to rule that her proposed change posed a “<a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/business/2017-06-21-in-full-absa-goes-to-court-over-public-protector-report/">serious risk to the financial system</a>”. For its part the rating agency Standard &amp; Poor’s, happy as ever to police the boundaries of economic correctness, warned that any interference with the Reserve Bank’s independence could trigger new downgrades.
To insist that anyone who proposes changing the Reserve Bank’s mandate is economically damaging and stupid is as contemptuous of democracy and dangerous to the economy as Mkhwebane’s excess. It is undemocratic because it seeks to close down policy debate by declaring that only one view of the Reserve Bank’s mandate can ensure a healthy economy. It is dangerous because it blocks the search for economic remedies by seeking to bully even those who propose only mild changes to what the country now has.
The idea that the Reserve Bank should have a broader mandate is neither radical nor dangerous. The most famous central bank, the <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/structure-federal-reserve-system.htm">US Federal Reserve</a>, has a broader mandate. Its dual mandate requires it to seek maximum employment as well as price stability.
The <a href="http://www.rba.gov.au/monetary-policy/">Australian</a> equivalent’s mandate includes “maintenance of full employment and economic prosperity and welfare of the people”. <a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/html/index.en.html">The European Central Bank</a>, famed for its love of austerity, has a mandate to seek “sustainable growth”.
And the <a href="http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/Pages/home.aspx">the Bank of England’s</a> website says that, subject to its goal of price stability, it aims to support the government’s economic objectives.
In South Africa, not only has the view that the central bank’s mandate is too restrictive been repeated periodically but it may well have been implemented for a while. In 2010, then finance minister Pravin Gordhan <a href="https://www.moneyweb.co.za/archive/pravins-letter-to-gill-marcus/">wrote</a> to then Reserve Bank governor, Gill Marcus, proposing a mandate which included growth and employment. Marcus <a href="http://m.fin24.com/fin24/Economy/Inflation-debate-not-over-20100219">reacted positively</a>, which suggests that the bank acted on Gordhan’s letter. The financial system survived.
The US, European and Australian financial systems have also not collapsed. Their mandates have not triggered a downgrade and no one has accused these societies of economic illiteracy.
So either double standards are being applied or we are being told that restrictive central bank mandates are essential only if countries are in particular parts of the world (such as Africa) and governed by particular types of people (Africans).
And why does a change in the Bank’s mandate undermine its independence? A central bank loses its independence if politicians (or anyone else) can tell it what to do, not if its mandate changes.
For all its flaws, the Public Protector’s proposal would retain the Reserve Bank’s independence, leaving it to the bank to decide what promotes the “well-being” of the people or “transformation”.
<h2>Closing down debate is common</h2>
None of this means that the Reserve Bank’s mandate must change. Or that central bank independence must go. But it does mean that no one should be discouraged from debating the issue, as people routinely do in other democracies and market economies. What, besides that prejudice which we prettify by the term <a href="http://www.encyclopedia.com/history/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/afropessimism">Afropessimism</a>, explains the insistence that we may not debate what is freely discussed in most other places?
Closing down debate in this way is common in South Africa. It also lies behind complaints of policy uncertainty which does not mean, as it does elsewhere, that government keeps changing its mind and sending mixed messages – the macro-economic framework has been stable for more than two decades. It means, rather, that some people – who some others may take seriously – raise policy ideas the economic mainstream does not like.
This demand that people can say anything they like about economic policy as long as the mainstream likes it too offers a misleading view of the economy. It says that there is nothing wrong with it except political interference and that it will flourish if politicians simply leave alone what is done now.
The <a href="https://theconversation.com/business-needs-to-change-and-stop-blaming-others-for-south-africas-ills-64942">contrary evidence</a> is offered by mainstream organisations such as the International Monetary Fund and the South African Reserve Bank itself which have shown that the current economic rut is a product of problems in the private economy as well as what government does.
This means that the economy must change. This, in turn, requires new ideas. They will not emerge unless everything is up for debate and ideas are not silenced because they trigger the fears and prejudices of a few.

