It has become unfashionable to admit that one doesn’t really understand what phrases like “decolonising knowledge” or “a decolonised curriculum” mean. This is unfortunate. The process of coming to understand what decolonisation of knowledge might be is essential to achieving it – and that process is definitely not yet complete.
Decolonisation is not always a welcome concept in some quarters of academia. If curricula and ideas and knowledge are colonised, that means they have been shaped in part by considerations that are political, economic, social, cultural or otherwise tangential to the ideals of academic inquiry.
Admitting a need to decolonise any part of one’s discipline means admitting that it was formerly colonised to some degree. This in turn means admitting that what one previously touted as objective and untainted by the fleeting considerations of worldly affairs was, in fact, mired in them. Academics are much happier asserting that knowledge is power than they are conceding that power is knowledge.
Seen in this light, the decolonisation of knowledge is primarily an intellectual rather than a political project. It attempts to “disinfect” academic activities: to rid teaching, research, and institutional behaviour of influences that have little to do with the fair-minded pursuit of knowledge and truth.
But this is not the only approach. Decolonisation of knowledge is a contested concept. This “disinfecting” or critical model of decolonisation stands in contrast to a line of thought that sees knowledge as relative to a perspective, a cultural context, or something else again.
Decolonisation as cultural relativism
Decolonisation is sometimes presented, not as an attempt to resurrect the dispassionate search for knowledge, but as a rejection of the idea of objectivity, which is seen as a sort of heritage of colonial thinking.
Sometimes the idea is that notions like truth, fact or what “works” are fundamentally western and are imposed on other cultures. At other times, the idea seems to me that facts and truths are local. So what is discovered or expressed in one time or place will necessarily be inapplicable in another.
This line of thinking takes its cue from the fact that if you have sufficient power over someone you can enforce your views on them – or simply kill them if they disagree. Totalitarian states typically adopt policies that involve both silencing and killing dissenters.
Karl Marx famously <a href="https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01b.htm">maintained</a> that
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas.
Michel Foucault thought that power and truth are closely related, or even the same thing, which he <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/foucault/#4.4">sometimes called “power/knowledge”</a>.
On this line of thought, the attempt to critically evaluate the opinion of another person or group looks like an exercise in power politics. It’s a short step from there to the idea that, in order to rid ourselves of the effects of a colonial past, we must all desist from asserting our beliefs over others’ beliefs. There is African belief, and European belief, and your belief, and mine – but none of us have the right to assert that something is true, is a fact, or works, contrary to anyone else’s belief.
On this view, to decolonise knowledge is to understand this and so to adopt a certain very broad kind of relativism.
Critical decolonisation
I prefer the first understanding of decolonisation over the second: critical decolonisation over relativistic decolonisation.
One very simple reason is that the kind of relativism I have described is associated with traditions of thought that are European in origin: Marxism and postmodernism. I am sceptical of assertions that these views are of universal application. I worry that some of these assertions may themselves express a colonial heritage.
But I have more substantive concerns, too. One of these is a point made by Ghanaian-British author and philosopher <a href="http://appiah.net/">Kwame Anthony Appiah</a> in his book <a href="http://appiah.net/books/cosmopolitanism/">Cosmopolitanism</a>. Appiah values conversation very highly and rejects relativism in part because it doesn’t motivate conversation. As he puts it:
If we cannot learn from one another what is right to think and feel and do, then conversation between us will be pointless. Relativism of that sort isn’t a way to encourage conversation; it’s just a reason to fall silent.
The great attraction of uncritical decolonisation is that it appears to prevent us coming into conflict with each other. We simply accept that everyone is entitled to their views. But a moment’s thought shows there’s no protection against possible conflict. I might believe I can do things you don’t want me to do. I might even have views about your views.
The trouble is that ideas can conflict by themselves. They can logically contradict each other. They can mandate actions that are mutually exclusive. We might think very differently – but we share the same world.
The risk of being wrong
Critical decolonisation means accepting risk of error. It means considering whether indigenous knowledge systems might contain truths that western science has not accessed. But it also means accepting that in some cases indigenous knowledge systems might be wrong.
Critical decolonisation also means considering whether what we find in the canon of an academic discipline whose history has been dominated by Europe and America is really up to much. This is a very scary and painful question for academics who have devoted their lives to the study of what they have been told are works of genius.
Critical decolonisation leaves room for local knowledge. A policy to improve infant nutrition may <a href="https://philosophy.ucsd.edu/_files/ncartwright/phil152/PSA-2-Nov-0900.pdf">work in Tamil Nadu and fail in Bangladesh</a>. The relativist stance says that whether it works depends on your point of view. But this is a poor analysis of this case: it works in one and not the other, whichever place you are looking from.
The better approach is to seek an explanation for the difference: in this case, that the role of mothers in buying and distributing food differs between the two places. One can reject universal truths without endorsing relativism.
If done properly and critically a lot of what we count as great will fall in the process of decolonising knowledge. A lot of formerly unvoiced and unheard ideas will come to light. The process of critical scrutiny is essential to the success of this project – and nobody gets a free pass.

It will take critical, thorough scrutiny to truly decolonise knowledge

JOHANNESBURG
Private-sector activity in South Africa was little changed in May from April, remaining in positive territory, as new orders and output failed to register significant gains.
The Standard Bank Purchasing Managers&#8217; Index (PMI), compiled by Markit, was at 50.2 in May compared with 50.3 in April, still above the 50 mark that separates growth from contraction.
<blockquote>&#8220;PMI remained above 50 for the ninth month running in May, signalling the longest sequence of overall improvement in operating conditions in five years,&#8221; Markit said in a statement.</blockquote>
The sub-index for new orders fell to 50.1 in May from 50.4 previously. Output rose slightly to 49.9 from 49.6.
South Africa&#8217;s economic outlook has been clouded by credit rating downgrades to &#8220;junk&#8221; by two of the three major rating agencies after President Jacob Zuma fired Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan in late March.
A fall below investment-grade typically constricts funding and sharply raises borrowing costs.

