Nelson Alusala | Senior Research Fellow, University of Pretoria
President Joseph Kabila of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has barely five months to save his 17-year regime from a cataclysmic ending. According to the 31 December 2016 all-inclusive political agreement, Kabila should organise elections and hand over power.
But in a recent interview, Kabila said he wasn’t going to “promise anything” on when he would leave office. This stand is in violation of the political agreement brokered by the Conférence Episcopale Nationale du Congo (CENCO).
The agreement sets clear terms for Kabila’s exit. His second presidential term ended on 19 December 2016. The agreement allowed him an extension of one year on condition that he would neither seek a third term, nor attempt to amend the constitution to remain in power beyond December 2017.
But Kabila has not implemented the reforms that would pave way for an election. In addition, the country’s national elections commission shows no momentum. The country’s national elections commissioner, Corneille Nangaa, stated recently that presidential elections would probably not take place this year because of the conflict in the Kasai region and the fact that there isn’t a comprehensive electoral register.
The opposition called Nangaa’s statement a declaration of war.
Read together, the president’s unwillingness to give a clear indication that he will step down, and Nangaa’s projection that there might not be a 2017 election, point towards a well orchestrated plan to delay the vote.
This has deeply polarised the country which is on the brink of increased violence. With just five months before Kabila’s one-year grace period expires, a number of warning bells have gone off from various corners of the globe.
<h2>Delay tactics</h2>
Even before the expiry of his constitutional mandate in 2016 Kabila employed various strategies to prolong his stay in power. His game plan dates back to early 2011 when he amended the constitution to establish a single-round, simple-majority election system.
Since then he has made numerous other attempts to manipulate the system to his advantage. Three stand out.
In January 2015, the National Assembly passed a law that called for a national census as a precursor to national elections. The opposition parties and the public saw this as a ploy to enable Kabila to stay in power indefinitely – a national census exercise had the potential to go on for years.
After mass demonstrations across the country the senate was forced to renounce the move.
The second attempt came in May 2016 when the DRC’s constitutional court ruled that if the election did not take place by the end of his second term, Kabila could stay in office until a new president was elected. This ruling exploited a constitutional loophole which states that,
<blockquote>“ …if for whatever reason, there is not a new president or a president-elect in place at the time when the current president’s term ends, then the sitting president stays in place, until there is a new president elect.”</blockquote>
The court ruling triggered mass demonstrations particularly in the capital Kinshasa.
In a third attempt, Kabila set out to placate the opposition and to convince them that organising an election within the required time frame would be impractical. In November 2015 he announced that the country would engage in national, all inclusive political dialogue bringing together the opposition, civil society and religious groups.
He highlighted five key areas of discussion. They included creating a credible voters roll, agreeing on the election calendar, securing the election process, financing the poll, and the role of international partners in the elections.
Many in the country were sceptical about Kabila’s proposal and by June 2016 it hadn’t gained support. This was despite the African Union appointing Edem Kodjo to mediate the process.
A MONUSCO (the United Nations Mission in the Congo) report stated that the main opposition groupings – Dynamique de l’opposition, and the Groupe des sept (G7) &#8211; were describing the call for dialogue as a ‘trap’ set by Kabila.
Kodjo’s facilitation finally culminated in a political agreement between Kabila’s coalition and the Union pour la Nation Congolaise, an opposition party led by Vital Kamerhe. Among other controversial decisions, the agreement stipulated that the current president would remain in power until elections were held and his successor assumed office, in line with the May 2016 constitutional court ruling.
The rest of the opposition, which had boycotted Kodjos’s mediation, denounced the AU-led agreement. The effect was to split the country in two.
In an effort to break the impasse, a mediation led by CENCO organised consultations between the signatories and non-signatories to the AU-led agreement leading to the all inclusive political agreement of 31 December 2016. As mentioned above, Kabila seems to be ignoring its implementation.
<h2>Unheeded warnings</h2>
The UN has warned that the political impasse, rising insecurity across the country, and the worsening human rights and humanitarian situation could easily plunge the country into total chaos. In particular, it has pointed to the ongoing inter-ethnic violence in the Kasai region.
The world body has called for a successful political transition underpinned by free, fair and inclusive elections.
The UK has also cautioned that unless Kabila holds elections within the agreed time lines, the political uncertainty and instability in Kinshasa will spread across the country.
And the UN Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix, has also warned that there’s a risk that the gains of the last 17 years will be reversed if Kabila fails to arrange a successful transition.
A change of heart by Kabila could see him go down in history as the first Congolese president to hand over power democratically. The decisions he makes in the next five months will determine whether his 17-year rule will be worthy a legacy.

