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Sudan&#8217;s ruling military council and main opposition alliance have agreed on a constitutional declaration to prepare for the introduction of a transitional government. The agreement comes after months of negotiations between the military council and the Alliance for Freedom and Change (AFC), but what does it all mean? And what comes next? To help unpack what the country could potentially be seeing in the coming weeks and months, International Relations Expert, Emery Nzirabatinya joins CNBC Africa for more.

Sudan’s ruling military council & main opposition alliance agree on transitional government, but what next for Sudan

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Last week, Sudan’s ruling military council and an opposition alliance signed a power-sharing deal aimed at leading the country to democracy. It was a milestone that revived hope for an end of the political crisis. However, skepticism over the effectiveness of the deal also exists. Rozan Ahmed, Activist from Sudan joins CNBC Africa for more.

Will Sudan’s power-sharing deal hold?

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Over the past few weeks we’ve seen two big events take the headlines in the region, one being the stepping down of long standing Sudanese President, Omar Al-Bashir, and the subsequent protests and devastating strife in determining new leadership; the other more recent being the Ethiopian Army’s Chief of Staff and other top officials being shot amidst an attempted coup. Chief Strategist and Analyst, Ken Agutamba joins CNBC Africa to decipher exactly how this impacts the rest of the region.

Assessing the security situation in the EA region

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Sudan is into the 3rd day of a civil disobedience campaign that protesters launched to demand a civilian role. Four people were reported dead on the first day of the strike, meanwhile opposition leader Yasir Arman along with other opposition top figures have reportedly been deported to neighbouring South Sudan. Sudanese activist, Rozan Ahmed joins CNBC Africa for more.

Activist Rozan Ahmed gives update on Sudan’s civil disobedience campaign

By <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/mattia-cacciatori-140900">Mattia Cacciatori</a>, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-bath-1325">University of Bath</a>

A military coup d’etat in Sudan has ended Omar al-Bashir’s 30-year rule. In a widely publicised press conference, the country’s Defence Minister Awad Ibn Ouf <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-47891470">announced</a>

<blockquote>
the toppling of the regime and detaining (of) its chief in a secure place.
</blockquote>

Al-Bashir’s whereabouts is of interest because he’s wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide in Darfur. 

The ICC’s case stretches back to 2005 with the publication of <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2005/02/127392-un-commission-finds-sudanese-government-responsible-crimes-darfur">a UN report</a> that accused the Sudanese government of systematic abuses in Darfur. The United Nations Security Council then referred the suspects to the ICC. 

In the following years, the ICC would release two arrest warrants against al-Bashir – in 2009 and in 2010 – on several counts of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. In 2014, the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/14/omar-al-bashir-celebrates-icc-decision-to-halt-darfur-investigation">shelved the case</a> due to a lack of cooperation in pushing for al-Bashir’s arrest. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/oct/21/omar-bashir-travels-world-despite-war-crime-arrest-warrant">Many</a> saw the shelving as emblematic of the court’s lack of power over powerful individuals, especially sitting heads of state.

The fact that al-Bashir has been deposed will again raise questions about whether there’s a possibility of seeing the former Sudanese president facing trial at the ICC. Commentators have already expressed different opinions on whether he will or won’t end up facing trial at The Hague. Views either highlight the fact that he’s likely to face trial because he no longer enjoys the privileges associated with his position. Or that he still has influence over the new government and, as such, bringing him to The Hague would be extremely complicated.

I believe the trickier question is whether the ICC should prosecute the former Sudanese president. This might seem like a redundant and even immoral question – if not him, then who? But it’s not that simple. 

Let me be clear. I have no sympathy for al-Bashir – nor for any dictator whose policies harm, or aim to harm, civilians. 

But I believe the particular circumstances of al-Bashir’s case mean that the court is between a rock and a hard place. That’s because two very difficult issues arise out of the present circumstances. Both have serious implications for the court and its work, as well as whether sitting heads of state believe they can act with impunity.

<h2>The conundrum</h2>

The idea behind attempted prosecutions of sitting heads of state is that they should be prosecuted – irrespective of their position – in instances when crimes of huge magnitude have been committed.

Originally, the idea was to discourage sitting heads of states from committing heinous crimes by putting in place limits to the exercise of sovereign statehood. In other words, knowing that your position of power is not going to prevent international prosecution, should ideally act as a deterrent. 

Unfortunately, when the ICC attempted to turn this idea into pragmatic action, it met extraordinary resistance. In Kenya, <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-statement-05-12-2014-2">for instance</a>, the prosecution against the current sitting Head of State Uhuru Kenyatta, was dropped in 2014 after the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, Fatou Bensouda, said it was impossible to investigate the crimes further. This was because witnesses were terrified to testify and the Kenyan government refused to cooperate.

In recent years the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/12/african-union-icc-kenyan-president">the African Union</a> has gone as far as suggesting that in the future the court should rather focus on mid-level officials.

But if the ICC doesn’t prosecute al-Bashir, it will give credit to critics who think that the court is essentially powerless against the most powerful political figures in a country. 

On the other hand, if it does, it would suggest that powerful individuals can only be prosecuted when they leave their positions of power. 

And here lies my preoccupation. 

If the Court prosecuted al-Bashir right now, it would be sending a worrying message to other dictators: do whatever you want, as long as you maintain power. Or, to be even more explicit, do whatever you can to maintain power. 

This is a strikingly dangerous message to project for two reasons.

<h2>Dangerous message</h2>

The first problematic message that taking al-Bashir to court would send involves war-torn countries.