South Africa’s private-sector activity little changed in May, PMI shows

TJ Strydom | JOHANNESBURG
The former head of South Africa&#8217;s power utility Eskom has approached the courts to overturn his sacking, local media reported on Sunday.
Eskom was told to remove chief executive Brian Molefe last week after members of the ruling African National Congress criticised his reinstatement just two weeks ago, given he resigned last year amid allegations of graft.
Molefe has launched an urgent application in the Labour Court in Johannesburg to have the decision to remove him declared invalid, the Timeslive website reported.
Eskom and Public Enterprises Minister Lynne Brown were listed as respondents, the report said. Neither Eskom nor Brown&#8217;s spokesman could immediately be reached for comment by Reuters.
Molefe resigned in November after a report by the Public Protector, a constitutionally mandated corruption watchdog, raised questions over Eskom coal contracts awarded to a company owned by the Gupta family, wealthy friends of President Jacob Zuma.
Zuma&#8217;s opponents said Molefe&#8217;s return was a new attempt to access contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Government ministers have said the Guptas have offered to secure them promotions in return for tenders.
Zuma and the Gupta family deny wrongdoing. Molefe also denies any wrongdoing and said he resigned in the first place in the interest of good governance and stability.
(Reporting by TJ Strydom)

South Africa power utility’s former CEO to challenge sacking in court

TJ Strydom
South African President Jacob Zuma has denied owning a &#8220;palace&#8221; in the United Arab Emirates, his office said on Sunday, after local media reported that an influential family bought him a home in the wealthy Gulf state.
Graft accusations in more than 100,000 leaked documents and e-mails last week heaped more pressure on the scandal-plagued Zuma only days after he survived a no-confidence vote by members of his own party&#8217;s top body.
South Africa&#8217;s Sunday Times newspaper reported that several independent sources had told it that the Gupta family had bought Zuma a retirement home for 330 million rand ($25 million) in an upmarket suburb of Dubai.
The newspaper did not name the sources, but said they included businessmen, senior officials in the ruling African National Congress and people close to the Zuma family. It also cited some of the leaked e-mails.
The Gupta family, wealthy Indian-born businessmen whose companies have contracts with state-owned firms, have denied all allegations of influence-peddling or improper dealings and through a spokesman last week labeled the e-mails &#8220;fake news&#8221;.
&#8220;President Zuma does not own any property outside South Africa and has not requested anybody to buy property for him abroad,&#8221; his office said in a statement, adding that the report about a &#8220;palace&#8221; in Dubai was a &#8220;fabrication&#8221;.
&#8220;The president has also not received or seen the reported emails and has no knowledge of them,&#8221; his office said.
South Africa&#8217;s anti-graft watchdog called in November for a judge to investigate alleged influence peddling in Zuma&#8217;s government and focused on allegations that the brothers, Ajay, Atul and Rajesh Gupta, influenced appointments of ministers.
Zuma is fighting the report in court and has not appointed a judicial commission to investigate. He denies any wrongdoing.
Last year, South Africa&#8217;s top court found that Zuma had failed to uphold the constitution by ignoring instructions to pay back some of the $16 million in state funds spent on renovations at his private home.
(Reporting by TJ Strydom; editing by Mark Heinrich)

South Africa’s Zuma denies owning ‘palace’ in Dubai

<ul>
<li>S&amp;P Global Ratings (S&amp;P) affirms South Africa’s long term foreign and local currency debt ratings, negative outlook is unchanged</li>
</ul>
Government welcomes S&amp;P’s decision of maintaining South Africa’s long term local currency debt ratings of ‘BBB-‘; an investment grade rating. The affirmation of the long-term foreign currency rating of ‘BB+’ and the negative outlook on the ratings are also noted. 
While government agrees with S&amp;P that the pace of economic growth is slow and as such poses risks to fiscal consolidation and rising contingent liabilities, the fiscal policy stance continues to be guided by chapter 13 of the Constitution. It states that while there is promotion of efforts aimed at economic development, good governance, social progress and rising standard of living for all South Africans, there must also be transparency, accountability and sound financial controls in the management of public finances. 
Key focus is to safeguard confidence and reclaim the investment grade ratings. Intensive engagements with broader stakeholders will continue. Sustainable fiscal policy and efforts to tackle sources of low growth are critical. Improvement in policy design, finalisation of key policies and coordination remain critical for boosting confidence and economic growth. Government is currently re-engaging with the private sector to make sure that the joint work of government, business, labour and the civil society continues and that the pledges made thus far are fulfilled. 
The work to improve governance and financial challenges in the state owned companies (SOCs) is also on track. In November 2016, Cabinet: 
 Endorsed a private-sector participation framework to guide collaboration between SOCs and the private sector on infrastructure projects; 
 Adopted a guideline for the remuneration and incentive standards for directors of SOCs; 
 Approved the broad thrust of a guide for the appointment of boards and executive officers; 
 Recommended further consultation on the first draft of a new government 
shareholder policy, which will culminate in overarching legislation for SOCs; 
and 
 Noted the proposal to determine and cost the developmental mandates of 
SOCs. 
Government is committed to work with its social partners in improving business 
and consumer confidence. The National Development Plan continues to be the 
anchor policy of government providing greater policy certainty. The Constitution 
remains explicit in realising the fundamental rights of all who live in South Africa 
and that the public funds are spent for a common good.

S&P Affirms SA’s foreign & domestic debt, Outlook remains negative

Joe Brock | JOHANNESBURG
The ruling African National Congress said on Friday it is gravely concerned by leaked documents alleging influence-peddling by friends of President Jacob Zuma, deepening a divide in South Africa&#8217;s ruling party over its leader.
Some South African media reported on Thursday they had access to over 100,000 leaked documents and emails that showed improper dealings in lucrative government contracts by business friends of Zuma.
The latest allegations of influence-peddling may deepen divisions in the ANC as factions battle for control ahead of a party conference in December where a successor to the beleaguered, scandal-plagued Zuma will be chosen. Zuma can remain as head of state until an election in 2019.
Zuma and the Gupta family, wealthy Indian-born businessmen whose companies have contracts with state-owned firms, have not commented but have denied similar allegations in the past. Reuters could not independently verify the new allegations.
&#8220;These reports contain very worrying claims about the nature of the relationship between government and private interests,&#8221; the ANC said in a statement, calling on government to urgently establish the veracity of the leaks.
&#8220;The ANC views these allegations in a very serious light as, if left unattended, they call into question the integrity and credibility of the government.&#8221;
The statement appeared to contradict Zuma, who said at a parliamentary session on Thursday that he was not interested in &#8220;hearsay&#8221; published in newspapers.
A backroom schism in the ANC over Zuma has burst into the open in recent weeks as his opponents seek to oust him or ensure his chosen candidate does not take over the reins.
Analysts say Zuma&#8217;s camp will back his ex-wife and former African Union chair Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in December, while another faction will support Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa.
ANC SPLIT IN TWO
&#8220;This week we have seen there are clearly two ANCs,&#8221; said political analyst Daniel Silke.
&#8220;One ANC sees very little wrong with crony capitalism, kickbacks and shady payments. The other ANC sees the reputation of the party among the electorate disintegrating and fear the real possibility they could lose power.&#8221;
Opposition parties have made upbeat comments about unseating the ANC in 2019, an unthinkable scenario a few years ago for a party that has led comfortably since it swept to power under Nelson Mandela at the end of apartheid in 1994.
Zuma survived a call to resign at an ANC meeting last week due to disputes over political appointments and his friendship with the Gupta family.
Parliament is expected to hold a no-confidence vote in Zuma later this year but he has survived similar attempts before.
When Zuma sacked respected finance minister Pravin Gordhan in March, three of the top six members of the ANC, including Ramaphosa, openly criticising his decision, breaking the party&#8217;s strict rule of showing unity in public.
Gordhan&#8217;s replacement Malusi Gigaba has been accused of having close ties to the Guptas. Gigaba said on Friday that he had done nothing wrong and the leaked documents would not link him to the family.
(Additional reporting by Olivia Kumwenda-Mtambo, TJ Strydom and Tiisetso Motsoeneng; Editing by Mark Heinrich)