Op-Ed: South Africa’s central bank row points to dangerous levels of intolerance

Politics are in shambles across the world. Populism and political gambles are making headlines from London to Washington. Southern Africa is no exception. If it’s any comfort, this suggests that there’s nothing genuinely typical about African versions of <a href="https://www.dandc.eu/en/article/populism-common-southern-africa-where-former-liberation-movements-have-become-dominant">political populism</a>. Nor are the flaws in democracy typically African.
This might put some events into wider perspective. But it’s nonetheless worrying to follow the current political turmoil in some southern Africa countries.
The regional hegemon, South Africa, is embroiled in domestic policy tensions of unprecedented proportions since it became a democracy. And the situation in the sub-region is not much better.
The state of opposition politics and democracy is in a shambles too. The fragile political climate and the mentality of most opposition politicians hardly offer meaningful alternatives. This is possibly an explanation – but no excuse – for the undemocratic practices permeating almost every one of the region’s democracies.
Beyond multi-party systems with regular elections, they resemble very little of true democracies.
<h2>South African hiccups</h2>
At the end of May the dimensions of “state capture” in South Africa were set out in a report published by an <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017/05/26/FULL-REPORT-%E2%80%98How-South-Africa-is-Being-Stolen%E2%80%99-a-report-on-state-capture">academic team</a>.
It shows how deeply the personalised systematic plundering of state assets is <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-05-26-betrayal-of-the-promise-the-anatomy-of-state-capture/">entrenched</a>. Additional explosive evidence was presented only days later through thousands of leaked e-mails. Dubbed the “Gupta Leaks”, they document a mafia-like network among Zuma-loyalists and the Indian Gupta family.
The evidence points to massive influence, if not control, over political appointments, the hijacking of higher public administration and embezzlement of <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/stnews/2017/05/28/Here-they-are-The-emails-that-prove-the-Guptas-run-South-Africa">enormous proportions</a>.
Some 65% of South Africans want Zuma to <a href="http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/65-of-south-africans-want-zuma-to-resign--ipsos">resign</a>. An all-time low approval rating of 20% makes him less popular among the electorate than even <a href="http://time.com/4785127/michael-temer-nicolas-maduro-donald-trump/">US President Donald Trump</a>. Despite this – combined with growing demands from within the party that he steps down – the ANC still backs its president.
But divisions within the party are deepening, with some in its leadership demanding an <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/88337066-4797-11e7-8519-9f94ee97d996">investigation</a> into the Gupta patronage network.
For his part, Zuma is focused on pulling strings to secure Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/dispatches/2017/03/10/zuma-succession-the-businessman-vs-the-ex-wife-or-is-it-all-smoke-and-mirrors/">his successor</a> as president of the party. The other front-runner candidate is Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa.
Zuma’s assumption appears to be that, once in office, his former wife would not endorse any legal prosecution of the father of her children.
But the country’s official opposition party, Democratic Alliance (DA), isn’t reaping the benefits of the ANC’s blunders. It has its own problems, which are constraining the gains it might otherwise be making from the ANC’s mess.
The party is divided over what to do about its former leader and Premier of the Western Cape province, Helen Zille following a tweet in which she defended the legacy of colonialism. The comment whipped up a storm of protest and for weeks the party had been at pains on how to deal with the scandal.
<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-127318 alignleft" src="http://cnbc.africa/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Helen-Zille_Tweet-300x127.png" alt="" width="300" height="127" />
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DA leader Mmusi Maimane finally announced that Zille had been suspended from the party and that a disciplinary hearing would decide what further <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-40143710?ocid=socialflow_twitter">political consequences</a> she might face. But a resilient Zille immediately challenged <a href="http://m.news24.com/news24/SouthAfrica/News/das-u-turn-on-zille-suspension-20170603">the decision</a>.
Whatever the outcome, the DA’s image is damaged. Its aspirations to be the country’s new majority party has been dealt a major blow.
<h2>Regional woes</h2>
In Angola, 74-year-old Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who has been in office since 1979, has decided to select a <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3995176/Angolas-President-Dos-Santos-stand-2017-state-radio.html">successor</a>. The scenario will secure that the family “oiligarchy” will remain in control of politics and the country’s economy, while the governing People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) uses the state apparatus to ruthlessly suppress any meaningful <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/the-mercury/20170221/281706909446949">social protests</a>.
In contrast Robert Mugabe – reigning in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980 &#8211; shows no intention of retiring. He was nominated again as the Zimbabwe African Nation Union/Patriotic Front’s (ZANU/PF) candidate for the 2018 <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-30365706/mugabe-confirmed-as-zanu-pf-candidate-for-2018-election">presidential elections</a>. But everyone is anxiously following the party’s internal power struggles over the ailing autocrat’s <a href="http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2017/04/zimbabwes-make-break-moment/">replacement</a>. Fears are that the vacuum created by his departure might create a worse situation.
While the regime’s constant violation of human rights is – as in Angola – geared towards preventing any form of meaningful opposition, there are concerns that the unresolved succession might add another violent dimension to local politics.
Zambia’s democracy also looks sad. The country’s main opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema of the United Party for National Development (UPND) is on trial for high treason. Hichilema has been embroiled in a personal feud with President Edgar Lungu of the governing Patriotic Front (PF) for years. He was arrested in early April after obstructing the president’s motor cavalcade. The charge of high treason is based on the accusation that he <a href="https://zambiareports.com/2017/04/09/hichilema-willfully-put-pres-lungus-life-danger-state-house/">wilfully put President Lungu’s life in danger</a>.
The trial is feeding growing concerns over an increasingly autocratic regime. The once praised democracy, which allowed for several <a href="https://www.themastonline.com/2017/05/15/its-time-to-start-talking-about-zambia-says-cheeseman/">relatively peaceful transfers</a> of political power since the turn of the century, is <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/05/16/birmingham-university-professor-cheesemans-ignorance-democracy-shocking-regrettable/">now in decline</a>.
Lesotho is also in a mess. It provides a timely reminder that competing parties seeking to obtain political control over governments are by no means a guarantee for better governance. Aptly described as a <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-06-02-00-lesothos-groundhog-day-election">“Groundhog Day election”</a>, citizens in the crisis-ridden country went to the polls for the third time since 2012 with no new <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2017/06/02/lesothos-night-before-the-elections-photo-of-the-weekexplainer/">alternatives or options</a>.
Their limited choice is between two former prime ministers aged 77 (Tom Thabane) and 72 (Pakalitha Mosisili). The likely election result is another fragile coalition government – provided the military accepts the result.
Meanwhile, the biggest challenge for relative political stability in the region might still be in the making: President Joseph Kabila, whose second term in office in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) ended in December 2016, is still hanging on with the promise that he’ll vacate the post by end of this year.
Despite a constitutional two-term limit, his plans remain a matter of speculation. In a recent interview, he was characteristically <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/die-lage-am-samstag-aggressiver-nationalismus-plus-atomraketen-a-1150544.html">evasive</a>. He refused to give a straight answer on whether he’s still considering <a href="http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/kabila-says-he-never-promised-to-hold-elections-in-drc-20170603">another term</a> and flatly denied that he had promised anything, including elections.
Kabila’s <a href="http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/12/21/Up-to-20-dead-as-Congo-police-protesters-clash-over-president/6411482288306/">extended stay in office</a> threatens to exacerbate an already explosive and violent situation, with potentially devastating consequences.
His continued reign would not only provoke further bloodshed at home. Any spill-over will challenge the Southern African Development Community’s willingness and ability to find solutions to regional conflicts in the interests of <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-southern-africa-can-learn-from-west-africa-about-dealing-with-despots-71722">relative stability</a>. A stability which is at best fragile and indicative of the crisis of policy in most of the regional body’s member states.