The fact that many of the cases in which the ICC is expected to act happen in regions and countries at war, the message is likely to hinder the resolution of a conflict by providing an extra incentive to those in power not to step down. 

Syria provides an interesting example. In the context of the country’s civil war, an al-Bashir prosecution at this stage would warn Syrian leader Bashar Hafez al-Assad about what could happen if he stepped down. Given that recent diplomatic <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/syria-talks-led-russia-iran-turkey-revived-sochi-180730152251886.html">talks</a> to end the Syrian conflict largely revolved around Assad renouncing his presidency, seeing al-Bashir facing trial could stiffen Assad’s position even more.

The second problem is one of perception. To see al-Bashir face trial at The Hague, the Court needs the cooperation of the newly installed military government. But, as academic and Sudan expert Alex de Waal <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/11/world/africa/omar-bashir-sudan.html">points out</a>, al-Bashir was a spider at the centre of an intricate web. And it’s almost certain that at least parts of the new government have been involved in the crimes for which al-Bashir is wanted. Cooperation has historically meant that the Court would need to implicitly agree with the new government that it wouldn’t prosecute its members. 

There’s an uncomfortable precedent to this. The memory of Luis Moreno Ocampo, the former Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, posing for pictures with Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni’s government are still vivid. Back then, the major concern was about impartiality. As Mark Kersten has pointed out, this was <a href="https://justiceinconflict.org/2015/03/19/why-the-icc-wont-prosecute-museveni/">seen as</a> the ICC neglecting state-perpetrated crimes. The Court still needs [to recover from] this incident. 

Where does this leave the ICC? The situation isn’t easy to solve. It seems that the power that states still retain over the Court is an insurmountable obstacle in the prosecution of sitting heads of state. I particular, their willingness, or not, to cooperate. 

In this sense, I think that the ICC is in a lose/lose situation. 

Unfortunately, developments around any case against al-Bashir aren’t likely to redress these problems. They’re more likely to highlight them even more.<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115388/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" style="border: none !important; box-shadow: none !important; margin: 0 !important; max-height: 1px !important; max-width: 1px !important; min-height: 1px !important; min-width: 1px !important; opacity: 0 !important; outline: none !important; padding: 0 !important; text-shadow: none !important" />

<a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/mattia-cacciatori-140900">Mattia Cacciatori</a>, Lecturer in International Relations and International Security, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-bath-1325">University of Bath</a>

This article is republished from <a href="http://theconversation.com">The Conversation</a> under a Creative Commons license. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/al-bashir-why-the-icc-is-between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place-115388">original article</a>.

Why the ICC is between a rock and a hard place when it comes to Sudan’s Al-Bashir

By Pieter Scribante, Economist and Political Analyst at NKC African Economics



Government sources are reporting that President Omar Al Bashir has stepped down as president of Sudan, according to Reuters.



The
military has taken control of the country and is arresting government officials
– including former cabinet ministers and the leader of the ruling National
Congress Party (NCP) Ahmed Harun. 



The
current whereabouts of Mr Bashir and Prime Minister Motazz Moussa are unknown,
but there are reports that they are in transition talks with the military. 



The
First Vice President and Defence Minister Ahmed Awad Ibn Auf, an old ally of Mr
Bashir, has sided with the military and has been selected to head a transitional
government. 



The
military was seen moving through the streets of Khartoum and raiding the
headquarters of the Islamic Movement which is headed by Bashir. Radio and
television stations were placed on alert this morning, and at 14:00 Mr Ibn Auf
addressed the nation with the highly anticipated “important announcement”. 



The
defence minister stated that a two-year transition period has begun, with the
military leading the country and relieving the previous regime of their power.
He also issued a new state of emergency and suspended the constitution, with
more news expected as the situation develops. 



The military coup d’état follows nearly four months of continuous anti-government demonstrations which started on December 18. These protests were initially sparked by deteriorating economic conditions such as rapid inflation, fuel shortages and a lack of liquidity. 



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On
Saturday, April 6, a coalition of opposition parties headed by the Sudanese
Professionals’ Association (SPA), the main protest organisers, organised the
biggest mass protest yet seen with an estimated 500,000 people. 



This
marked the anniversary of the end of Sudan’s 1985 national uprising, which led
to the overthrow of President Ja’afar Nimeiri, in favour of a democratically
led government. 



Clashes
on Saturday between the protesters and the security forces ensued, with the
security forces – meaning police and the National Intelligence and Security
Services (NISS) – using tear gas and live ammunition against the demonstrators.
This was a change in approach after uncommon restraint shown since protests
began late last year. 



Government
sources estimate that 21 people have been killed, including five soldiers. 



The
biggest twist in events happened when soldiers intervened to protect the
protesters against the security forces (on two separate occasions) with some of
them being killed. The protesters focused their attention of the army and
started protesting in front of their headquarters, calling for the military to
rise against the president and support their cause as they did in 1985. 



The
role of the army has caused may to compare events in Sudan with those in
Algeria where a protest movement also led to the toppling of a regime. 



Below we show data comparing protest escalation in the run-up to government transitions in North African states in recent years. Compared to the ‘Arab Spring’ events of 2011, which escalated very quickly as in Algeria this year, the Sudan revolt has been a sustained campaign of nearly four months and is more like events in Egypt in 2013. 



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Thursday’s
events mark the end of Mr Bashir’s 30-year rule which was marred by conflict,
accusations of war crimes, corruption, and the underdevelopment of Sudan. It is
unknown what is going to happen to him as he is wanted by the International
Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in
Darfur in 2003. 