South African graft accusations expose split in ANC over Zuma

<div class="source"><a href="http://www.cnbc.com/leah-ginsberg/" rel="author">Leah Ginsberg</a> | <a href="http://twitter.com/lginzy">@lginzy</a></div>
Would you rather have a house or a handbag? If you have to choose, you can&#8217;t afford the Hermès white Himalaya crocodile diamond Birkin bag that Christie&#8217;s just unloaded for $379,261, making it the most expensive handbag ever sold at auction.
The exclusive white Himalaya Birkin, handmade from Niloticus crocodile with more than 240 diamonds on its 18-karat-gold hardware, is routinely in the top spot for most expensive bag — this year&#8217;s titleholder (sold in Hong Kong) knocked the crown off another white Himalaya Birkin that <a class="inline_asset" title="https://news.artnet.com/market/most-expensive-bag-ever-sold-2016-507656" href="https://news.artnet.com/market/most-expensive-bag-ever-sold-2016-507656" target="_self">sold for a little over $300,000 in 2016</a>.
<div id="attachment_126745" style="width: 610px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-126745" class="wp-image-126745 size-full" src="http://cnbc.africa/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Expensive_Handbag_in_the_World_sold_at_Christies_Hong_Kong_on_31_May_2017.600x400.jpg" alt="" width="600" height="400" />Hermès matte white Himalaya Niloticus crocodile diamond Birkin sold for more than $379,000 at Christie&#8217;s in Hong Kong</div>
Celebrities, of course, love the bag. David Beckham, who is worth $350 million, <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/17/david-beckham-gave-wife-victoria-an-expensive-hermes-birkin-bag.html" target="_self">bought his clothing designer wife, Victoria, an albino Nilo crocodile Himalayan Birkin</a> in 2008 for a reported £80,000 (or about $100,000). Kim Kardashian has also been spotted with the Himalayan.
<div id="attachment_126746" style="width: 510px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-126746" class="wp-image-126746 size-full" src="http://cnbc.africa/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/David-Victoria.jpg" alt="" width="500" height="335" />Photo: Flickr.</div>
The Himalayan is so-named because the coloring resembles the famous mountain range, and it&#8217;s &#8220;possibly the rarest and most desirable handbag in the world,&#8221; according to Hermès expert <a class="inline_asset" title="http://www.vogue.com/article/most-expensive-hermes-birkin" href="http://www.vogue.com/article/most-expensive-hermes-birkin" target="_self">Jane Finds</a>.
<div id="dart_wrapper_responsiverectangle" class="dart_wrapper dart_ads_noniframe_responsiverectangle badge-ad"></div>
&#8220;Hermès only very rarely—and very thoughtfully—creates unique pieces of this caliber,&#8221; says Finds. <a class="inline_asset" title="http://www.christies.com/features/Deconstructed-The-Himalaya-Birkin-7219-1.aspx" href="http://www.christies.com/features/Deconstructed-The-Himalaya-Birkin-7219-1.aspx" target="_self">Christie&#8217;s</a> estimates only one or two of the bags are handmade per year.
The bag is so rare and expensive in part because white or albino crocodiles are hard to come by and the dying process for the bag is painstaking.
Even the simplest of Birkin bags <a class="inline_asset" title="http://fortune.com/2015/06/23/hermes-birkin-investment/" href="http://fortune.com/2015/06/23/hermes-birkin-investment/" target="_self">start at about $10,000</a> and are famous for their often months- or years-long waiting lists to purchase.
But Birkins aren&#8217;t just fashion statements or folly — these bags only <a class="inline_asset" title="http://time.com/4182246/hermes-birkin-bag-investment-gold/" href="http://time.com/4182246/hermes-birkin-bag-investment-gold/" target="_self">appreciate in value</a> with time.
Just ask Victoria Beckham. She reportedly has 100 Birkins in a collection that&#8217;s estimated to be worth <a class="inline_asset" title="http://www.vogue.com/article/birkin-celebrity-style-kim-kardashian-west-victoria-beckham" href="http://www.vogue.com/article/birkin-celebrity-style-kim-kardashian-west-victoria-beckham" target="_self">$2 million</a>.

You know you’re rich when you buy this — a $379,261 handbag is the most expensive ever sold at auction

