African leaders agreed on Wednesday to form a $3 trillion continental free-trade zone encompassing 1.2 billion people, but its two biggest economies, Nigeria and South Africa, did not sign up, diminishing its impact.
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The African Union started talks in 2015 to establish a 55-nation bloc that would be the biggest in the world by member states, in a bid to increase intra-regional trade, which sits at a measly 15 percent of Africa’s total commerce.
Rwandan president Paul Kagame, host of an AU summit called to conclude the initial negotiations, declared the meeting a success after 44 African nations signed up to establish the free trade bloc within 18 months.
It was not immediately clear why South Africa and Nigeria stayed on the sidelines. Others staying out of the bloc were Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Zambia, Burundi, Eritrea, Benin, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau.
“It would have been great if the two biggest economies on the continent, Nigeria and South Africa, had signed, but the most important is that the rest of the continent is sending a right message to these two biggest economies that we are moving ahead without you,” said Michael Kottoh, an analyst at Confidential Strategies in Ghana.
The project needed a minimum of 22 countries signing up to get off the ground and Kagame hailed the effort so far.
“What is at stake is the dignity and well-being of Africa’s farmers, workers and entrepreneurs,” he said.
AU trade commissioner Albert Muchanga also put a positive spin on the absence of the top two African economies, telling Reuters they would soon join in.
“They are still doing national level consultations and so when they finish they will be able to come on board,” he said.
<h3>TRADE ZONES</h3>
Economists point to Africa’s low level of intra-regional trade as one of the reasons for the continent’s enduring poverty and lack of a strong manufacturing base.
It is blamed on a host of factors, from colonialism, to high internal tariffs to poor road and rail links to excessive border bureaucracy and petty corruption at frontier checkpoints.
The relatively small size of many African markets &#8211; only Nigeria and Ethiopia have populations estimated at 100 million people or more &#8211; also inhibit private sector investment.
Africa already has an alphabet soup of competing and overlapping trade zones &#8211; ECOWAS in the west, EAC in the east, SADC in the south and COMESA in the east and south &#8211; although only the EAC, driven mainly by Kenya, has made significant progress towards a common market in goods and services.
Analysts said governments needed to do more to ensure goods and people flowed freely across borders.
“If they just sign the agreement without opening the borders, without getting rid of non-tariff barriers and if they don’t work on free movement of people, it is not going to work,” analyst Kottoh said.
Even the six-nation EAC has its sticking points &#8211; Tanzania has been known to kick out Kenyan executives and impound Kenyan imports at the border, in violation of EAC rules.
Businessmen said the current set-up forced them to look outside the continent, particularly Asia for manufactured goods.
“It is easy and cheaper to buy in Asia than to buy in the sub-region because of less-flexible rules of origin and non-tariff barriers that are not clear,” said Meriem Bensalah-Chaqroun, head of the Moroccan Confederation of Businesses.
Sudden changes in rules and impromptu checks on goods also held up supply chains.
“Some countries all of a sudden decide they are going to do a quality check on goods but they don’t really know what they want to check. That slows the trade,” said Thomas Schafer, CEO of Volkswagen Africa.
“We are not able to bring a vehicle from South Africa into Zimbabwe in a cost-efficient and fast way. That needs to change.”
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Writing by Duncan Miriri; Editing by Ed Cropley and Alison Williams
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Africa agrees to giant trade bloc, but Nigeria, South Africa sit it out

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44 African heads of state on Wednesday March 21, signed the African Continental Free Trade Area making it the world&#8217;s largest free trade area. This move is aimed at boosting intra Africa trade to 52 per cent by 2022.

44 African nations sign pact establishing free trade area

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The single market for Africa is expected to supercharge economies, rapidly scale-up industries, grow small and medium-sized businesses into big continent-wide operators and solve some of Africa’s most chronic development.