While
they will be happy to see the back of the dictator, protesters have emphasised
that they want a civilian transitional government which contrasts with the
announcement by the military. They have said that they are willing to go back
to the streets if the army takes over with Mr Ibn Auf ruling the country as he
was the minister in charge of the protest crackdowns since the national
emergency declaration on February 22. 



The
recent announcement fell short of the protester’s demands and is likely to
inspire further demonstrations across the country.



Data: <a href="https://www.jonathanmpowell.com/coup-detat-dataset.html">Powell, Jonathan &amp; Clayton Thyne. 2011</a>. Global Instances of Coups from 1950-Present. Journal of Peace Research 48(2):249-259 and The Armed Conflict Location &amp; Event Data Project (Acled).

Op-Ed: Sudan’s military takes control of the country

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Latest reports from Sudan indicate that the military has said it will not extradite deposed president Omar Al-Bashir who is charged with war crimes. Meanwhile, protesters have vowed not to stop protesting until a civilian rule is established. Hassan Elhagali, Professor of Political science at the University of Khartoum joins CNBC Africa to help us understand Bashir’s fate and the current situation.

Sudan unrest: Latest up-date

By <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/andrew-edward-tchie-326213">Andrew Edward Tchie</a>, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-essex-1291">University of Essex</a>

Following months of protests, and a prolonged sit-in outside the military headquarters in Khartoum, Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir was placed under house arrest on April 11 as the country’s military <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-politics/sudans-bashir-steps-down-government-sources-say-idUSKCN1RN0AY">prepared for a transitional government</a>.

Many have described the Sudanese uprising as a “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/sudan-protests-dead-bread-protests-180112095320512.html">bread protest</a>” against a rise in inflation. In fact the Sudanese people took to the streets for much more than a struggling economy, or the price of bread. They have been calling for freedom, peace, justice and the <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190406-sudan-thousands-rally-for-bashirs-departure/">downfall of the regime</a>. 

And they have finally won. 

The generation leading the uprising was born and raised during <a href="https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2016/af/265306.htm">al-Bashir’s 30-year rule</a>. The protesters are mostly young professionals who have been directly affected by the regime’s <a href="https://books.google.co.ke/books?hl=en&amp;lr=&amp;id=9dWLDwAAQBAJ&amp;oi=fnd&amp;pg=PP1&amp;dq=islamization+and+arabization+policies+sudan+&amp;ots=9M0xKuJv1-&amp;sig=uq8DQBeecnBb0qaB68aQMN1zaGw&amp;redir_esc=y#v=onepage&amp;q=islamization%20and%20arabization%20policies%20sudan&amp;f=false">Islamisation and Arabisation policies</a>. 

These policies have been particularly harsh against women’s freedoms and rights, which explains why young Sudanese women are at the heart of the uprising. The policies have also resulted in multiple years of conflict and insecurity in Darfur, South Kordofan, and the Blue Nile. 

Sudan’s governing system has already deteriorated because of years of state autocracy, nepotism, corruption and violent conflict. 

Al-Bashir’s removal may bring down the state if a strong successor isn’t positioned to replace him. But in my view, given how Sudan has historically been run, the democratic preferences of many young protesters is unlikely to come to fruition. Their expectations for a functioning democracy, with free and fair elections, and constitutional freedoms will not be met unless the next leader of Sudan is a reformist. 

<h2>Al-Bashir’s first responses</h2>

The regime responded to the protests in three ways. 

First, al-Bashir tried to quickly reconsolidate his power by proposing constitutional changes that would have allowed him to stand for reelection in 2020. That was quickly <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2019/02/16/sudan-proposal-to-scrap-term-limits-shelved-amidst-persistent-protests/">taken off the table</a>. 

He then declared a year-long nationwide <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/02/28/omar-al-bashir-declares-a-state-of-emergency-in-sudan">state of emergency</a>. The emergency state prohibited “unauthorised” gatherings and movements. Violence followed as the state deployed <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/04/sudan-government-mounts-lethal-offensive-against-protesters-killing-nine-blocking-food-and-water-supplies/">heavy-handed tactics</a> to break up the protests. 

Al-Bashir also dissolved federal and state governments, replacing almost all of Sudan’s 18 state governors with army officers. And he <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/sudanNews/idAFL5N20H5X9">ordered parliament</a> to delay deliberations over proposed constitutional amendments that would allow him to run for an extra-constitutional term in next year’s elections. 

When the protests didn’t subside he called for broad-based dialogue. 

In a bid to stay in power, al-Bashir also reached out to those who had backed him financially on previous occasions. These included the Persian Gulf states as well as Egypt and Russia. However, these allies have done little more than offer him <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-protests-qatar/qatari-emir-hosts-bashir-backs-unity-in-restive-sudan-idUSKCN1PH1I5">vague statements</a> of support.

<hr>

 
 
 Read more:
 <a href="http://theconversation.com/how-foreign-backing-is-keeping-sudans-omar-al-bashir-in-power-109522">How foreign backing is keeping Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir in power</a>
 
 

<hr>


He also began to lose the support of Western backers. Once warm to al-Bashir, they recently <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-britain-norway-demand-political-transition-plan-in-sudan/4868303.html?utm_source=Media+Review+for+April+10%2C+2019&amp;utm_campaign=Media+Review+for+April+10%2C+2019&amp;utm_medium=email">began to issue stern reprimands</a>.

