By George Ott, Economist, NKC African Economics 



On December 21, Côte d’Ivoire’s President Alassane Ouattara announced that the eight member states of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (Waemu) and France had agreed to rename the CFA franc and implement a range of reforms to the long-standing regional currency.



Although talk of change had been in the air, the December announcement came as somewhat of a surprise, certainly to some others in the region.



The
formation of an independent monetary union and the adoption of a regional
currency has been a long-term goal for the broader 15-member Economic Community
of West African States (Ecowas), of which all the Waemu states are members.
Ecowas leaders met as recently as June 2019 and agreed to adopt a common
regional currency, to be called the ‘eco’, as early as 2020. 



However,
with manifold challenges facing this project, the Waemu states appear to feel
they were already in a position to get the reform ball rolling, ostensibly with
the goal of facilitating the eventual formation of an Ecowas regional monetary
union.



Aside
from the broader Ecowas debate, the reforms announced in December to be
implemented on the West African CFA franc include: renaming the CFA franc the
eco; scrapping the obligation requiring Waemu members to keep 50% of their
foreign reserves at the French central bank; and the withdrawal of all French
representatives from decision-making and management bodies of the West African
Monetary Union (comprising the same eight Waemu member countries). 



Significantly,
however, the eco will remain pegged to the euro and the Banque de France will
continue to guarantee the convertibility of the currency.



Although
these reforms represent the most substantial changes in the more than
seven-decade history of the CFA franc, it nevertheless received a mixed
reception. 



While
some commentators hailed the move as a significant breakaway from French
involvement and a step towards monetary independence, others pointed out that
the move was largely symbolic and the reforms ‘cosmetic’, as the maintenance of
the euro peg will continue to dictate the scope of regional monetary policy
decisions.



Another
significant challenge facing the eco lies in the Waemu member states satisfying
the convergence criteria for the adoption of the new common currency. 



Key
criteria are: maintaining a budget deficit of less than 3% of GDP; public debt
ratio of less than 70% of GDP; annual inflation rate of less than 10%; and, maintaining
a minimum of three months of import cover. Currently, it appears unlikely that
the majority of the Waemu countries will meet all these criteria by the very
ambitious inception date of July 2020.



Regional
giants and fellow Ecowas members Nigeria and Ghana have also weighed in on the
developments, adopting somewhat contrasting positions. 



While
Ghana came out strongly in favour of the eco and the formation of a broader
regional monetary union (although not in favour of the euro peg but rather a
floating exchange rate), Nigeria has taken a more cautious approach in first
considering its official response.



With
anti-colonial sentiment growing in the region, this move is perhaps mostly
symbolic at this stage, and is to the political benefit of Mr Ouattara and
France’s President Emmanuel Macron. However, this does not mean that it is not
significant. 



The
long-standing Ecowas goal of establishing an independent, regional monetary
union with a single currency remains in the minds of many in the region, and
the decision by the Waemu to make the first move may yet prove to be a valuable
viability test for this ideal. 



Yet, in the meantime, with the maintenance of the euro peg, the reforms are not expected to have much of an impact on the currency, at least not in the short- to medium term. Moreover, the goal of officially moving to the eco by mid-2020 may prove to be overly ambitious.

Westafrica_Wikimedia

Op-Ed: From CFA franc to ‘eco’, what you need to know about West Africa’s new currency

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Nigeria’s non-oil revenues fell by 17 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2018 from the preceding quarter, the government’s non-oil revenue was below the proportionate quarterly budget estimate of 1.4 trillion naira. Meanwhile, The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and African Development Bank (AfDB) have signed a 22.7 million-dollar agreement for the Abidjan-Lagos corridor highway development project to increase trade and investment among member states. Obiora Madu, CEO Multimix Group joins CNBC Africa for more.

Nigeria’s non-oil revenues down 17% in Q4 2018

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Nigerian business owners in Ghana are seeking the intervention of the regional economic union ECOWAS over the closure of some Nigerian-owned businesses in Kumasi and Ashanti region of Ghana. Bamidele Ayemibo, Export Group Chairman at the Lagos Chambers of Commerce and Industry joins CNBC Africa to discuss this development.

Nigerian traders look to ECOWAS over closure of shops in Ghana

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At the fifth meeting of the Presidential Task Force on the ECOWAS Single Currency Programme in Accra in February, the task force adopted a revised roadmap to accelerate the creation of the ECOWAS single currency by 2020.

Is West Africa ready for a single currency?

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The leaders of the Economic Community of West African States said last month that they will push ahead with a single currency by 2020 while the East African community also said they&#8217;ll have a single currency by 2024.

Thumps up to free trade in Africa but not a single currency – Economist

West African regional bloc ECOWAS hit 20 Guinea-Bissau politicians and businessmen with sanctions, including travel bans and asset freezes, on Tuesday, accusing them of undermining efforts to resolve a prolonged political crisis.
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The decision followed the nomination by President Jose Mario Vaz of Augusto Antonio Artur da Silva to the post of prime minister late last month, in violation of a 2016 ECOWAS-brokered deal.
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Among those targeted by the sanctions were members of Vaz’s parliamentary faction as well has his son, Emerson Goudiaby Vaz.
“The Conakry Accord has not been implemented and as a consequence it is appropriate to apply sanctions to those falling short,” the bloc said in a statement.
For over two years, Vaz has been embroiled in a bitter dispute within his own ruling African Party of the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) that has hobbled the government.
The impasse has sparked regular protest marches and raised fears of instability that diplomats fear could be exploited by drug traffickers, who have long used the turbulent nation as a transit point for shipments between South America and Europe.
Under the ECOWAS deal aimed at ending the impasse, Vaz had been meant to name a prime minister agreed in consensus with the rival faction, which is headed by former prime minister Domingos Simoes Pereira.
But Pereira’s supporters have rejected Silva’s nomination.
<div class="Attribution_attribution_o4ojT">
Reporting by Alberto Dabo; Writing by Joe Bavier; Editing by Hugh Lawson
</div>

ECOWAS issues sanctions over Guinea-Bissau political crisis

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Joe Femi Dagunro joins CNBC Africa to discuss the intricacies of what a single currency would mean for the West African region.