Op-Ed: Democracy is looking sickly across southern Africa

<a href="http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/69574d004112cc428595f510d2cccae0/ServiceundefineddeliveryundefinedprotestsundefinedspreadundefinedacrossundefinedJoburg-20170905">Recent violent protests in South Africa</a> have refocused attention on the growing number of demonstrations over government failure to provide basic services, such as water and electricity. The country is known as the <a href="http://www.sabc.co.za/news/f1/b9ad4d8042b5df199f1a9f3d86b55090/South-Africa:-">“protest capital of the world”</a>.
Research by the Centre for Social Change, University of Johannesburg seems to bear this out. Based on estimates from <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304076282_Counting_Police-Recorded_Protests_Based_on_South_African_Police_Service_Data?_iepl%5BviewId%5D=5KxFFchge3DcotG82x6t7YVe&amp;_iepl%5BprofilePublicationItemVariant%5D=default&amp;_iepl%5Bcontexts%5D%5B0%5D=prfpi&amp;_iepl%5BtargetEntityId%5D=PB%3A304076282&amp;_iepl%5BinteractionType%5D=publicationTitle">South African Police Service data</a>, we found that between 1997 and 2013 there were an average of 900 community protests a year. In recent years the number has climbed to as high as 2,000 protests a year.
The situation in South Africa is not unique. <a href="http://www.cadtm.org/IMG/pdf/World_Protests_2006-2013-Final-2.pdf">Protests have been increasing</a> globally, particularly since the <a href="https://www.globalpolicy.org/social-and-economic-policy/the-world-economic-crisis.html">2008 global economic crisis</a>.
In a <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Southern-Resistance-in-Critical-Perspective-The-Politics-of-Protest-in/Paret-Runciman-Sinwell/p/book/9781472473462">new book</a>, my colleagues from the Centre for Social Change and I attempt to understand South Africa as part of the global protest wave.
On the face of it, protests in South Africa look quite different. They tend to be fragmented and happen mostly in black townships and informal settlements. The occupation of central public spaces in towns and cities, as we are seeing in <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/venezuelan-opposition-renews-protests-maduro-170420173517381.html">Venezuela</a>, happens seldom.
While there are important differences there are also commonalities. Whether protests focus around the “1%” as they did during the <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1369118X.2015.1043318">Occupy movement</a> or around the lack of service provision in townships, protesters around the world are critiquing the failure of a representative democracy to provide socio-economic equality.
<h2>Broken promises</h2>
South Africa’s governing ANC came into power in 1994 on the promise of a <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/better-life-all">“better life for all”</a>. There have been important gains, such as increasing access to electricity from 51% of the population in 1994 to <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-04-25-africa-check-does-the-anc-have-a-good-story-to-tell/#.WRwOQJKGOpp">85% in 2012</a>, but inequality remains endemic. Recent data from the World Bank confirms that South Africa remains one of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/datablog/2017/apr/26/inequality-index-where-are-the-worlds-most-unequal-countries">the most unequal countries in the world</a>.
As part of research by the Centre for Social Change we spoke to protesters all over the country. A new book from the centre highlights the extent to which protesters are raising not just concerns about the quality of service delivery but also about the quality of post-apartheid democracy. As Shirley Zwane, from <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/place/khayelitsha-township">Khayelitsha</a>, near Cape Town, explains:
<blockquote>We don’t have democracy!… We [are] still struggling… you see if we are in democracy there’s no more shacks here… No more bucket system… we supposed to have roads, everything! A better education… There is a democracy?…. No, this is not a democracy! They have, these people in Constantia, Tableview, Parklands, they have a democracy, not for us!</blockquote>
For Shirley the quality of post-apartheid democracy is linked to the provision of basic services. She is not alone in this view.
<a href="http://afrobarometer.org/publications/wp8-views-democracy-south-africa-and-region-trends-and-comparisons">Research by Afrobarometer</a> has found that compared to other countries in the region South Africans are much more likely to emphasise the realisation of socio-economic outcomes as crucial to democracy. That South Africans should view housing and services as central to post-apartheid democracy is unsurprising given that apartheid systemically denied the majority of people these rights.
<h2>Crisis of affordability</h2>
Community protests are fundamentally about the exclusion from democracy experienced by many black working class citizens since the <a href="http://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu/unit.php?id=65-24E-6">end of apartheid in 1994</a>.
Although the provision of services to the previously marginalised black majority has increased substantially, black working class households face an increasing crisis of affordability.
In sectors covered by a minimum wage, the real median wage <a href="https://www.academia.edu/31349234/Is_South_Africa_at_a_Turning_Point">increased by 7.5%</a> between 2011 and 2015. But last year inflation on an <a href="http://www.pacsa.org.za/images/food_barometer/2016/2016_PACSA_Food_Price_Barometer_REDUCED.pdf">average working class food basket was 15%</a> and certain staple foods, such as maize meal, increased by as much as 32%. This has put a real squeeze on working class households especially when, due to high levels unemployment, each black South African wage earner <a href="http://www.pacsa.org.za/images/food_barometer/2016/2016_PACSA_Food_Price_Barometer_REDUCED.pdf">supports four people</a>.
<h2>Structural challenges</h2>
The crisis of affordability facing black working class households also compounds the structural crisis within local government.
In South Africa local governments are responsible for delivering services. Over the past 15 years local municipalities have increasingly had to find ways to fund these services through their own tax base. Many have resorted to cost recovery measures, for example by introducing prepaid meters. Their introduction <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/pimville-residents-protest-against-eskoms-prepaid-meters-20170327">has been behind many protests.</a>
The financial difficulties for local and provincial governments looks set to get worse. In the country’s <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2016/speech/speech.pdf">latest budget</a> the National Treasury cut their funding as part of R25 billion budget cuts. In the case of Gauteng, the scene of the most recent protests, this amounted to a R2.9 billion rand cut <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/tight-budget-for-gauteng-1995372">over three years</a>.
To fill the gap, municipalities and provinces are going to have to look increasingly to their own tax base to fund service provision. A difficult prospect when slightly more than half the population survives on <a href="http://beta2.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-03-10-11/Report-03-10-11.pdf">R779 or less a person a month</a>.
<h2>A global crisis</h2>
As Professor Michael Burawoy argues in our new book, the nature of the crisis varies from country to country. In South Africa the crisis represents the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=gCmEDgAAQBAJ&amp;pg=PT48&amp;lpg=PT48&amp;dq=Michael+Burawoy+forcible+exclusion&amp;source=bl&amp;ots=YPlKuMoX0L&amp;sig=Aagamv6XQL7XWlwXy52qBjgaBmM&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=0ahUKEwiD0u_61PbTAhUkDsAKHXPhA7AQ6AEIKDAB#v=onepage&amp;q=Michael%20Burawoy%20forcible%20exclusion&amp;f=false">forcible exclusion</a> of many black working class households from democratic institutions, largely because of their inability to afford socio-economic goods. For instance, while access to electricity has increased, access is increasingly mediated by prepaid meters, therefore the ability to access service is inextricably linked to the ability to afford them.
It’s this exclusion that leads many to say that <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=gCmEDgAAQBAJ&amp;pg=PT48&amp;lpg=PT48&amp;dq=Michael+Burawoy+forcible+exclusion&amp;source=bl&amp;ots=YPlKuMoX0L&amp;sig=Aagamv6XQL7XWlwXy52qBjgaBmM&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=0ahUKEwiD0u_61PbTAhUkDsAKHXPhA7AQ6AEIKDAB#v=onepage&amp;q=democracy%20only%20for%20the%20rich&amp;f=false">democracy is only for the rich</a>. Globally, people are beginning to search for new solutions to these problems with many being drawn to left-wing movements and political parties, such as <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/cristina-flesher-fominaya/%E2%80%9Cspain-is-different%E2%80%9D-podemos-and-15m">Podemos</a> in Spain. Whether such a comparable movement can emerge in South Africa remains to be seen.

South African protesters echo a global cry: democracy isn’t making people’s lives better

A paradox has played out in Ethiopia over the last decade. While its economy has thrived, its political landscape has been overwhelmed by rampant corruption. In 2013, for example, more than 50 high profile people, including government officials and businessmen, were arrested during an anti-corruption crackdown.
As Ethiopia’s economy transformed between 2010-2015, through the expansion of services, agriculture and improvements in infrastructure, corruption became a way of life. This is predominantly because of the political dominance of a single party – the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front. The Front is a coalition of four parties and has ruled Ethiopia since 1991.
Despite touting itself as a multiparty state, true multiparty politics have not been able to take root in the country. This is because of the ruling party’s control over security apparatus, media, electoral organs and administrative structure. “Politics of tolerance” are not entertained as opposition parties are seen as enemies, rather than political rivals.
Underlying the change needed to tackle corruption, is the need to transition from this single party state to a true multiparty system.
This will promote political choice and give democratic rights to all citizens. It will introduce a system of checks and balances that will expose abuses and reveal corrupt officials.
Corruption in action
As explained in my book, Ethiopia borrowed its development model from South Korea and Malaysia. These presume that development is managed by highly disciplined, nonpartisan, professional government functionaries.
In Ethiopia, however, government bureaucrats are recruited on meritocracy. They operate in line with their ethnic affiliation and to fulfil the whims of the dominant party.
The second is that public procurement for development projects such as highways, electrification, telecommunications, information technology and housing are not handled through tender processes.
Another major contributory factor is the state’s complicated bureaucracy. Sectors such as land administration, customs and public procurement, have become the pillars of the rent seeking political economy. Businesses are forced to pay bribes to obtain permits and licenses.
The prevalence of political corruption has had a number of consequences. It’s affected the country’s gross domestic product and rewarded unproductive employees in both the private and public sectors.
Its greatest impact, however, has been the fuelling of instability. This has led to a great deal of domestic turmoil. As a result, violent anti-government protests against domestic and foreign investments have erupted in recent months.
This violence has threatened the country’s infrastructure, foreign investment and civilians. The situation has escalated to a point that ordinary law enforcement agencies are unable to properly handle the situation. Instead, the Federal Government declared a six-month-long state of emergency, effective October 10, 2016. This has been extended by another four months.
Anti-corruption efforts
If the Ethiopian government refuses to address these issues, the current flourishing economy will likely evaporate. The signs aren’t good. The government’s current attempts at fighting corruption are superficial and will produce marginal results.
The anti-corruption Proclamation of 2005, for example, was poorly implemented and lacked methodologies in handling corruption cases. It had limited power and its enforcers lacked skills in investigation and prosecution.
The country’s court system can’t effectively deal with corruption either. This is because the court system in Ethiopia is engulfed with injustices and corruption is deeply rooted. For example, judges are generally not assigned to the court bench as a result of their training or experience, but to fulfil the country’s ethnic quota system of ruling. They therefore make decisions in favour of their ethnic groups and purposely prolong the execution of court cases.
The way forward
Certain changes need to be made to fight corruption. Civic organisations, alternative parties and opposition groups need to be involved in political dialogue. This can start to happen through the restructuring of the federal system and a multiparty system that gives an equal playing field.
By doing this, Ethiopia will improve its electoral system and give way to proportional representation rather than only allowing the largest block of voters to be represented.
By design, Ethiopia established the political gridlock itself through the creation of ethnic and regional federalism. Communication and commercial interaction among constituents has gradually declined because regions are confined within watertight compartments. They develop apart and have little influence on each other.
The existing regional states need to be subdivided into manageable units or woredas as they’re called in Ethiopia. This would make local units more manageable. They will each have a say in selecting their own administrators, holding them to account for their decisions. Each unit could have a number of municipalities run by community elected mayors and council members.
For the judicial system at the federal level, the framework for judicial appointment and retention must be reevaluated and restructured. Judicial positions should be advertised publicly to attract a wider selection pool of higher calibre candidates. Judicial Administration Commissions must have clear standards, procedures, and rules for decision making.
These basic structural changes, and a willingness on the part of the government to allow multiparty democracy to prevail and real power devolved to the local level, will pave the way for Ethiopia to sustain its current economic growth trajectory.