Fitch Ratings-Hong Kong-01 June 2017: Fitch Ratings has affirmed South Africa&#8217;s Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at &#8216;BB+&#8217; with a Stable Outlook. The issue ratings on South Africa&#8217;s senior unsecured foreign- and local-currency bonds and on the sukuk trust certificates issued by RSA Sukuk No. 1 Trust have also been affirmed at &#8216;BB+&#8217;. The Short-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs and the rating on the short-term local-currency securities have been affirmed at &#8216;B&#8217;. The Country Ceiling has been affirmed at &#8216;BBB-&#8216;.
KEY RATING DRIVERS 
South Africa&#8217;s ratings are weighed down by low trend GDP growth, sizeable contingent liabilities and deteriorating governance. Positively, they are supported by deep local capital markets, a favourable government debt structure and a track record of fairly prudent fiscal and monetary policy.
A cabinet reshuffle at the end of March, which triggered an earlier downgrade of South Africa&#8217;s ratings, is likely to undermine governance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), weaken fiscal consolidation and reduce private sector investment as a result of weaker business confidence. While efforts to improve the SOE governance framework will continue, implementation decisions, for example on appointments of senior SOE management, will hamper these efforts and could lead to weaker financial positions of SOEs and higher contingent liabilities for the government.
As the new Finance Minister has emphasised, the government&#8217;s commitment to existing fiscal targets still stands. As a result, it is unlikely that the government will raise its expenditure ceilings which have served as a key anchor for fiscal policy. The government is also likely to implement some tightening if, as is expected, revenue underperforms but the adjustment will be insufficient to keep deficit targets on track.
Senior ANC and government leaders have emphasised that the government&#8217;s recent rhetoric of &#8220;radical socioeconomic transformation&#8221; signals no fundamental change and that the government remains focused on the long-standing goal of inclusive growth. Documents released ahead of the ANC policy conference in June also indicate policy continuity, including on the sensitive issue of land expropriation. Severe tensions within the ANC also limit the ability to make radical policy changes but they also undermine policy predictability as it is unclear which factions will prevail on individual policy issues.
In-fighting within the ANC will remain particularly strong ahead of the electoral conference in December 2017, when the ANC will select a new party president. The new party leader will likely become the country&#8217;s president after national elections in 2019 or earlier. Even after the electoral conference, policy will still be influenced by competing factions in the ANC and the government will juggle multiple complex policy objectives, in particular improving business confidence and addressing the high degree of inequality.
South African GDP growth remains a key rating weakness, with a five-year average of just 1.6% compared with a &#8216;BB&#8217; category median of 3.5%. Growth fell to just 0.3% in 2016 and is expected to rise only moderately to just 1% in 2017 and 1.8% in 2018, as political uncertainty will continue to weigh on private investment. The recovery reflects lower inflation combined with stable wage growth, which will boost real consumer income. In addition, a record harvest in 2017 will boost growth after a severe drought had weighed on GDP growth in 2016.
The government&#8217;s February budget projected the consolidated national government deficit to narrow to 3.1% of GDP in FY17/18 (year end March) and 2.8% in FY18/19 from 3.4% in FY16/17. However, this relied on optimistic GDP growth forecasts of 1.3% for 2017 and 2% for 2018 and benign assumptions for tax multipliers. Particularly the gains from tax measures of 0.6% of GDP are uncertain. We expect the government to announce some expenditure cuts in its medium-term budget policy statement in October, but this will not fully offset the tax shortfall. As a result, we foresee a consolidated national government deficit of 3.3% in FY17/18 and 3.1% FY18/19.
South Africa&#8217;s general government debt, at 52.6% of GDP (including local government debt) in March 2017, is above the &#8216;BB&#8217; and &#8216;BBB&#8217; category medians of 51% and 41%, respectively. We expect debt to continue rising over the next two years, to 55.1% of GDP in FYE19. However, the low share of foreign currency debt in total debt, at 11.5% compared with a &#8216;BB&#8217; median of 51%, and the long average maturity of its bonds of 14.7 years reduce the risk of financing difficulties.
The government has guarantees for SOEs, independent power producer contracts and public-private partnerships of ZAR445 billion (10.1% of GDP). In addition, at FYE16 SOEs&#8217; debt without an explicit government guarantee totalled ZAR463 billion (10.5% of GDP). Given the weak state of SOE finances, the problems in SOE governance and the importance of SOEs for the country&#8217;s economy and politics, the risk that some of this debt will land on the sovereign balance sheet is substantial.
The risks are illustrated by the problems of South African Airways, which the Ministry of Finance deems technically insolvent, although its liabilities are small. Eskom, as the biggest recipient of government guarantees, received significant capital injections from the government in 2015 but is not expected to require further support in the near term. South Africa&#8217;s plan to build 9.6GW of nuclear electricity capacity, to be implemented by Eskom, could raise government exposures significantly. However, a court decision in April has significantly delayed progress towards signing procurement contracts, as the government will need to relaunch consultations.
South Africa&#8217;s current-account deficit has narrowed to 3.2% of GDP in 2016 from a peak of 5.9% in 2013 and is likely to remain around 3% in 2017 and 2018. Weak growth of domestic demand, particularly import-intensive private investment, has led to import compression. A weak rand has also improved the competitiveness of domestic goods and services. Recent strengthening of prices for some of South Africa&#8217;s key export commodities will also support export receipts and the strong harvest will reduce the need for food imports. Reserves are low relative to financing requirements and the high commodity share in exports adds to volatility in export receipts, but the fully flexible exchange rate will act as a buffer for external financing shocks.
Most indicators of economic development are in line with &#8216;BB&#8217; category medians. GDP per capita at market prices is estimated at USD5,246 for 2016, compared with a median of USD5,058. The World Bank&#8217;s governance indicator, at the 59th percentile, is well above the &#8216;BB&#8217; median but this may not adequately reflect governance issues that were highlighted in the recent state of capture report by the public prosecutor and governance may deteriorate as a result of the government reshuffle. The rating is supported by a sound banking sector, which has a Fitch Bank Systemic Risk Indicator of &#8216;bbb&#8217;.
SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) and QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO) 
Fitch&#8217;s proprietary SRM assigns South Africa a score equivalent to a rating of &#8216;BBB&#8217; on the Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR scale.
Fitch&#8217;s sovereign rating committee adjusted the output from the SRM to arrive at the final Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR by applying its QO, relative to rated peers, as follows:
Macroeconomic Performance, Policies and Prospect: -1 notch, to reflect South Africa&#8217;s weak growth prospects relative to the &#8216;BB&#8217; and &#8216;BBB&#8217; category medians, with important repercussions for public finances.
Structural Features: -1 notch, to reflect the expected deterioration in governance standards, particularly related to SOEs.
Fitch&#8217;s SRM is the agency&#8217;s proprietary multiple regression rating model that employs 18 variables based on three year-centred averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score equivalent to a Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR. Fitch&#8217;s QO is a forward-looking qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM output to assign the final rating, reflecting factors within our criteria that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully reflected in the SRM.
RATING SENSITIVITIES 
The following risk factors could, individually or collectively, result in negative rating action:
&#8211; A marked increase in the government debt/GDP ratio or in contingent liabilities;
&#8211; A further deterioration in South Africa&#8217;s trend GDP growth, for example, due to sustained uncertainty about economic policy;
&#8211; Rising net external debt to levels that raise the potential for serious financing strains.
The following risk factors could, individually or collectively, result in positive rating action:
&#8211; A substantial strengthening in trend GDP growth;
&#8211; An improvement in governance that is supportive of public finances and the business climate;
&#8211; A marked narrowing in the budget deficit and a reduction in the government debt/GDP ratio.
KEY ASSUMPTIONS 
Fitch expects global economic trends and commodity prices to develop as outlined in Fitch&#8217;s Global Economic Outlook.