Will a single currency for ECOWAS succeed?

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For newly appointed Ambassador Ketil Karlsen, Head of EU delegation to Nigeria and ECOWAS said an agreement on economic partnerships could help create conducive framework for transparency and investments across sectors.

Tech use in Nigeria on the rise but needs improvement

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The President of Ghana, Nana Akufo-Addo, who visited President Muhammadu Buhari at the Presidential Villa on Tuesday, disclosed that President Buhari&#8217;s illness created a volume of anxiety within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Ghanaian president visits Buhari

Since the year 2000, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has given eligible African countries duty and quota free access to the United States’ markets. This has created an opportunity for African businesses, big or small to meet, trade with new markets and improve the quality of their products. Over the years, it has been described as a catalyst for democracy and a criterion for African countries that want to partake in the AGOA agreement.
The 16th edition of AGOA Forum sought to explore how countries can continue to maximise the benefits AGOA provides. Thanks to the dedication and hard work of the National Organization Committee of the AGOA Forum in Togo, led by Mrs. Dede Ahoéfa Ekoue, the Lomé edition of the event was a great success. Togolese Prime Minister Komi Klassou described the forum as an “opportunity for Sub-Saharan Africa to review the different challenges and point out the challenges of achieving accelerated and inclusive growth”.
<blockquote>To learn more about the 16th edition of AGOA Forum watch&#8230;</blockquote>
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“The key matter of the forum is how do we leverage trade for the economic good of our people and see the best way to maximise the opportunities of AGOA?,”  added Togolese Minister for Trade Bernadette Legzim-Balouki.
According to the Togolese trade minister, the volume of trade between the US and Africa has dipped in the past few years.  According to <a href="https://agoa.info/data/total-trade.html">AGOA’s website</a>, combined two-way goods trade in 2015 was valued at $36 billion and $50 billion in 2014.
Intra-African integration which reportedly stands at 13 percent is said to contribute to Africa’s low contribution to global trade.  According to some delegates at the conference,   the removal of certain barriers to aid connectivity will go a long way in improving Africa’s contribution to global trade.
“Togo has 8 million inhabitants, a small market. But ECOWAS is a market of 300 million. We can consolidate and boost exports, “ says  Balouki
Togo is a West African country working to achieve this. With massive investments in its infrastructure, especially transport infrastructure, the small West African country is positioning itself to become a transport hub in West Africa.  Togo’s Minister of Infrastructure and Transport Ninsao Gnofam calls it a place of transit.
With a modern airport and the construction of another 300 kilometre runway, owning one of the deepest Sea Ports in Africa and a number of inter-connecting road projects, Togo is gradually becoming a transport hub for the import and export of goods in out of Africa.
“We can welcome ships carrying 20,000 containers,” says Ninsao
Togo was granted a textile visa which allows the country export apparels to the United States of America. While this is a laudable achievement, Togo does not own a textile mill.  Togo’s cottons are milled outside the continent and imported into the country. Senior Bureau Official At The Bureau Of African Affairs, Peter Ballerin says AGOA allows for eligible countries to export textiles milled outside the country. But how much can countries such as Togo benefit from such provisions. This emphasises the need for African countries to revive textile manufacturing in order to reap full benefits AGOA provides,.
Togo is also rich in agriculture and has the potential to boost its economy through the export of agriculture produce. According to the US Ambassador to Togo David Gilmour, “Togo has a lot of productive land but there are barriers that must be addressed, barriers such as land rights, business climate issues, telecoms service and increase in competitiveness”.
That said, Togo is an excellent investment destination, he adds.
Togo is working to improve the ease of doing business in the country. It takes just two days to register a business in there.  Togo however is one country out of many eligible African countries under AGOA.  Delegates at the conference believe a lot more needs to be done especially when one considers the fact that the AGOA agreement may not be extended beyond 2025.
Fred Oladeinde, Chairman of the Civil Society Network Secretariat sums it up better, “millions of Dollars and lives have been invested to get us this far. We need to use our time wisely to achieve our goals and objectives of crafting competitive policies, implement cost effective initiatives in developing infrastructure and linkages that bring the level of investment and technology required to build industries and create jobs”
While Togo’s economic recovery has allowed the country emerge as a dynamic player in the region with the Lomé Ports,  home to regional  Airline, Asky and Pan African Bank, Ecobank, Togo is introducing reforms which it hopes will increase its growth rate from 6 per cent recorded in 2015. Togo’s aim is to trade with the rest of Africa and the world. The underlying objective is to ensure every citizen takes part in this journey towards economic stability.
For Africa, the time to act is now as 2025 is just a few years away.
<ul>
<li>This article was written by Onyi Sunday.</li>
</ul>