Ethiopia needs a multi-party democracy to end the crushing impact of corruption

Conventional wisdom tells us that good political societies are built on the principles of constitutionalism. This entails upholding the <a href="http://www.blackwellreference.com/public/tocnode?id=g9781405136532_chunk_g978140513653223">rule of law</a> and <a href="http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/vile-constitutionalism-and-the-separation-of-powers">separation of powers</a>. This is to ensure an <a href="http://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-94-007-0753-5_3064">even distribution of power</a> where a society is “<a href="https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/administrative-law/constitutionalism-good-governance-a-dangerous-law-essays.php">built on principles of law, not men</a>”.
In the 1990s many African states <a href="http://www.researchgate.net/publication/265493847_Constitutional_Reforms_and_Constitutionalism_in_Africa_Reflections_on_Some_Current_Challenges_and_Future_Prospects">reinvented their constitutions</a> to build good political societies. They moved away from one-party authoritarian states to embrace a constitutional political order and representative democracy. They also enacted two-term presidential limits. This was, as Charles Fombad <a href="http://www.buffalolawreview.org/past_issues/59_4/Fombad.pdf">tells us</a>
a clear recognition of the need for radical changes … In some cases, it meant a total break with a dreadful past … but in most cases it meant recognising that a constitutional framework built around the one party system that had bred authoritarian and dictatorial rule was a recipe for political instability and economic decline.
But the limitations on presidential terms have not entirely quashed a culture of entitlement to rule. Glimpses of this culture persist.
This is evident in what is now referred to as the “<a href="http://presidential-power.com/?p=4874">third term tragedy</a>” or the “<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/09/16/heres-how-african-leaders-stage-constitutional-coups-they-tweak-the-constitution-to-stay-in-power/">constitutional coup</a>”. This is when African presidents extend their tenure in office, effectively becoming “president for life”, changing constitutions to do so. Increasingly, this is met with civic resistance.
Burundi, Rwanda, the Congo and Burkina Faso are examples of where this has happened.
Roots of constitutionalism
Constitutionalism found its roots in <a href="http://www.sophia-project.org/uploads/1/3/9/5/13955288/elahi_socialcontract.pdf">social contract theory</a>, which was penned by <a href="http://fee.org/articles/john-locke-natural-rights-to-life-liberty-and-property/">John Locke</a> among others.
The basic argument is that humans have inalienable and natural rights to life, freedom and estate. And for us to exercise these rights, we create a political society of consent where constitutional principles reign supreme. Thus, as <a href="http://www.sophia-project.org/uploads/1/3/9/5/13955288/elahi_socialcontract.pdf">Manzoor Elahi</a> reminds us:
According to Locke, the purpose of the government and law is to uphold and protect the natural rights of men. So long as the government fulfils this purpose, the laws given by it are valid and binding, but when it ceases to fulfil it, then the laws would not have validity and the government can be thrown out of power.
This interpretation of the purpose of government also informs the <a href="http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf">principles of good governance</a>. These are transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation, responsiveness, and respecting the rule of law. The social contract between those who govern and those who are governed is founded on this <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/GoodGovernance/Pages/GoodGovernanceIndex.aspx">rights-based approach</a> to governance. This means that leaders govern at the pleasure of the people, and do not rule with sovereign license at the cost of constitutional rules. The well-being and rights of the people must be the central concern of those who govern.
Good governance entails playing by the rules. It requires accepting <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/gambia-jammeh-rejects-result-presidential-election-161210034606068">electoral defeat</a> if the people willed it so.
Cases of constitutional coups
There have been some classic examples of “constitutional coups” in recent years. These include:
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.africanleadershipcentre.org/index.php/2014-10-22-15-44-06/alc-newsletters/sept2015-issue/385-the-new-assault-on-presidential-term-limits-in-africa-focus-on-burundi">Burundi</a>, where President Pierre Nkurunziza’s machinations for a third term in 2015 led to political instability and a <a href="http://europe.newsweek.com/burundi-army-chief-says-coup-attempt-failed-327288">failed military coup</a>. He subsequently emerged victorious in an election marred by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/24/burundi-pierre-nkurunziza-wins-third-term-disputed-election">violence and intimidation</a> in 2015.</li>
<li>Congo: In 2015, President Denis Sassou Nguesso claimed that the people <a href="http://www.voanews.com/a/congo-brazzaville-opposition-to-protest-president-third-term-bid/2976658.html">wanted him</a> to extend his 32-year stay in power and announced a referendum to change the constitution to allow him to contest the election. This was met with mass protest, with people proclaiming that the “<a href="http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKCN0RS0LK20150928">Congo does not belong to Nguesso</a>”. In 2016 he won <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/congo-president-denis-sassou-nguesso-wins-election-160324040212900.html">at the polls</a> amid tight security measures and a communications black out.</li>
<li><a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2014-11-03-an-undignified-exit-the-fall-of-burkina-fasos-compaore">Burkina Faso’s Blaise Compaoré</a> was forced to flee following widespread protests against his bid to extend his 27-year rule in 2014.</li>
<li>Rwanda’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/01/rwanda-paul-kagame-third-term-office-constitutional-changes">President Paul Kagame</a> will run for a third term this year. This after the constitutional was amended to allow him another term, following a referendum to that effect. He may be in power until <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/20/rwanda-vote-gives-president-paul-kagame-extended-powers">2034</a>.</li>
</ul>
In 2015 West African states took a progressive step with a proposal to ban “constitutional coups” by limiting presidents to only two terms. But the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32808685">idea was abandoned</a> as some states in the region did not support it. This happened despite the fact that research shows Africa’s citizens largely <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno30.pdf">support limiting presidential terms</a>.
The African Union (AU) committed to a <a href="http://theconversation.com/why-zumas-african-way-is-at-odds-with-the-african-unions-vision-57589">democratic social contract</a> with <a href="http://archive.au.int/assets/images/agenda2063.pdf">Agenda 2063</a>. There is a formal promise to abide by the will of the people and to respect the rule of law. The problem rather, as <a href="http://www.buffalolawreview.org/past_issues/59_4/Fombad.pdf">Charles Fombad concludes</a>, is that
In many countries, the problems were not caused by the absence of constitutions. Rather it was the ease with which African leaders had rendered constitutions dysfunctional by regularly ignoring their provisions or amending them when it suited their convenience.
Some highlight the lack of effective opposition in Africa. But the problem also relates to views about governance and the rules. It seems the rules are made to the broken.
The AU has to be commended for taking a firm stance against regime change through <a href="https://www.files/ethz.ch/isn/105906/P197.pdf">military coup</a>. It has suspended countries for “<a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/african-union-suspends-burkina-faso-military-coup-150919073352770.html">unconstitutional regime change</a>”. But it has not been as effective in its opposition to dealing with the problem of extended presidential terms. This could be due to the <a href="http://www.saiia.org.za/policy-briefings/presidential-term-limits-a-new-african-foreign-policy-challenge">sovereignty principle</a>, which makes African states reluctant to interfere in others’ affairs.
But the problem of leaders clinging to power is only one manifestation of a lack of respect for constitutional rules in Africa. Others include the fact that opposition political parties are often <a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/02/10/rwanda-end-attacks-opposition-parties">harassed</a> and their leaders <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-uganda-opposition-leader-under-house-arrest-amid-tensions-2016-2">locked up</a>. They are also painted as illegitimate proxies for harmful <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-10-06-icg-confrontation-in-zimbabwe-turns-increasingly-violent/#.WIia6rF7GqA">foreign “third forces”</a> seeking regime change.
Gambia shows democracy advancing, but…
Many have applauded the Economic Community of West Africa <a href="http://www.ecowas.int/">(Ecowas)</a> for the role it played ensuring a peaceful transition after the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38271480">Gambian election</a>.
After President Yahya Jammeh rejected his loss, citing “<a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/gambia-jammeh-rejects-result-presidential-election-161210034606068">foreign interference</a>”, it looked like a replay of a now all-too-familiar script, wherein a leader clings on to power against the popular will.
But regional leaders had other ideas. With a <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/gambia-yahya-jammeh-final-deadline-step-170120044922953.html">not-so gentle push</a> from them, Jammeh eventually <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/jammeh-arrives-banjul-airport-stepping-170121210246506.html">accepted the electoral outcome</a> and vacated the plush presidential chair.
Yes, we may see the Gambian story as an <a href="http://europe.newsweek.com/gambia-election-result-sign-democracy-advancing-africa-528532?rm=eu">advancement for democracy</a> in Africa. And yes, there are many lessons the Southern African Development Community (SADC) can learn from Ecowas in <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-southern-africa-can-learn-from-west-africa-about-dealing-with-despots-71722">dealing decisively with despots</a>.
But the temporary Gambian crisis also points to a deeper governance problem in Africa: leadership attitudes towards “governance”. Many African leaders have yet to appreciate that constitutional rules matter. And while military coups are increasingly “<a href="http://newafricanmagazine.com/why-are-military-coups-going-out-of-fashion-in-africa">out of fashion</a>”, people on the continent need to pay attention to the “softer” methods used to entrench the “president-for-life syndrome” which threaten the continent’s democratic gains.
More importantly, given a commitment to good governance through <a href="http://au.int/en2/agenda2063">Agenda 2063</a>, African leaders must do more than show respect for the rules. They must also realise that they need to govern – not rule – at the pleasure of the people.
This would speak to building a culture of accountability and good governance through a change in mindset – instead of seeing their job as ruling the people leaders would see their role as governing the people. It would also entail vacating political office when your time is up.