Op-Ed: Why Kabila’s bid to remain in power is bad news for the DRC

The government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) recently <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-22/congo-to-revisit-mine-law-proposals-rejected-by-industry-in-2015">announced plans</a> to reintroduce the shelved changes to the country’s mining code.
The current mining code, introduced in 2002, was based on a draft prepared <a href="http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=434e2344-7d5f-4623-b2cb-cd502f0fc076">under the auspices of the World Bank</a>. Its primary objective was to relaunch the industrial mining sector following the Congo Wars of 1996 to 2003 by opening it up to foreign investors. While it has been successful in achieving this goal, the benefits to Congolese people are more difficult to discern.
Today the DRC is Africa’s largest copper producer and the world’s largest cobalt producer. Its mining sector contributes <a href="https://eiti.org/democratic-republic-of-congo#contribution-of-the-extractive-industry-to-the-economy">22% of GDP and 28% of government revenue</a>. Yet the most recent Human Development Report ranks the DRC <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/COD">176 out of 188 countries</a>, with a life expectancy of 59 and 77% of the population living below the income poverty line.
The latest round of changes were originally submitted to parliament in March 2015, but the amendment process <a href="http://af.reuters.com/article/drcNews/idAFL5N16I5EV">was suspended</a> due to collapsed commodity prices and fierce industry opposition.
It’s now back on the agenda. As in the past a major debate will ensue between the Congolese Government, civil society and the DRC mining industry. The strongest opposition to the proposed changes comes from the large multinational mining corporations, who argue that increasing taxes will hold back the sector’s potential.
However, a review of the major tax changes reveals them to align with regional standards. The DRC’s high operating costs are offset by the equally high quality of its mineral deposits, and the current tax rate exerted over the sector is low. In addition, reviving the reform process presents an opportunity to address a number of concerns related to transparency and local development.
<h2>Debunking industry myths</h2>
In the past, propositions that provoked the most debate were those that tried to reduce the tax advantages enjoyed by mining companies. The most important proposed tax changes to the DRC’s mining code are:
<ul>
<li>increasing taxes on profits from 30% to 35%;</li>
<li>increasing the government’s stake in new mining projects from 5% to 10% and;</li>
<li>increasing royalties from 2% to 3.5% for copper and cobalt.</li>
</ul>
When compared to mining tax regimes in other African countries, the proposed changes do not place the DRC outside of the norm. Most African countries demand a 10% government stake in mining projects. The proposed copper royalty tax is also within the range imposed by many governments in the region, such as Zambia (6%), Ghana (5%) and Tanzania (4%).
Likewise, the DRC’s proposed profit tax is within the range of other countries, though it sits at the top end. Both Cameroon and Ghana impose the same 35% profit tax as the DRC is considering.
But the mining industry’s response to these comparisons is twofold. They say the DRC provides an extremely challenging operational environment, with exceptionally high transport and power costs. And they say what matters is not individual tax rates, but the overall tax burden (including both formal and informal taxes).
Both points are questionable.
<h2>Costs, and the opaque world of taxes</h2>
A <a href="https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/nrgi-sortir-de-impasse-fiscale-rdc.pdf">report</a> published last year by the Natural Resource Governance Institute &#8211; which works with governments on natural resource management &#8211; shows the DRC’s production costs to be extremely favourable compared to regional competitors. In 2013 the average production cost of copper in the DRC was $3,672 per tonne. This same cost was $4,582 in Zambia and $4,931 in South Africa.
High quality Congolese mineral deposits appear to offset high operational expenses to generate low production costs (and therefore high profits). Indeed, last year <a href="http://www.miningweekly.com/article/drc-mines-still-attractive-investment-prospect-for-china-despite-risks-2016-08-05/rep_id:3650">the research firm BMI reported</a> that the DRC will remain a “destination of choice” for mining investors in the coming years due to its low production costs and high quality minerals.
The concern about the overall tax rate as opposed to individual tax changes is entirely legitimate. Yet the few non-industry studies that exist suggest this overall rate to be extremely low. Research by Professors <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Stefaan_Marysse2/publications">Stefaan Marysse</a> and <a href="http://uccc.academia.edu/TshimangaMbuyiKasekaClaudine">Claudine Tshimanga</a> &#8211; prominent political economists working on the DRC &#8211; revealed a tax rate of 21% for one of the country’s largest copper mines, well below the World Bank’s recommended <a href="http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOGMC/Resources/336099-1156955107170/drcgrowthgovernanceenglish.pdf">46% tax rate</a> for the country.
Similarly, a recent fiscal study conducted by the German Society for International Cooperation found that between 2011 and 2014, total state revenue collected by the mining sector amounted to <a href="https://www.uantwerpen.be/images/uantwerpen/container2673/files/Publications/Annuaire/2015-2016/07%20Radley.pdf">a mere 6 percent of total mining sector revenue</a> for the same period.
<h2>What’s been left out</h2>
Yet there’s a danger that the heated debates about tax rates and royalties will drown out the urgency of addressing other big issues, many of which have been left out of the draft revision. Global Witness &#8211; a non profit focused on the links between natural resource exploitation, conflict and poverty &#8211; <a href="https://www.globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/democratic-republic-congo-plans-water-down-laws-against-mining-corruption/">has been calling attention to these omissions</a>. These include the removal of “crucial regulations banning politicians and senior army figures from owning mining rights”, an opaque tender process and insufficient beneficial ownership disclosure requirements.
In addition, many mining companies <a href="http://news.banro.com/manual-releases/Banro-s-Mining-Convention-And-Titles-Confirmed-By-">have signed “conventions”</a> with the DRC government that exist outside of the tax and legal structure established by the country’s mining code. There’s no provision within the current draft to address this loophole.
Lastly, for a number of years Congolese civil society <a href="http://www.congomines.org/reports/1247-propositions-d-amandements-de-la-societe-civile-au-projet-de-revision-du-code-minier">has been pushing hard</a> for improvements to the code on environmental and local development issues. For example, existing policy provides little guidance on critical issues such as forced displacement. Only three of the mining code’s 344 articles refer to the relationship between title holders and people living in title holders’ concessions.
<h2>Time to seize the opportunity</h2>
The DRC’s mining code is 15 years old. Extremely advantageous fiscal incentives were included back in 2002 to attract foreign investors to the country. Yet they have minimised the benefits of increased mining production to the Congolese government and people. The proposed tax changes bring the DRC up to date with today’s regional standards and should be supported.
But when the DRC’s parliament reopens in September, its members would do well to incorporate civil society concerns on key transparency, environmental and local development issues. Fail to do so, and Congolese people &#8211; particularly those directly affected by mining projects &#8211; will be locked into another decade or more of inadequate mining legislation. Change is long overdue, and the opportunity must not be missed.