Fitch Affirms South Africa at junk; Outlook Stable

Turkish mobile operator Turkcell (<a href="http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/overview?symbol=TCELL.IS">TCELL.IS</a>) said on Thursday a $4.2 billion lawsuit against South Africa&#8217;s MTN (<a href="http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/overview?symbol=MTNJ.J">MTNJ.J</a>) over a disputed Iran license would be heard in a South African court after years of delays.
Turkcell first sued Johannesburg-based MTN in a U.S. court in 2012, alleging the South African mobile company used bribery and wrongful influence to win a lucrative Iran license that was originally awarded to Turkcell.
The case was later withdrawn from U.S. courts and filed in South Africa 2013, where it has been caught up in legal wrangling. MTN has rejected the allegations. It did not immediately respond to a request for comment on Thursday.
<blockquote>&#8220;We are delighted that the case is finally coming to trial in South Africa,&#8221; Serhat Demir, a Turkcell vice president, said in a statement.</blockquote>
&#8220;Turkcell will be seeking the earliest possible trial date, and looks forward to vindicating its claims before the South African courts.&#8221;
Turkcell&#8217;s claim was delayed by objections from MTN and Turkcell&#8217;s responses to the objections, Turkcell said. On May 5, a South African high court rejected another 30 objections from MTN, clearing the way for the case to go to trial, it said.
In papers filed in November 2013 with the South Gauteng High Court in Johannesburg, Turkcell claimed that MTN &#8220;acted wrongfully&#8221; and interfered with Turkcell&#8217;s relationships with the Iranian government.
<blockquote>MTN previously appointed a retired British judge to lead an external investigation into Turkcell&#8217;s allegations. That probe dismissed the accusations as &#8220;a fabric of lies, distortions and inventions&#8221;.</blockquote>
Shares in MTN fell 2 percent to 115 rand as of 1034 GMT, lagging behind a 0.9 percent decline in its closet rival Vodacom Group (<a href="http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/overview?symbol=VODJ.J">VODJ.J</a>).
(Reporting by David Dolan and Can Sezer; Additional reporting by Tiisetso Motsoeneng in Johannesburg; Editing by Ece Toksabay/Keith Weir)

Turkey’s Turkcell says $4.2 billion suit against South Africa’s MTN to go to trial

Barclays (<a href="http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/overview?symbol=BARC.L">BARC.L</a>) cut its stake in Barclays Africa Group (<a href="http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/overview?symbol=BGAJ.J">BGAJ.J</a>) to 15 percent sooner than expected on Thursday, ending more than 90 years as a major presence in the continent.
The British bank, which under Chief Executive Jes Staley is firmly focused on Britain and the United States, said it was selling 2.2 billion pounds ($2.83 billion) worth of shares in Barclays Africa Group due to strong investor demand.
Barclays had said on Wednesday it would sell shares worth 1.5 billion pounds in its second such sale since announcing plans to offload most of its African business.
The bigger share sale initially lifted shares in Barclays, which is partly relying on the funds raised to meet capital requirements identified as a concern by the Bank of England in November. By 0835 GMT, the shares were down 0.1 percent.
The sale is expected to mean an increase of approximately 27 basis points to Barclays&#8217; core capital ratio, a key measure of financial strength, which was 12.5 percent at 31 March 2017 .
&#8220;We still see this deal as utterly transformational for Barclays’ capital position, which in turn offers specific opportunities for earnings enhancement,&#8221; analyst Ian Gordon at Investec wrote in a note following the announcement.
Barclays, whose shares were trading up 0.5 percent at 0740 GMT, said on Wednesday that South African pension fund Public Investment Corporation would buy 7 percent of the shares, raising its holding to 14 pct according to Thomson Reuters data.
The Barclays Africa Group shares, which were up nearly 3 percent at 143 rand at 0835 GMT, will be priced at 132 rand a share, the bank said.
That represents a 5 pct discount to Wednesday&#8217;s closing price of 139 rand and will raise an aggregate 2.2 billion pounds, the bank said, adding it will then place an additional 12.7 million shares in a black economic empowerment scheme.
Barclays said in March 2016 it would sell most of its 62.3 pct stake in Barclays Africa Group, giving itself two to three years to complete the sale. Its first sell down of 12.2 percent was completed in May 2016, but the bank had since been hindered by regulatory delays and political upheaval in South Africa.
Since taking over 18 months ago, Staley has scaled back the bank&#8217;s geographic footprint and emphasized investment banking, although his attempts to revitalize this business have been clouded by investigations in the U.S. and Britain.
Staley has also faced criticism from investors following his attempts to unmask a whistleblower, which Barclays insiders fear could unseat him if the findings of inquiries are damning.
Barclays also faces regulatory obstacles, with an ongoing probe by Britain&#8217;s Serious Fraud Office (SFO) into its 2008 cash call at the height of the financial crisis and allegations by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) over mortgage mis-selling.
Analysts at KBW said the completion of the sale earlier than expected was positive for the bank&#8217;s capital ratio.
&#8220;However this still remains far from market leading (still below Credit Suisse or Deutsche Bank), whilst a number of headwinds remain outstanding,&#8221; they added in a note.
(Editing by Rachel Armstrong and Alexander Smith)

Barclays makes early African exit with $2.8 billion share sale

Barclays PLC plans to sell 187 million shares or 22 per cent of Barclays Africa Group via an accelerated bookbuild, which is expected to be concluded overnight.  The conclusion of the sale due to be announced Thursday, will see Barclays shareholding reduce to below 50 per cent.This follows regulatory approvals, including approval from the South African Finance Minister, to reduce its shareholding in Barclays Africa to this level.
READ: <a href="http://cnbc.africa/news/2017/02/23/barclays-africa-terms-of-seperation-2/">Barclays Africa, Barclays reach terms of separation</a>
Barclays PLC announced its intention <a href="http://cnbc.africa/news/special-report/2016/03/01/barclays-africa-british-parent-exit/">last year</a> to reduce its shareholding in Barclays Africa over a two to three year period.  On 5 May 2016, Barclays PLC sold 103.6 million shares in Barclays Africa, reducing its shareholding to 50.1%.
http://cnbc.africa/news/special-report/2016/03/01/barclays-africa-british-parent-exit/
“This transaction marks the next phase of Barclays Africa’s evolution as a standalone pan-African financial services group, committed to Africa,” said Maria Ramos, Barclays Africa CEO
http://cnbc.africa/news/southern-africa/2016/05/04/barclays-says-to-sell-12-pct-stake-in-african-business/

Barclays to sell 22% of Barclays Africa

Wendell Roelf | CAPE TOWN
A South African government task team has rescinded the reinstatement of Brian Molefe as chief executive of state power utility Eskom and a new CEO will be appointed within 48 hours, Public Enterprises Minister Lynne Brown said on Wednesday.
Molefe resigned in November last year after a report by the Public Protector, a constitutionally mandated corruption watchdog, raised questions over Eskom coal deals.
Molefe&#8217;s surprise return two weeks ago highlighted divisions in the ANC and drew allegations from opponents that the ruling party and President Jacob Zuma weren&#8217;t tackling graft.
(Reporting by Wendell Roelf; Writing by Ed Stoddard; Editing by Joe Brock)

South Africa government removes Molefe as Eskom CEO

<div class="storify"><iframe loading="lazy" src="//storify.com/cnbcafrica/live-592ea3990d2b79b83a32ae36/embed?border=false" width="100%" height="750" frameborder="no"></iframe><script src="//storify.com/cnbcafrica/live-592ea3990d2b79b83a32ae36.js?border=false"></script><noscript>[<a href="//storify.com/cnbcafrica/live-592ea3990d2b79b83a32ae36" target="_blank">View the story &#8220;LIVE: The IMC on Eskom&#8221; on Storify</a>]</noscript></div>