Africa faces a new threat to democracy: the ‘constitutional coup’

Democratization in Africa 
On Thursday, 19 November 1863, during the Gettysburg Address, US President Lincoln defined democracy as a “government of the people, by the people, and for the people”. The method in which the people take part in this form of government is at the ballot box by voting in elections. Therefore, elections serve as the hallmark (but not the only way) of the practice of democracy in democratic systems.
Democratization has swept across the African continent since the end of colonialism, in the late 1950’s – from Ghana’s first presidential elections on 27 April 1960, to South Africa’s in 27 April 1994, and then to Nigeria’s first elections in 27 February 1999.
The Economist Intelligence Unit has revealed, in a <a href="http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy-Index-2016.pdf&amp;mode=wp&amp;campaignid=DemocracyIndex2016">report</a>, the different categories of democratic systems across the world for the year 2016. Of the 19 full democracies in the world, one of them is an African country &#8211; Mauritius; of the 57 flawed democracies in the world, 7 are from Africa and include Cape Verde, South Africa, Namibia; of the 40 hybrid democracies, 14 are from Africa and include Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria. The United States went from being a full democracy to being categorized as a flawed democracy in the 2016 report.
Excerpts from an Interview with Professor Jega (former chairman of INEC)
In a recent interview with <a href="http://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/people/attahiru-muhammadu-jega">Professor Attahiru Muhammadu Jega</a> the former chairman of Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), who oversaw the 2011 and the 2015 general elections in Nigeria. He is the current and the inaugural Africa Initiative for Governance Visiting Fellow of Practice at Oxford University’s Blavatnik School of Government. He had the following to say about overseeing what was considered a widely applauded electoral process in Nigeria’s elections in what is, arguably, Africa’s giant nation.
Jega said the key message he emphasised while being at the helm of INEC was, “credible elections are the business of everybody, not only the work of an electoral commission, and all hands had to be on deck in order to deliver credible elections”. He acknowledged that the 2007 Nigerian elections were considered to be “the worst elections in the history of [the] country”. He further said that INEC engaged with civil society organisations, who had previously advocated for electoral reforms in Nigeria after the 2007 elections. Jega recognized and credited “the partnership with credible civil society organisations [as being] to a large extent responsible for the success of the 2011 as well as the 2015 general elections”.
When asked about the backdrop upon which he executed his mandate at INEC – given the loss of public confidence in the electoral process following the 2007 elections as well as the general public’s cynicism towards the electoral system in the country, Jega said, “a lesson they learnt quite early at INEC was that success would only be predicated on open and transparent conduct and gaining the confidence of all stakeholders”. He said, “The INEC [they] came into in June 2010 had a very negative image of being an electoral commission that was not considered as transparent […] and too cosy with the incumbent government”. He emphasised that it was a “herculean task for [his team in INEC] to clean the [commission] of that negative image”.
Whether there is a relationship between democracy and economic growth in Africa’s context, Jega said, “Most African countries have embraced democracy. There is a clear link (by scholars and theorists of democratization) between democracy and development. But what is constraining development in [some countries in] Africa is the poor conduct of elections – the lack of integrity in the way in which elections are conducted. The multiplicity of irregularities that characterize the conduct of elections in countries like Nigeria, which are diverse, is obstructive of the desires of development […]”. His advice to African countries that will be conducting elections in 2017: Kenya, Liberia, Rwanda and Angola is to bring integrity to the conduct of elections.
To the incumbent governments, he said: “Electoral Commissions are not just any government agency that can be incorporated in the incumbent regime’s governing agenda – they should be relatively independent and well-financed and given the freedom to organize and conduct elections with integrity”. As regards Jega’s advice to Electoral Commissions, he advised on the importance of focus despite criticism from both incumbent governments and the oppositions. He also advised on the significance of careful planning and the “meticulous implementation of their plans as well as the creation of a level playing field for all contestants and all political parties involved”.
The tenure of Jega, as the head of INEC was not without public opposition and controversy, with some politicians questioning some of his decisions. When Jega was specifically asked about the public incident when he was called “tribalistic” and “partial”, this is what Jega had to say: “The work of chairman of an electoral commission in a country like Nigeria, which is diverse and large, and also has a lot of religious and ethnic mobilisation brought into the conduct of elections, is very challenging”.
He noted the significant opposition he faced when he announced the decision to make use of the card-reader technology into the elections, and said: “Having accepted the job, I had to prepare my mind as to how to withstand the challenges which came with the job. When politicians from both sides, the government side and the opposition side are criticizing you, then you know you must be doing something right”. He said, however, that he knew that elections with integrity were difficult to achieve but not impossible.
When he was asked on whether he would run for elected office in Nigeria, he responded with a “No”. He said, “For now he will continue his work as an academic”.
Conclusion: Democracy &amp; Economic Policy
Scholars have <a href="http://voxeu.org/article/do-elections-developing-countries-improve-economic-policy">shown</a> that there is a correlation between conducting credible elections and economic policy in developing countries. In a study by the same scholars, it was concluded that the extent to which economic policy serves to improve is based on the frequency of elections – the more the better; it was also noted, however, that if such elections are of low-quality the fewer the elections the better – as low-quality elections “<a href="http://voxeu.org/article/do-elections-developing-countries-improve-economic-policy">may actually worsen policy</a>”.
The importance of competitive elections with integrity serve as the crux of a functioning and healthy democracy, where the electorate can hold their governments to account and where governments are disciplined to develop economic policy and improve good governance.
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Is there a relationship between democracy and economic growth?