Mining to be scaled down during South Africa’s 21-day lockdown

Op-Ed: The DRC is revisiting its mining code. Why reform is long overdue

The European Union is poised to impose sanctions against more Congolese officials, sources in Brussels said, amid worsening violence in the resource-rich country since President Joseph Kabila overstayed his mandate and pushed back elections.
One source said the EU will add nine names to its Congo blacklist of people subjected to asset freezes and travel bans. They join seven others, including members of the Congolese army and police, the bloc put on its list in December citing &#8220;serious violations of human rights&#8221;.
The bloc&#8217;s 28 member states are expected to approve the enlarged sanctions list at a meeting in Brussels later on Wednesday, the source said.
Kabila, in power since 2001, struck a deal in December with Congo&#8217;s main opposition bloc to stay on after his mandate expired provided he held elections by the end of 2017. But talks to implement the deal broke down in March when Kabila refused to commit to the bloc&#8217;s choice of prime minister.
Political tensions are high after security forces killed dozens during protests over election delays last year. Worsening militia violence in recent months has also raised fears of a backslide toward the civil wars of the turn of the century that killed millions.
The Congo government has repeatedly denounced earlier sanctions imposed by the EU and United States as unjustified and illegal, and has threatened diplomatic retaliation.
Congo mines significant amounts of cobalt, gold, diamonds, copper and tin but remains one of Sub-Saharan Africa&#8217;s poorest countries.
On Tuesday, the EU said separately it would help transport aid workers and medical supplies to a remote north-eastern region of Congo, which is fighting an Ebola outbreak.
(Reporting by Gabriela Baczynska; editing by Richard Lough)