<h2>The protests</h2>

By the time al-Bashir stepped down protests had taken hold in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/24/world/africa/sudan-protests-omar-hassan-al-bashir.html">more than 35 cities</a> across the country. People took to the streets in more and more places following the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/prompted-protests-sudan-181224114651302.html">first demonstration</a> in the northern Nile-side town of Atbara. 

The current uprising was triggered by a government decision to <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-s-plans-to-lift-subsidies-meet-fierce-resistance">lift subsidies</a> on essential commodities and to <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/sudan-bread-price-protests-rebellion-government-khartoum-a8697986.html">drastically increase</a> bread prices. In a matter of weeks, the protest in Atbara would reach the capital Khartoum 349 kilometres away. 

As protests erupted across the country agents of the powerful National Intelligence and Security Service and riot police began to crack down on demonstrators. Throughout, however, the army refrained from intervening. Rumours began to surface that al-Bashir was ready to hand over power to the armed force. But this was swiftly rejected by the Minister of Information and government spokesman of the government, Hassan Ismail.

In the final days before al-Bashir stepped down thousands of demonstrators reached the ministry compound in Khartoum. This also houses al-Bashir’s residence, the secret service headquarters and the defence ministry.

Protesters then upped the stakes by trying to gain support from the army. What began to emerge was that senior officers were possibly weakening, or that they were hoping to use the protests to pressure factions within the ruling elite. 

Protesters used a number of tactics to keep the momentum going. These included using social media such as Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp. All evolved during the uprising despite the government’s attempts to block the user, and Virtual Private Networks were used to access the women’s only Facebook group called “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/sudans-women-expose-injustice-facebook-190216164557780.html">Minbar Chat</a>”. 

Videos recorded by the protesters became important in documenting the crimes perpetrated by the security forces during the peaceful protests. They also became the main means of informing the Sudanese people and the international community about the brutality of al-Bashir’s regime. 

Now that al-Bashir has resigned he will probably be required to leave the country by agreeing to safe passage to a friendly state, possibly somewhere like Egypt, or Qatar. The only way he can remain in Sudan is if he had prior agreement with the military to ensure his safety. It’s possible that the new generals he appointed after the declaration of a state of emergency might side with him. 

Their support could have been one of the reasons why he felt that he could step down. Looking ahead, with or without Bashir, there’s also a possibility that the protests could continue if the people of Sudan feel that the swamp has not been drained of all the regime’s oppressive leaders.<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115306/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" style="border: none !important; box-shadow: none !important; margin: 0 !important; max-height: 1px !important; max-width: 1px !important; min-height: 1px !important; min-width: 1px !important; opacity: 0 !important; outline: none !important; padding: 0 !important; text-shadow: none !important" />

<a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/andrew-edward-tchie-326213">Andrew Edward Tchie</a>, Editor, Armed Conflict Database; Research Fellow, Conflict, Security and Development at International Institute for Strategic Studies, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-essex-1291">University of Essex</a>

This article is republished from <a href="http://theconversation.com">The Conversation</a> under a Creative Commons license. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-sudans-protesters-upped-the-ante-and-forced-al-bashir-from-power-115306">original article</a>.

How Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir was forced out of power by protesters

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Omar Al Bashir who swept to the presidency of Sudan at the head of a military coup in 1989, has been shown the door by the sons of his soldiers. Denis Dumo, Journalist and Security Analyst joins CNBC Africa for more.

Omar Al Bashir steps down after three decades in power

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Sudanese President since 1993 Omar Al Bashir has stepped down after months of unrest in the Capital Khartoum. And now for more on this, Sudanese Freelance Journalist Elzahraa Jadallah joins CNBC Africa on phone to discuss the end of Bashir&#8217;s regime.

Sudan’s Bashir out and arrested

CAIRO (Reuters) &#8211; Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir has stepped down and consultations are under way to set up a transitional council to run the country, government sources and a provincial minister said on Thursday.



The minister of production and economic resources in North Darfur Adel Mahjoub Hussein told the Dubai-based al-Hadath TV that “there are consultations to form a military council to take over power after President Bashir stepped down”.



Reporting by Khalid Abdelaziz in Khartoum and Ali Abdelaty in Cairo, writing by Sami Aboudi, editing by Aidan Lewis

Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir steps down

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One of the most controversial presidents in Africa – who narrowly escaped arrest in South Africa – has stepped down. Omar Al Bashir who swept to the presidency of Sudan at the head of a military coup in 1989, has been shown the door by the sons of his soldiers. A military council will now plot the way forward for the oil rich nation. CNBC Africa’s Chris Bishop looks into the background of the days of Al Bashir.

Sudan’s Al Bashir steps down, army to announce transition

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Reports from Sudan suggest that President Omar Al Bashir has stepped down after months of protests against his rule. According to government sources, consultations are under way to form a transitional council to run the country. For more CNBC Africa is joined by Rozan Ahmed, a Sudanese activist who has been part of the demonstrations.

Sudanese Activist speaks out on Bashir’s removal from power

CAIRO/DUBAI (Reuters) &#8211; Sudanese authorities are blocking access to popular social media platforms used to organise and broadcast nationwide anti-government protests triggered by an economic crisis, internet users say.



Sudan has been rocked by near-daily demonstrations over the past two weeks. Protesters have set alight ruling party buildings and have called on President Omar al-Bashir, who took power in 1989, to step down.



In a country where the state tightly controls traditional media, the internet has become a key information battleground. Of Sudan’s 40 million people, some 13 million use the internet and more than 28 million own mobile phones, local media say.



Authorities have not repeated the internet blackout they imposed during deadly protests in 2013. But the head of Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Service, Salah Abdallah, told a rare news conference on Dec. 21: “There was a discussion in the government about blocking social media sites and in the end it was decided to block them.”