How African countries can maximise the benefits AGOA provides

Sarah Logan | Economist, International Growth Centre
&nbsp;
Critical elections are being held in Rwanda and Kenya. In Rwanda, the incumbent Paul Kagame will face Frank Habineza, of the Democratic Green Party of Rwanda and independent candidate Philippe Mpanyimana.
In Kenya, Raila Odinga, representing an umbrella opposition party, the National Super Alliance, will challenge incumbent Uhuru Kenyatta of the Jubilee Party.
Some controversy already mars both polls. Victoire Ingabire, considered the strongest opposition leader in Rwanda, remains jailed for threatening state security. The Rwandan constitution was also recently amended to allow Kagame to run for a third term and to potentially rule until 2034.
In Kenya, there’s been considerable criticism of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, the body running the election. Issues have included the reliability of the technology being used and the alleged partiality of the commission’s former leadership. And the recent printing of 1.2 million extra ballot papers has raised suspicions of planned vote rigging. The torture and murder of Christopher Msando, the commission’s head of information and technology, has further increased concerns.
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With their frequent irregularities, it’s easy to become cynical about elections in Africa. But we must fight our scepticism and indifference because elections continue to be an extremely important component of the continent’s growing democracy.
<h2>Elections and democracy</h2>
While elections alone are insufficient for democracy, they are nevertheless a prerequisite. This is because they promote political participation and competition needed for democracy. It’s the failure or absence of elections that largely defines dictatorships.
Other prerequisites for democracy include:
<ul>
<li>checks on executive power,</li>
<li>civilian control of the military,</li>
<li>civil rights and due process, and</li>
<li>an independent media and active civil society.</li>
</ul>
Since the early 1990s, elections in Africa have, on the whole, become increasingly free and fair. A number of factors have contributed to this. The effectiveness of electoral governance – institutions and regulatory norms – has been the most important. The legitimacy of elections depends on clear procedural rules.
Studies have found that the electoral management boards are the most significant indicators of the quality of electoral governance. In particular, whether a board is autonomous of government is crucial. Very few African countries inherited autonomous electoral management boards at independence. But, in line with global trends, their prevalence has been rising.
By 2002 more than half of African electoral management boards were fully autonomous, 29% were semi-autonomous, and only 20% weren’t autonomous.
International election observation has also contributed to elections becoming more free and fair. Their presence can reduce fraud and increase domestic confidence in the process. Inviting international observers to monitor an election has now become a necessary conditionfor an election to be considered internationally legitimate. Refusal to do so is almost akin to admitting electoral fraud.
&nbsp;
Long-term observers begin work months ahead of an election. This is because free and fair elections depend a great deal on what happens before voting day. In fact, vote buying and political intimidation before polling day are more common than disputes over vote counting or polling procedures.
&nbsp;
<h2>Free media and active citizens</h2>
A free media and active civil society continue to play an indispensable oversight role. This includes keeping institutions honest and keeping people informed.
A study in Sierra Leone showed that election debates between parliamentary candidates were very effective. Recorded debates between local parliamentary candidates were shown in numerous villages.
An evaluation of their impact showed that watching the election debates substantially increased viewers’ political knowledge. It also made it more likely that they would vote along policy (rather than ethnic) lines. Electedpoliticians who had been involved in the debates also tended to invest more in their constituencies, and to visit them more often.
<h2>Civil society</h2>
Civil society has a particular role in promoting a peaceful electoral environment. Its role is particularly crucial where tensions are high. Non-partisan citizen observers and monitoring groups, such as the West Africa Election Observers Network, are increasingly involved in election monitoring. Some of the results have been impressive. For example, a coalition of observers in Ghana trained and deployed about 4000 people to cover the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections.
Regional blocs have also been important in strengthening democracy by enforcing electoral outcomes. A good example was when the Economic Community of West African States stepped in after the Gambian president Yahya Jammeh refused to leave office after losing the 2016 election. The regional body’s commitment to remove him by force if necessary was highly commendable.
Its influence can also be seen in the fact that 14 out of its 15 member states have presidents who have been in office for less than two terms. The Economic Community of West African States should serve as a model to other regional blocs.
<h2>Making Africans polls free and fair</h2>
A great deal of progress has been made on improving political participation across the continent. But genuine political competition in elections remains a challenge. More work is still needed to remove biases in favour of incumbents. Another area that needs work is lifting restrictions on access to state-controlled media by opposition parties.
And for democracy to be strengthened further a number of players have to take an active role. This includes governments, opposition parties, the media, citizens, civil society and the international community.