This article first appeared on <a href="http://www.theglobalcommunique.com/2017/01/africas-elderly-presidents-in-a-young-continent/">The Global Communiqué</a> and is republished with its permission.
America (as the beacon of democracy) has in the recent campaign trail arguably resembled African politics in some ways. The 2016 campaign for the US presidency was what many would call ‘brutal’, and I argue almost as ‘brutal’ (figuratively) as it gets in some African countries. Why do I say that? Simply because, it was one where on numerous occasions arguments deviated from rational policy debates; to rather focus on individuals’ temperaments.
Here we are in 2017 and the campaign is far gone, with an inauguration that took place just a few days ago. Yet it is striking that America yet again continues to make its own history, this time by having an individual who was the country’s oldest president at inauguration. Until Friday, January 20th, 2017, America’s oldest president at inauguration was Ronald Reagan who was sworn in at age 69. President Donald Trump is 70 years.
America, welcome to the ‘ruled by the elderly’ club.
Here in Africa, we have too many of them: South Africa’s Jacob Zuma and his age mate Ivory Coast President Alasane Ouattara are both turning 75 this year; while Malawi’s President Peter Mutharika is turning 77. Liberia’s Ellen Johnson Sirleaf is 78. Alpha Conde of Guinea is turning 79 this March; while Manuel Pinto da Costa of Sao Tome and Principe and Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria both will be 80 this year. Cameroon’s Paul Biya is 83. Mohamed Beji Caid Essebsi of Tunisia who was elected into office in 2014 is 90 years old and Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe continues to rule at the age of 92. Mugabe is the continent’s, as well as the world’s, oldest president.
The continent of Africa, like other parts of the world, cherishes its senior citizens. But when some of them ascend to positions of power such as those of presidency, they seem to forget about the majority of their population, the youth.
The United Nations estimates that Africa has the world’s youngest population with a median age of 19.5. South Africa has a median age of 25.7 years yet it is ruled by a president three times that age. Zimbabwe’s median age is 20.2 and yet the 92 year old Mugabe remains at the helm of power, and has been since 1980. Angola, 17.9 and its president José Eduardo dos Santos is 74. Malawi with a median age of 16.3 has a president of 77 years.
The most unfortunate part is that their reign has mostly turned out to be somewhat of a ‘ruling by the elderly for the elderly’ phenomenon. Their solutions have largely failed to help African youths in solving the high unemployment rates. It is estimated that the average unemployment rate in sub-Saharan Africa is around 12 percent – with this figure being higher in some countries within Africa. This unemployment rate emerges from the continent’s “most educated generation”.
WHY DOES AGE WIN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS?
Experience
In most African countries, there is a minimum age set for presidential candidacy and yet there isn’t any cut off age limit. This has ultimately put the younger presidential aspirants to a disadvantage who are pitted against the older politicians who often appear more experienced in public service.
An analysis of the list of presidents cited above shows that most of these politicians have been in public service for a very long time. This presents them with the advantage of supposedly vast knowledge and experience to convince the voters of the need to keep them in office.
But in the fast changing political environment, their ideas have mostly become redundant and ineffective to solve the challenges their countries are facing in today’s world.
Tradition
In most African countries, tradition dictates that the young ought to be led. There is an apparent belief that the young cannot effectively lead and that they are regarded as immature.
A good example was in my home country Malawi in the last election held in May 2014. One of the candidates, Atupele Muluzi had just turned 35, the minimum age to allow one to run for the presidency in Malawi. During the campaign, other contenders capitalized on his age arguing that he is young and immature to lead the nation. He was nicknamed ‘baby’. It has to be noted, however, that no study has been conducted to prove whether his young age contributed to his dismal performance in the election.
During the 2014 election, Muluzi, also seemed to notice that his age would be to his disadvantage; he therefore appointed Godfrey Chapola as a running mate, a man who was at the time 65 years old – as an attempt to strike a balance for his presidential ticket.
Legacy
Some of the African leaders have been in office since the dawn of (or in the early years after) independence in their respective countries. Examples are the following: Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, who fits in this category, was the colonial liberator of the country; Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni freed Uganda from the dictatorial rule of Idi Amin (1971-79) and Milton Obote (1980-85); South Africa’s Jacob Zuma is the leader of a heroic political party – the African National Congress.
These leaders’ ability to have (in some cases) successfully led their people out of struggles, seems to have given them the leeway to do everything possible to stay in power. While they do hold elections, of which they won, the opposition in some of these countries often decry election fraud – which they claim has kept such leaders in office.
The argument at hand is that such leaders’ relevance in the modern day political setting has simply diminished.  Their relevance was then. Today, they struggle to strike a balance between good performance and democratic rule and quality governance versus their dictatorial tendencies.
RETIREMENT AGE IN AFRICAN POLITICS
Almost every profession in the world, except politics, has a retirement age. Most countries in the world have a retirement age which varies from country to country, but is around the age of 65 years. The retirement age is mostly set to allow younger people to join the workforce. It is also set due to the fact that as a human being gets older, their energies and capacities to deliver arguably wanes.
The physical changes in the body are inevitable as one ages. Speaking, not as a health expert – it is commonplace to know that physiologically-speaking body tissues change as one grows older and as a result, the efficiency of the body, if not maintained through exercises, declines.  
It may therefore not necessarily be our elderly presidents’ fault that they for example read formerly presented, old speeches in meetings or frankly just fail to deliver when in these positions – a job that is one of the most stressful in the world and with it carries a lot of responsibilities. Such bad performances in their roles could simply be due to their old age.
This is the more reason why perhaps African countries need to set retirement ages or limit terms in politics. Apart from helping our old men and women to rest, a retirement age (as well as enforced term limits) would also enable young people to run for public office and contribute to the development of their nations while their ideas and their capabilities are still fresh.﻿