Users of the three main telecommunications operators in the country — Zain, MTN and Sudani — said access to Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp has only been possible through use of a virtual private network (VPN).



Though VPNs can bring their own connection problems and some Sudanese are unaware of their existence, activists have used them widely to organise and document the demonstrations.



Hashtags in Arabic such as “Sudan’s_cities_revolt” have been widely circulated from Sudan and abroad. Hashtags in English such as #SudanRevolts have also been used.



“Social media has a really big impact, and it helps with forming public opinion and transmitting what’s happening in Sudan to the outside,” said Mujtaba Musa, a Sudanese Twitter user with over 50,000 followers who has been active in documenting the protests.



NetBlocks, a digital rights NGO, said data it collected, including from thousands of Sudanese volunteers, provided evidence of “an extensive internet censorship regime”.



Bader al-Kharafi, CEO of parent company Zain Group, told Reuters: “Some websites may be blocked for technical reasons beyond the company’s specialisation.”



Neither the National Telecommunications Corporation, which oversees the sector in Sudan, nor MTN or Sudani could be reached for comment. Twitter and Facebook, which also owns WhatsApp, declined to comment.



“While Sudan has&nbsp;a long history of systematically&nbsp;censoring print and broadcast media, online media has been relatively untouched despite its exponential growth&#8230; in recent years,” said Mai Truong of U.S.-based advocacy group Freedom House.



“The authorities have only now started to follow the playbook of other authoritarian governments.”



Additional reporting by Ahmed Hagagy in Kuwait; Editing by Aidan Lewis and Gareth Jones

Why Sudan has just blocked access to popular social media platforms

<figure><img decoding="async" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/219387/original/file-20180517-155564-upsa5z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" alt="File 20180517 155564 upsa5z.jpg?ixlib=rb 1.1" /><figcaption>Burundi’s Pierre Nkurunziza is one of many authoritarian African leaders. 
AMISOM Public Information/Flickr</figcaption></figure>
<a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/cheryl-hendricks-267661">Cheryl Hendricks</a>, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-johannesburg-1275">University of Johannesburg</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/gabriel-ngah-kiven-482032">Gabriel Ngah Kiven</a>, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-johannesburg-1275">University of Johannesburg</a>
There is mounting concern in Africa about a lack of leadership as well as an increasing trend of hard-won democratic rights being reversed. One way this is being done is through presidential term limits being abandoned, or extended. This in turn is leading to a reemergence of authoritarian politics, and political violence.
Extending or abolishing term limits is not unique to the continent. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin won a fourth term <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/18/world/europe/election-russia-putin-president.html">in March 2018</a> after changes to the constitution and some nimble political footwork. And the Chinese parliament <a href="https://www.independent.ie/.../china-abolishes-presidential-term-limits-36692282.html">recently voted</a> to abolish term limits allowing for the possibility of President Xi Jinping becoming president for life. Given that Russia and China play an influential role on the African continent these events don’t bode well for the future of presidents sticking to term limits on the continent.
Burundi is a case in point. A poll <a href="https://theconversation.com/democracy-in-peril-burundis-referendum-will-cement-nkurunzizas-grip-on-power-96544">is being held</a> to amend the constitution to extend presidential term limits from five to seven years. Incumbency would be restricted to two consecutive terms. But the amendment doesn’t apply retroactively which means that President Pierre Nkurunziza could possibly remain in office until 2034. If he lives that long (he’s 55-years-old), and given that he assumed the position in 2005, this would make him president for 29 years.
Burundi is far from alone. Rwanda, Togo, Gabon, Uganda, Chad, Cameroon, Djibouti, Republic of Congo, Sudan, Eritrea, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have all fiddled with term limits. They’ve done this by abolishing, amending or ignoring them, or by simply not holding elections. Other countries such as Ethiopia, Gambia, Lesotho, and Morocco <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/term-limits-for-african-leaders-linked-to-stability/">have never</a> introduced term limits.
Some bids to remove or extend term limits and have failed. These include Frederick Chiluba in 2001 and more recently Edgar Lungu in Zambia, Olusegun Obesanjo of Nigeria (2005), Mamadou Tandja of Niger(2009-2010) and Blaise Compaore of Burkino Faso (2014).
Noteworthy is the fact that many West African countries actually adhere to term limits. This was recognised recently when Ellen Johnson Sirleaf received the Mo Ibrahim <a href="http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/prize/">leadership prize</a> after duly serving her constitutionally mandated term.
The upward trend of amending or abolishing constitutional term limits is likely to increase if organisations like the African Union (AU) don’t deal with the problem. In many countries citizens showing their disapproval, have been met with repression and violence. Large-scale political violence is likely to be the consequence if the trend persists.