Why elections matter for democracy in Africa. The cases of Kenya and Rwanda

Tahiru Azaaviele Liedong | University of Bath
It’s been nearly two decades since the idea of a single currency for West Africa was first mooted. Yet the sub-region is still far from having a common legal tender. What is ordinarily a good idea seems to have fizzled into a fantasy.
Now, the story is that the single currency has been scheduled for 2020. But there is scepticism about the prospects of this coming to pass, especially at a time when economic blocks like the European Union are struggling.
The decision to create a single monetary zone for West Africa was reached by Heads of State of the 15 member countries at a summit of the Economic Community of West African States, the region’s economic commission, in Lome, Togo in 1999.
At the time, a currency union of Francophone West African Statesalready existed to facilitate economic integration among countries which use the CFA Franc (courtesy of the Communauté Financière Africaine, or the African Financial Community) as their currency.
To speed up the macroeconomic convergence necessary for a single currency across the entire sub-region, six Anglophone Heads of State met in Accra Ghana in 2000 and agreed to create a second monetary zone for the Anglophone countries, with the ultimate aim of merging with the Francophone countries. The aim was to create a single and harmonised monetary union for all of West Africa by 2004.
The implementation of that common currency for West Africa’s Anglophone countries was postponed four times before finally being jettisoned, dimming the hopes of a single currency for the sub-region.
The convergence criteria the Economic Community of West African States set for its member countries seem to be the bane of the single currency project. While the criteria are essential, they are also very high bars to scale for the countries concerned.
<h2>The hurdles to overcome</h2>
To implement the single currency, the regional economic body set some conditions.
First, it requires all countries to achieve a single digit inflation of 5% or less, which is a difficult task. In Ghana, data shows that the average yearly inflation between 2000 and 2016 was 16.92%, which is far from a single digit. Nigeria, the largest economy in the region, recorded an average inflation of 11.92% between 2003 and 2016, a rate which far exceeds 5%.
Moreover, West African countries are net importers, even of food. Nigeria, for instance, spends USD$6.5 billion annually on food imports. This sad situation compounds the inflation problem, which is made even worse by the region’s unfavourable exchange rates.
Second, the regional economic body requires all member countries to achieve budget deficit to GDP ratios of 4% or lower before the single currency is launched. In other words, budget shortfalls should be 4% or less of the total market value of all goods and services produced in the respective member countries. It will take a miracle for this to happen by 2020, three years from now.
How can Ghana, whose total debt to GDP stood at 73.3% in 2016, be expected to attain this ratio? How about Gambia whose public debt stood at 108% of GDP in 2015? Even Nigeria, which has one of the lowest debt to GDP ratio in West Africa, is far from the milestone. Essentially, budget deficits have soared and governments will continue to borrow to finance public expenditure.
If the convergence criteria are not revised to reflect the real macroeconomic situation in the sub-region, the single currency dream will remain work-in-progress for the unforeseeable future. This is because economic growth in the sub-region is slow, poverty is rife and the fundamentals for integration are far from realisation.
<h2>Is a single currency even necessary?</h2>
A single currency could help address West Africa’s monetary problems, such as the lack of independence of central banks and non-convertibility of some currencies. Ultimately, a single currency and its associated regional institutions could also boost investor confidence and promote trade within the sub-region.
But sadly, Africa does not trade with itself. Overseas trade represents 80% of total trade on the continent. Trade between African countries accounts for a woeful 10%, compared to 40% and 60% between North American and European countries respectively.
The story is not different for West Africa where trade between countries is extremely low. The sub-region’s largest partner, the EU, accounts for 37.8% of total trade. Meanwhile Nigeria, which has the largest economy in the sub-region, exported only 2.3% and imported less than 0.5% from other West African countries in 2010. Has the trend since changed? No.
In the current circumstances, the necessity of a single currency is untenable if trade is the main motivation, except the regional commission is hoping West Africa will trade more with itself or attract more investors after the launch.
But that will not happen overnight. Even the Francophone countries which have used CFA Franc as their common currency since 1945 record less than 16% of intra-union trade.
<h2>Loss of monetary sovereignty</h2>
Launching a single currency will also require creating and empowering new regional institutions, such as the West African Central Bank, to manage or supervise monetary policy for the member countries.
The regional commission has made it clear that it’s committed to do what’s necessary to achieve its goal, but what remains to be tested is whether this commitment is real or rhetorical.
The search for wealth drives African politics. Hence it will be interesting to see how politicians react when they lose sovereignty over the management of one of the major things that draws them into politics – money.
Nigeria is expected to play a catalyst role in the single currency project, but it’s also one of the most corrupt countries in Africa. In fact, nine of the 15 member countries of the sub-region ranked between 101st and 168th in the 2016 corruption index, out of a total of 176 countries.
To some extent, a single currency and a regional central bank will reduce corruption in the individual countries. The big question is, will the politicians’ greed allow this to happen? Even if the single currency is successfully implemented in 2020, spectators should not be surprised by any chaos or renunciation of earlier political pledges when the reality starts to kick in.

Op-Ed: Why the quest for a single currency for West Africa won’t materialise soon

Ori Lewis | JERUSALEM
Israel&#8217;s ambassador to Senegal will return to his post after he was recalled last year following Dakar&#8217;s support of a U.N. Security Council resolution against Israeli settlements.
The announcement was made after a meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Senegal President Macky Sall on the sidelines of an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) gathering in Liberia
Netanyahu addressed ECOWAS as a guest speaker on Sunday and met several African leaders, including Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, the president of Mali, a Muslim state with whom Israel has no diplomatic relations.
A statement from Netanyahu&#8217;s office said Senegal had agreed to support Israel&#8217;s candidacy to become an observer nation at the Organisation of African Unity.
The two states also agreed to resume joint projects and cooperation in security and agriculture, the statement added.
Senegal, New Zealand, Malaysia and Venezuela, sponsored last December&#8217;s Security Council resolution demanding Israel end its settlement activity on occupied territory which the Palestinians hope will be part of an eventual independent state.
Netanyahu recalled the envoys to Senegal and New Zealand, Israel has no diplomatic ties with Malaysia and Venezuela.
The resolution passed in the 15-member Security Council because the United States, under the administration of former president Barack Obama, broke with its long-standing approach of diplomatically shielding Israel and did not wield its veto power, instead abstaining.
(Writing by Ori Lewis; Editing by Angus MacSwan)
&nbsp;

Israel and Senegal end diplomatic rift after leaders’ meeting

Alberto Dabo | BISSAU
West African regional bloc ECOWAS said on Tuesday it was ready to impose targeted sanctions against those it deems responsible for blocking the implementation of a deal to resolve a political crisis in Guinea-Bissau.
The former Portuguese colony&#8217;s parliament has not sat in over a year amid a dispute between rival factions, including supporters of President Jose Mario Vaz and backers of former Prime Minister Domingos Simoes Pereira.
The parties agreed to a deal following talks in Conakry, capital of neighbouring Guinea, last year, but key aspects have not been respected and there has been little let-up in the tensions that have racked the coup-prone nation.
&#8220;In the absence of the implementation of the Conakry accords within a deadline of 30 days, ECOWAS will move onto sanctions measures,&#8221; the bloc said in a statement released at the end of a mission led by Liberia&#8217;s Foreign Minister Marjon Kamara.
It gave no further details about who might be targeted and what specific sanctions would be applied.
Under the Conakry agreement, Vaz was required to appoint a new prime minister acceptable to all the various factions who would then name a new, inclusive government.
However, Vaz&#8217;s opponents have rejected his choice of Umaro Mokhtar Sissoco Embalo as the new prime minister and Pereira&#8217;s supporters have boycotted his government.
The impasse has sparked regular protest marches and raised fears of instability that diplomats fear could be exploited by drug traffickers, who have long used the turbulent nation as a transit point for shipments between South America and Europe.
(Reporting by Alberto Dabo; Writing by Joe Bavier; Editing by Gareth Jones)