What AfCFTA means for Africa’s citizens

Tshepo T. Gwatiwa |Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement (IHEID) and Michael Noel Sam | Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
The African Union (AU) has adopted a Free Movement Protocol and a draft plan of action to go with it.
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The idea was first set out in the Abuja Treaty, which was endorsed in 1991 at the establishment of the African Economic Community. The AU’s protocol defines free movement as the right to enter and exit member states and move freely within them, subject to the states’ laws and procedures. It regards the freedom to travel or move goods across the continent as likely to boost the economic integration of Africa.
There are several reasons why the protocol is an important development.
First, it will directly affect ordinary people. Up until now the effects of most of the AU’s treaties and protocols have filtered down to people’s lives from a distance, if at all. This protocol applies directly to citizens’ movement.
Second, it moves the AU closer to the progress that sub-regional groupings have made on migration. For example, the East African Community (EAC) launched its passport in 1999 and has recently started a process to issue an EAC e-passport. This is a passport with digital identification features.
In West Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) launched a regional passport in 2000, but implementation by member states has been slow.
Lastly, free movement of people in other regions has been beneficial. For example, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development reports that the average unemployment rate has been lowered by 6% in Europe due to free movement within the European Union (EU). And according to the International Monetary Fund, free movement has resulted in better institutions and better economic management in Eastern Europe.
<h2>Advantages of free movement</h2>
There’s a great deal of evidence that migration boosts the economies of receiving countries. Free movement in Africa can be expected to enhance business and investment as the EU example has shown.
According to an African Development Bank report, tourism in the Seychelles increased by 7% annually between 2009 and 2014 when the country abolished visas for African nationals. By 2015, thanks to increased revenues, it had become a high income country with thriving real estate, aviation and service industries.
The same report also states that African travel to Rwanda has increased by 22% since it eased its visa requirements in 2013. Since then Rwanda’s cross-border trade with Kenya and Uganda has increased by 50%. This is evidence that free movement of labour and capital, boosts economic activity.
<h2>Addressing the challenges</h2>
But the protocol in its present form doesn’t go far enough, and the AU needs to revisit parts of it. For instance, it should choose a biometric African identification card rather than an African passport . A biometric ID is cheaper to produce than a passport and could be based on existing designs of national IDs instead of brand new documents. This could help overcome resistance to the passport on the grounds of cost.
The biometric ID could be introduced alongside existing national IDs. It could be rolled out in instalments and, for example, issued to diplomats, business people and students to begin with.
The ID would accompany ordinary sub-regional passports and exempt the bearers from visa requirements. It is instructive to note that national IDs can and do facilitate free movement too.
For example, 15 ECOWAS member states have introduced national IDs and plan to launch a biometric card to serve as a travel document in the region. Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda have an agreement to use national IDs for travel within the three countries.
Finally, there are some overlaps between the protocol and other African Union instruments such as the Refugee Convention, which recognises the special needs of vulnerable groups. Rather than restate the provisions of the convention, the protocol should be refined to provide unique protections for these special groups.
<h2>Security issues and xenophobia</h2>
Free movement does not have to become a security threat for individual member states. The protocol does not encourage undetected movement. Rather, it requires stricter security controls at ports of entry. This means that blacklisted individuals who could be a threat to national security can be kept out.
The AU’s Special Technical Committee on Defence and Security can also be given the job of improving intelligence sharing as well as cross-border police co-operation.
Xenophobia is also a legitimate concern when it comes to free movement. The AU could use structures and instruments like the Continental Early Warning Systems, and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council ECOSOC to help it manage issues of security and xenophobia.
<h2>Gains to be made</h2>
The protocol is poised to deliver significant gains for Africa. It embodies the spirit of African integration and marks progress in regional partnerships. It promises great investment and trade opportunities, as well as the possibility to boost physical infrastructure such as roads, as has been the case in America and Asia.
<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92057/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />However, various state and non-state actors must sensitise domestic populations on the benefits of free movement in order to avoid a surge of nationalism, anti-immigrant hysteria and the kind of right wing politics that has swept across Europe and America over the past four years.
This article was originally published on The Conversation.

How the free movement of people could benefit Africa

Mohamed M Diatta | Sciences Po – USPC
At a time where Africa has seen a few long-standing leaders exit, the issue of change in power is occupying minds of citizens as well as those in leadership positions.
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In spite of their varied repertoire of tactics to remain in power, no one is immune to the wave of change in leadership that has led many African presidents to lose their coveted top job.
Whether through elections, succession battles, coups or end of terms in office it has become a question of when and how they will exit. That’s if one is not too concerned with what comes afterwards. Though it is too early to tell whether meaningful changes can be expected, cases such as Zimbabwe suggest that its citizens can envisage more of the same.
Nevertheless, a review of developments in 2017 shows that it was a fruitful year for those advocating change. Examples include the Gambia where Adama Barrow came in as a promising new leader. Angola’s Joao Manuel Lourenço rose to power and immediately replaced some top public servants, raising hopes that he might champion good governance, although there hasn’t been an overhaul of the system.
In any case, the arrival of a ‘new’ leader in power always brings optimism for change and constitutes an opportunity for new beginnings.
<h2>The big changes of 2017</h2>
In the Gambia Yahya Abdul-Aziz Jammeh decided to hang onto power following his electoral defeat to Adama Barrow.
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After nearly four decades in power Angola’s Jose Eduardo Dos Santos did not seek reelection. But his ruling Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) retained power after winning the August presidential election. Dos Santos was succeeded by Joao Manuel Goncalves Lourenço, his former Minister of Defense.A nuisance to his Senegalese neighbour and an embarrassment to his peers in the subregional body, he was eventually pushed out by the Economic Community of West African States, ending his 22-year rule. He has since been in exile in Equatorial Guinea.
Zimbabwe provided the finale to an eventful year when, in a battle for succession, Robert Mugabe was forced out by a faction of his ZANU-PF with the help the Zimbabwean Defense Forces. Emmerson Mnangagwa, his long-time ally, and vice-president, took over the country. Mnangagwa has announced that elections this year will be ‘free and fair’. He is expected to retain power and his ZANU-PF to keep control of the national assembly.
<h2>Different fortunes</h2>
Rwanda, Kenya and Liberia all presented tales of different presidential fortunes.
After the December 2015 constitutional amendment allowing Paul Kagame to run for a third term and potentially remain in power until 2034, he was, without a surprise, reelected in august 2017 with almost 99 % of the votes. Kagame, touted by many as the providential leader who has stabilised and redressed a country emerging from genocide, is also criticised for muzzling all forms of opposition and restricting civil liberties.
In Kenya, Chris Msando, head of information, communication and technology for the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, was tortured and murdered a week before the presidential election. Following the august 8th polls, the opposition coalition known as NASA and led by Raila Ondinga, contested the reelection of incumbent Uhuru Kenyatta. Despite international observers (including the African Union) finding no major issues with the polls, the Kenyan Supreme Court annulled the results and called for a new election in October.
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Kenya has since sunk into a political and institutional crisis, aggravated by the recent inauguration of Odinga as the ‘peoples president’.Uhuru Kenyatta was eventually reelected president in October, after NASA’s refusal to take part in the election without addressing the key issues raised about the electoral commission.
Africa’s presidential electoral year ended in Liberia, on 28 December, with the passing of the baton between the ruling-party’s candidate Joseph Nyumah Bokai and Georges Oppong Weah. The former soccer star turned politician and senator, won in the second round with more than 60% of the votes taking over from Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s 12 year rule. He will have to redress the resource-rich but yet poor nation, in the wake of a debilitating Ebola outbreak.
<h2>Lessons to take into 2018</h2>
In the three emblematic cases of ‘handover’ – Angola, Zimbabwe and The Gambia – it’s difficult to say whether the democratic deficit is less serious today. But if ZANU-PF and the MPLA don’t renew themselves, systems that don’t have a stellar record in the rule of law and good governance departments could easily be perpetuated.
Gambians, for their part, can hope that the coming to power of a novice in politics will bring them a better life.
Ensuring democratic and good governance, free and fair elections, and peaceful transitions to power are no longer optional.
Stability in several countries will indubitably be jeopardised in 2018 if some governments do not deliver free and fair elections. Similarly, undertaking constitutional changes that contradict the rule of law, the separation of powers and don’t uphold political agreements, will further entrench instability. From this point of view, Africa’s regional organisations will have to manage the post-electoral crises from previous years – including Kenya – and try and prevent those on the horizon this year.
<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91600/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />The African Union must, more than ever, have all its member states sing to the tune of democracy. This can be facilitated by a reform of the organisation. But this, in turn, hinges on the political will of those who will have to endorse the necessary changes. Unfortunately, they remain, for the moment, the guardians of the old order.
This article was originally published on The Conversation.