<h2>A rolling back of rights</h2>
Africa went through a wave of democratisation from the 1990s. Citizens took to the streets demanding democratic rights. In many countries, the uprisings ended decades of one-partyism and personal rule. The key demands were for multi-party democracy, constitutionalism and that democratic norms and standards be institutionalised.
It’s in this milieu that countries adopted a bill of rights, the rule of law, checks and balances and term limits. Presidential term limits were deemed necessary for a number of reasons. The view was that <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2015/10/05/how-and-why-term-limits-matter">they would enable</a> better governance, equal opportunity to serve in government, curb patronage politics as well as end authoritarianism. These norms and standards were also seen as a way to stabilise countries <a href="http://www.monitor.co.ug/SpecialReports/688342-688342-ptx9ooz/index.html">politically</a>.
It certainly seems that these constitutional gains are being eroded by heads of state seeking to prolong their stay in power. There also appears to be little concerted attempt by bodies such as the AU to stop the erosion of hard-fought for democratic rights.
The AU’s silence may be because of ambiguity in norms and policy, and because of its leadership. The AU’s Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, which was ratified in 2012, rejects unconstitutional changes of government. But it doesn’t say anything specifically about abolishing term limits. <a href="http://archive.ipu.org/idd-E/afr_charter.pdf">Article 23 (5)</a> notes that countries will have appropriate sanction imposed on them if there are:
<blockquote>Any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments, which is an infringement on the principals of democratic change of government</blockquote>
But it doesn’t spell out what type of amendments are being referred to.
The second factor has to do with the fact that many holding leadership positions at the AU are the same men who have amended or abandoned term limits – or come from the countries that have done so. This suggests the organisation won’t be tackling the “third termism” trend any time soon.
<h2>Spurious reasons for extending stays</h2>
A number of arguments have been put forward by leaders seeking to extend, or simply abandoning, term limits.
One is that term limits prevent <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Mugabe-slams-two-term-limit-on-African-leaders-20150614">people’s choice</a> of president. Another is that African leaders have much more to do to bring about development and therefore need more time. A third is that they have the sovereign right to govern and change constitutions as they see fit. And finally, the strongman argument around a president’s ability to keep the country united and to create peace and stability.
Rwanda is a case in point. President Paul Kagame <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/08/05/rwandas-paul-kagame-landslide-poll-win-around-98-votes/">received 99%</a> of the vote in August 2017. There’s no gainsaying that there have been remarkable achievements in rebuilding a post-genocide Rwanda. But if there isn’t anybody (and this is doubtful) capable of challenging Kagame after 18 years of rule, then he hasn’t created an environment for democratic leadership to emerge.
We should also be wary of election results that yield 99% support as this smacks of the heyday of one-man and one-party rule.
<h2>The curse of third terminism</h2>
As Africans prepare to celebrate Africa Day on the 25th of May, we need to keep in mind the ideas that inspired <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/organisation-african-unity-oau">formation</a> of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963 and the <a href="https://au.int/en/history/oau-and-au">African Union</a> in 2001. These were the Pan-African ideals of political and economic integration, solidarity, unity, dignity, justice and equality for all.
The growing trend of “third termism” is likely to prevent African countries from reaching these goals yet again as the interests of individuals are placed above those of citizens and countries.
Africa needs visionary and courageous leadership, not benevolent or autocratic rulers. It needs leaders that can create the enabling environment for democracy, peace, and development to thrive and endure, and for citizens to live to their fullest potential.
Africa also needs citizens who will hold leaders to account and who will contribute to the realisation of the vision of a democratic pan-African future.
As Africans we don’t have to make a choice between democracy and development. We deserve both.
<a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/cheryl-hendricks-267661">Cheryl Hendricks</a>, Professor of Political Science, <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-johannesburg-1275">University of Johannesburg</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/gabriel-ngah-kiven-482032">Gabriel Ngah Kiven</a>, PhD candidate in Political Studies at the Department of Politics and International Relations , <a href="http://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-johannesburg-1275">University of Johannesburg</a>
This article was originally published on <a href="http://theconversation.com">The Conversation</a>. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/presidential-term-limits-slippery-slope-back-to-authoritarianism-in-africa-96796">original article</a>.