EU to impose sanctions on more Congo officials: diplomats

<div id="article-byline">By <a href="http://www.reuters.com/journalists/david-lewis">David Lewis</a> | KINSHASA</div>
One day in November 2015, President Joseph Kabila visited his foreign ministry and smiled broadly as a computer took his photograph and fingerprints. He was there to mark the launch of the Democratic Republic of Congo&#8217;s new biometric passport, fitted with a chip to store details of his identity.
Kabila and his aides have extolled the benefits of the passports, saying they will allow freer movement across an increasingly security-conscious world. In private, the organizers of the deal have another reason to celebrate: It presents an opportunity to make hundreds of millions of dollars off some of the poorest people on the planet.
The passport is among the most expensive in the world, costing each Congolese applicant $185. A UK passport costs half as much, and a U.S. passport $110.
Yet according to documents reviewed by Reuters, the Congolese government will receive just $65 from each passport. Instead, most of the money will go to Semlex, a firm based in Belgium that is producing the travel documents, and to a small company in the Gulf.
That Gulf company, called LRPS, receives $60 for every passport issued, according to documents relating to the deal between the Congo government and Semlex. LRPS is registered in Ras Al Khaimah in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a jurisdiction where details of ownership are often kept secret.
According a person with direct knowledge of the passport deal, LRPS is owned by Makie Makolo Wangoi, who is believed to be a close relative of Kabila. This source said that Wangoi traveled to the UAE in June 2015 to complete the transfer of LRPS shares into her name. Documents referring to travel arrangements and the share transfer indicate that Wangoi owns LRPS, though the evidence is not conclusive.
Reuters sent questions about LRPS to Wangoi&#8217;s email address but received no reply. The Congolese presidency did not respond to Reuters inquiries about the passport scheme and the ownership of LRPS. Nor did Semlex respond to requests for comment.
After these various inquiries were sent, a senior Congolese security official contacted Reuters and said he would provide responses on behalf of Kabila, Wangoi, and others. He later said all questions should be referred to the CEO of Semlex, Albert Karaziwan, and supplied no further comment.
Karaziwan did not reply to emails or text messages sent to him. Lawyers for him declined to comment, citing possible legal action over a person involved in the passport deal for allegedly disseminating misleading information. Reuters gave Kabila and others multiple opportunities to say whether any of the information about the passport deal in this article was misleading. They did not respond.
The surprising cost of Congo&#8217;s passports is highlighted by a rival proposal from a separate Belgian company called Zetes. In that document, reviewed by Reuters, Zetes outlined plans in 2014 to supply biometric passports to Congo for $28.50 each. Zetes confirmed making such an offer.
Over time, Congo&#8217;s $185 biometric passports could generate hundreds of millions of dollars for LRPS and Semlex while diverting potential revenue away from an unstable and impoverished state. According to the United Nations, the average per capita income in Congo is just $680 a year.
The Congolese state needs all the funds it can get and has previously missed out on revenues from big corporations: A 2013 report by the Africa Progress Panel said Congo appeared to have lost out on $1.3 billion in revenues from five mining deals since 2010 because state companies had &#8220;systematically&#8221; undervalued assets when selling concessions to investors.
Those deals involved complex transactions between big enterprises; in the passport scheme, the state is losing out on revenue that comes directly from ordinary citizens.
Kabila was due to step down in December but elections have been postponed, leaving him in charge as domestic opponents assert his authority has run out. Dozens of people have been killed in violent clashes between protesters and police.
During Kabila&#8217;s rule, some of his close associates have acquired considerable wealth through interests in numerous businesses in the country, according to the corruption watchdog Global Witness. In December, the news agency Bloomberg detailed a network of about 70 companies – not including LRPS – that it said were linked to members of Kabila&#8217;s family, including Wangoi.
Kabila did not respond to requests for comment on that story either, but officials close to Kabila have denied Congo is losing out in deals that favor officials or businessmen close to the president. They have also defended his family&#8217;s involvement in business, saying they are private citizens who have a right to engage in commercial activities.