Africa waves some leaders goodbye: but is the democratic deficit any narrower?

The African Union does not have any secret dossiers and nothing to spy on, a senior official said in Beijing on Thursday, rejecting a report in French newspaper Le Monde that Beijing had bugged the regional bloc’s headquarters in Addis Ababa.
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Le Monde, quoting anonymous AU sources, reported last month that data from computers in the Chinese-built building had been transferred nightly to Chinese servers for five years.
After the massive hack was discovered a year ago, the building’s IT system including servers was changed, according to Le Monde. During a sweep for bugs after the discovery, microphones hidden in desks and the walls were also detected and removed, the newspaper reported.
Speaking to reporters with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at his side, head of the African Union Commission Moussa Faki Mahamat said the allegations in the paper were false.
“What I can assure you of is that the relations between China and Africa, as I described, are unwavering. No manoeuvres of this type can distract us from our objectives,” Faki said.
“The African Union is an international political organisation. It doesn’t process secret defence dossiers. We are an administration and I don’t see what interest there is to China to offer up a building of this type and then to spy,” he said.
“So these are totally false allegations and I believe that we are completely disregarding them.”
The $200 million headquarters was fully funded and built by China and opened to great fanfare in 2012. It was seen as a symbol of Beijing’s thrust for influence in Africa, and access to the continent’s natural resources.
Wang said that he appreciated Faki’s comments, and called the headquarters a symbol of China-Africa friendship.
“It cannot be tarnished by any person or any force,” Wang said.
China-Africa relations had withstood decades of ups and downs and changes in the international arena, he added.
“Perhaps some people or forces are unwilling to help Africa themselves and have a feeling of sour grapes about the achievements of China’s cooperation with Africa,” Wang said.
“Any rumours are powerless, and any sowing of discord won’t succeed.”
As in the Ethiopian capital, China’s investments in road and rail infrastructure are highly visible across the continent. At a 2015 summit in South Africa, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged $60 billion in aid and investment to the continent, saying it would continue to build roads, railways and ports.
Separately, Wang announced that China would hold another summit with African leaders this September, in Beijing.
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Additional reporting by Martin Pollard; Editing by Nick Macfie
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African Union says has no secret dossiers after China spying report