ECOWAS threatens sanctions in Guinea-Bissau amid political impasse

Following the resolution of the political impasse in The Gambia, a great deal of attention has focused on the role played by the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas). The regional body brought a swift end to the potentially explosive crisis sparked by the refusal of former President Yahya Jammeh to hand over to the newly elected Adama Barrow. 
Jammeh’s flight to exile was preceded by weeks of diplomacy to persuade him to hand over power peacefully. When this failed regional troops and military assets were mobilised to install Barrow forcibly. The rest is history. Barrow is now officially in the presidential seat. 
This resounding success, unrivalled by any African regional organisation, has taken decades to craft. It is remarkable to think that at its inception in 1975, joint military action was not even on the cards. 
The fractious 1960s 
By the close of the early 1960s most countries in the West African sub-region had gained political freedom from colonial powers. They adopted a variety of political systems including multiparty democracy, one-party civilian administrations and military autocracies. The region developed quite a reputation for military coups. There were more in the region than anywhere else on the continent. 
Initial attempts to form Ecowas floundered in the early 1960s. This was due largely to the differences between Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, and Nigeria’s first prime minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, on the kind of integration necessary for the states in the region. 
The fall of these two personalities from power in 1966 did not end the political rivalries in the region. Attempts at integration were further delayed by the civil war in Nigeria between 1967 and 1970. Its aftermath further affected any chances at integration due to the struggle over the supremacy of the West African region between Nigeria and Côte d&#8217;Ivoire along Anglo-Francophone lines. 
Eventually two influential military leaders – Generals Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria and Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo – formed the nucleus of Ecowas in the 1970s. They succeeded in bringing on board the other military leaders of Dahomey (now Benin), Ghana and Niger among others. This explains the dominant role of the military in the life of the organisation. 
Ecowas was eventually formed on May 28 1975, in Nigeria as a regional economic grouping of 15 states. Membership went up to 16 when Cape Verde joined in 1976. But it declined again to 15 when Mauritania withdrew in December 2000. 
The Ecowas Treaty of 1975 envisaged the group as an economic community with the aim of promoting 
cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity. 
The grouping saw its role as raising the living standards of people in the region, increasing and maintaining economic stability, fostering closer relations among its members and contributing to the progress and development of the continent. 
It is significant that no reference was made to defence or security in any of the treaty’s 65 articles. 
How did the economic bloc blossom into a dominant sub-regional peace and security organisation in Africa? 
The need for a security organisation 
When Ecowas was formed in 1975 only Nigeria had experienced a civil war. But there was an increase in the number of violent conflicts after the late 1980s. 
Several factors contributed to the intractability and complexity of violent conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Côte d&#8217;Ivoire. These included the effects of the Cold War, economic malaise, human rights abuses and political rivalries and interests of states in the region. The conflicts had deleterious implications for peace and security of the region. 
The effect of the civil wars was that some states became places for recruiting disenchanted unemployed youth into various armed banditry groups. They pillaged the region for natural resources and committed heinous war related crimes. 
Ecowas was formed at a time when power vacillated between civilian and military rulers in the region. The period was characterised by governments accusing one another of supporting dissidents. There were also accusations of domestic problems being instigated externally. 
Against this backdrop, the treaty was revised in 1993. The “Revised Treaty” allowed the promulgation of protocols to regulate the peace and security architecture of member states. 
The peace and security architecture of Ecowas 
The first protocol promulgated was a nonaggression pact signed on April 28 1978 in Lagos, Nigeria. The region’s leaders present noted that the community 
cannot attain its objective save in an atmosphere of peace and harmonious understanding among Community members. 
This marked the beginning of future steps by member states to address security matters in the region. But the protocol proved inadequate against either external attacks or intrastate conflicts which were becoming more frequent. This led to the mutual assistance in defence protocol being passed. 
This was signed in May 1981 despite fervent opposition from Mali, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. It did not create a standing army but provisions were made for joint action in the event of any security threat to a member state through a voluntary contribution of troops. These were referred to as the Allied Armed Forces of the Community. 
But the reliance on troop contributions from member states was a major challenge. This was because by the time troops were assembled the violence would have escalated. 
These and many other bottlenecks, in particular, the harrowing experiences of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (Ecomog) in Liberia and Sierra Leone, led to the next big step. Which is why in 1999 a mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security was agreed. 
Current peace and security framework 
The 1999 protocol put in place comprehensive structures and processes that have to be followed in the event of conflict breaking out. 
The mechanism makes provision for diplomatic and military interventions. It empowers regional leaders to decide on the deployment of political and military missions. 
Ecowas has a standby force in member countries which can be deployed rapidly to prevent conflicts from escalating. The rapid deployment of troops from Nigeria and The Gambia’s neighbour Senegal in the recent deadlock is a case in point. 
Other protocols relating to the prevention, management and resolution of conflict make up a significant part of the regional peace and security architecture. These include a supplementary protocol on democracy and good governance adopted in 2001. 
There are a number of other security related structures. These include an early warning system and a mediation and security council which advises the authority of heads of state and government. In addition, there are offices of the special representatives, a council of elders and special mediators. 
But the challenge of preventing conflicts from escalating remained. To meet this challenge, a conflict prevention framework was agreed in 2008. This enabled the regional powers to harness human and financial resources from other important players such as private and civil society organisations. 
A major challenge that now remains is the financial burden associated with political and military missions. But with its long history of meeting its challenges full square, there is every chance Ecowas will make a success of that, too.