LIVE: Reactions to the IMC decision to rescind Brian Molefe’s appointment

Mobile technology has contributed to identity theft being the top white collar crime in the world and yet existing authentication methods such as passwords and biometrics have failed to counter this. Seeing the gap some of Africa’s leading computervision scientists at the University of Johannesburg in partnership with business developed a world first technology, code-named aiDX, at aiThenticate Computervision Labs to answer one of the most difficult, challenging and urgent questions of our time: “Who is someone actually?”.
André L Immelman, CEO of aiThenticate Computervision Labs, reckons the lab comprising of 16 computervision scientists could develop into the world’s next Google.
The technology due to go to market next month has been engineered as the next generation authentication technologies. It could be used by banks to identify customers and police to recognise criminals. Unlike conventional biometrics, such as fingerprints, faceprints, voiceprints and irisprints, which are all based on simple geometry: connecting key features to form a pattern that is then associated with a particular individual,  aiThenticate Computervision Labs&#8217;s technology uses deep science to answer the “who is someone actually?”question, says Immelman.
[bc_video video_id=&#8221;5453251731001&#8243; account_id=&#8221;1571595826001&#8243; player_id=&#8221;default&#8221;]
aiThenticate Computervision Labs&#8217; technology uses proprietary algorithms that simulate human cognition, its scientist have successfully managed to develop the next generation of authentication technologies, reckons Immelman.
&#8220;The human brain simply operates at a much deeper, far more advanced level than what is possible with conventional authentication methods. Extensive field tests have shown that, as the next generation authentication technology, aiDX eclipses, and in fact, surpasses the overall performance of conventional authentication methods by a factor of some 20x on average,&#8221; says Immelman.
Moreover, as an optimetric technology, aiDX can be deployed on any device that’s equipped with a digital camera, including standard, off-the-shelf Android or iOS smartphone or tablet, adds Immelman.

Africa creates world-first next generation digital identification technology to fight identity theft

South Africa has, in the past, been credited with taking on innovative corporate governance <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/bb4557d2-5b75-11e4-b68a-00144feab7de">standards</a> and integrated reporting. So it’s particularly depressing to see the spectacle around the country’s largest state-owned enterprise, its power utility Eskom.
The <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017/05/12/Molefe-didnt-resign%E2%80%9A-says-Eskom.-He-retired">drama</a> has revolved around Eskom’s CEO Brian Molefe, who has returned to the job just months after quitting. The contradictory explanations of his return point to huge flaws in the accountability systems of the country’s state owned enterprises. It’s clear that Eskom flouted many basic <a href="https://www.icaew.com/en/technical/corporate-governance/overview/does-corporate-governance-matter">principles</a> of sound corporate governance.
This poses enormous risks as these systems are imperative for ensuring an ethical public service and society.
When Molefe announced his <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2017-05-12-brian-molefe-did-not-resign-that-is-why-we-can-reinstate-him-eskoms-board-says/">departure</a> from Eskom, he specifically connected his leaving to “corporate governance”; he was certainly accurate in that. On top of the issue of his claimed connections to the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22513410">Gupta family</a>, the <a href="https://www.ujuh.co.za/state-of-capture-public-protectors-report/">allegations</a> that spurred his exit spoke to breakdowns in information sharing and decision making that were made to benefit only a few.
The National Executive Committee of the ruling party, the ANC, has since ordered that Molefe’s return to Eskom should be reversed, a decision seen to be going against the wishes of its President Jacob Zuma.
There are many flaws that need to be examined in this saga, but let me flag three foundational faults in corporate governance. Firstly, there were serious lapses around Eskom’s senior executive remuneration processes. Secondly, it looks like the basic rules of consultation around critical decision making were flouted. And thirdly, creating a <a href="https://www.ujuh.co.za/lynne-brown-brian-molefes-return-to-eskom-is-better-than-r30m-payout/">false dilemma</a> between handing Molefe a R30 million payout or allowing him to return to his Eskom job points to a simple disregard of the rules.
<h2>Process failures</h2>
The compensation question: the question of fair and justified compensation for senior executives looms large in the Eskom saga. There’s still no clarity over why Molefe left Eskom in December last year: whether he “retired” or “resigned” remains a contested point. More recently, South Africans were informed that he was, in fact, on <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-05-22-now-eskoms-molefe-was-on-unpaid-leave">unpaid leave</a> in the months between his departure in December and his return in early May.
Whatever the reason for his departure, Eskom’s board chose to award Molefe <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/why-did-brian-molefe-get-a-r30m-golden-handshake-8690587">R30 million</a>. This raises the first potential failure in the accountability system: the responsibility of board members to decide fair and justified compensation for senior executives.
This is true regardless of whether they retire or resign or go on unpaid leave. Each is governed by sets of rules to guide a board’s decision-making. Leaving aside the obvious contradiction that anyone would be paid R30 million for being on unpaid leave, none of the normal remuneration rules seem to have been followed. But without a basic understanding of the terms of his departure, a proper analysis is almost impossible. This failure of transparency in the process makes justifying the award on the grounds that it was in the interests of Eskom’s stakeholders even less likely.
Flouting consultation processes: The second failure in the governance system is a lack of clarity around the <a href="https://www.ujuh.co.za/lynne-brown-brian-molefes-return-to-eskom-is-better-than-r30m-payout/">role</a> of the Public Enterprises Minister, Lynne Brown. Her decision to contradict the board and deny the R30 million pay-out triggered an evaluation of what to do about Molefe’s connection to Eskom. In her statement, Brown highlighted the fact that she hadn’t been consulted and referred to decisions that appeared to have been made without the required approvals.
An effective corporate governance system has clearly delineated processes for both consultation and decision making.
In this case, it seems that steps in that process were skipped over, and key people weren’t consulted, leading to an unsupported outcome.
Creating a false dilemma: Brown claimed that there were only two options open to her – to pay Molefe R30 million or reinstate him. But by doing so she created a false dilemma that stood to benefit the person who stepped down, rather than the company and its stakeholders. In the process, the board and the minister ignored multiple options that would have likely been better.
For example, if neither the board nor Brown could agree on severance compensation, Molefe could be paid his old salary in the interim, while final negotiations took place (there is a paid leave option in his contract). This type of bridging arrangement would create fairness for him while avoiding disruption to Eskom’s operations.
<h2>A question of ethics</h2>
A fundamental principle of good governance, laid out in <a href="http://www.iodsa.co.za/?page=KingIV">King IV</a> (a set of guidelines for strong corporate governance which companies/directors should comply with and explain their choices), that applies here is that:
<blockquote>governing bod[ies] should govern the ethics of the organisation in a way that supports the establishment of an ethical culture.</blockquote>
Regardless of political ideology, it is difficult to see that Molefe’s return to Eskom can be said to be in the best interests of creating an ethical culture.
Strong accountability systems create ethical cultures because everyone knows the rules, and believes the rules are being followed. As a result, people trust that when things don’t go their way, there’s a clear explanation. While they may not agree with choices, they are confident that a decision was made after a known process was followed.
Strong accountability systems can certainly privilege some people over others in different circumstances, but they clarify what gets rewarded and what gets punished. This leads to an ethical culture because there’s a common understanding and, crucially, some levels of shared purpose.
<h2>Not just about following the rules</h2>
Good accountability systems are about more than creating and following rules; while compliance is an aspect of these systems, it is really the bare minimum. They create and support a sense of shared destination, bolstered by agreed processes.
Recently, leaders have too often relied on their legal “right” to do something, ignoring their ethical obligation to the greater good: the good of their company, their portfolio, their electorate, their country.
While the legal grounds for better governance are worth debating and enforcing, South Africans must never neglect the profound ethical impact of failed accountability systems. Eskom’s current situation is about more than fulfilling its legal obligations. It’s a warning that South Africa’s ethical culture might slip through our hands. Let’s hold on tight.