Paul D. Williams, George Washington University
To understand why states provide peacekeepers to multilateral operations I recently analysed what motivated states to join the African Union Mission in Somalia. The mission was deployed to Mogadishu in March 2007 and has been fighting al-Shabaab militants for more than 10 years. It has become the African Union’s longest running, largest, most costly, and most deadly operation.
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The mission and its partners are currently debating how to transfer its security responsibilities to local Somali forces.
Of the AU’s 54 members in 2007, only six contributed troops to the mission. They are Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti (2011), Kenya (2012), Sierra Leone (2013) and Ethiopia (2014). Thirteen others reportedly considered deploying troops but decided against it.
Research conducted as part of a project that analyses the effectiveness of peace operations suggests the decisions about deployment were based on the interplay between five sets of factors: political, security, economic, institutional and moral.
The decision was political when countries sought to enhance their prestige, reputation, and influence or in response to pressure or persuasion by external actors. Security concerns were behind the decision to act if national, regional or global threats are at play. Economic factors included financial benefits or losses to government. And countries might also have deployed peacekeepers to boost their security sectors. The intended benefits included improved reputation, operational experience and assistance packages.
Finally, countries might act to meet ethical commitments to promote peace or assist people caught up in war.
To establish why the six countries deployed troops to Somalia I examined the story behind each government’s decision. My conclusion is that there was no single or uniform explanation. And that there was often a mismatch between the most common public justifications and what I suspect were the main drivers of the deployments.
<h2>Mismatch between official positions and reality</h2>
The official justifications for joining the mission were usually that events in Somalia posed a direct security threat. Moral commitments to African solidarity to help fellow Africans in distress were also invoked. But these justifications were often less important than other unacknowledged or downplayed factors.
These included that the mission delivered a number of benefits to countries that contributed troops. For example, their armed forces were strengthened. Or there were political advantages relating to international prestige and external partnerships. There was also economic support for the domestic security sector.
These factors all played a role in the decisions taken by Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia to join the AU mission.
Of course, the mission helped alleviate some regional security concerns. But the tangible benefits for the troop-contributing governments and their militaries were often more important.
Overall, the most important motive was institutional. The next was enhancing national reputation and key political relationships. Third were the economic benefits. In the initial decision these factors were consistently more important than dealing with direct threats to national security and commitments to restoring peace or solidarity.
Gaining access to external sources of finance was also a crucial part of explaining why the countries contributed troops. This includes Kenya and Ethiopia. They initially conducted unilateral interventions into Somalia, mainly for reasons of national security. But they then joined the AU mission largely because of financial concerns.
It also points to a limitation of AU peace operations. That they require financial support from donors can make them a less attractive option than providing peacekeepers to UN missions. UN missions come with a reliable system of financing for personnel and contingent owned equipment.
<h2>Political risks</h2>
In sum, joining the mission brought important material benefits for the governments and their armed forces. But there were other benefits too. For Burundi and Sierra Leone, the deployments were a crucial part of professionalising and forging new identities for their post-civil war militaries.
Politically, the decision to join also helped countries strengthen relationships with key external donors, especially the US, UK and European Union.
But, because they couldn’t control the military forces receiving the money, the donors faced a number of risks. These included operational risks – that the peacekeepers may under-perform as well as the economic risk that resources might have been used more effectively. There were also inherent political risks to the donor’s reputation if the peacekeepers behaved badly while on mission. Or if troops were involved in oppression in their home countries.
<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90757/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />The political risks did in fact materialise. AU peacekeepers were accused of misconduct. This included indiscriminate use of force against civilians, illicit commerce and sexual exploitation and abuse. There were also political tensions between donors and Uganda and Burundi when soldiers were involved in oppression back home. Nevertheless, joining the Somalia mission sometimes helped authoritarian regimes deflect more severe criticism.
This article was originally published on The Conversation.

What spurred six countries to join the AU’s mission in Somalia

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Ahead of the African Union summit slated for 22nd &#8211; 29th January 2018, 10 finance ministers convened in Kigali to review the Kigali decision on AU self-financing.

Finance ministers meet to discuss AU’s plan on self-financing

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Calestous Juma |Harvard University
African countries are forging ahead to complete negotiations for a continental free trade area between 55 countries by early next year. The idea, adopted by the African Union in 2012, is to create a single market which includes the free movement of goods, services and people. The integrated African market covers 1.2 billion people and a combined GDP of over USD$3.5 trillion.
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Large markets are job-creating as they support more trade in goods, services and assets. It is expected that a well designed agreement would help Africa boost industrial development, promote economic transformation and create new wealth. The benefits won’t be automatic but will require continuous national, regional and continental efforts.
Large regional markets are also essential for industrialisation. This is because they attract investment into firms that can diversify their product lines and stimulate the creation of related industries. This includes the supply of spare parts, distribution of goods and provision of advisory services. Some of these may start as their supplies but they may also grow into independent enterprises.
Viewed against the odds of success in getting 55 countries to foster meaningful regional integration, Africa has made commendable progress in crafting its own creative approach. But reports from recent talks and a slowdown of regional integration efforts suggest a disturbing trend.
Some government delegates are likely to seek to include protection for existing products and industries. This would be detrimental to the process if these lists ended up shaping the final agreement given the 2018 signing deadline. Such a retreat would run counter to recent advances in Africa’s trade integration efforts. In 2015 for example, three regional trading blocs, covering 650 million people in 26 countries, signed the landmark Tripartite Free Trade Area with a combined GDP of over USD$1.5 trillion.
<h2>Agreement challenges</h2>
The trade agreement nevertheless needs to be carefully thought out, particularly given that Africa is starting with a low intra-regional trade of 15% compared to 19% in Latin America, 51% in Asia and 72% for Europe.
There is the risk that rushed negotiations could result in an agreement with too many exceptions to cover protected industries. This could include using non-tariff barriers – like safety measures – to protect local industries. A range of African countries use non-tariff barriers to curb imports of goods such as maize, milk, sugar, food oil products, and steel and iron.
Sensitive and excluded products – like sugar and dairy products – might in some cases cover up to 600 tariff lines (product codes used at the national level). But these exceptions should be used sparingly to enable domestic industries to access the larger regional and global markets needed for their growth.
In addition, the trade agreement needs to address the effects it may have on existing industries, environment, peace and security. It also needs to provide the policy space needed for governments to promote social policies such as job creation that could provide new performance standard for industries. Such policies should also balance between social goals and the need to be competitive on the global market.
Concerns over the expansion of foreign imports, rather than regional trade integration, also needs to be carefully assessed to avoid the free trade area becoming a conduit for imports. This could undermine Africa’s goals to increase its industrial and trade capacity. At present, nearly 85% of the goods traded in Africa come from outside the continent. Only 15% of the goods traded in Africa are produced locally, leading to an annual food import bill of over USD$35 billion.
But the focus of the negotiations should not be the fear of imports. Rather the focus should be on scaling up export production in existing niche markets through the creation of new industries. Examples of growing industries include the supply of semi-processed processed foods that are turned into final products by importers. African firms such as the Agro Chemical and Food Company in Kenya are also producing speciality chemicals which are used in a variety of medical and manufacturing industries.
<h2>Moving away from protectionism</h2>
The alternative to protection is therefore market growth. This involves having deeper knowledge of markets through the collection of key information market, eliminating trade barriers, reducing subsidies and upgrading the quality of infrastructure. It also involves building capacity to manage the rules of origin of products to avoid illegal dumping of goods, customs and trade procedures and reporting and resolution of trade barriers.
The negotiations need to shift their from protectionism to greater regional trade integration. One way to do this is to set up a high-level expert committee or panel – drawn from government, private sector, academia and civil society – to include other relevant perspectives on issues such as infrastructure, technological capacity, and industrial growth. This would help to broaden discussions to reflect Africa’s current needs view of trade as an instrument for economic transformation.
This committee would be guided by evidence-based research as well as by Africa’s own regional trade experiences. There are many examples that show how quickly Africa is learning about the risks of using bans and exemptions to restrict regional trade. For example, Zambia’s positive decision to reverse a ban on fruit and vegetable imports.
The committee would also need to draw on lessons from other regions of the world. As I set out in Emergent Africa: Evolution of Regional Integration, Africa has a lot to learn from regional trade integration, especially the Association of Southeast Asian Nations .
The bloc’ approach to integration transcends the traditional focus on the free movement of goods. It includes measures such as the creation of industrial parks to foster industrial development. The region also uses technology-based agreements covering key fields such as information and telecommunications technologies. This is particularly important because of the role of engineering and technology in all aspects of trade covering product design, production and distribution through international logistics chains.
<h2>The future is open</h2>
The challenges facing African trade negotiators are not easy. Africa’s regional integration efforts are the most complex ever undertaken. They are not just about emulating trading rules used in other regions of the world. They are about remaking the continent to create new networked interactions between sovereign states in a flexible way. This makes for a more open future with expanding possibilities to use regional trade integration to spread prosperity.
<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87366/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />Dr Francis Mangeni, the Director of Trade, Customs and Monetary Affairs, with the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), contributed to this article. He is co-author with Calestous Juma of the forthcoming book: Emergent Africa: Evolution of Regional Economic Integration
This article was originally published on The Conversation.