Op-Ed: Africa – a young continent led by elderly presidents

Welcome to 2016 in the Divided States of America.
Who would have ever thought that Donald Trump would be elected president when all this first began back in March of last year? Well, at 2:32AM on November 9, 2016, hell officially froze over and America elected Donald Trump the 45th President of the United States.
But, every so often, things need to be turned upside down to put them right-side up. So the voters did the political equivalent of using an ideological 2-by-4 to get the country’s attention. And make no mistake, Donald Trump’s victory was a sharp, populist kick to the groin of the liberal establishment that has dominated American mindshare, media and politics for most of the last decade.
For the purposes of full disclosure, I voted for Hillary Clinton &#8211; albeit reluctantly. I think she would’ve made a decent president but would have likely been under political artillery fire around the clock from the Republicans &#8211; which would have compromised her effectiveness in office as it did Barack Obama’s.
But, in hindsight, it really doesn’t surprise me that Donald Trump won the election. Over the months, as I watched the news coverage, it seemed to me that the media was starting to get a little too nervous about him. Could he actually win? Trump was rogue and unpredictable. He was in your face. He was a New Yorker. And he had 15,000,000 Twitter followers. All the while, Hillary was slipping, then recovering and then slipping again in the polls.
So to help her seal the deal, the media stopped reporting on Hillary &#8211; and started selling her to us. But there’s an old adage in sales that goes something like this: “people buy from people they like.” Although Trump, like Clinton, had extremely low favorability ratings, the voters saw her moral deficit as just too large to overcome. And as the campaign dragged on, the never-ending email scandals plaguing her made it very clear that something wasn’t quite right on the Left. No pun intended.
In the end, thanks to Julian Assange, Hillary Clinton was Wiki-Leaked into political extinction.
But try the media did. “Just look at the numbers. Trump can’t possibly win” one pundit said a few days before Election Day. “His path to victory is improbable, if not impossible” he continued. And many prominent voices in the media kept implying that the election basically belonged to Hillary anyway. “It’s her turn,” I would hear every day.
Well, it wasn’t. And when the voting was over, the silent majority had spoken. Actually, the silent majority had screamed. It was Donald J. Trump’s turn.
So now, a rainbow coalition of young millennials &#8211; still lost in an ideological fog &#8211; are angrily protesting the election results across the country – both in the streets and all over social media as well. And while many of the cell phone videos being released make it seem like there is a never ending flow of enraged demonstrators, it is probably less than 1/20 of 1% of the population – at most.
Of course, the real irony here is they’re demonstrating because the democratic system actually worked – not because it failed. They just didn’t like the outcome.
Others are now calling for the complete gutting of the Electoral College &#8211; which was established as part of America’s Constitution in 1787. Yes, Hillary won the popular vote but she lost the Electoral College. That’s how it works. Those are the rules. It’s like saying that one team beat the other in football because they ran up and down the field more often even though the other team scored more goals. Sorry, you lost. The number of goals you score determines the winner of the game. Nothing else.
Of course, had Clinton won the election, the Left would be extolling the virtues of the system and marveling at how well it performed. So, come on kids, get over it. You can’t just change the rules to get the result you want.
So now it’s time for the U.S. to start to heal itself. I’m hopeful we can but, frankly, I’m not convinced we have the national will. We are so divided it’s almost as if we are two countries right now. There’s anger everywhere. I walk all over New York every day and the vibe on the streets reminds me of an angry America in the late 1960’s. The main difference is that Donald Trump is now the new Richard Nixon.
So Trump needs to lead the country and act decisively to reunite America. He needs to reassure the voters that he is the President of all the people irrespective of gender, religion, race or ideological leaning.
But as the recent protests and unrestrained fury on Facebook and Twitter demonstrate, the liberal establishment doesn’t react well to losing. They don’t play well with the other kids in the sandbox especially if they disagree with them. So here’s the bottom line. The results are final and the American people have spoken. President Obama said exactly this in his post-election press conference.
We now need to give Trump a chance to govern.
But watch what he does, not what he says. Campaigns are about words. Presidencies are about actions. Yes, he will attempt to reverse many of Obama’s policies as well as most of his executive orders. Let’s face it, much of it hasn’t worked. That’s why the voters chose another path and put Trump in office. And if he fails, he’ll be out too. That’s the beauty of democracy. If the president doesn’t do a good job, you can fire him.
Trump’s mandate from the American people is to fix what ails us. I hope he focuses on creating jobs first. Putting people back to work always acts as a salve on the wound and will spark the economy. He’s claiming he will spend USD 1 trillion on infrastructure projects across the country &#8211; although it will likely take a few years for that to have an impact. He will push to reduce taxes which is long overdue. And with a Republican controlled Congress, he could get this done early on in his presidency. He will look to rebuild the military to its former levels just like Ronald Regan did back in the 1980’s. What he does with it, however, is anybody’s guess. My sense is he will also start to move away from the incendiary rhetoric against Muslims and Mexicans &#8211; and he should. He has to. But I don’t think he is anti-Muslim. He is anti-terrorism. And he is not anti-Mexican. He is anti-illegal immigration. There’s a big difference. He is already softening his position on the mass deportation of illegal immigrants saying now that only those with criminal records will be deported. But he will also secure the borders and make it very tough to get into this country illegally – wherever you’re from.
Perhaps the best illustration of how he might approach the presidency is this. Back in 1986, real estate developer Donald Trump watched New York City try &#8211; and repeatedly fail &#8211; to build a public skating rink in Central Park. It had already been under construction for 12 years at that point. Legendary New York City mayor, Ed Koch, told Trump he’d give him the project but he needed it finished in 18 months. Trump said he could do it in four. And he finished in three. I think this is the kind of President we could very well get.
Donald Trump and I are both New Yorkers – actually, we each grew up in Queens which is one of the city’s five boroughs. So here’s one thing I know for sure. He’ll work harder than anyone on the planet. And that’s a trait you want in your president.
So I’ll leave you with this. Stop whining. It benefits all of us to give Donald Trump the opportunity to do his job and allow for the peaceful transition of power to a new administration with different ideas. This is our history and how we have always done it. We gave Barack Obama the chance to govern. We gave George W. Bush the chance to govern. And every president before them too. If Hillary had won, I’d have gotten behind her and cheered her on as well.
But now it’s Trump’s turn. If we render his efforts ineffective through endless protests and violence, blatantly biased media coverage, social media smear campaigns and partisan political obstruction, I am not sure we will ever find our way back to being the United States of America again.
Rather, we will unfortunately remain as we are today. The Divided States of America.
So give him a chance.﻿