How West Africa built the muscle to rout dictators and keep the peace

Conventional wisdom tells us that good political societies are built on the principles of constitutionalism. This entails upholding the <a href="http://www.blackwellreference.com/public/tocnode?id=g9781405136532_chunk_g978140513653223">rule of law</a> and <a href="http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/vile-constitutionalism-and-the-separation-of-powers">separation of powers</a>. This is to ensure an <a href="http://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-94-007-0753-5_3064">even distribution of power</a> where a society is “<a href="https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/administrative-law/constitutionalism-good-governance-a-dangerous-law-essays.php">built on principles of law, not men</a>”.
In the 1990s many African states <a href="http://www.researchgate.net/publication/265493847_Constitutional_Reforms_and_Constitutionalism_in_Africa_Reflections_on_Some_Current_Challenges_and_Future_Prospects">reinvented their constitutions</a> to build good political societies. They moved away from one-party authoritarian states to embrace a constitutional political order and representative democracy. They also enacted two-term presidential limits. This was, as Charles Fombad <a href="http://www.buffalolawreview.org/past_issues/59_4/Fombad.pdf">tells us</a>
a clear recognition of the need for radical changes … In some cases, it meant a total break with a dreadful past … but in most cases it meant recognising that a constitutional framework built around the one party system that had bred authoritarian and dictatorial rule was a recipe for political instability and economic decline.
But the limitations on presidential terms have not entirely quashed a culture of entitlement to rule. Glimpses of this culture persist.
This is evident in what is now referred to as the “<a href="http://presidential-power.com/?p=4874">third term tragedy</a>” or the “<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/09/16/heres-how-african-leaders-stage-constitutional-coups-they-tweak-the-constitution-to-stay-in-power/">constitutional coup</a>”. This is when African presidents extend their tenure in office, effectively becoming “president for life”, changing constitutions to do so. Increasingly, this is met with civic resistance.
Burundi, Rwanda, the Congo and Burkina Faso are examples of where this has happened.
Roots of constitutionalism
Constitutionalism found its roots in <a href="http://www.sophia-project.org/uploads/1/3/9/5/13955288/elahi_socialcontract.pdf">social contract theory</a>, which was penned by <a href="http://fee.org/articles/john-locke-natural-rights-to-life-liberty-and-property/">John Locke</a> among others.
The basic argument is that humans have inalienable and natural rights to life, freedom and estate. And for us to exercise these rights, we create a political society of consent where constitutional principles reign supreme. Thus, as <a href="http://www.sophia-project.org/uploads/1/3/9/5/13955288/elahi_socialcontract.pdf">Manzoor Elahi</a> reminds us:
According to Locke, the purpose of the government and law is to uphold and protect the natural rights of men. So long as the government fulfils this purpose, the laws given by it are valid and binding, but when it ceases to fulfil it, then the laws would not have validity and the government can be thrown out of power.
This interpretation of the purpose of government also informs the <a href="http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf">principles of good governance</a>. These are transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation, responsiveness, and respecting the rule of law. The social contract between those who govern and those who are governed is founded on this <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/GoodGovernance/Pages/GoodGovernanceIndex.aspx">rights-based approach</a> to governance. This means that leaders govern at the pleasure of the people, and do not rule with sovereign license at the cost of constitutional rules. The well-being and rights of the people must be the central concern of those who govern.
Good governance entails playing by the rules. It requires accepting <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/gambia-jammeh-rejects-result-presidential-election-161210034606068">electoral defeat</a> if the people willed it so.
Cases of constitutional coups
There have been some classic examples of “constitutional coups” in recent years. These include:
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.africanleadershipcentre.org/index.php/2014-10-22-15-44-06/alc-newsletters/sept2015-issue/385-the-new-assault-on-presidential-term-limits-in-africa-focus-on-burundi">Burundi</a>, where President Pierre Nkurunziza’s machinations for a third term in 2015 led to political instability and a <a href="http://europe.newsweek.com/burundi-army-chief-says-coup-attempt-failed-327288">failed military coup</a>. He subsequently emerged victorious in an election marred by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/24/burundi-pierre-nkurunziza-wins-third-term-disputed-election">violence and intimidation</a> in 2015.</li>
<li>Congo: In 2015, President Denis Sassou Nguesso claimed that the people <a href="http://www.voanews.com/a/congo-brazzaville-opposition-to-protest-president-third-term-bid/2976658.html">wanted him</a> to extend his 32-year stay in power and announced a referendum to change the constitution to allow him to contest the election. This was met with mass protest, with people proclaiming that the “<a href="http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKCN0RS0LK20150928">Congo does not belong to Nguesso</a>”. In 2016 he won <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/congo-president-denis-sassou-nguesso-wins-election-160324040212900.html">at the polls</a> amid tight security measures and a communications black out.</li>