How Africa can negotiate an effective continental free trade area agreement

By Stephanie van den Berg
THE HAGUE &#8211; The International Criminal Court on Thursday rebuked South Africa for not arresting Sudan&#8217;s president on a genocide warrant when he visited Johannesburg in 2015, but declined to refer Pretoria to the United Nations for possible censure over the lapse.
The ICC indicted Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir in 2008 over the deaths and persecution of ethnic groups in Sudan&#8217;s Darfur province between 2003 and 2008. But he has continued to travel internationally, visiting Jordan as recently as March.
The first part of Thursday&#8217;s ICC ruling was expected as the war crimes court has consistently rejected arguments put forward by the South African government, namely that it could not arrest Bashir because visiting heads of state at the African Union Summit held in the country enjoyed diplomatic immunity.
ICC judges said that heads of state or government clearly fall under the court&#8217;s jurisdiction and cannot be exempted at home or abroad, echoing the conclusion of a South African domestic court.
The second stage of the ruling was surprising as it was the first time the ICC found one of its members had defied its rules, yet took no action by reporting South Africa to the U.N. Security Council or ICC member states for possible censure.
&#8220;The decision is something of an indictment of the U.N. Security Council and the (ICC&#8217;s) Assembly of State Parties,” ICC expert and legal scholar Mark Kersten told Reuters.
Presiding Judge Cuno Tarfusser, reading a summary of the ruling, noted that past referrals of countries to the Security Council for noncompliance were &#8220;futile&#8221; in terms of leading to further action and also &#8220;not an effective way to obtain cooperation&#8221; with the ICC.
&nbsp;
BASHIR DENIES WRONGDOING
Bashir denies wrongdoing and has rejected ICC jurisdiction. It was the Security Council itself that referred Sudan&#8217;s case to the ICC in 2005.
&#8220;It is shocking that other (ICC member states) such as Jordan are also failing in their obligations to arrest Bashir, and this decision makes it clear they do so in flagrant violation of international law,&#8221; Amnesty International said in a statement.
The ICC&#8217;s decision not to refer South Africa might also be intended in part to dissuade it from pulling out of the court.
In February, the African Union called for member states to leave the ICC over a perceived bias by prosecutors in focusing on African conflicts.
Kenya, Namibia, Burundi and South Africa have threatened to ditch the ICC and Pretoria began the formal withdrawal process last year before being blocked by a domestic court for not getting parliament&#8217;s approval first before pulling out.
&#8220;I believe (Thursday&#8217;s) ruling will raise the costs of withdrawal for South African President Jacob Zuma,&#8221; Kersten said.
In The Hague, South African Ambassador Bruce Koloane said that for the time being &#8220;(we are) still a member effectively of the ICC, we still have to honour all our obligations”.
In South Africa, opinions on what to do next were divided.
Pretoria&#8217;s foreign affairs department said the government would study the ruling &#8220;and its implications and seek legal opinion on available options&#8221;.
Siphosezwe Masango, who chairs parliament&#8217;s international relations committee, said he remained convinced South Africa was right not to arrest Bashir, &#8220;a sitting head of state&#8221;.
Pretoria&#8217;s main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, said the ICC ruling was an indictment of Zuma&#8217;s ANC government, noting it had upheld the domestic court&#8217;s position.
&#8220;The ANC seems intent on relegating South Africa to the status of a scumbag nation which protects the law-breakers and corrupter of this world,&#8221; DA Federal Executive Chairperson James Selfe said.
(Additional reporting by James Macharia in Johannesburg, Wendell Roelf in Cape Town, Anthony Deutsch and Toby Sterling in Amsterdam; editing by Mark Heinrich)