The Divided States of America

Big data allows us to quantify political risk and we must do so, in order to avoid pointless attempted coups and excessive political repression. It may also be useful for investors.
﻿There’s some really interesting data on Africa in this report – including the 96% annual chance that Nigeria retains the democracy label it won after the important 2015 elections (and that “failed state” risk is very low indeed), and the 97% chance that SA remains a democracy despite fears of many that it may end up following Zimbabwe’s path to greater poverty and less democracy.  Both look more solid countries than many think.  Political risks are three times higher in other African countries than Nigeria – as we highlight below, from Ivory Coast to Mozambique.  Meanwhile annual democratisation risk is much higher than we expected in Egypt (13% a year) and Morocco (9%).
The best dancer at a wedding I attended last month was an open-minded member of China’s Communist Party who I tested this report out on. He thinks it’s wrong. China’s communist party will be in power for another 100 years he reckoned, as we have yet to see the third generation of family rule – and Chinese dynasties don’t only last two generations.  Data tells me that China is changing because of rising income levels, and that he is making the same mistake as those Turkish military officers who in July said that military coups have generally succeeded in Turkey, so will succeed in 2016.  They are trapped by their understanding of history, and their lack of understanding of the power of the middle class.  
In yesterday’s media, we saw three stories about democracy and autocracy, from the pro-democracy groups winning seats in Hong Kong’s elections, to Gideon Rachman’s piece asking a set of fascinating questions about politics and geo-politics to the news from Russia, ahead of the parliamentary elections on Sunday 18th September. Russia has stopped the Levada Centre, the only independent pollster (who we met at our 20th annual conference in June) from producing polls – as it is now a foreign agent.  
Our new report has something to say on all these issues, and many others.  
1)      We reiterate our 2011 argument that all countries become democracies as they get rich, except those countries that export a lot of oil per capita (see fig 2 in the report – because Russia does not) and the city state of Singapore.  Rachman thinks the “end of history” thesis only lasted 20 years.  I think he’s wrong. Look at fig 3 – which shows all the countries in the world that are not democracies. Above $14k of per capita GDP, only large oil exporters, Belarus and Singapore, and above $21k, only large oil exporters and Singapore, are not democracies.  Where then is the successful challenge to the “end of history thesis” that all countries eventually become rich and democratic? This table also answers Rachman’s question about why poor China in 1989 stayed autocratic while wealthier central Europe democratised.
2)      We show that no countries ever lose a positive Polity IV rating once they have a high per capita GDP.  The Turkish coup attempt could not succeed – or to be 100% accurate, we have never (yet) seen a country lose democracy at Turkey’s income level which is over $15k. 
The percentage chance of a country losing a positive Polity IV score (full democracy, democracy or open anocracy) and getting a negative score (autocracy, closed anocracy) at certain per capita GDP thresholds (2011 PPP dollars).
 <img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="/media/19206387/renman_graph1_7sept.png" width="481" height="289" alt="Ren Man _Graph 1_7Sept"/>﻿
Source: Polity IV, Penn table, Renaissance Capital  
 3)   We examine the countries that have seen a deterioration in their democratic rating –Turkey, Russia and Malaysiawere all more democratic a decade ago than they are today.  We highlight that as all rich countries are democracies or oil exporting autocracies, and none occupy the middle ground (Singapore is an exception), this tells us that
a) Russia, Turkey and Malaysiawill remain “open anocracies” but stagnate economicallyand remain middle income or
b) They become “democracies” – a surprisingly high 10% chance each year (but thedata sample is too small for us to be confident about this) or
c) They do grow fast, while remaining “open anocracies” – which has never happenedbefore.     
 4)  We highlight how the oil price crashed in 1985 and triggered a wave of democratisation among countries that exported only a little oil per capita (from the USSR to Mexico).  We may see a new wave of democratisation since the oil price crash of 2014-15, and suggest democratisation may occur in 2018-20 inRussia, Iran and Venezuela.  See figure 16. 
 5) Political regimes are actually very stable.  There is an 86-100% chance each year that the current regime will remain in place next year.  The greatest risk of significant change is in the poorer countries.  See fig 25 for EM, fig 26 for Frontier and fig 27 for Beyond Frontier – to see the chances of political change in the coming year.  African countries fromIvory Coast, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwehave a 1 in 7 chance of a big change – with more risk of a shift towards autocracy than democracy.  Nigeria and Kenya are far more stable, with a 96% and 95% chance respectively of remaining a “democracy”.
6) Democratisation is coming toChina, Vietnam, Morocco, Egypt and Jordan.  China is already at the income level where there is a 4.5% chance each year of a shift towards democracy.  This risk will grow to 8% in the 2020s, when per capita GDP is higher.  Vietnam is likely to lag China.  Morocco already carries a 9% chance annually of a further shift towards democracy, while Jordan and Egypt have a surprisingly high 13% chance of such a shift in any given year.  Democratisation at high income levels tends to be relatively peaceful.
 7)  The Pinochet argument– that autocracy is better at low levels of GDP per capita – is undermined by our data analysis. See figure 19 and fig 20.  Some autocracies do grow faster than democracies, but a number from Cuba to Tajikistan do not. 
<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="/media/19206394/renman_graph2_7sept_600x408.jpg" width="600" height="408" alt="Ren Man _Graph 2_7Sept"/>﻿
 
 8) However, we do find that there is some correlation between ease of doing business, corruption, legal scores and political system – the extremes of democracy and autocracy tend to favour better results than those with very mixed systems.  See figures 21-23.
 9)The demographic argument– that lots of young people are destabilising for any political regime – is supported by our data.  However, we found that too many young people (more than 30% of the population are 15-29), as well as too few (25% or less), suggests no change.  It is 25-30% which is the key level that encourages change. China and Russia might be at less risk of political change if they get old before they get rich.  See figures 29 and 30. 
 We have not looked at all the market implications of political change. This was a report which in 37 pages aims to show what will happen.  We need to produce another report to look at the market implications of this.  One challenge will be the fact that we have more political history than financial history for many emerging and frontier markets.
 But one conclusion we would highlight is that EM and Frontier markets are more politically stable than we might think – and the risks some of us remember from the 1990s when Russia’s military was shelling its parliament and Turkish tanks provoked the fall of a government – are now risks that are concentrated in beyond frontier markets like Zimbabwe, rather than larger markets.  ﻿
 
TED talk: <a href="http://www.ted.com/talks/charles_robertson_africa_s_next_boom.html?source=email#.UmdluZ8ok3k.email">http://www.ted.com/talks/charles_robertson_africa_s_next_boom.html?source=email#.UmdluZ8ok3k.email﻿</a>

Report: The revolutionary nature of growth (2016)

In recent weeks, following the local elections, we have been reminded of the importance of democracy. Our commitment to this as a country has encouraged all stakeholders; citizens, business, investors and politicians alike &#8211; all while the world continues to keep a watchful eye on South Africa. However, the ongoing dispute between the Ministry of Finance and South African Revenue Service (SARS) places this new found confidence at risk.
Ernest Mahlaule, President of the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce and Industry (JCCI) says: “In conversations with our constituents and stakeholders, we have become aware of how reports of the ongoing dispute between the office of the Minister of Finance and SARS is impacting confidence in South Africa, from  local and international businesses. The situation continues to create instability in the Rand and local markets, which comes at a very delicate time for the local economy.”
“Something needs to give. If this situation continues for much longer, the greater risk is the lasting reputational damage to the country, in the eyes of our current and future investors, and this is something the country simply cannot afford.”
South Africa is still at risk of being downgraded to ‘junk’ status, where research from local economists has already demonstrated that, should this happen, it will take the country’s economy at least seven years to recover. “The startling reality, however, is that if South Africa is downgraded to junk status – and our political will is still at odds – this could spell the beginning of more, and compounding, challenges for the country,” Mahlaule﻿ continues.
“We hope the situation is resolved quickly and that an appropriate and lasting resolution can be found to put this debacle to rest, once and for all. Now is a time to come together and collaborate in line with the emerging consensus whereby all stakeholders comprising business, organised labour, government as well as civil society have resolved to continue working together towards reigniting the economy and create the much needed jobs for our citizens. We should further be mindful of the fact that when political will is exerted, it should never be to the detriment of the country’s common interests. The people of this country want strong leaders with a proven understanding and sense of accountability for the power of the positions they hold,” concludes Mahlaule.﻿

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