Eskom CEO saga highlights massive systems failure in South Africa

Chinese President Xi Jinping made it clear at the <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/full-text-of-xi-jinping-keynote-at-the-world-economic-forum">World Economic Forum meeting in Davos</a> that the world should abandon protectionism and commit itself to an open global economy.
A <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-silkroad-idUSKCN18B11S">recent summit</a> in Beijing that focused on China’s most ambitious foreign policy to date – the <a href="http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative/obor/en/1/1X000000/1X0A36B7.htm">Belt and Road initiative</a> – added texture to this call.
The grand vision was launched in 2013 originally as the “One Belt, One Road” initiative. It involves China underwriting billions of dollars of infrastructure investment in countries along the <a href="http://www.ancient.eu/Silk_Road/">old Silk Road</a>, linking it with a network of countries in Europe, Asia and Africa.
At the centre of the plan are two physical routes. The Silk Road Economic Belt, stretching from Asia to Europe, and the Maritime Silk Road that begins in China and passes along the Indian Ocean littoral to East Africa and then Europe.
Because of its high ambitions, the initiative has been criticised for being <a href="http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_chinas_belt_and_road_new_name_same_doubts">unachievable</a>. Critics are also questioning the <a href="http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-analysis/what-impact-could-the-21st-century-maritime-silk-road-have-on-south-africa">impact</a> it may have on countries that are not officially linked to the routes.
For some countries, including BRICS stalwarts like India, the project challenges the current global order, replacing it with a <a href="http://www.theasanforum.org/one-belt-one-road-a-new-roadmap-for-a-sinocentric-world/">Sino-centric</a> one. Others believe the initiative presents an <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/12/c_136277495.htm">alternative approach</a> to globalisation in an era where powers like the US seem intent on increasing protectionism and retreating from their global leadership role.
China has maintained that it’s committed to taking an inclusive approach to trade and diplomacy. In a <a href="http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html">2015 white paper</a> it reiterated that the development of the initiative was open, and welcomed the active participation of all countries and international organisations.
Thanks to the initiative’s massive financial ambitions, it’s likely to have a ripple effect on a number of regions. For example, the impact could be felt across Africa, although its significance, in relation to other regions, remains unclear. It could help the continent plug its infrastructure deficit, a necessary step for economic growth on the continent, and in particular industrialisation.
<h2>Meeting of minds</h2>
This isn’t the first attempt to revive the ancient trade routes. There have been attempts by the EU, US, Russia and even India to reconstruct the ancient Silk Road that linked Asia and Europe in particular.
What makes China’s attempt different is the commitment of President Xi, as well as the numerous agreements – such as the <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-04/20/content_29017833.htm">130 transport pacts</a> – it has already signed with partner countries along the route.
China made clear from the beginning that the initiative wouldn’t get off the ground without widespread participation. As such, the summit was positioned as an opportunity to <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2017-02/03/content_28087627.htm">build consensus</a>.
The overall plan aims to provide a commitment of some <a href="http://www.joc.com/international-trade-news/infrastructure-news/china-infrastructure-news/china%E2%80%99s-belt-and-road-set-12-trillion-funding_20160617.html">$1 trillion</a> in future funding. And China used the summit as an opportunity to increase the Silk Fund from $40 to <a href="https://qz.com/983460/obor-an-extremely-simple-guide-to-understanding-chinas-one-belt-one-road-forum-for-its-new-silk-road/">$100 billion</a>.
China is using the Belt and Road initiative as an opportunity to position itself diplomatically on the global stage. This was clear from the summit which provided a platform for the country to <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-silkroad-idUSKCN18B11S">amplify</a> its voice on the world stage. Over <a href="https://geopolitics.co/2017/05/13/list-of-attendees-to-the-belt-and-road-summit-in-beijing/">50 countries </a> took part. This included the presidents of Argentina, Chile, Indonesia, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey, Vietnam and Uzbekistan. Representatives of the United Nations, International Monetary Fund and World Bank also attended.
As scholar Gregory Chin explains in <a href="http://www.currenthistory.com/Article.php?ID=1254">China’s Bold Economic Statecraft</a>, global relations are under constant negotiation. They are increasingly characterised by shifting alignments rather than fixed alliances.
China understands the opportunities presented by this state of flux.
<h2>How does Africa feature in China’s grand plan?</h2>
Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta attended the summit, along with the <a href="https://geopolitics.co/2017/05/13/list-of-attendees-to-the-belt-and-road-summit-in-beijing/">prime minister</a> of Ethiopia; as well as the Egyptian Minister of Trade and Industry and Tunisian Minister of Culture.
Kenya’s presence was particularly significant because East Africa has been the main focus of the initiative on the continent.
While this may be of concern to other African countries, China is also supportive of Africa’s homegrown development plan as set out in the African Union’s Agenda 2063. There are clear synergies with the Belt and Road initiative that support greater connectivity. And as African countries have expressed interest, China has responded, at least rhetorically, in favour of their inclusion.
Yet this won’t be enough. Support from African countries is key. And success depends on them providing adequate security to protect the investment environment. More broadly, African governments will need to promote an enabling environment for projects to succeed, particularly if, as envisaged, the private sector plays a key role in Belt and Road projects.