ICC declines to refer S.A to UN on Sudan’s Bashir arrest

South Africa&#8217;s anti-graft watchdog will investigate the government&#8217;s providing of protection services to former African Union (AU) Commission chair Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, its spokesman said on Sunday.
Dlamini-Zuma, once married to President Jacob Zuma and seen as a front-runner to succeed him, in March concluded her five-year tenure as AU Commission chairwoman and has made several public appearances in South Africa since.
An investigation into Dlamini-Zuma, seen as Zuma&#8217;s preferred candidate by political analysts, is bad news for the scandal-plagued president who survived a no-confidence vote by his own party&#8217;s highest body last week.
The Democratic Alliance (DA), the largest opposition party, in April complained that Dlamini-Zuma is enjoying protection services afforded to visiting heads of state or elected representatives, while she holds no official position.
<blockquote>&#8220;Dlamini-Zuma is a clear candidate in the ANC leadership succession race, and her use of VIP Presidential Protection as she campaigns is clearly another ANC abuse of public money,&#8221; the Democratic Alliance said in a statement on Sunday.</blockquote>
The Public Protector&#8217;s spokeswoman, Cleopatra Mosana, said the anti-graft watchdog will investigate Dlamini-Zuma&#8217;s use of VIP protection services.
&#8220;Yes it will,&#8221; she said, without elaborating.
The African National Congress&#8217; women&#8217;s league endorsed the party veteran and former minister as presidential candidate in January, though the ruling party has not officially given the go-ahead to campaign for an elective conference in December.
(Reporting by TJ Strydom; Editing by Angus MacSwan)

South Africa’s anti-graft watchdog to probe Dlamini-Zuma’s protection detail

The African Union (AU) is developing a policy designed to hold companies to account by setting down guidelines on how they should conduct business on the continent.
The aim of the policy is to implement a set of guiding principles drawn up by the United Nations. It will provide a roadmap for states, regional economic communities and regional institutions to regulate the impact of business activities on people. The policy also seeks to advance guidance for firms conducting activities in Africa.
The policy has been in the making since 2016 and still has to be adopted by an AU technical committee. Because it’s not a treaty it won’t be subject to ratification by all AU member states.
This “soft law” approach raises questions about whether the policy will ever be implemented. But the fact that the AU has developed one is a major step forward and could help African countries deal with some major rights issues including: land grabs and environmental pollution.
Land grabs
Africa’s agricultural sector has attracted significant investment. This has resulted in massive land acquisitions by local and foreign firms which has enabled them to engage in large scale production. But local agrarian populations have been dispossessed of their land with little to no consultation or adequate compensation.
Chinese businesses have become the face of the growing concern over land grabs on the continent. A 2014 report estimated that about 10 million hectares of agricultural land in Africa belonged to Chinese businesses. But the Chinese aren’t the only ones acquiring massive tracts of land on the continent.
In Tanzania for instance, Sweden-based Agro EcoEnergy acquired 20,000 hectares of land to establish a sugarcane plantation and an ethanol-production site. Local people in the Bagamoyo district in Dar es Salaam were deeply distressed by the acquisition.
Although local communities were consulted, they weren’t presented with any alternatives, particularly around the issue of compensation. Nor was the community given adequate information about the impact of the project.
Environmental pollution
Another major business and human rights challenge has been environmental pollution, particularly in the extractive industries. In many cases foreign-owned companies have been involved.
One of the biggest concerns involve oil spillages and gas flaring from business-related activities in Nigeria. For example, over 100 million barrels of oil was spilled in the Niger-Delta between the 1960s and 1997. In 2014 alone, Shell and ENI admitted to over 550 oil spills in the region.
The United Nations Environment Programme estimates that a cleanup process in the Niger Delta will take between 25 to 30 years.
And some estimates suggest that the impact of gas flaring has significantly reduced life expectancy in the region, from 70 years to about 45 years.
Key aspects of the policy framework
All this suggests that Africa needs to regulate business activities with human rights impacts.
The policy framework builds on the three key pillars of the United Nations guiding principles. These are the state’s duty to protect human rights, businesses’ responsibility to respect human rights, and access to remedies.
States need to ensure that business activities don’t negatively affect the livelihoods of local communities. Governments must therefore ensure agreements are drawn up with home states of multinationals and also with businesses to protect human rights.
For their part, businesses have a responsibility to respect human rights. As such, they are required to desist from activities that will have an adverse impact on human rights. To give effect to this responsibility, businesses are expected to develop human rights policies and make a commitment to implement them.
An example is the Coca-Cola Human Rights Policy. This sets out the company’s commitment to conduct due diligence and to address human rights failures if they occur.
Access to remedies talks to the issue of justice. This means that it has to be underpinned by judicial and nonjudicial, state-based and non-state-based measures to protect victims of business related human rights violations.
Businesses are also required to develop grievance procedures to ensure recourse for affected communities. A practical example of this is the grievance mechanism developed around the Trans Adriatic Pipeline which is being built to transport natural gas from the border of Greece and Turkey to southern Italy.
But it’s important that these procedures should not prejudice the rights of victims to seek justice from judicial systems.
Deepening respect for human rights
The AU’s policy is a right step towards ensuring business upholds human rights. But it’s only the start of a long journey towards deepening a culture of respect for human rights among businesses in Africa.
Only time will tell if the policy framework, once adopted, will in fact be used. But the mere fact that it’s being formulated shows resolve on the part of states to tackle key human rights issues related to business activities in Africa.
A number of key steps need to be taken if the policy is to become a reality.
First, sufficient resources must be made available to make sure its implemented by both states and regional bodies.
Secondly, states must drive policy implementation with the political will to regulate businesses within their territories.
And finally institutions must be strengthened at all levels of implementation including national, regional and continental levels.
But successful implementation won’t be achieved unless there’s cooperation between state institutions, businesses, local populations as well as civil society.