Op-Ed: Is Africa on a slippery slope back to authoritarianism?

Author: World Bank &amp; CNBC Africa
The World Bank Group’s latest Doing Business 2018: Reforming to Create Jobs report ranks New Zealand, Singapore and Denmark in first, second and third spots, respectively, followed by the Republic of Korea; Hong Kong SAR, China; United States; United Kingdom; Norway; Georgia; and Sweden. Mauritius, in 25th place is the highest ranked economy in Sub-Saharan Africa.
On Africa it revealed the following: Nigeria, Malawi and Zambia were among this year’s top 10 improvers, based on reforms undertaken. For the first time, the group of top 10 improvers includes economies of all income levels and sizes, with half being top improvers for the first time – El Salvador, India, Malawi, Nigeria, and Thailand.
Since its inception, Doing Business has recorded business reforms in 186 of the 190 economies it now monitors. Rwanda has implemented the highest number of business reforms over the past 15 years, with a total of 52 reforms, followed by Georgia, which advanced this year into the top 10 ranked economies (47 reforms) and Kazakhstan and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (41 reforms each).
&nbsp;
Fact Sheet: Sub-Saharan Africa
 What are the ranking trends? 
<ul>
<li>Mauritius, in 25th place in the Doing Business rankings, is the highest ranked economy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Other economies in the region that perform well on the ease of doing business rankings are Rwanda (at 41), Kenya (80), Botswana (81) and South Africa (82).</li>
<li>The region’s lowest ranked economies are Somalia (190), Eritrea (189), South Sudan (187), and the Central African Republic (184).</li>
<li>Other large economies in the region and their rankings are Democratic Republic of Congo (182), Ethiopia (161), Nigeria (145), Tanzania (137), Sudan (170), and Uganda (122).</li>
<li>Rwanda ranks among the best globally in the Doing Business areas of Registering Property (with a rank of 2) and Getting Credit (6). In registering property, Rwanda has an efficient land registry where it takes 7 days to transfer property and costs only 0.1% of the property value, the same as in New Zealand.</li>
<li>Mauritius has among the least cumbersome business regulations in two Doing Business areas: Dealing with Construction Permits (with a rank of 9) and Paying Taxes (10).</li>
<li>Four economies in Sub-Saharan Africa rank in the top 10 in Getting Credit (with an average rank of 115). Zambia ranks 2, just after New Zealand, and Rwanda, Malawi and Nigeria all rank 6.</li>
<li>The region underperforms in the areas of Getting Electricity (with an average rank of 148), Trading Across Borders (137), and Registering Property (131). It takes an average of 115 days to obtain a permanent electricity connection to the grid in Sub-Saharan Africa, compared to the global average of 92 days.</li>
</ul>
 What are the reform trends?
<ul>
<li>A record number of 83 reforms, making it easier to do business, were implemented in 36 of 48 economies in Sub-Saharan Africa in the past year. This is the largest number of reforms ever recorded by the Doing Business report in any region, and represents 31 percent of all reforms implemented globally in in the past year.</li>
<li>With Malawi, Nigeria and Zambia, Sub-Saharan Africa is the most represented region among the global top 10 improvers in the Doing Business 2018</li>
<li>Multiple economies in the region implemented three or more reforms in the past year, including Kenya (6 reforms), Mauritania, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Senegal (5 reforms each), Malawi, Mauritius and Niger (4 reforms each), and Angola, Benin, Cabo Verde and Zambia (3 reforms each).</li>
<li>Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 14 of the 22 reforms globally in Dealing with Construction Permits. Many economies, including Benin, Cabo Verde, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Niger, Nigeria and the Seychelles made dealing with construction permits easier by publishing regulations related to construction online.</li>
</ul>
What are the highlights of the past 15 years? 
<ul>
<li>Since the start of Doing Business, the region carried out a total of 798 reforms.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Rwanda has implemented the most reforms in the past 15 years, totaling 52, followed by Kenya (32) and Mauritius (31).</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Starting a Business, with 163 reforms, was the leading indicator for regional reforms, followed by Getting Credit and Trading across Borders with 112 and 108 reforms respectively.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>the average number of days to start a business in the region has dropped to 22.5 days from 61 days in 2003.</li>
</ul>
Rankings Data for Sub-Saharan Africa
<table width="620">
<thead>
<tr>
<td rowspan="2" width="235">Economy</td>
<td width="78">Rank 
(1–190)</td>
<td colspan="2" width="151">Distance to frontier score (0–100)</td>
<td colspan="2" width="156"># of Reforms </td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="78">DB2018</td>
<td width="78">DB2017</td>
<td width="73">DB2018</td>
<td width="81">DB2017</td>
<td width="75">DB2018</td>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td width="235">Angola</td>
<td width="78">175</td>
<td width="78">40.11</td>
<td width="73">41.49</td>
<td width="81">2</td>
<td width="75">3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Benin</td>
<td width="78">151</td>
<td width="78">48.62</td>
<td width="73">50.47</td>
<td width="81">2</td>
<td width="75">3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Botswana</td>
<td width="78">81</td>
<td width="78">64.87</td>
<td width="73">64.94</td>
<td width="81">1</td>
<td width="75">2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Burkina Faso</td>
<td width="78">148</td>
<td width="78">51.34</td>
<td width="73">51.54</td>
<td width="81">3</td>
<td width="75">1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Burundi</td>
<td width="78">164</td>
<td width="78">46.86</td>
<td width="73">46.92</td>
<td width="81">1</td>
<td width="75">0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Cabo Verde</td>
<td width="78">127</td>
<td width="78">55.82</td>
<td width="73">56.24</td>
<td width="81">0</td>
<td width="75">3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Cameroon</td>
<td width="78">163</td>
<td width="78">45.05</td>
<td width="73">47.23</td>
<td width="81">2</td>
<td width="75">2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Central African Republic</td>
<td width="78">184</td>
<td width="78">34.08</td>
<td width="73">34.86</td>
<td width="81">1</td>
<td width="75">0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Chad</td>
<td width="78">180</td>
<td width="78">38.58</td>
<td width="73">38.30</td>
<td width="81">2</td>
<td width="75">0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Comoros</td>
<td width="78">158</td>
<td width="78">48.05</td>
<td width="73">48.52</td>
<td width="81">2</td>
<td width="75">1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Congo, Dem. Rep.</td>
<td width="78">182</td>
<td width="78">37.43</td>
<td width="73">37.65</td>
<td width="81">2</td>
<td width="75">1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Congo, Rep.</td>
<td width="78">179</td>
<td width="78">40.09</td>
<td width="73">39.57</td>