IDENTITY EXPERT
Over the past 20 years, Semlex has become a leader in providing identity and travel documents for African nations. From its headquarters in an imposing building on Avenue Brugmann in Brussels, it has supplied clients stretching from Guinea-Bissau in Africa&#8217;s west to Kenya in the east and Madagascar in the Indian Ocean.
Landing a contract in Congo &#8211; one of the continent&#8217;s most populous nations, with some 70 million people – had the potential to be highly rewarding for the firm. Documents seen by Reuters, including correspondence between Semlex and the government and agreements between individuals and firms involved in the deal, paint a picture of how the contract was pulled together.
A key figure was Semlex CEO Karaziwan, who founded the company in 1992 and whose family owns all but a small percentage of the business. Karaziwan is a Belgian of Armenian origin, born in the Syrian city of Aleppo. He owns a turreted castle in Belgium and has business interests from real estate to restaurants. His main focus is technology and security for governments, particularly in Africa.
Between October 2014 and June 2015, Karaziwan engaged in a series of communications with Congolese authorities, including several letters addressed directly to Kabila, according to documents reviewed by Reuters. On Oct. 16, 2014, Karaziwan sent Kabila an outline of his company&#8217;s expertise, saying Semlex was able to offer biometric passports at a cost of 20 to 40 euros each ($21.50 to $43), thanks to having its own printer in Lithuania.
Five days later, Karaziwan sent another letter to Kabila. This time he invited two senior officials from Kabila&#8217;s inner circle, Moise Ekanga Lushyma and Emmanuel Adrupiako, to Dubai for meetings to discuss a possible contract.
Ekanga has headed the Congolese government office overseeing billions of dollars of cooperation between Congo and China. Adrupiako is an influential financial adviser who has worked with Kabila since 2001. One official with detailed knowledge of the workings of Kabila&#8217;s presidency described Adrupiako as the informal &#8220;treasurer&#8221; in his office.
In early November 2014, Semlex said it could produce passports at $50 apiece, according to the documents seen by Reuters. In a letter sent to Kabila on Nov. 13, the price had risen to $120.
In March 2015, Karaziwan was invited to Kinshasa, DR Congo&#8217;s capital, by the foreign minister to finalize a deal. By the end of May, a proposal for Semlex to provide passports for five years was cleared by the budget ministry.
On June 11, 2015, Karaziwan and Congo&#8217;s Foreign Minister Raymond Tshibanda and Finance Minister Henry Yav Mulang signed the final contract. Semlex agreed to invest $222 million in the project. The Congolese government would charge citizens $185 per passport, a steep rise from the $100 cost of the country&#8217;s previous passports.
On the day the passport was launched, Karaziwan, Tshibanda and a group of Semlex workers posed for a photograph, seen by Reuters: In the middle was Kabila, grinning broadly.
Weeks later, the prime minister of Congo at the time, Mapon Matata Ponyo, wrote to Foreign Minister Tshibanda complaining that he had only heard about the passport deal in the press. In the letter, reviewed by Reuters, Matata Ponyo asked for more details on the contract to see whether it met requirements for transparency. He never received a reply, a spokesman for Matata Ponyo said.
A senior official at the body that regulates government contracts in Congo, the Autorité de Regulation des Marchés Publics, said the passport deal should have gone through a public tender. &#8220;This did not happen,&#8221; said the official. &#8220;It was handled directly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The contract should have been published.”
THE SPLIT
The June 11 contract provides that $65 from each passport be earmarked for the Congolese state. The remaining $120 was allotted to a consortium that includes Semlex Europe, based in Brussels; Semlex World, based in the United Arab Emirates; Semlex&#8217;s Lithuanian printer; and the UAE entity called LRPS.
That $120 was further divided up by two other agreements, also dated June 11. According to one contract, a Kinshasa-based firm called Mantenga Contacto Trading Limited was allotted $12 from each passport in return for handling much of the project&#8217;s human resources issues, including supplying staff. Mantenga acknowledged Reuters inquiries but supplied no comment.
The three Semlex firms involved in the deal were allotted $48 per passport.