Why the African Union must press ahead with a business and human rights policy

A platform to promote inclusive markets on the continent was the topic of discussion at a side event at African Development Week. The African Inclusive Markets Excellence Centre (AIMEC) is set to become the premier pan-African regional platform for thought leadership and action on inclusive business and inclusive markets.
Inclusive business will improve the lives of millions of people in Africa and help to implement the provisions of the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, said Anthony Mothae Maruping, Commissioner for Economic Affairs, ACU, as he introduced the session.
The Centre would promote growth by encouraging transformative inclusive regional value chains, which in turn would lead to income generation and poverty alleviation across the continent.
“The Centre will need active participation from established business. It will target clients in the public and private sectors, including SMMEs,” Maruping said. “It will need the efforts and support of all stakeholders.”
According to studies, economic inequality remains a big problem in Africa. Some African countries have a Gini coefficient of 65% compared to an average of 42% in other developing countries. (A Gini coefficient of zero expresses perfect equality, where for example, everyone has the same income. A coefficient of 1 – or 100% – expresses maximal inequality where only one person has all the income or consumption, and all others have none.)
The AIMEC centre will respond to that challenge.
Inclusive business includes the poor as clients and customers as well as employees, producers and business owners at various points in the value chain. Inclusive businesses build bridges between the established business sector and the poor, for mutual benefit.
“’During our research, we found that technology has supported inclusion in many ways. One of the big cases of inclusion in Africa is the mobile banking network M-Pesa in Kenya. They have 25 million Kenyans now who have access to finance through their cell phones,” says Tomas Sales, Special Advisor, Private Sector, Inclusive Growth, and Sustainable Development Cluster, UNDP Regional Service Centre for Africa.
“Picture that in other sectors. For instance, the government of Rwanda has supported a business which uses drones to give access to health care products in remote rural areas. So, inclusion can be promoted through technology. It is actually a powerful driver for it,” he says.
<h3>The heart of an NGO and the brain of business </h3>
Based in Senegal, Bonergie is a social business providing solar energy to people living in poverty. Its founder and Managing Director is Gabriele Schwarz. She says: “The inclusive market has a lot of potential for economic growth of African countries because we involve the bottom of the pyramid. We look at people we call poor as customers, as employees, as market players, and this is quite a new approach.”
“There are many opportunities for Africa to establish a wide range of inclusive businesses because the old structures like we have in Europe or the Western world are not so strong here, so here you could really start something new,” she continues.
Most such initiatives have taken place in English-speaking Africa in the areas of mobile banking, energy and agriculture. “I am sure there are many more examples which we don’t know of, that is why it is so interesting to be together and to have a platform and meeting and look at what is working and what is not. Because if you focus on things that are not working, you lose a lot of time, energy and also money. And that is why it is so important to replicate the things that are working,” Schwarz says.
She describes inclusive business as a mix of NGO and business, which is very attractive to young people who are trying to open new businesses because they’re looking for a meaningful way to do business. The collaboration it fosters is ideal to address issues like eliminating poverty.
<h3>Need for new funding infrastructure</h3>
Finding funding for inclusive business is difficult at the moment as it is a new sector. Traditional funders of NGOs don’t fund the private sector. Traditional investors don’t fund inclusive business because poor customers are not seen as bankable. “So, we really have to set up a new funding infrastructure as well, like impact investors,” says Schwarz. “Some people call this patient money. There are already some good initiatives on the market, and impact investing is also for the financial business a growing market.”
Nana Oumou Toure-Sy, Coordinator, UNDP Regional Service Centre for Africa, West &amp; Central Africa Sub-Regional Platform, describes AIMEC as a flagship for UNDP’s work in Africa. The UNDP’s 2013 report on inclusive business recommended the establishment of such a centre as it would support innovative private sector development.
Tomas explains: “One of the main ideas is to bring the different stakeholders together – big companies, small companies, government, academics, civil society – and the point is to review what is happening in the sector, what are the needs, what are the opportunities. Make no mistake, regulation and incentives are a critical part of this.”
Asked what the objective is at this stage, he replies: “Actually we came to Dakar to get an approval from the Ministers on the idea of the creation of the centre. As you know, the meetings couldn’t proceed as envisaged, I just talked to the African Union counterpart in they told us there is a plan to still organise the meeting somewhere in April. If that happens, we’re going to proceed with the original plan, which is: The centre is approved by the African ministers of economic development and finance, the heads of state approve and then we get into the process of identifying the host country and implementing it. We hope it can still be done this year because the needs are huge.”