<td width="81">1</td>
<td width="75">1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Côte d&#8217;Ivoire</td>
<td width="78">139</td>
<td width="78">51.67</td>
<td width="73">53.71</td>
<td width="81">4</td>
<td width="75">1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td width="78">173</td>
<td width="78">39.89</td>
<td width="73">41.66</td>
<td width="81">2</td>
<td width="75">1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Eritrea</td>
<td width="78">189</td>
<td width="78">22.45</td>
<td width="73">22.87</td>
<td width="81">0</td>
<td width="75">0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Ethiopia</td>
<td width="78">161</td>
<td width="78">45.69</td>
<td width="73">47.77</td>
<td width="81">0</td>
<td width="75">2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Gabon</td>
<td width="78">167</td>
<td width="78">44.86</td>
<td width="73">46.19</td>
<td width="81">1</td>
<td width="75">2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Gambia, The</td>
<td width="78">146</td>
<td width="78">51.93</td>
<td width="73">51.92</td>
<td width="81">1</td>
<td width="75">0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Ghana</td>
<td width="78">120</td>
<td width="78">56.90</td>
<td width="73">57.24</td>
<td width="81">1</td>
<td width="75">1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Guinea</td>
<td width="78">153</td>
<td width="78">49.48</td>
<td width="73">49.80</td>
<td width="81">1</td>
<td width="75">0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td width="78">176</td>
<td width="78">41.22</td>
<td width="73">41.45</td>
<td width="81">1</td>
<td width="75">1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Kenya</td>
<td width="78">80</td>
<td width="78">62.56</td>
<td width="73">65.15</td>
<td width="81">5</td>
<td width="75">6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Lesotho</td>
<td width="78">104</td>
<td width="78">59.88</td>
<td width="73">60.42</td>
<td width="81">1</td>
<td width="75">0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Liberia</td>
<td width="78">172</td>
<td width="78">40.45</td>
<td width="73">43.55</td>
<td width="81">0</td>
<td width="75">1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Madagascar</td>
<td width="78">162</td>
<td width="78">44.62</td>
<td width="73">47.67</td>
<td width="81">3</td>
<td width="75">2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Malawi</td>
<td width="78">110</td>
<td width="78">52.61</td>
<td width="73">58.94</td>
<td width="81">3</td>
<td width="75">4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Mali</td>
<td width="78">143</td>
<td width="78">52.62</td>
<td width="73">52.92</td>
<td width="81">3</td>
<td width="75">0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Mauritania</td>
<td width="78">150</td>
<td width="78">49.32</td>
<td width="73">50.88</td>
<td width="81">4</td>
<td width="75">5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Mauritius</td>
<td width="78">25</td>
<td width="78">75.45</td>
<td width="73">77.54</td>
<td width="81">1</td>
<td width="75">4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Mozambique</td>
<td width="78">138</td>
<td width="78">53.03</td>
<td width="73">54.00</td>
<td width="81">1</td>
<td width="75">2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Namibia</td>
<td width="78">106</td>
<td width="78">59.40</td>
<td width="73">59.94</td>
<td width="81">0</td>
<td width="75">1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Niger</td>
<td width="78">144</td>
<td width="78">50.08</td>
<td width="73">52.34</td>
<td width="81">6</td>
<td width="75">4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Nigeria</td>
<td width="78">145</td>
<td width="78">48.18</td>
<td width="73">52.03</td>
<td width="81">2</td>
<td width="75">5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Rwanda</td>
<td width="78">41</td>
<td width="78">70.19</td>
<td width="73">73.40</td>
<td width="81">4</td>
<td width="75">5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">São Tomé and Príncipe</td>
<td width="78">169</td>
<td width="78">44.45</td>
<td width="73">44.84</td>
<td width="81">0</td>
<td width="75">1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Senegal</td>
<td width="78">140</td>
<td width="78">49.31</td>
<td width="73">53.06</td>
<td width="81">4</td>
<td width="75">5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Seychelles</td>
<td width="78">95</td>
<td width="78">60.40</td>
<td width="73">61.41</td>
<td width="81">0</td>
<td width="75">2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Sierra Leone</td>
<td width="78">160</td>
<td width="78">48.24</td>
<td width="73">48.18</td>
<td width="81">1</td>
<td width="75">2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Somalia</td>
<td width="78">190</td>
<td width="78">20.29</td>
<td width="73">19.98</td>
<td width="81">0</td>
<td width="75">0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">South Africa</td>
<td width="78">82</td>
<td width="78">64.97</td>
<td width="73">64.89</td>
<td width="81">1</td>
<td width="75">0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">South Sudan</td>
<td width="78">187</td>
<td width="78">33.19</td>
<td width="73">32.86</td>
<td width="81">0</td>
<td width="75">0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Sudan</td>
<td width="78">170</td>
<td width="78">44.29</td>
<td width="73">44.46</td>
<td width="81">0</td>
<td width="75">0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Swaziland</td>
<td width="78">112</td>
<td width="78">58.57</td>
<td width="73">58.82</td>
<td width="81">0</td>
<td width="75">2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Tanzania</td>
<td width="78">137</td>
<td width="78">53.93</td>
<td width="73">54.04</td>
<td width="81">1</td>
<td width="75">1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Togo</td>
<td width="78">156</td>
<td width="78">48.24</td>
<td width="73">48.88</td>
<td width="81">4</td>
<td width="75">1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Uganda</td>
<td width="78">122</td>
<td width="78">56.52</td>
<td width="73">56.94</td>
<td width="81">3</td>
<td width="75">1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Zambia</td>
<td width="78">82</td>
<td width="78">60.58</td>
<td width="73">64.50</td>
<td width="81">1</td>
<td width="75">3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="235">Zimbabwe</td>
<td width="78">159</td>
<td width="78">47.67</td>
<td width="73">48.47</td>
<td width="81">3</td>
<td width="75">1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Source: Doing Business database.
Note: The rankings are based on the average of each economy’s distance to frontier scores for the 10 topics included in this year’s aggregate ranking. This measure shows how close each economy is to global best practices in business regulation. A higher score indicates a more efficient business environment and stronger legal institutions.
http://cnbc.africa/news/western-africa/2016/04/25/nigeria-improvement-of-ease-of-doing-business/
http://cnbc.africa/news/2016/10/28/africa-doing-business/

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In his post &#8211; speech interview with CNBC Africa’s Christycole Popoola, Emir Sanusi, said that Sudan&#8217;s break-up did not guarantee its peace and that Nigeria must look beyond breaking up but rather, focus on intellectual conversations.

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