That left $60 out of the $120 allotted to the consortium. According to documents seen by Reuters, that $60 from each passport issued was allocated to LRPS. In return, LRPS would help with administration, logistics and the relationship with the government.
LRPS was represented in the talks with the government by Karaziwan, the boss of Semlex, according to the contract between Semlex and the Congolese government.
Reuters was unable to verify the current status of LRPS. But its certificate of incorporation with authorities in Ras al Khaimah shows it was set up on Jan. 14, 2015, as Semlex was negotiating the passport deal with Kabila&#8217;s representatives. The document does not say who owned the company when it was created. But a second document – an agreement to transfer shares – indicates that later in 2015, LRPS was owned by Cedric Fevre, a Frenchman based in Dubai who is a business associate of Karaziwan.
Though this computer-created document is unsigned, metadata embedded in it shows that it was created in the UAE in 2015 and printed on June 25 that year. That was the day that Fevre transferred all 10,000 shares in LRPS to Wangoi, according to the source with direct knowledge of the passport deal.
A second source, who was aware of the deal without having direct knowledge, also said Wangoi became the owner of LRPS.
The person with direct knowledge of the passport deal said that the only signed copies of the LRPS share-transfer agreement are held by Fevre and Wangoi. Reuters has not seen a signed copy, and Fevre and Wangoi did not respond to questions for this article.
Wangoi is little known outside the Kabila family. Corporate records confirm she is a shareholder in several companies with other Kabila family members. In two of these firms, Congo-based Shaba Impex Sprl and Shaboil Sprl, Wangoi uses the name Makolo wa Ngoy Kabila in the registration. Two people familiar with the president&#8217;s circle said Wangoi is one of Kabila&#8217;s many sisters. She was identified as a Kabila sister in the Bloomberg investigation into the business interests of the president&#8217;s family. Another source, who has studied Congo and Kabila for many years, said she could be a niece.
The passport contract runs for five years. It doesn&#8217;t stipulate how many passports will be made, but in recent years Congo has issued around 2.5 million of its old passports annually. A person with direct knowledge of the Semlex operation said the Belgian company had produced 145,000 of the new biometric passports by the end of January 2017, which would earn LRPS nearly $9 million.
In another document reviewed by Reuters, Semlex said that it would be able to supply Congo with 2 million passports a year, once the operation was fully up and running. That suggests the Belgian company could receive nearly $100 million a year from the deal, while LRPS could receive $120 million a year.
ELECTION DELAY
Kabila was due to step down in December at the end of his second term in office, a move that would have marked Congo&#8217;s first peaceful transfer of power. But the government said it needed more time and money to organize elections, and Kabila has remained president.
Dozens of people have been killed in protests over the election delay while a fresh rebellion in the south has killed hundreds more. On Dec. 31, mediators from the Catholic Church secured an agreement from Kabila&#8217;s camp that the vote will be held this year and Kabila will not seek re-election. Months on, the deal has still not been implemented and the church has walked away from the mediation process. Kabila himself has not publicly declared his position. His opponents say several efforts to push back the vote show he is in no hurry to yield power.
Whether or not Kabila stays in power, LRPS looks set to continue to make money from every passport issued in Congo. According to Article 14 of the contract for the deal, the agreement remains valid even if there are &#8220;institutional changes&#8221; in the country.
(Additional reporting by Noah Browning and Tom Arnold in Dubai, Stanley Carvalho in Abu Dhabi, Teis Jensen in Copenhagen, Robert-Jan Bartunek in Brussels and Matt Scuffham in Toronto; Editing By Richard Woods and Michael Williams)

Democratic Republic Congo

Op-Ed: Why Kabila’s bid to remain in power is bad news for the DRC

Op-Ed: The DRC is revisiting its mining code. Why reform is long overdue

EU to impose sanctions on more Congo officials: diplomats

Special Report: Congo’s pricey passports send millions of dollars offshore

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Democratic Republic Congo

Op-Ed: Why Kabila’s bid to remain in power is bad news for the DRC

Op-Ed: The DRC is revisiting its mining code. Why reform is long overdue

EU to impose sanctions on more Congo officials: diplomats

Special Report: Congo’s pricey passports send millions of dollars offshore

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