Africa Development Week: AIMEC, a platform for inclusive business in Africa will address inequality

The head of the 54-member African Union said on Monday that a U.S. travel ban on seven Muslim-majority countries including three in Africa heralded &#8220;turbulent times&#8221; for the continent.
AU commission chief Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma made the remarks in a speech to open an AU summit, after U.S. President Donald Trump&#8217;s executive order halted travel by people with passports from Libya, Somalia, Sudan and four other Middle East nations for 90 days, and stopped refugee resettlement for 120 days.
&#8220;We are entering very turbulent times. The very country to which many of our people were taken as slaves during the transatlantic slave trade has now decided to ban refugees from some of our countries. What do we do about this? Indeed, this is one of the greatest challenges to our unity and solidarity,&#8221; she told African leaders in the Ethiopian capital.﻿

U.S. travel ban heralds turbulent times for Africa: AU chief

The African Union is due to choose a new leader on Monday in a vote more likely to expose differences over the International Criminal Court and other issues than reaffirm the continent&#8217;s solidarity and common purpose.
In a clear split, three of its four major regions – the south, the east and the largely Francophone west – are supporting their own nominees to head the bloc, making deadlock followed by horse-trading likely.
Leading candidates to replace South Africa’s Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the first woman to serve as the continent’s top diplomat, are Kenyan foreign minister Amina Mohammed and Senegal’s Abdoulaye Bathily, analysts say.
In another potentially divisive move, the 54 heads of state gathered in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, will have to decide whether to approve the re-admission of Morocco.
The North African kingdom quit the AU’s predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity, three decades ago amid a dispute over the body&#8217;s recognition of Western Sahara, most of which has been controlled by Morocco since 1976.
However, King Mohammed VI has been on a diplomatic charm offensive in the last year to try to win Rabat’s readmission.
Continental heavyweights Algeria and South Africa have been backers of the Sahrawi Republic, the domestic political movements that lays claim to the territory along the northern Sahara’s Atlantic seaboard. Neither has said explicitly it will oppose Morocco&#8217;s re-entry.
Preliminary meetings have also been dominated by disputes over the International Criminal Court (ICC), which countries such as South Africa and Kenya say is a tool of Western imperialism that unfairly targets the continent.
Conversely, Nigeria, Botswana and other states say the Hague-based court is an important legal backstop for countries whose domestic justice systems have been compromised by civil conflict.
“You have all these calls for unity but actually if you look at the AU now, it is more divided than ever – over Morocco, the regional divisions and the ICC,” said Liesl Louw-Vaudran, an AU expert at the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria. “It’s unprecedented.”
Dlamini-Zuma, who is tipped as a replacement for her ex-husband, Jacob Zuma, at the helm of South Africa’s ruling African National Congress (ANC) this year, was due to end her term in July last year but had to extend her time when the AU failed to reach agreement on a successor.
Her election 4-1/2 years ago after intense lobbying by South Africa rankled many countries because it breached an unwritten rule preventing major states holding the AU chair.
During her time in charge, the medical doctor has focused on reforming the AU’s dysfunctional internal bureaucracy and drawing up a long-term for improving the lives of Africa’s marginal citizens, especially women and children.
However, she has been criticized for failing to heal the rifts created by her election and not doing more to prevent conflict in countries such as South Sudan, which the United Nations says is tilting towards genocide.﻿

African Union to choose new leader

&#8211; Thomson Reuters Foundation
﻿Women&#8217;s rights activists on Wednesday urged Nigeria to accelerate efforts to end child marriage after it joined an African Union (AU) campaign to eliminate the practice.
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Nigeria launched this week a nationwide drive to end child marriage by pushing for policies that protect girls&#8217; rights and help the justice system to punish perpetrators, becoming the 16th country to join the AU&#8217;s campaign.
The government made child marriage illegal in 2003, but only two-thirds of the country&#8217;s 36 states have implemented the law.
At least four in 10 girls in Nigeria are married off before they turn 18, while almost a fifth are wed before they reach 15, according to the United Nations children&#8217;s agency (UNICEF).
Early marriage deprives girls of an education, increases the likelihood of sexual violence and HIV, and puts them at risk of serious injury or death during childbirth, experts say.
&#8220;These (childbirth) complications are a leading cause of death among adolescents girls in countries like Nigeria &#8230; this is unnecessary and unacceptable,&#8221; said Mohamed Fall, UNICEF&#8217;s representative in Nigeria.
Rates of child marriage vary widely across Nigeria, with figures as high as 76 percent in the northwest, and as low as 10 percent in the southeast, said campaign group Girls not Brides.
Women&#8217;s rights group Donor Direct Action said the campaign to end child marriage was another positive step after a law banning female genital mutilation (FGM) was passed last year.
The prevalence of child marriage in Nigeria has dropped by nine percent since 2003, according to data from UNICEF.
&#8220;However, its decline needs to be dramatically accelerated, particularly in the north of Nigeria,&#8221; Anber Raz of Donor Direct Action told the Thomson Reuters Foundation by email from London.
&#8220;A lot of social and cultural change needs to happen, which may fall on the hands of local groups, who are under-resourced.&#8221;
Nigerian organisation Women&#8217;s Rights Advancement And Protection Alternative said the state also needed to address discrimination in access to education to prevent child marriage.
More than five million girls are out of school in Nigeria due to gender discrimination, said campaign group Girl Rising.﻿

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African Union to choose new leader

Nigeria joins African Union campaign to end child marriage

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AU

Africa agrees to giant trade bloc, but Nigeria, South Africa sit it out

44 African nations sign pact establishing free trade area

What AfCFTA means for Africa’s citizens

How the free movement of people could benefit Africa

Africa waves some leaders goodbye: but is the democratic deficit any narrower?

African Union says has no secret dossiers after China spying report

What spurred six countries to join the AU’s mission in Somalia

Finance ministers meet to discuss AU’s plan on self-financing

How Africa can negotiate an effective continental free trade area agreement

ICC declines to refer S.A to UN on Sudan’s Bashir arrest

South Africa’s anti-graft watchdog to probe Dlamini-Zuma’s protection detail

Why the African Union must press ahead with a business and human rights policy

Africa Development Week: AIMEC, a platform for inclusive business in Africa will address inequality

U.S. travel ban heralds turbulent times for Africa: AU chief

African Union to choose new leader

Nigeria joins African Union campaign to end child marriage

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