<li><a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2014-11-03-an-undignified-exit-the-fall-of-burkina-fasos-compaore">Burkina Faso’s Blaise Compaoré</a> was forced to flee following widespread protests against his bid to extend his 27-year rule in 2014.</li>
<li>Rwanda’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/01/rwanda-paul-kagame-third-term-office-constitutional-changes">President Paul Kagame</a> will run for a third term this year. This after the constitutional was amended to allow him another term, following a referendum to that effect. He may be in power until <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/20/rwanda-vote-gives-president-paul-kagame-extended-powers">2034</a>.</li>
</ul>
In 2015 West African states took a progressive step with a proposal to ban “constitutional coups” by limiting presidents to only two terms. But the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32808685">idea was abandoned</a> as some states in the region did not support it. This happened despite the fact that research shows Africa’s citizens largely <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno30.pdf">support limiting presidential terms</a>.
The African Union (AU) committed to a <a href="http://theconversation.com/why-zumas-african-way-is-at-odds-with-the-african-unions-vision-57589">democratic social contract</a> with <a href="http://archive.au.int/assets/images/agenda2063.pdf">Agenda 2063</a>. There is a formal promise to abide by the will of the people and to respect the rule of law. The problem rather, as <a href="http://www.buffalolawreview.org/past_issues/59_4/Fombad.pdf">Charles Fombad concludes</a>, is that
In many countries, the problems were not caused by the absence of constitutions. Rather it was the ease with which African leaders had rendered constitutions dysfunctional by regularly ignoring their provisions or amending them when it suited their convenience.
Some highlight the lack of effective opposition in Africa. But the problem also relates to views about governance and the rules. It seems the rules are made to the broken.
The AU has to be commended for taking a firm stance against regime change through <a href="https://www.files/ethz.ch/isn/105906/P197.pdf">military coup</a>. It has suspended countries for “<a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/african-union-suspends-burkina-faso-military-coup-150919073352770.html">unconstitutional regime change</a>”. But it has not been as effective in its opposition to dealing with the problem of extended presidential terms. This could be due to the <a href="http://www.saiia.org.za/policy-briefings/presidential-term-limits-a-new-african-foreign-policy-challenge">sovereignty principle</a>, which makes African states reluctant to interfere in others’ affairs.
But the problem of leaders clinging to power is only one manifestation of a lack of respect for constitutional rules in Africa. Others include the fact that opposition political parties are often <a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/02/10/rwanda-end-attacks-opposition-parties">harassed</a> and their leaders <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-uganda-opposition-leader-under-house-arrest-amid-tensions-2016-2">locked up</a>. They are also painted as illegitimate proxies for harmful <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-10-06-icg-confrontation-in-zimbabwe-turns-increasingly-violent/#.WIia6rF7GqA">foreign “third forces”</a> seeking regime change.
Gambia shows democracy advancing, but…
Many have applauded the Economic Community of West Africa <a href="http://www.ecowas.int/">(Ecowas)</a> for the role it played ensuring a peaceful transition after the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38271480">Gambian election</a>.
After President Yahya Jammeh rejected his loss, citing “<a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/gambia-jammeh-rejects-result-presidential-election-161210034606068">foreign interference</a>”, it looked like a replay of a now all-too-familiar script, wherein a leader clings on to power against the popular will.
But regional leaders had other ideas. With a <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/gambia-yahya-jammeh-final-deadline-step-170120044922953.html">not-so gentle push</a> from them, Jammeh eventually <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/jammeh-arrives-banjul-airport-stepping-170121210246506.html">accepted the electoral outcome</a> and vacated the plush presidential chair.
Yes, we may see the Gambian story as an <a href="http://europe.newsweek.com/gambia-election-result-sign-democracy-advancing-africa-528532?rm=eu">advancement for democracy</a> in Africa. And yes, there are many lessons the Southern African Development Community (SADC) can learn from Ecowas in <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-southern-africa-can-learn-from-west-africa-about-dealing-with-despots-71722">dealing decisively with despots</a>.
But the temporary Gambian crisis also points to a deeper governance problem in Africa: leadership attitudes towards “governance”. Many African leaders have yet to appreciate that constitutional rules matter. And while military coups are increasingly “<a href="http://newafricanmagazine.com/why-are-military-coups-going-out-of-fashion-in-africa">out of fashion</a>”, people on the continent need to pay attention to the “softer” methods used to entrench the “president-for-life syndrome” which threaten the continent’s democratic gains.
More importantly, given a commitment to good governance through <a href="http://au.int/en2/agenda2063">Agenda 2063</a>, African leaders must do more than show respect for the rules. They must also realise that they need to govern – not rule – at the pleasure of the people.
This would speak to building a culture of accountability and good governance through a change in mindset – instead of seeing their job as ruling the people leaders would see their role as governing the people. It would also entail vacating political office when your time is up.