Where Africa fits into China’s massive Belt and Road Initiative

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We all celebrated. Poverty in the world halved in just two decades – historic success, humankind at its best, a world altogether more free, less exposed to disease, less violent. More girls in school, too! We Africans were told that “<a href="http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21572377-african-lives-have-already-greatly-improved-over-past-decade-says-oliver-august">war, famine and dictators have become rarer</a>.”
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Today that celebration stops. I <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kL_JF63tZUw">often speak</a> about how our progress for a better world is threatened by a spiraling gap between rich and poor, withering global governance, climate change and more. Now, in failing to tackle these, something profoundly catastrophic is taking hold.
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The UN sounded the alarm earlier this year, joined by Oxfam and others. Our world of plenty is on the brink of unprecedented famine. Even as one famine in one country should be unacceptable – today we face the risk of four. People are dying and unless political decisions change, deaths will increase exponentially.
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<h2 class="st__content-block st__content-block--heading">An urgent and bold response</h2>
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<a href="https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bn-four-famines-190517-en.pdf">Thirty million people across these four countries are severely hungry</a>. Ten million of them face life-threatening emergency and famine conditions. That’s more people than live in London, about the same as populous Jakarta.
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We expect an urgent and bold response to match &#8211; most of all by rich and powerful nations. The last famine, in 2011 in Somalia, should have been the very last: inaction there led to the deaths of nearly 260,000 people, half of them children. We can still prevent a recurrence.
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<div class="image__credit">Image: The Economist</div>
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I have just returned from visiting Nigeria and South Sudan where I met resilient women who told me “we want to walk freely, we want to farm, we want to feed our families.” I joined young people and entrepreneurs helping their communities survive. But even among the local people organizing themselves to share what little food and shelter and resources they have, hope is running out.
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I met women newly arriving, hungry and thirsty, in the small towns of Pulka in northeast Nigeria. Their harrowing journeys lined their faces. The horrors of life under Boko Haram will not leave them. A man who’d been there for three months with his wife and children – like thousands of people – still sleeping in the open. Now the arrival of over a thousand more people this week from Cameroon is pushing services to the brink, and limited water supplies will become even more stretched. Aid agencies like ours can reach these people – we do what we can. But we need to be able to reach people in areas where the potential famine is taking hold.
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In South Sudan – a country in which deadly famine was declared in February – I saw the chilling impact of a civil war. Entire communities have been driven from their homes by <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoHSouthSudan/Pages/Index.aspx">acts of ethnic cleansing</a>. All I have known from war in my own country didn’t prepare me for the carcass of violence I saw. You can’t escape the stench. Malakal used to be South Sudan’s second city; today it’s more a ghost town.
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The women there rationally explained to me how they choose hunger over the certainty of being raped on the journey out to collect food. The UN recently <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20979&amp;LangID=E">found</a>that 70% of women in Juba, South Sudan’s capital, had been raped or abused since the war began three years prior.
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Conflict and callous politics drive famine. In Somalia these conspire with drought and <a href="https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/mb-climate-crisis-east-africa-drought-270417-en.pdf">climate change</a> for over three million people who urgently require support – mostly in rural areas, who are difficult to reach. The largest hunger emergency in the world is in Yemen where seventeen million do not know when they will get their next meal. Famines do not arrive like a meteor from the sky. They’re manufactured crises – the cruel consequence of government choices – and we saw them coming.
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<h2 class="st__content-block st__content-block--heading">A fair share</h2>
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But just as political failure led to these crises, political leadership can resolve them.
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The fundamental responsibility, yes, lies with those countries and the warring parties across the contexts. They must meet their most basic obligations to protect their people, provide services and uphold the safe passage of aid.
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Yet leaders of the G7 rich and powerful nations, who this week meet in Taormina, Sicily must be responsible to these people, too.
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Their immediate priority must be to save these people’s lives: we are billions shy of the funding target. And money can&#8217;t sit in bank accounts: it must reach those in need as quickly as possible. The UN is asking for $6.3 billion for all four countries but the world has stumped up less than a third of that. Oxfam has calculated a ‘fair share’ of funding that countries should commit to, based on their national income, and so far no G7 country has met this level, even though it is a tiny fraction of their budgets.
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France, Italy, and Japan have not given their fair share for any of the four countries, whilst inhumane proposals to withdraw life-saving aid now menace lives. The Trump Administration must not hold back the US Congress’ $990 million pledge to address famine. Lives depend on it.
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The most resounding plea from <a href="https://twitter.com/Oxfam/status/855747886696550406">women I met</a> – who have borne the brunt of the violence – was for peace. The international community must no longer be so polite. It is time to finally apply all its diplomatic pressure to push the parties towards the hard choices needed to end these conflicts. And if countries and armed groups fight – we’re realists – there are rules of war to fight by. They must too grant safe passage for civilians and access to aid agencies so we can help save lives in safety.
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The G7 are not some passive observers: they’re part of an international community that must also stop fueling these conflicts. Most are selling deadly arms to the parties fighting in Yemen even as they urge a political settlement. The US last weekend announced the sale of $110 billion worth of weapons to Saudi Arabia. <a href="https://www.oxfamamerica.org/press/oxfam-condemns-PGM-sale-to-saudi-arabia/">Precision-guided munitions</a> that have been used to commit horrific abuses in Yemen are front and center in the sale. The UK has also sold billions of arms to Saudi Arabia, in violation of its obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty.
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The G7 and G20 must also know their responsibility when, in the Horn of Africa, they see <a href="https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/mb-climate-crisis-east-africa-drought-270417-en.pdf">more intense natural hazards</a>. They’re supercharged by climate change powered primarily by the emissions of rich nations. I see this as cause for more ambition in rich nations’ commitments to the Paris Agreement – not a backslide.
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<h3 class="list-group__header">Have you read?</h3>
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<li class="list-group__item"><a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/04/conflict-and-famine-time-for-honesty">The true cause of hunger and famine? War and weak governance</a></li>
<li class="list-group__item"><a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/02/nearly-1-4-million-children-at-imminent-risk-of-death">1.4 million African children at imminent risk of starvation</a></li>
</ul>
</div>
<div class="st__content-block st__content-block--text">
Each conflict is of course unique. South Sudan’s neighbors can use their strategic clout to broker peace. In particular we believe Uganda is well placed to do this. But Africa&#8217;s leaders with the African Union must also act. Nigeria spells out clearest the link between economic mismanagement and conflict: this is Africa’s largest economy facing famine. Nigerians living in poverty grew to 43 million in recent years.
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<div class="st__content-block st__content-block--text">
High corruption and the influence of big business and the wealthy elite keeps the poorest Nigerians trapped in poverty and cut-off from the benefits of economic growth and basic services. Some people &#8211; searching for the means to survive &#8211; became vulnerable to groups like Boko Haram. Nigeria’s inequality is but an extreme version of our global economic model that our powerful leaders preside over – one in which 8 men now own as much wealth as the bottom 3.6 billion people.
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<div class="st__content-block st__content-block--text">
Let’s first avoid a catastrophic loss of life. This is happening on the G7’s watch: they must now inject the necessary cash to save lives and make a genuine push for peace. They must, too, choose to be relevant. Otherwise, we will be a long time burying the victims of further inaction.
This article first appeared on WEF&#8217;s <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/05/our-world-of-plenty-is-on-the-brink-of-unprecedented-famine">website</a> on 24th May and is republished with its permission. 
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