Africa faces a new threat to democracy: the ‘constitutional coup’

Following the resolution of the political impasse in The Gambia, a great deal of attention has focused on the role played by the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas). The regional body brought a <a style="font-family: Roboto, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; font-weight: 400;" href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/22/gambias-defeated-leader-yahya-jammeh-goes-exile/">swift end</a> to the potentially explosive crisis sparked by the refusal of former President Yahya Jammeh to hand over to the newly elected Adama Barrow.
Jammeh’s flight to exile was preceded by weeks of diplomacy to persuade him to hand over power peacefully. When this failed regional troops and military assets were <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/19/new-gambian-leader-adama-barrow-sworn-in-at-ceremony-in-senegal">mobilised</a> to install Barrow forcibly. The rest is history. Barrow is now officially in the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/gambia-president-adama-barrow-pledges-reforms-170128194124520.html">presidential seat</a>.
This resounding success, unrivalled by any African regional organisation, has taken decades to craft. It is remarkable to think that <a href="http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/economic-community-of-west-african-states-">at its inception in 1975</a>, joint military action was not even on the cards.
<h2>The fractious 1960s</h2>
By the close of the early 1960s most countries in the West African sub-region had gained political freedom from colonial powers. They adopted a variety of political systems including multiparty democracy, one-party civilian administrations and military autocracies. The region developed quite a reputation for <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/why-are-there-so-many-coups-west-africa/329209/">military coups</a>. There were more in the region than anywhere else on the continent.
Initial attempts to form Ecowas floundered in the early 1960s. This was due largely to the differences between Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, and Nigeria’s first prime minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, on the kind of integration necessary for the states in the region.
The fall of these two personalities from power in 1966 did not end the political rivalries in the region. Attempts at integration were further delayed by the civil war in Nigeria between 1967 and 1970. Its aftermath further affected any chances at integration due to the struggle over the supremacy of the West African region between Nigeria and Côte d&#8217;Ivoire along Anglo-Francophone lines.
Eventually two influential military leaders – Generals Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria and Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo – formed the nucleus of Ecowas in the 1970s. They succeeded in bringing on board the other military leaders of Dahomey (now Benin), Ghana and Niger among others. This explains the dominant role of the military in the life of the organisation.
Ecowas was eventually formed on May 28 1975, in Nigeria as a regional economic grouping of 15 states. Membership went up to 16 when Cape Verde joined in 1976. But it declined again to 15 when Mauritania withdrew in December 2000.
The <a href="http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/351_ecowas%20treaty%20of%201975.pdf">Ecowas Treaty of 1975</a> envisaged the group as an economic community with the aim of promoting
<blockquote>
cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity.
</blockquote>
The grouping saw its role as raising the living standards of people in the region, increasing and maintaining economic stability, fostering closer relations among its members and contributing to the progress and development of the continent.
It is significant that no reference was made to defence or security in any of the treaty’s 65 articles.
How did the economic bloc blossom into a dominant sub-regional peace and security organisation in Africa?
<h2>The need for a security organisation</h2>
When Ecowas was formed in 1975 only Nigeria had experienced a <a href="https://oldnaija.wordpress.com/2015/07/26/the-nigerian-civil-war/">civil war</a>. But there was an increase in the number of violent conflicts after the late 1980s.
Several factors contributed to the intractability and complexity of violent conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Côte d&#8217;Ivoire. These included the effects of the Cold War, economic malaise, human rights abuses and political rivalries and interests of states in the region. The conflicts had deleterious implications for peace and security of the region.
The effect of the civil wars was that some states became places for recruiting disenchanted unemployed youth into various armed banditry groups. They pillaged the region for natural resources and committed heinous war related crimes.
Ecowas was formed at a time when power vacillated between civilian and military rulers in the region. The period was characterised by governments accusing one another of supporting dissidents. There were also accusations of domestic problems being instigated externally.
Against this backdrop, the treaty was revised in 1993. The “Revised Treaty” allowed the promulgation of protocols to regulate the peace and security architecture of member states.
<h2>The peace and security architecture of Ecowas</h2>
The first protocol promulgated was a nonaggression pact signed on April 28 1978 in Lagos, Nigeria. The region’s leaders present noted that the community
<blockquote>
cannot attain its objective save in an atmosphere of peace and harmonious understanding among Community members.
</blockquote>
This marked the beginning of future steps by member states to address security matters in the region. But the protocol proved inadequate against either external attacks or intrastate conflicts which were becoming more frequent. This led to the mutual assistance in defence protocol being passed.
This was signed in May 1981 despite fervent opposition from Mali, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. It did not create a standing army but provisions were made for joint action in the event of any security threat to a member state through a voluntary contribution of troops. These were referred to as the Allied Armed Forces of the Community.
But the reliance on troop contributions from member states was a major challenge. This was because by the time troops were assembled the violence would have escalated.
These and many other bottlenecks, in particular, the harrowing experiences of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (Ecomog) in Liberia and Sierra Leone, led to the next big step. Which is why in 1999 a <a href="http://www.wanep.org/wanep/attachments/article/101/tp_ecowas_subregional_peacekeeping.pdf">mechanism</a> for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security was agreed.
<h2>Current peace and security framework</h2>
The 1999 protocol put in place comprehensive structures and processes that have to be followed in the event of conflict breaking out.
The mechanism makes provision for diplomatic and military interventions. It empowers regional leaders to decide on the deployment of political and military missions.
Ecowas has a standby force in member countries which can be deployed rapidly to prevent conflicts from escalating. The rapid deployment of troops from Nigeria and The Gambia’s neighbour Senegal in the recent deadlock is a case in point.
Other protocols relating to the prevention, management and resolution of conflict make up a significant part of the regional peace and security architecture. These include a supplementary protocol on democracy and good governance adopted in 2001.
There are a number of other security related structures. These include an early warning system and a mediation and security council which advises the authority of heads of state and government. In addition, there are offices of the special representatives, a council of elders and special mediators.
But the challenge of preventing conflicts from escalating remained. To meet this challenge, a conflict prevention framework was agreed in 2008. This enabled the regional powers to harness <a href="http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/womenandjustice/upload/ECOWAS-Conflict-Prevention-Framework.pdf">human and financial resources</a> from other important players such as private and civil society organisations.
A major challenge that now remains is the financial burden associated with political and military missions. But with its long history of meeting its challenges full square, there is every chance Ecowas will make a success of that, too.
<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://counter.theconversation.edu.au/content/71688/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" width="1" height="1" alt="The Conversation"/>
<a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/abdul-jalilu-ateku-159513">Abdul-Jalilu Ateku</a>, PhD Candidate in International Relations, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-nottingham-1192">University of Nottingham</a>
This article was originally published on <a href="http://theconversation.com">The Conversation</a>. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-west-africa-built-the-muscle-to-rout-dictators-and-keep-the-peace-71688">original article</a>.

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